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Abstract 
This thesis proceeds from the premise that the demise of the Communist 
systems of rule in Eastern Europe is not fully explicable using ''traditional" theories of 
transition or democratisation. This thests Is, therefore, concerned irutially with the 
limitations of existing theoretical frameworks. It proposes a line of enquiry that 
accounts for the breakdown of Communism through an analysis of a domestic 
variable: second society. In particular, it addresses the question of why the former 
European Communist regimes expenenced differing modes of breakdown in 1989. 
The thesis adopts a comparative approach and focuses on the three different cases of 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. By comparing them, 1t analyses the extent to 
which variations in the modes of breakdown can be explained by the second society 
variable. The case studies are divided into three sections. The first considers the 
historical issues and factors that conditioned the nature of the Communist regime and 
of emerging opposition. The second analyses the development of second society 
within each country and the third sectiOn considers the impact of second society on 
the mode of regime breakdown in 1989. The thesis concludes that the case studies , 
demonstrate a causal relationship between the second society variable and the mode 
of breakdown experienced by the Commurust regtmes. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
THE REGIME BREAKDOWN AND TRANSITIONS LITERATURE 
The years 1989-1991 witnessed one of the momentous events of the twentieth 
century and probably the greatest turning point in post-World War II history: the 
dissolution of Communism in Eastern Europe and the subsequent disintegration of the 
USSR itself. Variously described as "the end ofhistory,"1 and the "anus mirabilis of 
the post-war era in Europe,"2 The electrifYing collapse of Eastern Europe's 
Communist regimes heralded the end of the post-1945 ideological division of the 
European continent between East and West, and signalled an end to the forty-five-
year-old Cold War confrontation. Furthermore, 1989 symbolised the triumph of 
democracy over Communist ideology, as the former Communist safe houses began to 
adopt democratic principles in their political, social and economic hves. Neither the 
East European leaders nor Mtkhail Gorbachev- nor, mdeed, many Western observers 
- foresaw that the June 1989 elections in Poland would be followed by the rapid 
unravelling of the Hungarian Communists' attempts at controlled reform or the 
revolutions spreading at a giddy speed to East Germany, Czechoslovakia and, finally, 
to Romania. Only one month prior to Czechoslovakia's "velvet revolution," the 
Communist Parly leader, Milos Jakes, for example, was telling foreign visitors that 
there was no prospect of imminent trouble in his country.3 
In 1989, then, academics were caught unprepared for the striking changes that 
took place. Certainly, the global wave of transitions away from authoritarian rule that 
began with Portugal's "Revolution of the Carnations" in 1974 and which crested with 
the collapse of the Communist regimes across Eastern Europe in 1989,4 has spawned 
many, and often conflicting, theories of regime transformation and democratisation. 
The fact that the rich diversity of countries and their respective, and very much 
individual, modes of transition has, to an extent, precluded the development of broad 
models. Indeed, the search for a standard set of preconditions or facilitating events 
and factors is being increasmgly recognised as futile. 5 Although representing the 
1 F Fukuyama, 'The End ofH1story,' The National Interes!, Summer 1989, pp.3-18. 
2 G Schopfhn, 'The End ofCommumsm m Eastern Europe,' Internal!onal Affairs. Vol66 No I, 
January 1990, p 3 
3 The Observer, Tearmg Down the Iron Curtam, 1990 London, Hodder and Stoughton, pp 8-10 
4 S P.Huntlngton, The Third Wave· Democratisal!on m the Late Twenl!eth Century, 1991 Oklahoma, 
Umverstty Press, Introduction. 
5 B Zhang, 'Corporatism, Totahtananism and TransitiOns to Democracy,' Comparative Pohncal 
Studtes, Vo127(1), Apn11994, p llO 
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viewpoint of a minority of scholars, Russell Bova claims that recent Communist 
transitions should not be regarded as special phenomena but, rather, as a sub-category 
of the wider global process of democratisation and that, therefore, a great deal can be 
learnt from earlier transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe. 6 Contrary to his 
opinion, Nancy Bermeo has stressed the uruqueness of the events of 1989. No 
Communist system of rule had ever previously collapsed, and many of the actions 
undertaken by a wide array of actors in both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
were largely unprecedented and therefore unpredictable.7 Consequently, she contends 
we should avoid too heavy a reliance on the literature on earlier transitions from 
authoritarian rule. Similarly, Gerardo Munck explains the difficulties encountered by 
those such as Samuel Huntington and Adam Przeworski in accounting for theory 
deviant cases - Poland and Hungary, for example - in their apparent willingness to 
explain Communist transitions via traditional and well-tested, yet ill-suited, theories. 8 
In light of these problems, this chapter is, therefore, concerned firstly with 
examining the limitations of existing theoretical frameworks with regard to the former 
Communist states of Eastern Europe. Secondly, whilst acknowledging that to search 
for the single cause of a regime transition is futile, it will propose a line of enqniry 
that accounts for the breakdown of Communist authoritarianism, via an analysis of a 
neglected domestic variable: civil society. 
(1.1) Existing Theories of Democratisation/Regime Transition and their Predictive 
Limitations 
Despite the recent growth of political and academic interest in democracy and 
the process of democratisation, there remain gaps in our understanding of the factors 
that facilitate or obstruct the emergence, establishment and subsequent consolidation 
of democratic goverun~ent. In the existing literature on regime breakdown and 
democratisation, studies of regune transition tend to fall into two categories. The first 
emphasises variables of context,9 whilst the second focuses on the actual process 
6 R Bova, 'Pohllcal Dynanucs of the Post-Commumst Trans111on,' World Pohllcs, Vol44 No 1, 
October 1991, pp.113-115. 
7 N.Bermeo, L1berahsanon and Democrallsallon, 1992 London, John Hopkins Press Ltd, pp.179-180. 
8 G L.Munck, 'Democrallc Trans111ons m Comparallve Perspecl!ve,' Comparal!ve Pohllcs. Apnl1994, 
p 361 See also· G Sarton, 'Concept M1smformation m Comparallve Pohllcs,' Amencan Pohllcal 
Sc1ence ReVIew, No 4, 1970, p 1034. 
9 Larry D1amond, Juan Lmz and Seymour M.L1pset, for example, See therr arl!cle, 'Comparmg 
Expenences w1th Democracy,' m L D1amond, J Lmz and S M L1pset (eds ), Pohllcs m Develonmg 
Countnes, 1990 Colorado, Lyune Rlenner Publishers Ltd, pp 1-37. 
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under examination.Io The former prerequisites approach explains transition via certain 
objective conditions, such as the level of economic development, and of literacy 
amongst the population, transformations of the class structure - in particular, the 
growth of a politically-active middle class - and other environmental factors, which 
trigger a process of democratisation as a more or less predetermined and unintended 
consequence of wider structural change. 11 Conversely, the latter - the generic or 
process approach - focuses on the scope and significance of human choices and 
preferences and, thus, emphasises the role of specific political actors and their 
conscious decisions to change a country's political system.I2 
(1.2) Prerequisites Approach 
The central argument of the prerequiSites approach to the transition process is 
that democratisation is likely to occur in a society 1f certain preconditions or 
prerequisites are present or emergent. The approach represents the quest for a set of 
universal conditions that can explain the presence or absence of a democratic political 
system. Factors generally taken to be central to a process of change are summarised 
below. 
(1.2.1) Economic Wealth and Development 
Economic development and a rising income per capita, it is argued, will be 
accompanied by a number of factors - particularly social - which are conducive to, 
and supportive of democracy: higher rates of literacy, for example, widespread higher 
educational opportunities, and an urbanisation of the workforce. Such socio-economic 
development extends individual and group political consciousness, multiplying 
political demands and broadening participation. As countries develop economically, 
they move into a "zone oftransition,"13 of which democracy is the probable outcome. 
Thus, a process of democratisation is conceived as the natural concomitant of a 
complex amalgam of social and economic prerequisites, the transition of a regime 
being largely determined by certain specific socio-economic levels or indicators.I4 
Expressed succinctly, for example: 
10 G O'Donnell and P.Schnutter, Transttions From Authontanan Rule- Tentative Conclustons About 
Uncertam Democractes, 1986 Baltimore, John Hopkms Uruversity Press. 
11 A Przeworskt, 'Some Problems m the Study ofTransition to Democracy,' m !llli!, p 47. 
12 T.Vanhanen, Strategtes of Democratisation, 1992 London, Taylor and Francts Ltd. The distinction 
between prereqmsttes and process ts developed m. S.Hun!Ington, 'Wtll More Countnes Become 
Democratic?' Pohtical Spence Ouarterlv. 99 (1984), pp.193-218. 
13 L Dtamond et a!, op ctt p 19 
14 D E.Neubauer, 'Some Conditions of Democracy,' American Pohtical Sctence Review, Vol61 No 4, 
December 1967, pp 1002-1006. 
-4-
"The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 
democracy."15 
In support of this statement, Lipset concluded that a society characterised by 
economic poverty would support either an oligarchy or a tyrannical form of rule. 
Employing indices of wealth, education, industrialisation and urbanisation, his study 
demonstrated that their respective levels were much higher in democratic countries 
than non-democratic ones. In recognition of the fact that transitions theory has 
evolved in new directions since the late 1950s, Lipset's later 1993 study did conclude 
that the relationship between wealth and democracy was not as deterministic as 
previously thought.16 However, the study represented an amendment of his initial 
approach rather than its abandonment. In a similar study, Cutright posited a linear 
relationship between socio-economic and political or democratic development; 17 
whilst Abbas Pourgerami formulated a wealth theory of democracy, emphasising the 
mutually reinforcing process of economic, political and cultural development.18 
(1.2.2) Social Structure and Cultural Context 
The existence of certain associational groups and social classes within a 
widely differentiated social structure consistently favours democracy, whilst a highly 
centralised or state-dominated society is likely to produce a system based on absolute 
monarchy or authoritarian dictatorship. Barrington Moore, for example, has stated 
that the foundations of democracy generally rested on a politically active middle class 
bourgeoisie.19 In addition, the existence of a supportive political culture - for 
example, one that fosters a natural and accepted willingness to tolerate diversity and 
conflict, or that recognises the legitimacy and benefits of negotiation and compromise 
- will provide fertile ground for the germination and subsequent growth of 
" S M Lipset, 'Some Soctal Requtsttes of Democracy,' Amencan Pohtlcal Science Revtew, Vol53 
No I, March 1959, p.71. 
16 S M Ltpset, K R Seong and J C.Torres, 'A Comparative Analysts of the Soctal RequlSltes of 
Democracy,' International Soc10l Sctence Journal, No.136, 1993, p.l70. 
17 Plnhps Cutnght, 'National Pohtlcal Development Its Measurement and Soctal Correlates,' in: 
N.Snuth ( ed ), Pohtlcs and Soctal Ltfe, 1963 Boston, Houghton Mtffim Co , pp.569-582. 
18 A Pourgerarrn, 'The Pohtlcal Economy of Development· An Ernpmcal Exammatlon of the Wealth of 
Democracy,' Journal ofTheoretlcal Pohttcs, 3(2), 1991 
19 B Moore, Soctal Ongms ofDtctatorshm and Democracy, 1967 London, Alien Lane. See also· 
J Ferrma, 'Barrmgton Moore and the Precondt!tons for Democracy,' Bnttsh Journal ofPoh!tcal 
Sctence, 2, 1972, pp 21-46 
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democracy.2° Conversely, traditionally hierarchical or highly centralised and state-
controlled societies will generate accepted values and norms inimical to democracy.21 
(1.2.3) The External Environment 
In large measure, it is argued, the international context - that is, the standing 
or credibility of democracy on a global scale - is reflected in either the rise or decline 
of democratic political systems.22 The global spread of democracy post-1945, for 
example, mirrored the relative rise and pre-eminence of the United States; whilst the 
waning of democracy in Latin America in the 1970s was in part a reflection of the 
decline of American influence. 23 Simultaneously, the popularity and legitimacy of 
authoritarian ideologies and political systems, such as Communism, appeared to 
declme parallel to the evident deterioration of the economic, social and political 
systems of the Soviet Union. In addition, regional influences can have a significant 
effect on political development. The encouragement by West European states of the 
process of democratisation in both Spain and Greece is evident, as were the economic 
attractions of European Community membership. Finally, the impact of regional 
trends should not be overlooked. Huntington refers to the influence of factors such as 
simultaneous regional socio-economic growth and development, as occurred in Latin 
America; the impact of a common external factor, such as the influence of the United 
States in the case of Latin America; and the triggering of a trend of democratisation, 
or a demonstration effect of one society on another. 24 
To sununarise, structural prerequisites favourable to a process of 
democratisation have long been the object of considerable scholarly attention. In 
theory, if certain preconditions are present, a process of transition to democracy is 
likely to occur. No smgle factor, in particular, is sufficient to lead to democratic 
development however, some combination - which will vary from one country to 
another - may facilitate the onset of a process of democratisation. We should be , 
aware, however, that democracy has not always corresponded to our understanding of 
its supposed prerequisites. 25 Taking economic development as an example, it is 
20 G Almond and S Verba, The Ctvtc Culture, 1963 Pnnceton, Uruverstty Press 
21 S.Verba, 'Comparative Pohttcal Culture,' m· L Pye and S.Verba (eds ), Pohttcal Culture and Pohtical 
Development 1965 Pnnceton, Umverstty Press. 
22 L.Whttehead, 'lntemattonal Aspects ofDemocrattsatton,' m G O'Donnell and P Schnntter, op ctt, 
pp.3-46. 
23 S P Hunttngton, 'Wtll More Countries Become Democratic?' Pohttcal Sctence Quarterly, Vol99 
No.2, 1984, pp 206-7. 
24 Ibtd, p.207 0 
"R.Bova, op ctt, p.132. 
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important to recognise that a strong correlation does exist between such factors as a 
nation's wealth and political democracy.26 Neubauer, to an extent, confirms the 
conclusions ofLipset and Cutright agreeing that, as countries become more advanced 
economically and socially, they also tend to become more advanced politically. 
However, he proceeds to quality this by contending that, as countries experience 
socio-economic development, they merely move into a "developmental mode" or 
"threshold" from which democratic political development is only one of a number of 
possible outcomes, and not necessarily the automatic one. 27 Moreover, whilst it is 
undeniable that most democratic countries are also relatively wealthy, it cannot be 
said that all wealthy nations are democracies. This is important when analysing 
political transition in Eastern Europe. The Communist countries were united by 
economic cnsis and stagnation, foreign debt and rapidly rising inflation. Although 
certain individual countries were identified as occupying a position in the ''upper 
middle income" bracket supposedly supportive of democratisation - notably, 
Yugoslavia and Poland - regime transition occurred despite the existence of 
differentiated levels of socio-economic development. Why, then, did an econorrucally 
and technologically backward Eastern Europe undergo a blanket transformation of 
existing regimes? 
~ Similarly, it remains unclear whether a supportive political culture is a cause 
or, rather, an effect of democratic practice. 28 Relatively poor traditional societies, 
characterised by the existence of illiterate rural populations and parochial political 
cultures, do experience considerable difficulty in establishing and maintaining 
democratic political systems; and Eastern Europe did represent a relative vacuum of 
relevant experience m competitive pluralistic politics. However, the absence or 
presence of specific cultural or economic factors - at least based on the evidence 
presented by the East European examples - cannot be taken as the sole or main 
determinants of the onset or existence of democracy. In support of this, O'Donnell 
and Schmitter state that "it is fruitless to search for some international factor or 
context which can reliably compel authoritarian rulers to experiment with 
liberalisation much less which can predictably cause their regimes to collapse."29 In 
26 J B Londregan and K.T.Poole, 'Does High Income Promote Democracy?' World Pohttcs, Vol.49 
No I, pp 1-30, 1997; and B Kieman, The End of Soviet Poh!ics. 1993 Oxford, Westvlew Press Inc., 
p6 
27 DE Neubauer, Q1!..9!, pp 1002-3 
28 T.Lynn Karl and P.Schnutter, 'Modes ofTransi!ion m Lattn Amenca and Southern Europe,' 
International Social Science Journal, No,l28, 1991, p 270. 
29 G O'Donnell and P Schnutter, QlW.!, pp 18-19. 
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effect, the catalyst for a process of transition could not have come from a positive 
economic indicator of a certain level of development. 
To summarise, a prerequisite approach assumes democratisation to be a likely 
outcome of economic development and specific cultural patterns. Undeniably, such 
factors do play a contributory role in delineating the general boundaries for regime 
change and, therefore, should be considered in transition studies. They do not, 
however, determine the direction or outcome of regime change. 30 Prerequisite factors 
can be decisive in restricting or increasing the options available; however, a research 
strategy founded entirely on an attempt to identifY a set of standard determinants 
would be incomplete and questionable. 
(1 3) Processes 
The alternative process approach focuses on more subjective phenomena than 
levels ofliteracy or economic development. Underlying the analysis is the knowledge 
that "democracy does not fall from heaven," rather, its initiation and consolidation 
depends on a vast range of less tangible factors including individuals, groups and 
organisations, and their respective decisions, alliances and opinions.31 Studies do tend 
to vary in their emphases however. Przeworski, for example, advocates a theory 
founded on the interests and perceptions of key polttical actors;32 whilst Linz writes of 
the significance of ''political crafting" and the crucial role that political leadership 
plays in the crafting of democratic strategies. 33 Dror agrees that political leaders and 
their visions of society are central m the transition stage of democratisation, when a 
considered and viable selection between possible alternatives may have to be made. 34 
O'Donnell and Schmitter, also, analyse the ''making" of political democracy, focusing 
on relatively short-term developments and the reactions of key actors to them.35 
Rustow suggests that, from the single precondition of national unity, a viable 
democracy could be established through a process of polarisation, crisis and 
compromise;36 whilst Levine claims that analyses should examine the independent 
30 A Przeworskt, !ll1.£!l, p 47. 
31 G Sorenson, Democracy and Democratisation, 1993 Oxford, Colorado Press Inc., p.29. 
32 A Przeworski, !ll1.£!l, pp.33-4. 
33 J Lmz, 'Transitions to Democracy,' Washmgton Quarterly, Summer 1990, pp 143-164. Also, 
B Zhang, !ll1.£!l, pp 108-136. 
34 Y Dror, 1988. 
35 G.O'Donnell and P Schnntter, op ctt. pp 17-19. 
36 D A Rustow, 'Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,' Comparative Politics, Apnl 
1970, pp 350-361. 
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role played by political variables - leadership, organisational strengths and 
weaknesses, and institutions, for example - in determining political outcomes, and 
emphasises the role played by a re-emerging civil society and that of popular 
groups.37 Di Palma explains Communist breakdown from the different angle of a 
process of delegitimation of the entire system paralleled by the strengthening of a 
civil society;38 which supports Sorenson's analysis founded on the ruling ehtes' crisis 
of faith in its own legitimacy. 39 
With specific regard to the application of a process approach to Eastern 
Europe, however, particular emphasis has been placed on three, to an extent, 
interdependent factors, Firstly, the role of the existing ruling elite in the process of 
transition; the shifting alliances therein; and their attitude toward democracy, with 
particular relevance to the levels of legitimacy of the Communist regimes. Secondly, 
the role of external influences, especially the decisions made by the Soviet political 
elites, which had a direct impact on the East European Communist systems; and such 
as the "Gorbachev factor." Lastly, emphasis has been placed on the role of civil 
society. 
(1.3.1) The Elzte Factor and Delegltimatzon 
There has been a long-standing tendency m the scholarly literature on 
democratisation to emphasise the primary role of elites in leading, crafting, 
negotiating (or imposing) democratic transitions, and to emphasise the divisions, 
choices, calculations and strategic alliances among elites in both the authoritarian 
regime and its democratic opposition.40 With specific regard to the Southern European 
and Latin American transitions in the 1970s-80s, O'Donnell and Schmitter have 
advanced a model based on the assertion that ''there is no transition whose beginning 
is not the consequence - direct or indirect - of important divisions within the 
authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between the 
37 D Levme, 'Paradtgm Lost Dependence to Democracy,' World Pohttcs. Vol40 No.3, Apnl1988, 
pp380-385. 
38 G.Dt Palma, 'LegttJ.matJ.on from the Top to CIVll Society. Pohttco-Cultura1 Chaoge m Eastern 
Europe,' m: N Berm eo ( ed. ), l!ll£!!, pp 49-80. 
39 G Sorenson, op ctt, pp 29-30. 
40 See: G O'Donnell and P.Schnutter, op ctt Treattnents of the role of ehte pacts in transitton are also 
found m D Share, 'TransttJ.ons to Democracy and TransttJ.ons Through Transaction,' Comparattve 
Pohttcs, Vol19, 1987, pp 525-548; M G Burton, 'Ehte Settlements,' Amencan Socto1o!!!ca1 ReVIew. 
Vo152, 1987, pp 295-307, and J Htgley and M G Burton, 'The Ehte Vanable m Democrattc 
TransttJ.ons and Breakdowns,' Amencan Socio1ogtca1 ReVIew, Vo154, 1989, pp 17-32. 
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hard-liners and soft-liners.'"'1 Once the soft-lmers (reformers) have sufficiently 
prevailed to widen the space for independent po!ttical expression and activity, then 
civil society is ''resurrected" and a "general mobilisation likely to occur [that pushes] 
transition further than tt otherwise would have gone.''42 This view is also supported by 
Huntington: 
"Almost always democracy has come as much from the top down as from the 
bottom up; tt is as likely to be a product of oligarchy as of protest against 
oligarchy.'"'3 
Similarly, in Rustow's thesis it is e!ttes who opt for democracy and end the previous 
era of struggle, and it is the elites who decide the terms on which conflicts are 
resolved. 44 Bova, also, focuses on those transitions from authontarian rule in winch 
elements of the old regimes have played an important role in the initiation and/or 
direction of systemic change.45 With a focus on change within the Soviet Union, he 
seeks to illustrate issues of regime transition in the Communist world from a 
comparative perspective, usmg earlier transitions in Latin America and Southern 
Europe as a benclnnark. In that respect, independent movements such as Solidarity in 
Poland are identified as potential partners in pact-making negotiations. However, 
Bova's principal concern is with the centraltty of regime elites to the process of 
transition. With specific regard to Eastern Europe, transition analyses have 
overwhelmingly focused on the actions of the leadership and key elites, and their 
response to an increasingly evident Jack of popular legthmacy in the late 1980s. 46 
From the outset, Communist regimes had demonstrated minimal success in 
acquiring genuine political legitimacy. Only in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were 
the regimes established on the basis of a national acceptance of socialism. Elsewhere 
in Eastern Europe, Communism developed ltttle normative power over populat10ns 
and encountered recurrent problems in surviving systemic tests. 47 A secondary or 
quast-legitimacy, underpinned by the Soviet military presence and an ideological 
41 G O'Donnell andP.Schnntter, QR£!!, p.19. 
42 lb1<i pp.48, 54 and 56. 
43 S P.Huntmgton, 'Will More Countnes Become Democrattc?' op Cit, pp.193-218. 
44 D.A.Rustow, op c1t. pp 355-7. 
45 R.Bova, op c1t, pp.! 16-117. 
46 For example, see HA. Welsh, 'Pohttcal Trans1tton m Central and Eastern Europe,' Comparattve 
Pohttcs, Vol26 No 4, 1994, pp.379-394. 
47 P.G Lew!S (ed.), Eastern Europe· Pohttcal Crisis and Legittmatton. 1984 Beckenham, Croom Helm 
Ltd., p.71. See, also, J Lmz, op Cit, pp.146-8. 
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belief m their right to rule, increasingly depended, not only on the continued success 
of regime economic performance, but also on, as Przeworski has illustrated, the 
absence of preferable alternatives.48 With no apparent or viable alternative to 
Communist rule, even an electorally illegitimate regime could survive amid apparent 
popular rejection. 
By the late 1980s, however, Communist reserves - economic, political and 
material - had been exhausted. In the late 1970s, looming economic crisis, in 
particular, meant that East European populations began to withdraw their tacit 
acceptance of the parties' justifications for society's regulations, so much so that 
leadership calls for economic self-sacnfice, and for the attainment of Communist 
internationalist goals in the early 1980s, fell on deaf ears. 49 It is also significant that, 
during the same period, Communist regimes faced increasing independence in 
society, and the example of Poland, in particular, illustrates the depth of the problems 
faced by the Commurust elites in sustaining belief in the validity of their authority. 
Consequently, the 1980s witnessed a period when Communist authorities across 
Eastern Europe - with the exception of Romania and Bulgaria - began to 
acknowledge public demands and preferences, and to recognise the necessity of an 
earned instead of assumed public trust. As elites were necessarily forced to implement 
measures aimed at a degree of regime liberalisation in order to bolster systemic 
legitimacy, a loss of self-belief or legitimacy within the leaderships themselves began 
to affect the stability of the entire system of rule. 
Two observations, however, need to be made here. Firstly, the legitimacy 
argument is limited by one crucial factor, namely the fact that East European regimes 
had lacked effective political legitimacy since 1945 and, therefore, its loss could not 
have been sufficient cause, in itself, for the regimes to break down at the end of the 
1980s. Certainly, a quasi-legitimacy, ~mderpinned by continued economic success, 
was by then faltering and, in that respect, the legitimacy argument undoubtedly 
contnbutes to a fuller understanding of the processes at play in 1989. However, it 
caunot fully explain the timing of the revolutions. Secondly, some of the elite-oriented 
transitions literatlire is applicable to Eastern Europe in identifying disunity within 
ruling groups as a decisive stage in the opening of Communist regimes toward 
democracy, and without doubt, political elites are indispensable to bringing about 
democracy and its subsequent consolidation. However, although ehtes may be pre-
48 A Przeworsla, Q1!.£!!, p.53. 
49 D.N Nelson, 'The Rise ofPubhc Legttunation m the Sovtet Umon and Eastern Europe,' m: S.Petra 
Ramet (ed.), Adaptatton and Transformatton m Comrnumst and Post-Comrnumst Systems, 1992 
Oxford, Westvtew Press, p 31 
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eminent at certain stages of the democratisation process, they are not the whole story. 
That said, much of the literature still sees mass protest as a consequence of elite 
disunity rather than its source, as it was throughout much of Eastern Europe. 50 Yet, 
the question does have to be posed: why did Communist elites feel pressed to consider 
liberalisation; what was the root cause of their apparent loss of faith in their ability to 
rule? In this respect, the role of independent organisation in society, and evidence of 
the re-emergence of civil society, and their effect on the Communist regimes in 
presaging the introduction of reform measures should not be overlooked, as the 
upsurge of civil society appeared to generate divisions within the ruling elites. 
(1.3.2) External Influences and the Gorbachev Factor 
Literature analysing the democratisation process in Latin America and 
Southern Europe during the 1970s-1980s, with the particular exception of the Spanish 
transition, attributed a peripheral role to external factors or influences in the course of 
regime transition.51 In contrast, the international dimension was central to 
democratisation in Eastern Europe. 52 The respective roles of the European Union, the 
Council of Europe and the CSCE process cannot be discounted in any assessment of 
the factors contributing to 1989.53 Moreover, the position of the Soviet Union was 
essential to the success or otherwise of the transition processes. For many, the process 
of reform within the Soviet Union and its subsequent transition towards a form of 
pluralistic politics and, in particular, Mikhail Gorbachev's renunciation of the long-
standing Brezhnev Doctrine54 in favour of allowing East European countries to pursue 
their own paths of development in 1988-9 and beyond, 55 is the principal factor 
soD McSweeney and C. Tempest, 'The Pohtical Science of Democratic Transition m Eastern Europe,' 
Pohtical Studies, Vol.l6, 1993, pp.408-419. 
SI Here, as distinct from pp 4-5 above, external mfluences are understood to be the policy deciSions and 
actions of pohtical ehtes, particularly m Moscow, which were external to the mdiVIdual Conunumst 
countries concerned, but which had a specific impact on the mternal affarrs of the East European 
regrrnes. 
52 G Pndham et a! (eds ), Bmldmg Democracy? The Intemational Dimension of Democratisation m 
Eastern Europe, 1994 London, Leicester Umversity Press, p I. Also, P Brogan Eastern Europe 1939-
1989· The Fdlv Years War, 1990 London, Bloomsbury Pubhshmg, Ch. 7 '1989. The Gorbachev 
Factor' 
53 A.G.V.Hyde-Pnce, 'Democratisation m Eastern Europe the External Drrnenswn,' m G Pndham and 
T.Vanhanen (eds ), Democratisation m Eastern Europe, 1994 London, Routledge, pp.220-221. 
s• The Brezhnev Doctrine was formulated by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev m the aftemiath of the 
1968 Warsaw Pact mvasion of Czechoslovalaa. Supporting the theory that sociahst states had lmtited 
sovereignty and that all had an "mtemationahst obhgation" to mtervene m the defence of soc~ahsm, his 
pnnc1pal purpose was to Ideologically JUStify the mvaswn and to pubhcly delmeate the extent of the 
Soviet Umon's tolerance of reform amongst the satelhte states In effect, It amounted to a pubhc 
declaration of the USSR's mtention to defend soc1ahsm If threatened by internal or external forces 
ss Durmg his March 1988 VISit to Yugoslavia, Gorbachev forswore any "mterference m the mternal 
affarrs of other states under any pretext whatsoever," and further stated that all nations had the nght to 
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differentiating the year 1989 from, say, 1968 in Czechoslovakia or 1980-81 in 
Poland. 56 Certainly, reform in the East does owe a debt of gratitude to the process of 
perestroika initiated in the Soviet Union post-1985. Poland and Hungary, for example, 
appeared to have reached the limits of permissible reform within the prevailing 
systems, and needed an alternative to maintain systemic stability. And without a 
doubt, Gorbachev's successive pronunciations throughout 1987-8, stressing the 
independence of all Communist parties and the need for reform throughout Eastern 
Europe were significant - sometimes decisive - factors in hastening the transition of 
Communist regimes, particularly in the case of the former GDR. Overall, the degree 
of external influence does distinguish East European transitions from earlier examples 
of authoritarian breakdown and transition to democracy. 
Consequently, reliance on the external dimension as the principal explanatory 
factor is, to an extent, understandable. However, it would be a mistake to conclude 
that the revolutions of 1989 were the consequence only of external causes. The 
Gorbachev factor is an essential ingredient of a full understanding of the transition 
process - especially with regard to the withdrawal of unconditional support for 
established Communist leaders - and is important in delineating the wider 
environment of change. Furthermore, in the East European cases, the timing of the 
transitions would have to be partly explained by external factors. The fact that Eastern 
Europe both originated and disintegrated as a bloc means that the changing Soviet 
role in its sphere of influence cannot be avoided as an explanatory factor. Equally, 
however, the significance of such factors should not be over-estimated. International 
factors should not be regarded as the cause of revolution in 1989 but, rather, 
interpreted as complementing the processes of change already occurring within the 
individual East European systems themselves. In that sense, such factors as the 
fundamental reform of the Soviet-East European relationship or the political and 
economic pull of the West, encouraged and permitted a process of democratic reform 
already being propounded by opponents of the regimes throughout the Communist 
bloc. 
"therr own roads of socml development." Later m 1988, he told the UN General Assembly that 
"freedom of chotce" for all nations to dectde therr own path "ts a umversal prmctple that allows no 
exceptions." And m 1989, the fmal commumque of the Warsaw Pact annual meeting confrrmed "there 
are no umversal models of soctaltsm " See: G Roskm, The Rebirth of Eastern Europe, 2"' Edition, 1994 
New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, pp 132-3. Also, R F.Starr ( ed) 1988 Yearbook on International Commumst 
Affarrs, 1988 New Jersey, Hoover Institution Press, p 343 
56 P Schnntter, 'The International Context of Contemporary Democratisation,' Stanford Journal of 
International Affatrs, Vol.2, 1993, pp.1-34. Also, L.Wiutehead, 'International Aspects of 
Democratisation,' m G O'Donnell and P.Schnntter, QP..£!!, pp 3-46 
- 13-
(1.3.3) CIVIl Society 
Within the existing transitions literature, research focused on civil society and 
Eastern Europe has addressed the hypothesis that an active and institutionalised civil 
society is a necessary requirement for democratic consolidation.57 Consequently, a 
number of studies employing the civil society concept as explanatory tools have 
tended to focus on the development of political parties and parliaments. 58 Although 
these acknowledge the Importance of clVll society, such studies operate within a 
narrow conceptual framework. 59 For example, concentrating only on the development 
of institutionalised indicators of the onset of a process of democratisation, such as the 
emergence of coherent political parties or the establishment of recognised parliaments 
and accompanying political processes, neglects important contributory factors 
inherent within civil society. Although these processes are essential foundations of 
any democratic system, rather than being interpreted as a feature of regime 
breakdown they should, instead, be viewed as an indication of the completeness - or 
incompleteness - of democratic consolidation. Consequently, in order to fully 
understand the course of regime collapse and transition in Eastern Europe, such 
studies must be supplemented with a discussion of the civil society concept as an 
explanatory factor for the entire process of breakdown and trarisition, rather than the 
"end-game" only. 
The unexpectedly swift collapse of the Communist regimes throughout 
Eastern Europe has given a new relevance to the concept of civil society. Its 
reappearance on the intellectual scene, though, was not due solely to the increasingly 
overt methods of opposition employed by East European dissidents during the 1970s 
and 1980s. Autonomous organisations and movements have contributed to democratic 
transitions since the beginmng of the third wave of democratisation in the rnid-1970s. 
In Latin America, Southern Europe, Asia and Africa, the role of civil society 
organisations in fostering democratic transitions is a palpable fact. With specific 
regard to Eastern Europe, throughout the last two decades of Communist rule, and 
into the 1990s, references to contemporary civil society had figured in discussions, 
first of Solidarity in Poland, and the of all the European Communist countries. 60 
51 See, for example, articles on Poland, Hungary, the former GDR and YugoslaVIa m· R F Miller (ed ), 
The Developments of CIVIl Societies m Commumst Systems, 1992 Sydney, Alien and Unwm. 
58 P.Lewis, 'Civil Society and the Development ofPohtlcal Parties in East-Central Europe,' The 
Journal of Communist Studies, Vol9 No 4, 1993, pp 5-20 
59 A Fagm, 'Incorporatmg Commumty· Comphcat10ns to Theones of Democratic Transition m East 
and Central Europe,' Q1!£!!, p 146. 
60 M.We1gle and J Butterfield, 'CIVIl Society m Reformmg Commumst Reg~mes: the LogiC of 
Emergence,' Comparative Pohtlcs, Vol25 No.!, 1992, p.3; and C.Bryant, 'Social Self-Orgamsatlon, 
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There are, inevitably, many who hold doubts as to the applicability of the civil 
society concept to the Communist systems. Prominent here is Staniszkis who argues 
that the existence of a civil society in a Communist system was impossible due, 
essentially, to the collective forms of ownership and near total lack of possibilities for 
free association.61 O'Donnell and Schmitter stress that the beginning of authoritarian 
breakdown is essentially a function of internal splits withm the authoritarian regime. 62 
Berm eo addresses the concept of the survival of a civil society within a Communist 
"dictatorship," and poses the question: if the people are silenced by dictatorship, how 
can we possibly assess the popular will? What becomes of civil society?63 Certainly, 
If individuals and groups lack the right to seek alternative political representation or 
even to express their ideas, it is uncertain how institutionalised their powers can be, or 
will remain even if established. It is not clear that civil society can operate effectively 
on the organs of the state when the Communist system denies the existence of 
autonomous interests in society. This begs the question: can civil society develop in a 
one-party system, where its very existence is contradictory to that system's 
overarching-organisational principles? In response, however, one only has to look 
briefly at the vast literature on dissent in Eastern Europe to conclude that, inspite of 
Communist claims to the complete monopolisation of society, civil society can 
survive, even in highly coercive settings. 
As early as 1979, Vaclav Have! recognised that the invincibility of Communist 
regimes had been undermined by independence in society and foresaw that these 
could be toppled by a "social movement," an "explosion of civil unrest,'' or a "sharp 
conflict inside an apparently monolithic power structure." In other words, by the force 
of the individual and people power.64 Anticipating Bermeo's statement that early 
signs of the survival of civil society can be seen not on the "public political stage" 
but, rather, in "off-stage" forms of struggle and everyday forms ofresistance,65 Have! 
Ctvtlity and Sociology: A Comment on Kumar's Civd Society,' British Journal ofSoc10logy. Vol44, 
1993, p.397. 
61 J Frentzel-Zagorska, 'Patterns ofTrans1t1on from a One-Party State to Democracy m Poland and 
Hungary,' m: R.F Miller, QI1£!!, p 41. 
62 G O'Donnell and P.Schnntter, QI1£!!, p 48 
63 N Bermeo, 'Surpnse, Surpnse: Lessons From 1989 and 1991,' m: N Bermeo (ed ), Democratisation, 
1992 London, John Hopkins Press, pp 184-6. 
64 V Have!, The Power of the Powerless Cttlzens Against the State m Central-Eastern Europe. 1985 
London, Palach Press, pp 23-96. 
65 N Bermeo, op ctt, p 185. 
---------------------------------------------------------------
• 15. 
described how opposition, in general, and civil society, in particular, were manifested 
in the "private lives of individuals" long before they emerged on the visible surface of 
society. 66 The decade of the 1980s proved that autonomous action - both individual 
and group - an essential ingredient of a surviving and active civil society independent 
of state sponsorship, could and did emerge. Throughout Eastern Europe, groups and 
individuals pursued goals independent of state directives or policies, and in some 
cases, as the year 1989 ended, were to achieve those goals within the Communist 
systems. 67 Thus, according to Bimbaum, what the revolutions of 1989 signifY is the 
victory of the social movement, embedded in a reinvigorated civil society, over the 
established power structures of ruling Communist elites. 68 At all critical junctures, 
mass demonstrations appeared to be ''tearing the fabric ofthe old state apart."69 Kuran 
states that, facmg the people in the streets, Communism fell "like a house of cards;"70 
and Genov, also, sees collective political action within a re-emerging civil society as 
having triggered the transition to democracy throughout Eastern Europe.71 Wailer 
specifically highlights the emergence of peoples' forums- Solidarity in Poland, Civic 
Forum in Czechoslovakia, Neues Forum and the Evangelical Churches in the GDR, 
and the Dialogue Group in Hungary - spearheading the reform movements within 
individual countries and contesting the Communist monopoly of political power.72 
The existing regime breakdown and transitions literature, however, has not yet 
directed sufficient attention to the role of mass protest against authoritarian regimes. 
Scholars employing well-tested economic, political and military criteria have carried 
out endless post-mortems since 1989, but as Martz points out have failed to illuminate 
66 V.Have1, op ctt, pp 30-56 
67 C Sadowskt, 'Autonomous Groups as Agents ofDemocratlc Change m Commumst and Post-
Commumst Eastern Europe,' m. L Dtamond ( ed.), Pohtlcal Culture and Democracy m developmg 
Countnes. 1993 London, Lynne Rlenner Pubhshers, pp.163-195. 
68 K Brrnbaurn, 'ClVll Soctety and Government Pohcy m a New Europe,' The World Today, Vol47 
No 5, May 1991, p 84. 
69 N.Bermeo,lll!£!!, p.179. 
70 T.Kuran, 'Now out of Never: The Element ofSurpnse m the East European Revolutlon of 1989,'m: 
N Bermeo,lll!£!!, p 41 
71 N Genov, 'The Transttlon to Democracy m Eastern Europe· Trends and Paradoxes of Soctal 
Rationahsatlon,' Internatlonal Soctal Science Journal, 128, May 1991, p.332 
72 M. Wailer, 'Y01ce, ChOice and Loyalty,' in: G Parry and M Moran (eds ), Democracy and 
Democratlsatlon, 1994 London, Routledge, pp 50-52. See also hts articles: 'Groups, Interests and 
Pohtlcal Aggregatlon in East-Central Europe,' m. R.J.Htll (ed ), Beyond Stahmsm Commumst 
Pohtlcal Evolutlon, 1992 London, Frank Cass Ltd, pp 128-147; and 'Groups, Pames and Pohtlcal 
Change m Eastern Europe from 1977,' m: G Pridham and T.Vanhanen (eds.), Democratlsatlon in 
Eastern Europe. Domestlc and Intematlonal Perspectlves. 1994 London, Routledge, pp 38-61. 
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the overall importance of mass social movements.73 Many articles and essays do 
appear to conclude that 1989 undermined the previously accepted contention that a 
civil society could not exist Within a totalitarian-type regime, and that the late 1980s 
witnessed the emergence of long-suppressed and autonomous social activities.'4 The 
relative impact of such activities on the process of transition generally, however, 
remains under investigated. 
Many have, in fact, highlighted that civil society as a specific area of enquiry 
has not been given due weight in casual accounts of regime breakdown. Levine, for 
example, concludes that much remains to be learnt from a close analysis of civil 
society, and this needs to be incorporated into transitions analysis in more systematic 
and specific ways. 75 Kuran and Martz identify the general lack of attention to the 
power of the individual, and the significance of organised crowds. 76 The transitions 
literature that does introduce the concept of civil society tends, therefore, to address 
the apparent limitations of parts of traditional theory. However, these studies leave 
many unanswered questions. Bermeo, for example, recognising the centrality of elite 
decision and pact-making to the transition process, notes that such elites are but one 
of several groups of actors affecting the course of transition. 77 Via a consideration of 
the role of the Soviet military elite in the August 1991 coup,78 Bermeo identifies three 
specific areas which require further analysis by comparativists: the role of ethnicity 
and national identity; the role of the armed forces; and, most significantly for this 
study, the "common citizenry.'m Although recognising the concept of civil society as 
a potential explanatory factor, the article is limited in scope, however, and does not 
proceed to consider the specific impact of civil society on the transition process in 
Eastern Europe, concluding that obstacles to measuring its potential exist in societies 
characterised by "hidden preferences."80 Kieman's analysis of the end of Communist 
rule in the USSR employs Di Palma's model of "political crafting" in the Soviet 
context to support his argun~ent that clearly defined institutional forms are less 
73 J D.Martz, 'Bureaucratlc-Authontanamsm, Transitions to Democracy and the Pohtico-Cultural 
Dunensmn,' m H J W~ada (ed ), New Direction m ComparatiVe Pohtlcs. p 207. 
74 G Di Pahna, QJ!.£!!, p. 72. 
75 D H Levme, QJ!.£!!, pp 377-394 
76 T Kuran, QJ!.£!!, p 23. SllUI!ar sentiments are also expressed by G.Schopflm, QJ!.£!!, pp 3-16. 
77 N Bermeo, 'Surpnse, Surpnse· Lessons from 1989 and 1991,' QJ!.£!!, p 198. 
78 1blC!. pp 180-183. 
79 !bid, p.198. 
80 Ibid. 
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important than the crafting of an initial agreement between a country's civilian and 
political elites.81 In identifYing civtl society as a principal element of the 
democratisation literature,82 he does, however, concur with Levine's statement that 
the concept "is treated in general and abstract terms, with insufficient attention to 
specific groups" and their organised relations with the state, or the people in 
particular. 83 Kiernan's study is, however, concerned with the application of Di 
Palma's theories to the Soviet Union's experience of democratisation, rather than the 
applicability of civil society as an explanatory concept for Eastern Europe. Di Palma's 
study of dissidence in Poland and Hungary as a prime contributory factor in the 
decision of the regimes to liberalise and to open dialogue, he claims to be indicative 
of the strength of the civil society concept with regard to East European transitions. 84 
His study is, however, oriented towards an analysis of the impact of civil society on 
regime elites, and the effect of its absence in, say, Romania or Bulgaria is not 
considered. 
Pridham does compare the transitions in Communist Europe to those of 
Southern Europe. 85 His analysis is based on the hypothesis that there are three broad 
and interconnected levels of a process of transition: the state, inter-group relations and 
society, with the latter including specifically "civil society, associational life, social 
movements and participation in general."86 These differing levels are analysed within 
an "environment" which considers historical factors and the mode of transition, such 
as the international framework, the state of the economy, and "simply events" which 
may affect the process of change. 87 Measuring the extent of interaction between these 
levels, Pridham's analysis claims that the more interaction between the three, the 
more likely that transition will be unstable, uncontrolled and subject to upheaval. 88 
The differing degrees of interaction can then be employed to draw further 
conclusions, he argues, regarding the style and scope of transitions to liberal 
81 B.Kleman, Ql1£!l, p 30. 
82 Ibtd. p 31. 
83 D H Levme, Q11£!!, p.379. 
84 G Dt Palma, Ql1£!l, Ch I: Jntroducllon. 
ss G Pridham, 'Democrallc Transtllons m Theory and Pracllce Southern European Lessons for Eastern 
Europe?' m: G.Pndham and T.Vanhanen, Democrallsallon m Eastern Eurooe Domesllc and 
Intemallonal Perspecllves, 1994 London, Routledge, pp 15-37 
86 !bid, p.20. 
87 Ibtd, p 18 
88 Ibtd, p 20 
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democracy. Following an analysis of transition in Spain, Greece and Portugal in the 
late 1970s, Pridham is able to offer some insight into the East European process. 
Stating that historical factors - such as Poland's traditional tendency towards 
authoritarianism- and environmental influences- Gorbachev's Moscow reforms; the 
necessary extent of reform in the Communist systems; and the rapidity of events, for 
example - were evidently at work, Pridham concludes that the society level "has 
indeed been very important, although It is difficult. .. to do justice to the complexities 
of each national case of transition."89 Pridham's comparison of the South and East 
European transitions does suggest a much greater degree of society level, or "bottom-
up" momentnm in the latter, citing the existence of the Catholic Church in Poland, 
and networks of intellectuals and dissidents, in his justification of a process approach 
to democratisation. Despite the claim that significant cross-regional variants exist -
Poland versus Romania, for example -his study, however, does not focus specifically 
on the development of civil society in individual Communist comitries, or compare 
their respective impact on individual processes of transition. 
Similarly, Ramet's main focus is the 1990 political transition within the Soviet 
Union. Drawing comparisons to historical examples of regime change - the Chinese 
Revolution of 1911 or the 1931 overthrow of the Spanish monarchy, for example-
Ramet seeks to identifY a predictable pattern of authoritarian collapse.90 She identifies 
the construction of a civil society from below as one stage in the process of 
authoritarian political decay. Her article does raise the question of the differing levels 
of development of civil society and their respective Impacts on authoritarianism and it 
is, therefore, of relevance to this study. The principal focus, however, is on the 
comiection between the apparent chaos produced by system collapse and the 
existence, or otherwise, of an accepted set of values in society or of "real" systemic 
legitimacy, and the article, therefore, contains no systematic analysis of civil society 
as a broad concept or of the different levels of development in each comitry.91 
Chilton and Di Grilli both identifY popular mobilisation via social movements 
as being one of the dynamic processes miderpinning transition that has not previously 
received due consideration.92 Their studies focus on one particular feature of civil 
89 Ibtd. p.35. 
90 S P Ramet, 'When Systems Collapse: Toward a Theory about the Relatmnslup between System 
Decay and CIVIl Stnfe.' In: S P Ramet ( ed ), AdaptatiOn and TransformatiOn in Communist and Post-
Commumst Systems, 1992 Oxford, Westvlew Press, p 279 
91 Ibtd, pp 279-300. 
92 P.Ciulton, 'Mechanics of Social Change: Social Movements, Transnaltonal Coahnons and the 
Transformalton Processes m Eastern Europe,' Democraltsalton, V oil No. I, Sprmg 1994, pp 151-181, 
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society activity - the transnational contacts (TNCs) established between social 
movements - and assess its respective significance as a determining factor in the 
outcome of the 1989 revolutions. In that respect, the studies are significant here as 
they successfully demonstrate the explanatory value of domestic variables. For 
example, whilst acknowledging that the role of civil society must be considered 
alongside economic, leadership and military factors,93 Chilton's comparative analysis 
of the democratisation processes in Eastern Europe assesses the role played by 
independent social movements in the transitions from authoritarian rule. Focusing on 
Hungary, East Germany and Romania as three distinct types of regime transformation 
(negotiated social contract mould, sudden collapse, and regime coup, respectively) the 
article establishes a comparative framework in which two independent variables - the 
domestic role of social movements, and the extent of TNCs - are analysed for their 
respective and combined effect on the mode of transition. In essence, Chilton 
contends that the capacity of social movements to establish successful TNC networks 
(in this instance, peace and human rights networks) was a determining factor in 
contributing to the 1989 transformation in terms of the manner and extent of regime 
change. The influence of these movements varied depending on the strength of civil 
society in each country. For example, in the absence of such contacts, she argues, 
there was no development of an opposition in favour of democratisation or human 
rights, and regime change was limited, violent and sudden, as in Romania. In contrast, 
in Hungary, where civil society and TNCs were deemed to have reached ''higher 
degrees" of activity, change was gradual, comprehensive and non-violent.94 
In one respect, therefore, Chilton's article does answer the criticisms of Share, 
who claims that there has been little effort amongst transitologists to develop a 
typology of democratic transitions, which is necessary for any examination of the 
conditions for democratic consolidation.95 However, as with certain other studies, 
such as Arato's consideration of the impact of the Solidarity Union in Poland in 1980-
81,96 the treatment of the civil society concept is specific and limited. Chilton and di 
Cortona estimate the impact of civil society via the impact of established TNC 
networks only; Arato analyses the effects of Solidarity during a specific time period; 
and P Gnlh dt Cortona, 'From Communism to Democracy. Rethmkmg Regime Change m Hungary 
and Czechoslovalaa,' Intemanonal Soc1al Sc1ence Journal, 128, May 1991, pp 315-330. 
93 P.Cinlton, 1b1d, pp.175-6. 
94 lbid. p 174. 
95 D Share, 'Transitions to Democracy and Trans1tton Through Transaction,' Comparative Pohttcal 
Stud1es, Vol19 No 4, January 1987, pp.525-548. 
96 A.Arato, 'CIVIl Society Against the State· Poland 1980-81,' Telos. Part 47, Spnng 1981, pp 23-47. 
• 20-
whilst Share, having stipulated the need for a broad typology, analyses "transition 
through transaction" only, and with reference to one case-study, Spain. This raises the 
question of a comprehensive analysis of the effect of a developed - or under-
developed - civil society as a concept in itself on the process of transition and, in 
particular - and to elaborate of Share's study - on the mode of transition, an area 
highlighted by both Nelson and Munck as one requiring further investigation.97 
Chi! ton's study also raises the question of Poland: the civil society that existed there 
throughout the 1980s was, arguably, the most developed of all the East European 
countries, and its impact on the process of transition could, therefore, serve as a 
benchmark against which transition throughout the rest of Eastern Europe could be 
compared. It is interesting, however, that Poland is not included within her particular 
comparative study. 
(1 3.4) The Mode of Regzme Breakdown 
Certainly, there have been a number of studies - notably those by Huntington, 
Linz, and Karl and Schmitter - which have sought to distinguish between different 
types or modes of transition according to the relative importance of governing and 
opposition groups as the sources of democratisation. Linz, for example, using the 
classifications ruptura and reforma (the former referring to those transitions which 
incorporate a clear break with the past, and the latter, a protracted reform of the 
authoritarian system) contends that the actions of individuals and of civil society play 
an important and even decisive role, and classifies countries according to the 
particular mode of regime breakdown experienced.98 Interestingly, although stating 
that there appears to be no single model for the transitions in Communist countries, 
' Linz argues that the East Europeans' response to Gorbachev's perestroika was similar 
to processes that have taken place elsewhere.99 The reform progranime represented an 
initiative for change from above, subsequently reinforced and accelerated from below, 
which supports his statement to the effect that "transitions from authoritarianism to 
democracy tend to be initiated when leaders in the authoritarian regime start 
considering the possibility of reform .. .''100 With the primary focus on explaining 
modes ofbreakdown generally, the study does not specifically address the Communist 
revolutions of 1989. 
91 G Munck, op c1t. p 359, D N Nelson, op cit pp 11-40. 
98 J J Linz, 'Trans1t1ons to Democracy,' The Washmgton QuarterlY. Summer 1990, pp.150-152. 
99 Ibl!!, p.156 
100 Ibid. p.150. 
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Huntington, Zhang, and Karl and Schmitter, on the other hand, all distinguish 
between differing modes of Communist transition. Zhang's article focuses primarily 
on the 1989 Chinese transition and the later Soviet case, and contends that, although 
the choices made by elites during transition are important, political pact-making is 
dependent upon certain institutional conditions.101 Although Eastern Europe as a 
specific region is not considered here, Zhang claims that Ius generalisations on China 
and the USSR can be applied to the region, and that none of the former Communist 
regimes experienced a pacted transition.102 Tiris conclusion is, in itself, valuable and 
distinguishes the transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America from those in 
Eastern Europe. Poland, however, is classified as an exception, fitting neatly into none 
of the stated categories, and Czechoslovakia is cited as an example of regime 
breakdown, on the grounds that a significant weakening of the Communist regime 
resulted in the loss of its repressive capability which led, ultimately, to breakdown.103 
Tiris does pose the question as to the cause of the regime's initial weakening, or 
whether the process was affected by independent opposition in Czechoslovak society. 
Moreover, Zhang's conclusion that the Polish example appears to defY classification 
when civil society was at its most advanced stage of development in all the European 
Communist regimes, and when 1t was the first system in 1989 to experience 
breakdown, is representative of the general limitations of many existing theories. 
Karl and Schmitter explore the hypothesis that the mode of transition from 
authoritarian rule is a principal determinant of whether (a) democracy will emerge; 
and (b) whether or not it will be consolidated. In this respect, in distinguishing 
between processes in which authontarian ehtes continue to dominate political life 
post-transition, and those in which they were displaced by mass movements, they 
conclude that pacted transztzons are the most favourable to a consolidated democracy, 
followed by transitions by zmposition. Where mass movements gain control over the 
process of regime change, the probability of a successful democratic outcome 
diminishes.104 In defining modes of transition, two variables are considered. The first 
considers the actors involved and whether the impetus for change comes from above 
(elites) or below (masses). The second variable is that related to the strategy of 
transition, which varies along a continuum ranging from multilateral compromise to 
unilateral recourse to the use of force. 105 From the possible extremes, four ideal-types 
101 B Zhang, op cit pp.IOS-9. 
102 Ib!d p.132. 
103 Ib!d pp.132-3. 
104 T.Lynne Karl and P Schnutter, op c1t. pp 282 
lOS Ib1d. pp.274-5. 
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of regime transition therefore emerge. Pact in which elite groups agree upon a 
multilateral compromise among themselves; imposition, where elites employ force 
unilaterally to effect regime change agrunst mcumbent resistance; reform, in which 
the masses mobilise from below and impose a compromised resolution without resort 
to violence; and revolution, where the masses defeat the authoritarian rulers militarily. 
Noting that many cases of regime transition are, in fact, difficult to classifY- Hungary 
and the GDR, for example106 - Karl and Schmitter's "score" of recent examples in 
Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe categorises Poland and Czechoslovakia 
as cases of transition by reform, and Romania as being located between revolution 
and imposition.107 Karl and Schmitter do, then, distinguish between differing modes 
of transition according to where the impetus for change comes from: "above" or 
"below." However, other than linking civil society to mass-driven transitions there is, 
for example, no explanation as to why the transition process in, say, Poland was a 
bottom-up one, or why Solidarity was admitted to roundtable negotiations in 1989. 
This apparent limitation thus begs the question of the precise impact of civil society 
on the type of regime breakdown experienced. The individual modes of transition are 
related to the civil society concept as an explanatory variable in the sense that 
transition is produced by actors who choose particular strategies that lead to a process 
of change. The fact that Poland's transition is categorised as a process of reform of the 
ancien regime due, in large part, to the impact of Solidarity, does not, however, 
analyse the extent of development of the civil society as a whole, or its relationship 
with the regime, and, hence, particular reasons behind the union's ability to negotiate 
with the Communist Party from a position of power in 1989. 
Huntington, considering the "third wave" of democratisation as a whole, also 
locates the process of transition along a contmuum, in terms of the relative importance 
of governing and opposition groups as the source of dernocratisation.108 For analytical 
purposes, the cases are grouped into three broad types: transformation (Linz's 
reforma ), occurrmg when incumbent political elites take the lead in initiating regime 
change; transplacement when democratisation is the result of joint government-
opposition activity; and replacement (Linz's reforma) for a distinctly bottom-up 
process of trans1tion.109 Huntington's subsequent analysis of the three categories 
identifies certain broad characteristics for each type. Replacements, for example, 
106 Ibtd p 277. 
107 Ibtd pp 276-7. 
108 S p Huntmgton, op et!. p 583 
109 Ibui. pp.582-3. 
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deemed to be the commonest mode of transition in personal dictatorships, are 
characterised by the virtual absence of reformers within the authoritarian regime, with 
democratisation occurring as the independent opposition gains strength and the 
government loses it. Such regimes- the former GDR is cited here- are often unaware 
of their domestic unpopularity and regime collapse is, therefore, generally swift, with 
repressive governments often toppled by the force of mass public demonstrations.uo 
Particular emphasis is placed on what Huntington refers to as "forward legitimacy," 
defined in practical terms as a "sharp, clean break with the past," the institutions, 
procedures and individuals of the previous regime being too tainted by association to 
play a role in the formation of a new system.111 In defining the characteristics peculiar 
to each mode of transition, Huntington's article is significant for an analysis of the 
East European revolutions, and for any study seeking to identity the factors that 
contributed to the differing modes of transition experienced. With regard to Romania 
as an example of replacement, however, there are a number of factors that appear to 
run counter to Huntington's claims. With the assumption of power by the National 
Salvation Front (NSF), there was no sharp, clear break with the past in December 
1989, a fact which does also suggest the pre-revolutionary existence of reformers 
within the Communist regime. More crucially, mass mobilisations demanded the 
overthrow of the leader not the system.112 These three factors (the clear break with the 
past, the prior existence of intra-party reformers, and the push for democratisation by 
a strengthening independent opposition) are discussed as elements of the replacement 
mode, however. Czechoslovakia's classification raises queries too, in the fact that the 
Communist govermnent did not act forcefully to suppress the mobilisation of political 
power by the opposition; nor can we speak of a rough equahty between the 
government and opposition forces until the transition process was already well under 
way in 1989. Huntington's article does play closer attention to the role of opposition 
groups as the sources of regime breakdown than many transitions studies. The 
limitations, however, mean that there is no specific emphasis on the concept of civil 
society and its actual effect on the mode of breakdown {tt is considered alongside 
numerous other factors) or specific focus on the East European region . 
. 
(I 4) Conclusion 
Eastern Europe expenenced in 1989 a variety of events and modes of regime 
breakdown and transition, to the extent that to talk of a revolution against 
Communism presents a certain anomaly. There were, in fact, several and widely 
110 !bid, pp.602-8. 
Ill Ibid. p.605. 
112 Ibid. pp.602-7. 
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differing processes of revolutionary change. The foregoing discussion revealed that 
the transitions and democratisation literature has produced many, and often 
conflicting, arguments and theories. To summarise, the existing literature on regime 
transition focuses on a number of interdependent themes and issues. Predominant is a 
concern with explanations of why transition from authoritarianism to democracy 
occurs. In that respect, the literature can be divided into two broad schools of thought. 
The first- the prerequisites school- adopts a deterministic approach, in the sense that 
transition is considered to be one possible consequence of such factors as the 
attainment of a specified level of socio-economic development or the existence of a 
supportive political culture. The alternative -the process school- focuses analysis on 
human choices and actions, on the premise that a process of change can only be 
Initiated when key individuals or groups reach the decision that change is necessary or 
desirable. Within the latter school, it has been shown that the concept of civil society, 
although employed as an explanatory tool by a number of transitions theorists, 
remains an area that has been neglected to-date, or one that raises a number of further 
research questions- a point to which I will return. 
In seeking to explain the occurrence of regime change, existing literature also 
focuses on specific phases of transition: the reasons for the initial breakdown of the 
regime, the process of transition itself, and the factors favourable to a process of 
consolidation. In so doing, it approaches the analysis of these phases through a 
number of lenses, and considers the particular impact of international or external 
factors; the role of key social, economic and political elites; the effect oflow levels of 
systemic legitimacy; and the effect of mass protest against authoritarian rule. It has 
been shown, however, that literature employing such indices of change does raise a 
number of questions. For example, what role did civil society play in convincing 
elites of the necessity or desirability of change? Political leaders could not have 
initiated change without some reference, however minimal, to the public will, and 
given the potential costs of regime liberalisation, the question remains as to the root 
cause of the reform packages introduced, particularly at the end of the 1980s. What 
were the processes already under way in individual countries that were complemented 
by changes in the international sphere? Neither the change within the Soviet Union, 
nor the pressures emanating from such bodies as the EU or Council of Europe, for 
example, should be viewed as sufficient conditions for the breakdown of Communism 
in the Soviet bloc.113 The effective renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine was 
significant, and is crucial in differentiating 1989 from 1956 or 1968 in Eastern Europe 
and, therefore, should be recogmsed as a key factor in explaining the timmg of the 
113 A C Janos, 'Social Science, Commurusm and the Dynamics ofPohtical Change,' World Politics. 
Vol44 No I, October 1991, pp 81-112. 
-25-
revolutions, but not their actual occurrence. In Romania, the demonstration effect of 
events in Poland and elsewhere was crucial to the perception of the possibihty for 
change in society yet, throughout the rest of Eastern Europe, there was an internal 
popularly-driven dynamic which generated a pressure which may eventually, by itself, 
have toppled the Communist regimes. Cracks had been in evidence for at least two 
decades in some Communist countries and although, to many observers, Communist 
publics appeared to have accepted the prevailing status quo, the activities of such 
groups as Solidarity in Poland and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia provided potent 
evidence of democratic-oriented independence in society. Furthermore, what factors 
prevented the securing of effective systemic legitimacy; and what was the precise 
impact of public protest against Communism? In both these respects, the concept of 
civil society cannot be discounted. 
While some theonsts do recognise the explanatory validity of the civil society 
concept to Eastern Europe, its general treatment in the transitions literature, however, 
is either dismissive of its explanatory value; 114 or, on the other hand, neglectful of the 
concept in its entirety. By that, I refer to analysis that focuses on certain component 
features of civil society (TNCs for example) or to consider its significance in certain 
periods only. However, what of the constitutive role of civil society in the initial 
breakdown of Communist authoritarianism? What role if any does it play: ancillary or 
facilitating? Is there a distinct civil society phase in the breakdown of Communist 
regimes? Does the extent to which civil society is organised affect the course of 
transition? Comprehensive analysis of the impact of a developed civil society on the 
process of transition would appear to be an avenue which would allow us to flesh out 
these and related questions. 
In addition, in the foregoing review of the transitions literature, the mode of 
transition in particular, was identified as an area requiring further research. This is 
particularly evident with specific regard to the East European cases. A degree of 
commonality across the region did exist. All the former Communist countries were, 
for example (although to varying degrees), experiencing social, economic and 
pohtical crisis by the mid to late 1980s.115 With the initial exception of Yugoslavia 
and Czechoslovakia, all had seen Communism imposed from the outside and 
114 A C.Janos, tbui for example, who sees breakdown as a consequence of mtematiOnal factors 
(Czechoslovakta) or economtc fatlure (Poland and Hungary), and PG LeWis, 2P-£!!, tdentttymg ehte 
dtsmtegratton and the general collapse of legtttmacy as the cause of the pohttcal cnsiS m Eastern 
Europe 
115 K Henderson and N Robmson, Post-Commumst Pohttcs: An Introduction, 1997 Hemel Hempstead, 
Prenttce Hall, pp 1-21 
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subsequently supported by the Soviet Union and all had, therefore, lacked effective 
political legitimacy from the outset. Certainly, ideological justifications for 
Communist rule had given way during the 1970s to a quasi-legitnnacy founded on the 
purported superior ability of the central-command economy to "deliver the goods." 
Once economic crisis deepened in the 1980s, however, the legitnnacy of the systems 
decreased once more. In addition, all the countries ofEastem Europe had undergone a 
process of rapid socio-economic development post-1945. Admittedly, the levels of 
development reached were not uniform across the entire region: Poland and Hungary, 
for example, were more highly urbanised, industrial and educated societies compared 
to Romania and Bulgaria. However, it remains true that a certain level of development 
was common to all. Again, within all the Communist systems of rule, incumbent 
Communist parties faced the same potential dilemmas of either liberalisation or 
reform: any openings of the systems, or attempts to satisfy the demands emanating 
from the public, had the potential to merely open the floodgates to increased protest, 
thereby threatening the Communist monopoly of power. Furthermore, with 
Gorbachev's effective renunciation of the Brezlmev Doctrine between 1988-9, all the 
East European countries were presented with a qualitatively different Soviet-satellite 
relationship. The pledge of non-interference m the domestic affairs of the Communist 
nations was as applicable to Poland, Hungary, Romania or Czechoslovakia. 
If, then, such factors were common throughout the region, an important 
question remains to be addressed: why did the former East European Communist 
regimes experience different modes of breakdown? The transitions literature does 
seek to explain types of breakdown generally, according to the relative importance of 
governing and opposition groups to the process of democratisation, and classifies 
countries into broad categories of breakdown modes. The review of the extant 
literature did, however, indicate that a number of questions exist, principally, the 
specific relationship between civil society and the particular mode of breakdown 
experienced in ind!vidual countries. In essence, to what extent does civil society affect 
the mode of regime breakdown? Is there a scale that can be employed, ranging from 
unorganised and individual forms of opposition, to the evolution of fully developed 
alternative soczety which, in turn, determines the mode of breakdown experienced? 
Given the extent of factors common to all the East European countries, civil society 
appears to be a concept that would enable us to differentiate between the experiences 
of indiVIdual East European countries in 1989. 
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CHAPTER 11: CIVIL SOCIETY AND A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
The discussion of existing academic literature on regime breakdown and 
transition in Chapter One identified a number of specific questions related to the 
events of 1989 in Eastern Europe. In particular, it argued that the concept of civil 
society has been underplayed, especially in those studies seeking to explain modes of 
regime breakdown. I suggested, with specific regard to the East European context, 
that civil society is a factor that could be employed to address the apparent limitations 
of the extant literature. The central pwpose of this thesis, therefore, is to understand 
the effect of a domestic variable - civil society - upon the mode of transition 
experienced in Eastern Europe in 1989. Were generalisations to be drawn from the 
Polish example alone, the conclusion that civil society was the driving force behind 
regime breakdown and transition throughout the region could appear justifiable. 
However, despite the fact that a degree of commonalty did exist in Eastern Europe, it 
is also evident that the particular modes of transition experienced differed vastly, as 
did the levels of development of the civil societies to be found in the Communist 
systems and the nature of the respective authoritarian regimes being transformed. On 
the one hand, therefore, it may be questionable whether a comparative approach to 
Communism's breakdown in Eastern Europe is either justifiable or, indeed, useful. On 
the other, however, such divergences as those already discussed, should not be viewed 
as barriers to comparison. Debate over the importance of the unique versus the 
universal is not a new one, and it is not my intention to reiterate, here, these old and 
probably irresolvable arguments. Rather, I accept that there are elements of both 
present in the East European example, and argue that comparison in this study will 
permit the extraction of common themes and the formulation of an alternative theory 
to supplement existing transitions literature. 
This chapter is, therefore, concerned with establishing a framework for the 
analysis that will follow in the case-study chapters. Its main task will be to define a 
key concept - civil society - and investigate its applicability in the East European 
context. Although my chief concern is with the substance of" actually existing" civil 
societies rather than the theoretical uses of the concept, in order to indicate the 
common features and functions of civil societies in different social systems, it seems 
appropriate, first, to indicate the main stages in the evolution of the concept. 
-28-
(2.1) The Concept: Civil Society 
In recent years, both democratic activists and students of transitions to 
democracy have made extensive use of the term civil society.' Only a minimal 
agreement in these quarters as to the basic meaning of the term has ensured that the 
concept remains a matter of considerable dispute. Contemporary definitions abound, 
ranging from George Kolankiewicz's understanding of civil society as "all forms of 
unmediated and untrammeled association" 2 to James Scanlan's "broad network of 
non-political relations among individuals and groups who spontaneously and 
independently carry out a great many economic and social functions."' Gordon White 
refers to the concept as having a long and distinguished history in Western political 
theory- between 1750 and 1850, hundreds of British, French and German thinkers 
concerned themselves with the subject of civil society - yet it remains highly 
ambiguous.' 
(2.1.1) The Historrca/ Evolution of the Concept 
Historically, civil society entered European usage around the year 1400 with a 
nexus of meanings given to it by Cicero in the first century BC in his 'societas 
civilis'.5 It referred to individual states, and to the condition of living in a civilised 
political community sufficiently advanced to include cities: a society with its own 
legal code, and with undertones of civility and urbanity, of civic partnership (living 
and being ruled according to civil laws) and of the refinements of civil life and the 
commercial arts.• Until the eighteenth century, civil society was a condition in which 
individuals lived under government, and a concept which expressed the growth or 
expansion of civilisation to a point where society was civilised, with citizens 
regulating their relationships and settling disputes according to an accepted system of 
1 J L Cohen and A Arato, CIVIl Societv and Pohtlcal Theory, 1992 C=hndge, The MIT Press, Chapter 
One· 'The Contemporary Revtval of CIVIl Soctety,' pp 29-82. 
'G Kolanktewicz, 'The Reconstruction of Cittzenslnp,' m: K Z Poznanski ( ed ), Constructing 
Camtahsm. 1992 Boulder CO, Westview Press Inc., p.142 
3J.Scanlan, 'Reforms and Ctvtl Soc1ety in the USSR,' Problems ofCommumsm. Vol37 No 2, March-
Apnl1988, pp 42-43. 
'Gordon Wlnte, 'Ctvtl Society, Democratisation and Development,' Democratisation Vol.l No.3 
Autturm 1994, pp 375-390 
'D Mtller, The Blackwell Encyclopaedia ofPohtlcal Thought, 1987 Oxford, Blackwell Ltd, pp.77-78 
'E Shtls, 'The Vrrtue ofCtvtl Soc1ety,' Government and Onnosttlon, Vol26 No I, Wmter 1991, p 5 
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laws; one in which civility was prominent, and citizens took an active part in public 
life.' 
During the eighteenth century, in contractarian political thought, the concept 
evolved into something like its present usage, and in the writings of John Locke and 
Thomas Hobbes especially, political or civil society was contrasted with paternal 
authority and the state of nature. In addition, contractarian thought stressed the 
institutional basis of civil society, that is, the social contract binding members of a 
voluntary community to common mores "for the mutual preservation of their Lives, 
Liberties and Estates ... "' Adam Ferguson writing in 1767 defined the concept as a 
stage of civility, the natural consequence of civilisation, and employed it as a political 
term to contrast Western governments with Oriental despotism! In addition, civil 
society was deemed to be pluralistic, without which, individual and societal liberties 
could be neither guaranteed nor protected. Only pluralism could, to an extent, 
guarantee a balance-of-power to prevent the onset of despotic rule. Civil society was 
viewed as one in which urban life and commercial activities flourished, the 
implication being that a money economy, ready exchange in something like a free 
market, and a law-abiding political order comprised a satisfactory and progressive 
state of human affairs. Minimally, however, it was a society with a multitude of 
private activities, outside the family but distinct from the state.10 Furthermore, and 
significantly, Eighteenth Century writers elaborated the distinction of a sphere of 
society separate from the state, and with forms and principles of its own. 
This distinction betweeu state and civil society took central position and was 
expanded by Friedrich Hegel in his "Philosophy of Right" published in 1821, in 
which he defined civil society as a sphere lying between the family and the state.'' It 
was seen as an economic system: a distinct private realm of commerce, class interest, 
religion, and other individual and group prerogatives distinguishable from the 
7K.Kumar, 'ClVII Soctety. An Enqurry mto the Usefulness of an Htstoncal Term,' Bnttsh Journal of 
Sociology. Vol44,1993, p 377. 
8 J.Locke, Two Treattses of Government 1963 New York, Cambndge, p 395. Also, Z Rau, 'Some 
Thoughts on Ctvt1 Soctety m Eastern Europe and The Lockean Contractarian Approach,' Pohttca1 
Studtes, Vol.35, 1987, pp 582-3. 
9 A Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Ctvtl Society. (Edited by Fama Oz-Salzberger), 1995 
Cambndge, Cmbndge Umverstty Press, pp.71-3. 
''E.Schtls, Q11£!t p 5. 
11G.W F.Hegel, Phtlosophy ofRtght (Translated by T.M.Knox), 1952, C1arendon Press, pp.110, 189. 
A Pelczynski ( ed ), The State and ClVll Soctety. 1984 Carnbndge, Carnbndge University Press, p 1. 
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universal and encompassing power of the state. 12 This economic system contained 
within itself guarantees for individual rational behaviour and progress and, as such, 
was conducive to the realisation of the interests of mdividuals. In addition, it formed 
individuals into "super-individual collectivities" with an integrated societal self-
consciousness. 13 
"Civil society in this sense is an arena in which modem man legitimately 
gratifies his self-interest... but also learns the value of group action [and] social 
solidarity" 14 
In developing a more organic model of state-society relations, the lines between the 
legal existence of a civil society and the substance of activity therewithin were 
blurred, and although seen as two distinctly separate entities, the relationship between 
civil society and the state was necessarily symbiotic.1s Civil society could not function 
without the supervision of a regulatory state. In Hegel's hands, for example, civil 
society assumed a less positive meaning than previously, viewed as an essentially 
self-crippling entity in need of constant state supervision and control. In short, civil 
society could not remain civil unless it was ordered politically and subject to "the 
higher surveillance of the state." 16 In addition, two points must be noted. Firstly, 
whilst independent activity occurs within the realm of civil society, the overall 
orientation of individual actors is generally in accord with the aims of state leaders 
due to the fact that civil society has "flowed" or developed from the prior existence 
of the state, and is contained within it. 17 And, secondly, whilst emphasising economic 
relations, Hegel also stressed that non-economic institutions and the relations between 
them are not peripheral or minor aspects of civil society but are central to its 
functioning. 18 Thus, for Hegel, civil society consists of "the social sphere of classes 
and autonomous organisations", "the civil sphere of public institutions such as the 
courts and various other social welfare agencies" in addition to the economic sphere 
"G W.F.Hegel, Ibtd. pp.353-4; A.Pelczynsla, tbtd p 5. 
"E Schtls, Q1!.£!!, p 6. 
14See. Pelczynsla's Introducllon to The State and ClVII Society. op.ctt, pp 9-11. 
"G.W F Hegel, Q1!.£!!, p 266. N Robbto, 'Gramsct and the Concepllon of CJVtl Society,' m: C.Mouffe 
( ed ), Gramsct and Man<Jst Theory, 1979 London, Routledge and Keg an Paul, p 221. 
16J.Keane, 'Despollsm and Democracy,' m· 1 Keane (ed ), ClVII Soctetv and the State, 1988 London, 
Verso, pp. 50-53. 
17G.W F Hegel, Q1!.£!!, pp 154-5. 
"K Kumar, Q1!.£!!, p 379 
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of production, exchange and other market relations.19 Hegel's interpretation of civil 
society remains significant today, as political theorists generally distinguish civil 
society from the political state, using the former to denote forms of association which 
are spontaneous, customary and, in general, not dependent upon law; and the latter to 
denote the legal and political institutions of the wider state. 20 
Karl Marx, also, focused on the commercial and economic aspects of civil 
society. Referring to Hegel's organic model, Marx eliminated all distinctions between 
the legal existence of an independent public sphere and the orientation of its actors. 
However, whereas Hegel's interpretation had been a relatively complex one, Marx's 
was reductionist in essence, reducing civil society virtually to the economic sphere of 
labour, production and exchange. 21 Starting from the premise that it is not the state 
that nurtures and conditions civil society (Hegel) but civil society that conditions and 
regulates the state, Marx's interpretation was inextricably linked to the growth of a 
bourgeois middle class and the spread of capitalism. Consequently, civil society was 
interpreted as a particular stage in the development of productive forces:-
" The social practices and social institutions of civil society could be no more 
than the forms in which the essential life of capitalist society, the economic 
life, was played out." 22 
Thus, the concept of civil society was effectively dismissed as a residue of bourgeois 
social organisation and the rise of capitalism. For Marx, civil society could only be 
equated with bourgeois society, in which the bourgeoisie sought to dominate the state 
for its own advantage. Alternative orientations, for example, towards workers' 
interests, could never be realised within the context of a bourgeois institutional 
framework. Szajkowski reminds us It should be borne in mind, however, that for 
Marx the institutions of civil society were inextricably linked with his account of class 
and, consequently, his conceptual framework was bound to be that much narrower.23 
Irrespective of this, for Marx, civil society's two distinguishing characteristics 
remained the division of society, but a division between the property less masses and 
"Z A Pelczynski, 'Solidanty and The Rebrrth of Cml Soctety,' m J.Keane (ed ), Cml Soctetv and the 
State, 1988 London, Verso, p.364. 
''Hegel, Q11£!!, pp.x, 124-6, 376. R.Scruton, A Dtcttonary ofPohtical Thought 1982 London, The 
Macmtllan Press Ltd., p.66 
21A Pelczynski, The State and Cml Soctety, op ctt, p 2. 
22K Marx, 'Preface to an Contnbutton to the Cnttque ofPohttcal Economy,' in: K.Marx and F.Engels, 
Selected Works m Two Volumes, Vol1, 1962 Moscow, Foreign Langnages Pubhshmg House, p 362. 
23B SzaJkowsla, 'The Cathohc Church m Defence ofCtvtl Society m Poland,' m: B Mtsztal (ed ), 
Poland After Sohdanty, 1985 New Bnmswtck, Transactton Books, pp 68-69. 
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the coercive owners of the means of production. Although having wntten in 1845 in 
"The German Ideology" that civil society was "the true source and theatre of all 
history" ,24 his explanations of political events, legal changes and cultural 
development were based on economic criteria alone. Consequently, in contrast to 
Hegel's interpretation, which included cultural, social and political categories in 
addition to the economic, Marx's stemmed from a much narrower economic base. For 
him, the anatomy of civil society was to be sought purely in the political economy. 
Admittedly, such factors as market competition and commodity production were and 
are essential elements in the development of the concept of civil society since its 
Eighteenth Century interpretations. However, they represent only one dimension that, 
on its own, is unable to furnish a complete understanding. 
Gramsci's development of a theory of civil society during the period of Italian 
Fascism in the early twentieth century, departed both from Hegelian usage, and 
Marx's basically economic interpretation, and his writing- particularly in his "Pnson 
Notes" - was largely responsible for the revitalisation of the concept. For Gramsci, 
civil society was to be found neither within the state per se, nor within the economic 
sphere of production. Rather, he identified civil society as existing between the 
coercive relations of the state and the sphere of economic organisation. Consequently, 
the formula most commonly found in Gramsci is that the state consists of civil society 
and political society. Pol!tzcal society refers to the coercive apparatus, the arena of 
domination; whilst civil society is that of consent and direction exercised through 
private organisations such as the Church and trade unions: in effect, that area of social 
life which appears as the realm of the private citizen and individual consent. It was 
within the sphere of the civil society that intellectuals operate especially/5 and, 
therefore, an arena within which ideologies, theories, and individual schools of 
thought could be disseminated and used as springboards for the conquest of political 
power in the state.26 Thus, Gramsci's model of civil society, unlike Marx's, involves a 
double network and covers two dimensions. Firstly, the economic: the system of 
production and material concerns; and, secondly, the political-cultural: ideological 
and cultural apparatuses which affect the government. 27 
24K.Marx and F.Engels, The German Ideology. Part I With selections from Parts 11 and m, together 
With Marx's Introduction to A Cntique ofPohtical Economy, edited by C.J Arthur, 1970 London, 
International Publishers Also, N.Abercrombte, The Pengutn Dtctionarv of Sociology, 2nd Edition 
1988 London, Pengum Group, p.34. 
"D Forgacs (ed ), An Antomo Gramsct Reader, 1988 New York, Schocken Books, Chapter 10. 
Intellectuals and Education, pp 300-322. Also, K Kurnar, QJ!..£!!, p 382 
26A Pelczynski, The State and CIVIl Soctety, op ctt, p 3. 
27C Buct-Giucksman, Gramsci and the State, 1980 London, Lawrence and Wtshart, p 70. 
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Writing specifically about Italy, Gramsci concluded that it was within the 
sphere of civil society, as opposed to the political, that the working class under a 
Fascist leadership had a better chance of gaining hegemony, and having achieved it, 
could make it the springboard for the conquest of political power in the state. A 
revolutionary overthrow or radical change of the political state was out of the 
question, therefore, the only option for independent participation was to accept the 
' 
systemic boundaries Imposed by Fascism, while carving out as much autonomy as 
possible in an independent sphere of public actiVIty. Thus, whilst retaining the 
Marxian idea of the state as a predominantly coercive apparatus controlled in 
capitalist society by the production-owning bourgeoisie, he insisted that civil society 
could neither be seen just as the economic sphere, nor as a mere adjunct to the state. It 
was, rather, a sphere of various autonomous organisations and activities, in which the 
state did not necessarily have a monopoly of power or hegemonic status." As such, it 
offered various groups and classes an opportunity to undermine the domination of the 
bourgeoisie in its home territory of the economy and the coercive state, via a gradual, 
prior transformation within the realm of civil society itself. This political "war of 
position" was a more smtable strategy for a successful take-over of power than a 
sudden "war of movement" or sudden frontal assault (as proposed by Marxist-
Leninists) upon the state apparatus.29 In effect, Gramsci's civil society was functional 
in a way that Marx's was not. The outlines of, or an embryonic form of clVll society 
could develop within the context of a coercive or oppressive state, with autonomous 
interests and associations being pursued and organised independently of (though, 
notably, necessarily related to) the state.'0 
Gramsci's model of civil society is fundamental to an understanding of the 
emergence of an autonomous sphere in Eastern Europe and of the subsequent 
revolutions in 1989. Developments in Eastern Europe, especially Poland, have given 
the Gramscian approach - albeit in a somewhat modified form - a new lease of life, 
and allowed Western scholars to conceptualise recent developments, and dissidents, 
themselves, to map out a programme to achieve the de-totalisation of real socialism. 
Pelczynski, for example, employs a neo-Gramsc1an framework to analyse and explain 
28 D Forgacs, Qll.£!!, pp 233-238, and Chapter VIII. 'The Art and Science ofPohtics.' 
''D Boothman (ed ), Antonio Gramsci; Further Selections From the Pnson Notebooks, 1995 
Mmneapohs, Umversity ofMmnesota Press, pp 324, 350. Also, D Forgacs, Qll.£!!, Chapter VII; 'The 
Art and Science ofPohtics,' especially pp 225-229; and C Buci-Glucksman, Qll.£!!, pp 314-7. 
30 D Forgacs , Qll.£!!, pp.225-228. 
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"the rebirth of civil society" in Poland," as does Arato in his analysis of Solidarity in 
1980-81,32 and Frentzel-Zagorska investigating the patterns of transition from one-
party states.33 In the context of Communist Europe, a contractual approach to 
independent activity was not an option." Furthermore, the non-feasibility of a 
revolutionary overthrow or fundamental reform of the status quo had been forcibly 
demonstrated by the experiences of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
The only option for independent participation in the 1970s-1980s was, therefore, to 
accept the official systemic boundaries of Communist rule and the regime's control 
over "high politics," while carving out as much autonomy as possible over "low 
politics" in an independent sphere of public activity.35 Similarly, the proponents of 
independent activity in East Central Europe, beginning in the early 1970s, assumed 
that a civil society could emerge within the parameters of the totalitarian state. The 
monopolistic party would retain control over the broad economic and political agenda, 
whilst an increasingly independent second society would incrementally broaden its 
scope to effect the realisation of private and local interests. That is, opposition activity 
was focused on the search for a space within existing society which lay outside the 
official power structure and limits imposed by the state. These principles were 
embodied in Adam Michnik's theories of "New Evolutionism" 36 as the only way to 
oppose Communist regimes. The formation of the Committee for the Defence of 
Workers (KOR) in Poland in 1976 can be viewed as the first example of this 
horizontal collectivism within East European Communist society.37 What it 
demonstrated was that the outlines of a civil society could develop, in a Gramscian 
31 Z.A.Pelczynslo, 'Sohdanty and the Rebirth ofClVIl Society,' Q11.£!!, pp 365-6. 
"A Arato, 'Civtl Society Agamst the State: Poland 1980-81,' Telos, No.47, Spnng 1981, pp 23-47 
33J Frentzel-Zagorska, 'CIVll Society m Poland and Hungary,' Soviet Stud1es , Vol.42, 1990, pp.759-
777. 
34 Z Rau, Q11.£!!, p 584 
"" H1gh pohtlcs" refers to" the pnnc1pal poht1cal1ssues of soc1ety, the abstract 1deas and language of 
pohtlcs, the dec1s1ons and actions of the soc1etalleadership" Conversely, "low pohtics" mcludes 
"deciSions that dtrectly touch the CitiZen's da1ly hfe, the communal matters, and the cond1t1ons of the 
work place." S Btaler, Stalm's Successors· Leadershm, Stab1htv and Change in the Soy1et limon, 1980 
Cambndge, Cambndge Uruvers1ty Press, p.166. 
"'New Evolutlomsm' tmphed a long-term strategy of-
(1) transfonnmg the ex1sttng, and creating new, mdependent soctal organisations capable of defendmg 
autonomous mterests and res1sttng the dommatlon of the party-state; 
(n) extendmg, gradually, the arena m winch pubhc opunon could cnt1c1se eXISting pohc1es and 
formulate alternatives based on the actual and deSIIed needs of soc1ety. 
In: A M1chruk, Letters From Pnson and Other Essays, 1985 Berkeley, Uruvers1ty ofCahfonna Press, 
pp.135-148. 
37G Kolanloewtcz, Q11.£!!, p 142. 
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sense, within the context of an authoritarian state, with the interpretation and 
expression of interests being pursued independently of- though necessarily related to 
-the structure of state domination and economic relations.38 The relations between the 
Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) and Solidarity (which, significantly, Andrew 
Arato refers to as "the state versus civil society" )39 for example, evolved into a 
struggle for power of the kind Gramsci postulated - a slow gradual war of position in 
which the balance-of-power would ultimately tilt from the state to civil society. In 
essence, citing the Poland example as the principal reference point, East European 
civil society can, therefore, be seen as operating within - or parallel to - the wider 
boundaries defined and delineated by the state. 
Two further points are significant here. This neo-Gramscian interpretation of 
civil society involved a twofold re-orientation. Firstly, the target of democratisation 
shifted from the whole of society, to society outside of state institutions proper which, 
necessarily, incorporated a degree of self-limitation in that the leading role of the 
Communist Party in the state sphere remained unchallenged. And, secondly, the 
interpretation indicated that the agent of change would be an independent, self-
organising society aimed, not at revolution, but at structural reform achieved as a 
consequence of organised pressure from below.40 
(2.1.2) Contemporary Defimtzons 
In sununary of the above: 
"Civil society has been found in the economy and in the polity; in the area 
between the family and the state or the individual and the state; in non-state 
institutions which organise and educate citizens for political participation; 
even as an expression of the whole ciVIlising mission of modem society." 41 
Despite shifts in interpretation or definition, the theoretical concept has consistently 
retained certain central features. Firstly, civil society is a society distinct from, and 
mdependent of the state. It is the realm of organised social hfe that is open, voluntary, 
self-governing, at least partially self-supporting, and autonomous from the state. To a 
degree, however, the borders between ciVIl society and the state are not distinct, but 
blurred. There is an interdependence between the two spheres. The free association of 
38 A.Arato, 'Civil Soc1ety, H1story and Soc~ahsm. Reply to John Keane,' Prax1s International. 9, April-
June 1989, pp.J33-151, especially, p 141 and 146. 
"See A.Arato,'C1vil Soc1ety Agamst the State,' Qlli!!, pp.23-47. 
40 A M1chmk, op cit pp 86, 88 and 95. 
41K Kumar, Qlli!!, p 383. 
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civil society is constrained by the recogmtion of the principles of state authority and 
the rule of law , and needs the protection of an institutionalised legal order to develop 
and be secure. From its side, civil society strives to lay down limits on the actions of 
the state. In addition, civil society encompasses a vast array of organisations, formal 
and informal, and entails the creation of a wide variety of autonomous institutions -
independent pressure and interest groups, media (television, radio, and, more 
importantly, a press) free from censorship, an independent judiciary, for example - to 
form a network which has not one, but many centres and, therefore, cannot easily be 
destroyed by a monopolistic power. Civil society should also be civil: a society in 
which tolerance between competing individuals and groups is accepted and can 
flourish.42 Civil society fosters genuine political debate and in so doing, makes direct 
inputs into the political system and affairs of the state. Lastly, this links to a feature 
little emphasised during the Nineteenth Century but which is particularly relevant 
when referring to East Central Europe, and that is the idea of a politzcal community. 
Grzegorz Ekiert employs Gramsci's distinction between political, and domestic or 
civil society to account for the process of Communist regime change. The 
reinvigoration of political society, he argues, distmgwshed 1989 in Eastern Europe 
from earlier manifestations of civil discontent in 1956 and 1968. However, rather than 
equating political society With the coercive apparatus of the state (as Gramsci does), 
Ekiert's category of political society embraces "the entirety of voluntary associations 
and social movements in an active political cornmunity," 43 collectively organised 
around the principle of public political debate and participation. This could also be 
expressed by distinguishing between a passive and an active civil society, the former 
referring to the institutions that differentiate and stabilise it, and the latter to the forms 
of autonomous collective action required to defend and expand its political 
potentials. 44 
However, as I intend to use the concept of civil society as an analytical tool to 
foster as explanation of the events that took place in 1989 in Communist Eastern 
Europe, my chief concern is with the substance of "actually existing" civil society 
rather than the theoretical bounds or uses of the concept. Real civil societies will 
differ considerably from their normative claims and strictures, their defining 
42 See· S N Emstadt, 'CIVIl society,' in: S M Lipset (ed ), The Encyclopaedia of Democracy. 1995 
Washington, Congressional Quarterly, V oil, pp 240-242. 
"G Elaert, 'DemocratisatiOn Processes in East Central Europe,' Bntish Journal of Political Science 
Vol21, 1991, p 300. (Emphasis added). 
"A Arato, 'Social Theory, ClVII Society and the Transfonnation of Authontanan Socialism,' m: 
F.Ferenc and A Arato (eds ), Cnsts and Reform m Eastern Europe, 1991 New Brunswick, Transaction 
Books,p 5. 
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characteristics being largely detennined by the nature of the existing regime, as well 
as socio-cultural, political and lnstorical factors peculiar to each nation. For example, 
Diamond charts the development of civil society in the former Communist countries 
and distinguishes between those in Romania and Bulgaria and those in Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. According to his analysis, the latter had previous civic 
traditions that could - and were - revived throughout the 1970s and 1980s; whilst the 
countries of the fanner, particularly Romania, faced a far more difficult time, having 
no traditions on which to draw.45 Vajda, too, emphasises that the totalitarian political 
systems throughout Eastern Europe had highly variable modes of operation, due in 
part to the very different historical developments of the respective countries. 46 It is, 
therefore, important to highlight the distinction between civil society as an ideal type -
embodying all the virtues of separation, autonomy, and free association in their 
entirety - and the real world of civil society which will embody these principles to 
varying degrees. Consequently, rather than attempting to clarifY the many and varied 
theoretical interpretations outlined above, there is a need to devise a working 
definition of civil society which will enable an exploration of the process of 
Communism's breakdown in the societies of Eastern Europe, and to explore the 
implications of a civil society for the mode of regime breakdown. 
Considering all the above points, the most crucial and common understandmg 
of the concept appears to be that civil society is an arena of non-state institutions and 
practices, which enjoy a high degree of autonomy. As a working defmition, I 
understand civil society to be:-
The independent social self-organisation of society, the constituent parts of 
which voluntarily engage in public activity to pursue individual, group or 
national interests. Civil society is independently organised to the extent that it 
operates outside the formal, institutional framework of the state, yet it 
necessarily operates within, or parallel to, the established structures of the 
official state system. 
Significantly, civil society - being unofficial and nominally distinct from the state - in 
the absence of institutionalised and legal fonns of interest articulation and mediation, 
may emerge as a network of independent organisations outside the formal system, 
which may exert pressure on the political organs of the state. This interpretation 
pennits an understanding of the emergence of a self-organised society prior to the 
45L Dtamond, 'Toward Democratic Consohdatlon,' Journal of Democracy. Vol5 No.3, July 1994, pp. 
4-17 
46 M VaJda, 'East-Central European Perspectives,' m: J Keane (ed ), ClVll Soctetv and the State, 1988 
London, Verso, pp.333-360. 
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institutional transformation of the regime, and allows an analysis of the role of civil 
society in this transformation. It also facilitates distinctions between different types or 
sectors of civil society - for example, between those institutions with recogrusable 
political roles, and those with activities directed at spheres other than the political -
and, therefore, permits comparative analysis of the respective roles of civil societies in 
the course of regime change or collapse. 
(2.2) Civil Society in Eastern Europe 
The areas in which particular societies self-organise, the forms of their 
organisation, their goals and forms of activity will, to a large extent, be determined by 
the specific opportunities and barriers created by the defining characteristics of the 
given regime. In order to contextuahse the systemic changes within the East European 
regimes, and the role played by civil society therein, it is, therefore, essential to briefly 
outline the nature of the Communist regimes in which the drama was played out. In 
that respect, this section will consider the main characteristics of totalitarianism, and 
the relationship between that particular form of rule and civil society, both in theory 
and in practice. 
(2.2.1) Totahtariamsm 
In the immediate post-1945 years, Western analysts employed the concept of 
totalitarianism to refer to the Soviet Union and its European satellites.47 
Totalitarianism descnbed an economic, social and political system extending the 
principles of authoritarian rule into all spheres of hfe. It depended on detailed 
penetration and complete subjugation of all spheres of life by the central system of 
government. Totalitarian systems were characterised by an all-engulfing ideology, a 
hierarchy of powers to manage society, a mass party which aimed to indoctrinate and 
mobilise, and a political police with unlimited prerogatives. Furthermore, 
totalitarianism aimed at the dissolution of all social structures and bonds outside the 
control of the party, and, in that respect, the Soviet and East European totalitarian-type 
systems excluded any critical agent - civil society - extraneous to their organisational 
principals. 
47 C Fnednch and Z Brzezmsla, Totahtanamsm. Dictatorship and Autocracy. Revtsed Edttton, 1965 
Cambndge, Mass., Harvard Umverstty Press, p 3; and Z.Brzezmsla, Ideology and Power m Sovtet 
Pohttcs, Revtsed Edttton, 1968 New York, Praegar Pubhshers, p xxt. Although the totahtanan model 
was the predommant framework of analysis dunng the 1950s and early 1960s tt must, however, be 
recognised that the concept was a product of Western and ermgn\ scholarslup, and portrayed an tdeal 
type only. 
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By the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, the validity of the model was 
questioned with Nikita Khrushchev's "opening-up" of the Soviet system of rule.48 
This dismantling of the concept of totalitarianism led to the construction of alternative 
models, which emphasised a host of new features visible within the Soviet system.49 
For example, some refined the existing model on the evidence that the system no 
longer appeared to permit the dominance of the First Secretary - the "directed 
society" thes1s50 - whilst others employed a "mobilisation model," based on the 
premise that the Soviet system was but one variant in the process of political 
development. 51 An alternative school of thought observed the evident changes withm 
the Soviet polity - in particular, the apparent existence of a degree of pluralism -
viewing them as part of an mevitable trend linked to industrialising societies, wherein 
socio-economic development was necessarily accompanied by growing and changing 
public demands on the system compelling it to open up.52 Inspite of a lack of 
agreement on one particular model, most scholars recognised a degree of change in 
response to these new demands. 53 The expectation of continued change throughout the 
1960s and later was effectively dashed, however, by the Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in August 1968, thereby forcefully indicating the extent of Soviet 
tolerance for change within the satellite states.54 During the 1970s, subsequently, 
scholarly analysis of the system per se gave way to a number of studies of constituent 
parts of the system: the role of the elite groups, of technocrats, the interplay between 
domestic and international spheres of policy-making, for example. 
43 C Johnson, 'Companng Commumst Nations,' m: C Johnson (ed ), Change m Commumst Systems, 
1970 Stanford, Stanford Umvers1ty Press, p 2. Although the models developed referred specifically to 
the political system of the Soviet Union, the basiC prmc1ples also remam relevant for the East European 
systems of Commumst rule, which appeared to slavishly follow the example set by Moscow. 
49 New m some cases to the Soviet system Itself, and, m others, merely to the community of Soviet 
scholars. C Lefort, The Pohtical Forms of Modem Socwtv: Bureacracy. DemocracY. Totahtanamsm. 
1986 Cambndge, Pohty Press, Ch.2, pp 52-88. 
"A Kassof, 'The Administered Society· Totahtanamsm Without Terror,' in: F.J Fleron (ed ), 
Commumst Studies and the Social Sciences, 1969 Clucago, Rand McNally., p.46. 
" S P Huntlngton, Pohtical Order m Changmg Societies, 1968 New Haven, Yale Uruvemty Press, 
pp 40,47-53. 
"K.JoWitt, 'InclusiOn and Mob1hsation m European Lerunist Regimes,' World PohtJ.cs, Vol.28 No 1, 
October 1975, pp 69-96 
"J Hough, 'The Soviet System Petnfication or Pluralism?' Problems ofCommuniS!!L Vol.21 No 2, 
March-Apnll972, pp 25-45 
"W Taubman, 'The Change to Change m Commumst Systems. Modermsation, Post-modernisation 
and SovietPohtics,' m: H.W.Morton andR L.Tokes (eds ), SoVIet Pohtics and Soc1etv m the 1970s, 
1974 New York, Free Press, pp 379-80. 
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I do not propose to examine in any further detail the many criticisms of the 
totalitarian, or other, models of the European Communist systems that emerged during 
the 1970s. Suffice it to say that totalitarianism came under attack for a number of 
reasons. For example, as the era of the concentration of power in a single dominant 
leader, reaching its height under Stalin's repressive regime, gave way subsequent to 
his death, to a more relaxed and accommodating approach, the coercive apparatus did 
not appear to be so central or dominant a feature. What is significant is that the picture 
officially portrayed was one of consolidation, political strength, and social and 
cultural maturity, with the Communist Party recognised as the leading powerful force, 
enjoying authority and trust within society. Society was centralised with the Party 
exercising a recognised hegemony, with all individuals working towards one, 
commonly perceived socialist goal. Therefore, in theory at least, there were no 
divisions within the system at large. The very concept of a civil society was rendered 
superfluous to both the theory and the regime-claimed reality of the system. However, 
the fundamental tenet of totalitarianism - that a monolithic regime dominates an 
acquiescent and passive population - had been belied since 1945, not only by evidence 
of elite power struggles demonstrating obvious cleavages within the Party leadership 
itself, but also by increasing evidence of open political struggles and resistance. A 
cursory glance at the vast literature on dissident and opposition activity in European 
Communist systems reveals that the ideal-type or model of totalitarianism concealed 
certain anomalies and distinct shortcomings. 
However, despite these admitted flaws, totalitarianism has enjoyed a 
resurgence as a means of explaining the true nature of Communist systems. Joppke, 
for example, declared that it would be misleading to abandon the concept in favour of 
some alternative form of authontarianism.55 I would argue that, as a concept, it does 
have a useful analytical value when attempting to capture the essence of the East 
European Communist regimes. The East European systems may not have been 
orthodox totalitarian, yet they strove to be and continually tended in that direction. 
Moreover, prominent dissident intellectuals and writers consistently employed the 
term when referring to life under Communism. During his address forwarded to the 
University of Toulouse in 1984, for example, Vaclav Have! referred to the anonymity 
and de-personalisation of totalitarian power as symbolised by the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party (CCP}.56 Similarly, Ivan Klima begins an essay entitled "Culture vs. 
Totalitarianism" with the statement: 
ss C Joppke, East German Dissidents and the Revolution of 1989, 1995 Basingstoke, Macnullan Press 
Ltd, pp.I0-11, 17. 
56 V Have!, 'Ann-Poh!ical Pohtlcs,' in· J Keane (ed ), Civ1l Soc1etv and the State, 1988 London, Verso, 
pp.381-398 
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"With the exception of two brief periods [1945-8 and 1968] Czechoslovakia 
lived under the rule of totalitarian power for an entire half century." 57 
Writing on the subject of Charter 77, Josef Vohryzek talks of a "closed totalitarian 
society;" 58 and, similarly, Jacques Rupnik highlights the misguided abandomnent of 
the totalitarian model as a "propagandist product of the Cold war era," for it only to 
be re-appropriated by dissident writers within the East European regimes, citing 1968 
as the ultimate proof of the impossibility of"detotalising totalitarianism." 59 
(2.2.2) Totalztarianism and Civil Society 
One set of difficulties associated with the concept of totalitarianism revolves 
around an interpretation of the notion of social self-organisation within a supposedly 
totalitarian-type enviromnent. The essence of the totalitarian state is that it aspires to 
be total, asserting that the state is identical with society and co-extensive with it. It, 
therefore, denies autonomy to the individual and to non-state organisations, which 
must either be incorporated into the state apparatus, or face certain liquidation. Having 
secured control of social organisations, the totalitarian state seeks to penetrate every 
aspect of life, and assume control over all interests and activities. In theory, there can 
be nothing beyond state control: there can be no independent institutions With an 
autonomy and validity of their own, and no scope for an individual to remain true to 
his/her judgement, conscience or beliefs.60 Consequently, totalitarianism denies the 
possibility of, and excludes, any independent civil society. Therefore, if we consider 
Communist society to be, generally, characterised by the following four features·- the 
Party articulates the will of the people; the state is sacred, as is the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology; opposition to the Party and its policies signifies disloyalty; and individuals 
and groups, acting autonomously, are socially divisive, then it becomes evident that, 
any relinquishing on the part of the state of its control to personal or private activities 
or demands would necessarily entail a recognition of independent interests in society 
and, thus, undermine the entire rationale of the Communist regime.61 
"I Klnna, The Spin! of Prague, 1993 London, Granta Books, p.liO. 
"J Vohryzek, 'Thoughts Instde a Ttghtly-Corked Bottle,' in: V.Havel (ed.}, The Power of the 
Powerless, 1985 London, Palach Press, pp.198-221. 
"J Rupmk, 'Totahtanamsm Rev1Slted,' in· J Keane (ed ), op ctt. pp 263-267. 
60 B.Wolfe, CornmumstTotahtanamsm Keys to the Soviet System, 1985 Boulder CO, Westview 
Press, pp 267-9 
"SeeD Lane, Soviet Soctetv Under Perestrmka, 1992 London, Routledge, pp 107-130 for further 
discussion. 
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With particular reference to the countnes of Eastern Europe, sigmficant, then, 
were early manifestations of the apparent continued or potential existence of a semi-
functioning civil society which were apparent in Hungary and Poland in 1956, and 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. This existence took the form of an increasing tendency 
towards self-organisation within society, and a determmat10n to protect and extend the 
p~rmiSSible public sphere, thus, suggesting that the overall disengagement of the state 
from civil society was not as complete or total as propounded. 62 In the former GDR, 
for example, the increasmgly overt activities of mdependent peace groups and the role 
of the non-Orthodox Church began to represent the interests of a far from passive 
population. Dissident intellectlials certainly pressed for political reform and features 
normally associated with a civil society (freedom of the law and media, and of 
association, for example) m various waves from the 1950s. Sakwa states that the 
image of Eastern Europe as" a sea of grey immobility and passivity" can no longer be 
accepted:3 mirronng the cntlcisms levelled at theoreticians of totalitarianism, in 
general, and Sovietologists, in particular, that totalitarianism, as a theoretical system 
of rule, was, in reality, somewhat flawed in those countries in which it actlially 
existed. 
(2 2 3) How to Measure CiVIl Soczety m the East European Context? 
The apparent resurrection or survival of Civil society was identified by 
dissident intellecmals and scholars m both East and West. For example, Andrew 
Arato referred to the "Solidarity period" of 1980-81 as "the end of revisionism and 
the reconstimtion of civil society." 64 Essays which appeared in Poland written by 
Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron talked about the possibilities for the reconstruction 
of society, led not by the Party as the agent of reform but by independent public 
opinion and "by society." 65 Kuron's 1976 pamphlet- "Pour une Platforme unique de 
!'Opposition" -on an oppositional strategy for KOR outlined a systematic progranune 
for the resurrection of civil society based on the re-establishinent of the rule of law, 
and freedom of association guaranteed within an independent public sphere, to be 
founded on the networks of informal social relations that already existed in Polish 
society.•• The success of Michnik's "New Evolutionism" strategy depended on the 
"J Frentzel-Zagorska, op c1t, p 762. 
63R Sakwa, SoVIet Politics An Introduction. 1989 London, Routledge, p 319 
64 A Arato, 'CIVIl Society Agamst the State,' op c1t. p 23 
65Ibid, pp 27-29 
66 Cited m H Gordon Slollmg, Sanu2dat and An Independent Soc1etv in Central and Eastern Europe, 
1989 Basmgstoke, Macnullan Press, p 180 
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actions of independent society, and was subsequently to form the basis of Solidarity's 
policy concerning systemic transformatwn. Rudolf Bahro's "The Alternative in 
Eastern Europe" described the building of a new Communist Party outside the 
existmg one to absorb and replace Its predecessor as a result of its social hegemony. 
That is, it would truly be the representative of society, responding to independent 
political thought and action.67 In 1978, Jiri Pehkan was to interpret Bahro's concept of 
"dual power" to mean the emergence of parallel structures alongside official 
institutions -for example, publishing houses, universities, autonomous trade unions, 
social committees - which, together would form the basis of an entrre "parallel 
society". 68 In Hungary, Hegedus stressed the potential plurality of social forces 
seeking some autonomy and independent public expression. Even though, here, the 
existing network of social ties was almost exclusively intellectual, he proposed that 
they did provide a viable basis for an alternative, critical public sphere which could 
bypass the state altogether by setting up parallel institutions.69 In Poland, Wojcicki 
referred to the reconstruction of society amidst a high degree of organisation and 
societal autonomy, as an attempt to overcome the atomisation and control of the 
population. 70 In essence, as Western scholars referred to the resurrection of civil 
society, in Eastern Europe, a similar idea was more often expressed in concepts such 
as "the social self-organisation of society" in Poland, or an" independent society" in 
Czechoslovakia, or a "parallel society" in Hungary.71 
(2.2.4) From Civil Socrety to Second Socrety 
Richard Sakwa suggests three possible forms or varieties of 
resistance/opposition to communist power. Firstly, "organic work," that is, the steady 
devotion to the cause of reginle change but working tlrrough the structures of the 
existing system. Communist power, however, remained, tlrroughout its existence, 
relatively impermeable to opposition figures, any official opening, allowing even the 
expression of alternative ideas, would have struck at the very heart of the system. 
Secondly, violent or overt insurrection. This, too, was not an attractive choice for 
"RudolfBahro, 'The Alternattve m Eastern Europe' New Left Review 106, November-December 
1977, pp 3-38. 
68] Pehkan, 'Bahro's Ideas on Changes m Eastern Europe' m: R.Woller (ed ), RudolfBahro· Cnttcal 
Responses, 1980 New York, Wbite Plams, pp 168-185. 
69 A.Hegedus, 'Democracy and Soc10hsm m East and West in: Coates and Smgleton ( eds ), The Just 
Societv, 1977 Notttngham 
70 K WoJCicla, 'The Reconstructton of Society,' Telos, No.47, Spnng 1981, pp 98-104 
11 V Benda et a!, 'Parallel Pohs, or an Independent Society m Central and Eastern Europe: An Enquuy' 
SoCial Research, Vo155 Nos.l-2, Spring/Summer 1988, p 211. 
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opposition members: the mere threat of Soviet military intervention to maintain 
Communist govermnents, echoing the events of 1956 and 1968, deterred many would-
be opposition groups in Eastern Europe. Lastly, he suggests the creation of an 
alternative society, that is, a society not so much counterpoised to the official world as 
ignoring It; a second society insulated, to an extent, from Communist structures. n In 
the absence of any official political structure or avenue that could make it possible for 
groups or individuals to compete openly on the official political stage, the opposition 
turned its attention from authority and the state, to society as a means of change. The 
creation of an independent community became the only meaningful construction 
possible. As I highlighted previously, such a strategy was adopted by dissident 
intellectuals - notably, Have!, Michruk, Kuron and Hegedus - echoing Gramscian 
themes of the possibility of a civil society operating within the parameters of an 
oppressive authoritarian state. 
It is this last point that is significant for any discussion of the role of 
opposition, and for its effects on the process and mode of regime change and 
democratisation in Eastern Europe. That is to say, the development and subsequent 
consolidation of a second society is a theme integrating the disparate theme of 
opposition in Communist Europe and, as such, can be used to compare the effects of 
an autonomous civil society on regime transition. 
(2.2.5) The Second Society· A Definztion 
The concept of a second society should not be interpreted as a separate entity 
to that of civil society, but, rather, as one stage in the evolution of the latter. In 
essence, the birth and subsequent development of a second society is the precursor to 
a fully active, legally recognised civil society.73 The concept represented a 1970s East 
European construct; an attempt to encourage the development of civic initiatives in a 
system which recognised no legal public space for independence, and to account for 
and give direction to those actions already evident. The adoption of the second society 
concept by both East European dtssidents, and the groups and associations they 
encouraged, permits the analysis of independence in systems which afforded no legal 
recognition or space for traditional Civil society actors and activity. Inevitably, both 
mdividual and group efforts to overcome the social atomisation of society did prosper 
without the prior theorising of dissident intellectuals. Activities that would later be 
subsumed within the concept of a second society - black market selling and 
72R Sakwa, .Qil.£!!, pp 324-326. 
73 Only in Poland during the years 1980-81 With the legal recogrutlon of the Sohdanty Trade Umon, 
would It be JUStifiable to refer to the existence of a ciVIl society in Eastern Europe. 
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profiteering, reliance on familial and community networks to obtain scarce resources, 
for example - were a characteristic, albeit in varying degrees, of the Communist 
systems from the outset14 Similarly, cultural independence and phenomena such as 
samizdat publishing were in evidence before the theoretical essays written in the 
1970s gave meaning and direction to citizens' initiatives.75 In that respect, the concept 
of second society must be understood, on the one hand, as a spontaneous reaction to 
the strictures of the Communist system and, on the other, as the consequence of a 
deliberate strategy propounded by opposition intellectuals. 
The perspective of the second society has been advanced by a number of 
scholars in Eastern Europe. Notably, Elemer Hankiss, writing to explain the apparent 
contradictions inherent in his native Hungary, set forth the concept of a "dual 
society," thereby distinguishing between a "'first society' - 'the manifest, formal, 
institutional sphere', and the 'second society' - 'the latent and informal sphere of 
social existence."' 76 Vaclav Benda, a Czechoslovak Catholic intellectual and 
revolutionary democrat, wrote an essay in 1978 entitled "Parallel Polis" in which he 
called for the organisation of"parallel activities independent of the state, in which the 
various currents gradually form a broad, unlimited association of people, a 
community, a polis."n Vaclav Ravel's call for independent society to participate in 
"anti-political politics" - that is, "politics of the people" or "politics from below" -
was to prove a rallying-point for those willing to express their opposition to 
Communism and act upon it. 78 His "Power of the Powerless" talked of" a spectre of 
dissent haunting Europe," and recognised that the formation of a single, specific party 
in public opposition to the Communists was not the way to achieve a reform of the 
. 
system. Instead, he advocated "structures arising from below as a consequence of 
authentic social self-organisation." 79 Ivan Jirous referred to the "parallel polis" and 
its external manifestations (for example, the "second culture" or the Charter 77 
"S Sampson, 'The Informal Sector m Eastern Europe,' Telos. Vol66 No 4, Wmter 1985-6, pp 45-51. 
75 H Gordon Slalling, Sarrnzdat and An Independent Soc1etv in Central and Eastern Europe, op cif, 
pp 19-42. 
76E Hanlass, 'The "Second Society:" Is There an Altemaflve Social Model Ernergmg m Contemporary 
Hungary?' Social Research, Vol55 No 1-2, Sprmg/Surnmer 1988, pp.l8-21. 
77P.Uhl, 'The Alternaflve Commumty as RevolutiOnary Avant-Garde' m: V Have! et a!, The Power of 
the Powerless, 1985 London, Palach Press, p 192. 
"V.Havel, 'Anfl-Pohflcal Pohflcs,'QI!£!!, pp 381-398 
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movement) as embodiments of Ravel's "power of the powerless." 80 In this sense, 
Charter 77 and similar independent movements. such as the Committee for the 
Defence of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS) and the Czech "cultural underground," 
can be understood primarily as creators of a genuine alternative to the Communist 
totalitarian forms of social hfe. Charter 77 signatories, in particular, saw their 
activities as paralleling the activities of the official, recognised, institutionalised 
system, in an attempt to create a new sphere or dimension of social existence which 
would ultunately play a catalytic role in the transformation of the "first" or "official" 
society into a more democratic order. 81 
The fust and second societies, however, should not be understood as two 
distinct groups of people: 
"instead of being situated at two opposite poles, the two social spheres ... may 
reach deep into the middle field of a continuum and overlap, or even 
intertwine with one another." 82 
Rather, they should be seen as two identifiable, but not necessarily distinct, 
dimensions within the social sphere of a given society, regulated by two distinct sets 
of organisational principles. In addition, a well-developed second society subsumes a 
series of sub-systems. In the fust instance, a flourishing and mostly iiiegal "second 
economy" in competition with the planned economy of the state may exist. Many 
economists argued that, by the 1970s and 1980s, this second economy was an 
indispensable part of the entire economic system as it was able to satisfy consumer 
demands that the state-directed economy could not, and was therefore reluctantly 
accepted, as it - to a certain degree - channelled public discontent away from the 
official regime. The informal channels and networks that it created represented the 
growth of collective action vital for the day-to-day existence of virtually all East 
Europeans. 83 As such, for the individual, the second economy assumed a greater 
significance than the official one, and also contributed towards considerably 
extending personal liberties. 84 This phenomenon was more extensive and well-
'"'H Gordon Slallmg, 'Background to the study of oppos1lion m Cornrnumst Eastern Europe,' 
Government and Oooos1tion, V oil No 3, 1976, p.227. 
81A L1ehm, 'The New Soc1al Contract and the Parallel Polity' in. J L Curry (ed ), D1ssent m Eastern 
Europe, 1983 New York, PraegarPubhshers, p 177 
"E Hanlass, 'The Second Soc1ety: Is There an Altemalive Soc1al Model Emerging m Contemporary 
Hungary?' Social Research, Vol.55 Nos.l-2, Sprmg/Surnrner 1988, p.20. 
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developed in Hungary than elsewhere in Communist Europe, the population's 
involvement in unregistered economic activity being far greater. Endre Sik estimates 
that, by 1989, activity within the second economy accounted for as much as 35 per 
cent of total GDP.85 Secondly, a "parallel culture" in opposition to state censorship 
and the Communist drive to create a "people-as-one" society was a common 
characteristic.•• The term "parallel" or "second" culture is used to designate the 
entire realm of creative effort: samizdat, writing, independent art and theatre, 
education, and underground music and poetry, and youth culture. In particular, the 
role played by samizdat publications should not be underestimated, as its growth 
contributed significantly to the development of a second culture. To quote Ivan 
Klima: 
"I'm convinced that this 'underground culture' had an important influence on 
the revolutionary events of the autumn of 1989." 87 
In Czechoslovakia, alone, the publication of two hundred sarnizdat periodicals and 
several thousand books undermined the Communist Party's attempts to subject 
intellectual and spiritual life to the level of control exercised elsewhere in the system. 
The ideas disseminated in samizdat - all ultimately directed towards effective 
"freedom" - threatened the very heart of communist rule for, as Czeslaw Milosz 
states: 
"Communism recognises that rule over men's minds is the key to rule over an 
entire country, the word [therefore] is the cornerstone of the system."" 
A third possible characteristic of the second society was the "second social 
consciousness" representing a backlash from society against the reach of the official 
ideology in penetrating and permeating the consciousness of the masses. This 
phenomenon can best be seen in the split between the "public" and the "private" 
individual: a public adherence to Marxism-Leninism and the principles and structures 
of the Communist system, Inirrored by the development of private contrabelief 
systems expressed within the confines of the second society. This theme is best 
developed by Czeslaw Milosz in "The Captive Mind" in which he refers to the 
"ketman" that characterised the "people's democracies" of Eastern Europe. He 
defmes "ketman" as a behefthat: 
"E Sik, 'From the Second to the Informal Economy,' Journal ofPubhc Pohcy, Vol.2 No.12, 1993, 
p 158 
86R Sharlet, 'V ane!les of DISsent and Regulari!les of Repress tOn m the European Communist States: An 
Overview' m· J L Curry ( ed ), Dissent m Eastern Europe, op cit, p 8. 
87I Kluna, QP.£!!, p.SO. 
88C.Milosz, The Cap!lve Mmd, 1981 London, The Penguin Group, p.161. 
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"He who is in possession of truth must not expose his person, his relatives or 
his reputation to the blindness, the folly, the perversity of those whom it has 
pleased God to place and maintain in error. One must, therefore, keep silent 
about one's true convictions If possible." 
In essence, an individual's outward loyalty to the regime and all its principles, his/her 
apparent willingness to build, together with the Party, a socialist future, changes 
completely within the four walls of his home or amongst friends. Only then, can 
he/she live "within truth" and express feelings or ideas contrary to those espoused 
officially, and, thus, offer some form of resistance to the Communist system. 89 
Fourthly, a regime-opposed religious belief system, counterpoised to the 
officml policy of atheism could be identified within the bounds of second society.90 
This point is well illustrated by the significance of the Roman Catholic Church in 
Poland, where approximately 90 per cent of the population remained devout Catholics 
despite persistent attempts at persecution and limitations on the Church's activities. 
Similarly, in the former GDR, religion provided a focus for the activities of dissident 
groups and the opposition in general, contributing significantly to the evolution of 
alternative structures. In addition, the re-emergence of horizontal social networks, 
which saw the regeneration of the solidarity of local communities and interaction 
between diverse groups was complemented by the generation of a recognisable 
counter-elite, which would subsequently take centre-stage in the regime transitions in 
1989. Groups were uruted in their opposition to Communism and, thus, challenged the 
vertical organisation of power (all communication, theoretically, flowmg downward 
from the party to the people) which characterised the system. 
In summary, the notion of an "independent" or "parallel'' society caught the 
imagination of opposition circles across East and Central Europe. The concept 
embraced independent, autonomous imtiatives and activity undertaken within the 
framework of an otherwise controlled society, and served to demarcate it from the life 
of official institutions. It refered to the various forms of dissent expressed in Eastern 
Europe seen in the informal acts of collective protest or self-expression by individuals 
in the economy, culture and society, which could not be expressed within the 
structures of the Communist system.91 This concept was supported by former East 
European dissidents themselves also. Typically, for example, Jiri Dienstbier stated: 
''!bid especially Chapter 3. 
"R.Sharlet, Ql!.£!!, p 8 
91H Gordon Siollmg, Sarmzdat and An Independent Society m Central and Eastern Europe, op CI!, 
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"The dynamism today is with the independent and parallel activities, as 
instruments of the self-organisation of civil society." 92 
The existence of elements of a second society were significant for they 
demonstrated that Communist regimes had not only failed to achieve the level of 
control portrayed by the totalitarian and other models but, especially in the post-Stalin 
era, had also scaled back their ambitions, allowing independent activities in civil 
society to play a more overt role. The increasing number of independent groups and 
associations, embedded in second society, gave genuine expression to popular 
aspirations, and testified to the emergence of social forces with a solid public presence 
outside the official political structures, thereby creating a real challenge to the 
established forms of politics.93 Merely v1a their actual existence within the regimes, 
these groups challenged the fundamental tenets of the Communist systems, by 
undermining the effectiveness of the Communists' strategy to achieve the social 
at01nisation of the individual, and introducing independent elements into the socio-
political order that challenged the "people-as-one" principle of Communist theory. In 
this respect, non-Party groups and organisations of a second society, operating outside 
the formal political process, are crucial components of the entire process of change 
and transition in Eastern Europe, as they played important roles as agents of political 
change, and laid the foundations for the events of 1989. In Poland, for example, the 
phenomenon of autonomous groups flourished: the emergence of a range of social 
movements in the late 1970s heralded the first effective political opposition within the 
Communist bloc. Their efforts would culminate in the birth of the Solidarity Trade 
Union in 1980-81, and the reconstruction and consolidation of a legally recognised 
civzl society in Poland.94 
In addition, second society organisations provided forums for discussion and 
had the potential to formulate alternative political progranJrnes which, especially in 
Poland, were to form the basis for action throughout the 1980s.95 Second society 
groups successfully established horizontal networks, both internally and 
transnationally, thereby undernuning the hierarchical organisation of the official 
92V.Benda et al (eds.), QJl.£!!, p 233. 
"N Lampert, 'Democracy and Civil Society,' m· J Bloomfield ( ed ), The Soviet Revolution, 1989 
London, Lawrence and Wishart, p.211. 
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political systems. Transnational contacts between opposition groups - which 
incorporated mutually supportive exchanges and attempts to integrate activities, 
especially between Czechoslovak and Polish activists - opened up a new chapter in 
the history of the East European dissident movements, and countered official policies 
aimed at the insulation of domestic publics from troubles abroad!6 Furthermore, 
second society organisations were the breeding ground for alternative political 
leaderships, members of autonomous groups gaining valuable experience in the art of 
self-organisation and political confrontation. Leaders such as Lech Walesa and Vaclav 
Havellearnt skills and strategies that could be employed once the Communist regimes 
had fallen, and, post-1989, many former dissident leaders were to take-up influential 
positions within the transitional governments. Via the establishment of a recognisable 
counter-elite, second society opposition was able to gain a degree of heretofore 
unknown legitimacy and cred!b1hty in the eyes of both the populations at large and, to 
an extent, recognition from the Communist regimes, if only in the form of continual 
persecution and harassment of dissident leaders. In 1989, in particular, in those 
COUJ_ltries in which the leadership of the opposition was clearly recognisable 
(predominantly Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) failing Communist regimes 
were able to identifY specific potential partners with whom to open negotiations in an 
attempt to preserve the essence of the ailing systems. In sunimary, by effectively 
negating Communist attempts to achieve unity, consolidation and uncontested 
political strength, and with the re-engagement of the individual in political life via 
independent institutions, second society can be interpreted as a predominant factor 
affecting the process of transition in Eastern Europe. Independent organisations 
fulfilled a number of functions which contributed to an undermining of Communist 
rule. The extent to which they were able to do so, also undoubtedly affected the 
manner in which the regimes broke down m 1989. 
Having defined the concept of second society, it is important to outline a 
specific set of criteria that can be employed to "measure" the extent of its 
development in the individual case study countries. The potential for a "fully 
developed" second society to include such spheres as a second economy, an 
independent culture, to generate a recognisable counter-elite and to encourage 
independent religious affiliation, for example, has been outlined above. In order to 
gauge the extent to which second society encompassed these spheres of activity in 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, the following specific criteria will be used. 
96 P.Cinlton, Mechanics of SoCial Change· Soc1al Movements, Transnatwnal Coah!ions and the 
Transfonna!ion Processes m Eastern Europe,' Democra!isation. Vol1 No 1, Spnng 1994, pp.lSI-181. 
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In the first instance, with regard to the emergence and expansion of a second 
culture, the extent of samizdat publishing will be analysed. The question of whether it 
succeed in rallying the public to the opposition's cause, either via declarations of 
support or sympathy, or via the formation of independent groups and associations will 
be addressed. The case studies will consider whether samizdat publications were 
successful in attracting a national readership, or whether circulation was limited in 
terms of the numbers or particular regiOns appealed to. In addition, whether the sphere 
of activity developed to the extent that independent publishing houses were 
established that were able to nurture large networks of support; or to the extent that it 
encouraged independence in associated spheres, such as education will be addressed. 
Secondly, the extent of independent group formation will be analysed. In particular, 
the case studies will focus on the forms they adopted, in terms of structure or 
membership requirements, and their respective orientations (political, social and/or 
economic). Also, the degree to which second society groups were able to formulate a 
viable alternative policy progranime to that propounded by the Communist regime 
appears a significant factor to consider. In addition, the case-studies will focus on 
whether second society was spearheaded by an identifiable group or umbrella 
movement that was able to direct the independent activities of society as a whole; and 
whether these activities generated the emergence of a recognisable alternative 
leadership that, in turn, formulated a specific political progranime. The existence, or 
otherwise, of a popular and national independent church distinguishing between the 
institution as an alternative source of authority within society, or as a regime-support 
structure, would also appear to be a significant factor. 
I now pose the question: to what extent did the emerging second societies of 
Eastern Europe contribute towards the particular forms of transition that occurred in 
1989? Where second society appeared to be at the fullest stage of development in 
Eastern Europe (Poland) the regime was eroded from within. Breakdown was 
negotiated, gradual and peaceful, with second society organisations eo-opted at an 
early stage. Where opposition to Communism was unorganised and sporadic 
(Romama) breakdown was swift and violent, with second society organisations 
playing a specific role only after the irutial transition. Levels of opposition activity 
throughout the period of Communist rule were minimal and tended to be of an 
individual and isolated nature. In addition, two features of the second society in 
Poland appear to be significant. Firstly, the opposition, under the umbrella of 
Solidarity, uruted society and overcame class divisions; and, secondly, the 
independent union was able to formulate a viable political alternative to the 
Communist system of rule, and challenge the Jaruzelski regime in the political sphere. 
In these two respects, second society in Poland presented a society-wide, organised 
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political opponent, winch the Communist regime could not ignore in 1989. My 
hypothesis can, therefore, be summarised as follows: the extent of development of 
second society, and the nature and orientation of activities therewithin, determined the 
ability of opposition forces to appeal to all classes in society via the formulation of a 
popular, political alternative to Communist rule. This, in turn, had a specific impact 
on the mode of breakdown experienced in 1989. The hypothesis leads on to three 
specific questions. What were the historical factors within individual countries that 
conditioned the evolution of second society? What opposition, embedded Within 
second society, did evolve? And, what was the impact of this opposition on the 
particular mode of breakdown witnessed in 1989? By addressing these questions, I 
will be able to test the hypothesis outlined above. 
In order to assess the extent to which second society contributed towards the 
particular mode of breakdown experienced, it is also necessary here to outline a 
classification of modes of breakdown in order to compare the effect of second society 
on the process of change within the case stndy countries. This can be done by placing 
countries in transition at a point determined by two axes. The first (the vertical axis) 
relates to the level of development of second society; the second (the horizontal axis) 
relates to mode of regime breakdown (see Figure 2.1). 
M uure, 
fully· 
developed 
N atcent, 
under-
developed L<:;~.,...,------,,-----.,.-,---..,.---,-,-----...==---
Revoluuoo Coup Collapu Neaot1at1oo Extn~;at1on 
Mode of Breakdown 
Figure 2.1 Second Society and Modes of Regime Breakdown 
(Typology denved from: D Share, 'Transi!Ions to Democracy and Transi!Ion Through Transac!lon,' 
Compara!lve Political Studies. Vo119 No 4, January 1987, pp 525-548; S P.Huntington, 'How 
Countries Democrattse,' Pohttcal Science Quarterly, Vo1106 No 4, 1991-2, pp 579-616, and T L Kart 
and PC Schnutter, 'Modes ofTransi!Ion m Lattn Amenca, Southern and Eastern Europe,' Interna!lonal 
Social Science Journal, No 128, May 1991, pp.269-284). 
Whilst recognising that such categories represent ideal-types and that most 
cases of regime breakdown may manifest characteristics of more than one mode, it is 
important to define the SIX categories shown in Figure 2.1. Firstly, revolutions are a 
-----------------
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result of mass mobilisations and the consequent defeat of the incumbent authoritarian 
rulers. Therefore, regime breakdown may be a relatively rapid phenomenon and, 
significantly, accompanied by high levels of violence. Opposition forces will establish 
coherent groups or parties only after initial and probably spontaneous public 
demonstrations. Transitions through revolution tend to result in the complete 
delegitimation of the previous regime, and, therefore, a clear break with the past. The 
second category of breakdown via a coup occurs when the authoritarian regime is 
dislodged from power by an elite group from within the military, police force, or from 
within the incumbent governing party itself. The action of these groups may be 
triggered by the threat of impending military defeat, or by the perception of imminent 
threats to the status quo. The public may play an ancilhary role via mass 
demonstrations against the authoritarian regime or m support of the coup leaders, 
however, society does not generally hold the initiative in the transition process. The 
initiative in terms of the direction and extent of transition remains with the elite and a 
clear break with the past may not be identifiable. Mihtary coups, in particular, may 
involve the possibility of accompanying domestic violence. The collapse of an 
authoritarian regime may occur as the result of military defeat or occupation by an 
external power, or as a consequence of domestic factors such as severe economic 
cnsis. Multilateral negotiations may ensue, however, society generally plays a 
mirumal role as the principal impetus for change is an external one. Negotration 
occurs when government and opposition leaders are jointly involved in a negotiated 
transition, a situation itself the result of a rough equality of power between the two. 
Here, transition is characteristically peaceful and gradual. Furthermore, a degree of 
continuity between the old and the new regime will exist, no clear definitive break 
with the past being readily identifiable. Negotiations are preceded by mass 
mobilisations and the expansion of independent activities and public support for them. 
A distinction must be made, however, between negotiations that are elite-led and 
those that are society-led. The former variant of the negotiation mode concerns those 
transitions that are led from within the authoritarian regime. Incumbent ehtes play the 
key role in the transition process, controlling negotiations with certain eo-opted 
opposition groups. Transition is non-violent, with society playing a supportive role for 
the changes initiated "from above." Within the second variant, opposition groups 
play the predominant role, forcing the regime to enter negotiations. In both variants, 
negotiations are likely to ensure that the process of change is generally peaceful and 
that transition is characterised by mcremental reform of the authoritarian regime rather 
than its sudden overthrow. The final category of extrication can be the consequence of 
the sudden and rapid loss of legitimacy enjoyed by a regime, which abruptly retires 
from power allowing the democratic opposition to take over. Transition may be 
relatively swift, but not accompanied by widespread violence. Society may play a 
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crucial role in demonstrating the regime's lack of legitimacy, however, the main 
impetus for change comes from Within the regime. This category refers principally to 
those instances when the military-as-government extricates itself from power and 
returns to the barracks. 
(2.3) Country Justifications 
The modes of transition experienced by the European Communist regimes m 
1989 demonstrate major variations, despite their coincidental timing and the 
superficial similarity displayed in their rejection of Communism. 
I have chosen to focus on the three very different cases of Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Romania, and by comparing them, to analyse the extent to which 
the variation between the modes of transition can be explained by domestic, 
specifically second society, variables. The case-study countries have been selected as 
representing three points on a continumn, ranging from peaceful negotiated change to 
violent revolutionary upheaval. The Polish example represents one extreme of this 
contmumn: a negotiated, social contract-type of revolution (with independent social 
movements preparing themselves over a long period for the transfer of the state 
apparatus into their own hands) that was both gradual and peaceful. The Romanian 
example is located at the other extreme. Romania represents a case of regime collapse 
(perhaps better classified as a coup rather than a revolution) which was both 
catastrophic and arrested. The collapse of Communism was sudden and violent. In 
this study, therefore, Romania acts as the counter-case, which serves to illustrate what 
the significant conditions for the non-violent transitions in the remaining countries 
must have been. Czechoslovakia also experienced relatively sudden regime collapse, 
following some of the most severe repression wimessed m Eastern Europe throughout 
the 1970s. Yet, distinct from Romania, the transition was non-violent. In this respect, 
the Czechoslovakian example is located between the two extremes of Poland and 
Romania. 
In this thesis, the Po !ish case-study will serve as the standard for comparison. 
The self-liberation of second society in Poland, beginning with the formation of cross-
class opposition movements, reached its apex when the Party-state was compelled to 
legally recognise second society's existence and the boundaries of the public space. 
Second society was able to co-exist for a time (with the interruption of Martial Law) 
with a moribund authoritarian regime. At the end of the 1980s, social forces within 
this reconstituted second society were to negotiate a political compromise with the 
Communist regime, which allowed them to contest state power through parliamentary 
elections. During the entire process of regime breakdown, second society 
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organisations played a predominant role. In comparing Czechoslovakia and Romania 
to Poland, attention will be paid to the extent to which opposition to Communism 
developed (for example, whether it succeeded in overcoming the class divisions 
within society, or in formulating a viable alternative to Communist rule) and whether 
its effect on the mode of transition in each country was determining or peripheral. 
By employing the criteria outlined above, the case study chapters will assess 
the extent to which a second society developed in the Polish, Czechoslovak and 
Romanian examples. In so doing, they will also consider the context in which 
opposition developed, that is, the nature and characteristics of the Communist 
regimes, which either created specific opportunities or barriers for second society 
activities. The case-study chapters are, therefore, divided into three sections. In order 
to establish the context in which opposition to Communism developed, the first will 
consider historical factors which conditioned the nature of emerging opposition, in 
addition to the general characteristics of the established Communist regimes, which 
effected its subsequent evolution. The second section focuses specifically on the 
nature of the opposition that did emerge, and the range and extent of its activities, 
with a particular emphasis on the 1970s and early 1980s. The fmal section considers 
the role of second society during Communism's later years, and assesses its specific 
impact on the mode of transition experienced in 1989. 
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CHAPTER Ill: POLAND CASE STUDY 
In this chapter, I will address the central argument of this thesis: that is, to 
what extent the emerging second society within Poland contributed towards, or 
conditioned, the particular form of transition which occurred in 1989. My contention 
is that the mode of regime breakdown was directly dependent on the level of 
development achieved by the second society in Poland, and on its relationship with 
the Communist regime, which had evolved since the late 1940s. Post-1945, the 
country continually displayed a high and ever-maturing degree of second society 
activity, especially in the period after August 1980 and the formation of the Solidarity 
trade union. In 1989, as a direct consequence of the activities of opposition groups 
and individuals, the breakdown of the Communist regime and the Polish transition 
towards democratisation was characterised by negotiations involving both 
government and second society representatives. My argument, therefore, is that the 
development and activities of second society resulted in a gradual transition, 
characterised by a non-violent transfer of power and major structural changes of the 
economic and political systems. Independent organisations played a crucial and 
central role throughout. 
I do not mtend the case studies to be historical descriptions or chronologies of 
Communist rule from the 1940s to the year 1989. Certain important events and 
turning points will be analysed in more detail than others, however, insofar as they 
were sigruficant for the evolution of a second society in each country. In partiCular, 
the indigenous Iustoncal factors that had a beanng on the type of second society that 
was likely to evolve; the interplay between the policies adopted by the Communist 
regimes and those of the opposition forces; the adoption of specific and coherent 
strategies and progranunes by the opposition; and the development of intra-societal 
alliances, will be highlighted. 
The following case study chapter will is divided into three sections. The first 
sets the cultural, historical and political context within which second society 
developed, and highlights those factors that contributed, or detracted, from this 
development. Section Two maps out the evolution of the second society within 
Poland, concentrating, in particular, on the evolutiOn of theories of opposition by 
dissident intellectuals and the penod post-1976. The final section looks, in greater 
depth, at the activities and the specific strategies adopted by opposition groups and 
their contnbution to the mode of breakdown experienced by the Communist regime in 
1989. 
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(3.1) History and Political Traditions 
(3.1.1) Western Orientations and Traditions 
Whatever one's chosen definition of"Europe"t and "Poland,"2 there can be 
little dispute that, historically, Poland has lain on Europe's Eastern confines. In every 
other sense, however, its strongest links have traditionally been with the West. This 
Western connection was forged in large measure by Poland's loyalty to the Roman 
Catholic Church, which determined that all deep-rooted cultural ties lay with the 
Latin world; and that libertarian and pluralist values, common to Western s?cieties, 
found fertile soil on Polish lands.3 Poland's kinship with those countries that 
respected basic freedoms, held free electiOns in which the people could Judge their 
government, and accepted the mdependence of the judicial system and the freedom of 
the press, was constantly affirmed.4 
This characteristic was strengthened by a number of additional factors. Davies 
points to the development of Polish commerce with Germany, Holland, France and 
Spain, as opposed to trade links with the Black Sea countries to the East during the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; and to the consequences of the historical Franco-
German rivalry which repeatedly forced successive French kings to attempt to procure 
an alliance with Poland to complete the geographical encirclement of their German 
enemy.s Jerschina, highlights the fact that the West represented countries where no 
one confiscated private land; and countnes to which millions of peasants had 
emigrated to enjoy the benefits of higher pay, freedom and democracy.6 A significant 
additional factor IS that the West also represented those countries that had maintained 
their freedom, or liberated themselves, from Nazism. Unique in Eastern Europe, 
I Whether 1! IS the 1dea of Chnstendom; or the modem concept of a geographical contment stretchmg 
from G1bralter to the Caucasus 
2 Whether 1! was the ancient reahn" of the P1asts or the Jagolhans; or the umted Repubhc of Poland-
Lithuama. 
3 See· Norman Dav1es, Heart of Europe· A Short History of Poland, 1984 Oxford, Oxford Umvemty 
Press, Chapter 5, especially pp 336-345. 
4 See. Alam Touraine, Sohdanty; The Analysts of a Soctal Movement· Poland 1980-81, 1982 London, 
Cambndge Umvemty Press, p 50. 
5 N Dav1es, op ctt, pp 343-4 
6 Jan Jerscluna, 'The Cathohc Church, the Communist State and the Pohsh People', m· S Gomulka 
and A Polonsky (eds ), Pohsh Paradoxes. 1990 London, Routledge, p 87. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- -----
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Poland did not choose any form of alliance with Nazi Germany in the early 1940s. Its 
resistance forces had been large and well-organised and, thus, the experience of the 
War left the Poles with no feelings of complicity, and with a record of anti-Naz1 
resistance far stronger than, for example, that of Czechoslovakia or Hungary. 7 As 
such, once again, Poland's experiences were akm to those of the West of Europe, not 
the East. 
(3.1.1.1) Hrstory of Antr-Russranrsm/Sovietism, and Catholicism 
As a consequence of the above, the attempt to legitimise the Communist 
regime post-1945 encountered two specific obstacles whose foundations were deeply 
buried m Polish history. These were, firstly, the fact that Communism came from the 
East and was brought by Russians, a people whose state had been in competition with 
that of Poland since the sixteenth century. Poland's historical contact with the 
Russians fostered bitterness and mutual distrust, emotions which were perpetuated by 
more recent revulsions against the state-sanctioned orthodoxy of Tsarism and the 
atheism of the Marxist-Leninist ideology.s The Soviet crimes were best symbolised 
by reference to Katyn and the massacre of some four thousand Polish army officers. 
Until the late 1980s, Poles remembered it as the symbol of Soviet oppression.9 
Generations of Poles, therefore, came of age with an awareness of their Polish 
national identity, and with a strong desire for independence from the Russian 
aggressor. 
The second obstacle to Communist rule in Poland was the influence of 
Catholicism. In order to understand the position and role of the Church, it is necessary 
to focus on its historic role in Poland.IO The most significant point to highlight here, is 
7 See PG Lew1s, 'Leg1tnnacy and the Polish Communist State', in: D Held et a! (eds.}, States and 
Soc1e!les, 1983 Oxford, Mar!!n Robertson and Company Ltd, pp 436-8. 
8 See N Dav1es, op c1t, pp 344-345; Ch N 'The Legacy of Spmtual Mastery: Poland During the 
Part1!1ons 1795-1918' and Ch V 'The Legacy of an Ancient Culture Poland Before 1795' Also, 
Anonymous, The Dark S1de of the Moon, 1947 New York, for memorrs of the Polish deporta!lons of 
1939-40. 
9 Katyn Forest near Smolensk m ByeloruSSia marks the Site of a mass grave where the corpses of over 
4000 Polish Officers were unearthed by German mves!lgators m Apnl1943. 
10 The role played by the Roman Catholic Church m Pohsh lustory and pohllcs 1s a complex one. An 
m-depth analysiS IS not possible here See· Jan Novak, 'The Church m Poland,' Problems of 
Cornmumsm Vol 31 No I, 1982, pp.l-16, J.Jerscluna, op c1t. pp.76-96; S Staron, 'The State and the 
Church' m. A Bromke and JW Strong (eds }, Gterek's Poland, 1973 New York, Praegar Publishers, 
pp 158-175, L Dembmskl, 'The Cathohcs and Poh!!cs m Poland,' tbtd. pp 279-291; L Kolakowskl and 
J Gross, 'Church and Democracy m Poland. Two VIews,' Dtssent, Summer 1980, pp 316-322 
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the identification of Roman Catholicism with Polish nationality, a deep-rooted 
tradition established in the twelfth century, when national integration had been 
threatened by internal divisiOns and early German expansionism.11 In the absence of a 
nationally accepted monarch, it was the Primate who acted as head-of-state and 
maintained national uruty. Particularly dunng the "era of Partitions" in Poland, 
Catholicism as a religiOn, and the Church as an mstitution, played the role of essential 
agents in the preservation of a distinctly Polish national identity, helpmg to maintain a 
sense of nationhood across divided frontiers.I2 By sharing the fate of its people, the 
Church fulfilled the role of an important national rallying-point and, thus, became the 
effective mainstay of "Polishness." These ties were formalised in the twentieth 
century, dunng the inter-war period, by constitutiOnal conferral on the Catholic 
Church of" favoured status" as the majonty denomination of the population.IJ Post-
1945, the Polish Catholic Church emerged from the War with its accumulated 
authority perhaps greater than ever. Despite losses, the Church had, once again, 
shared the sufferings imposed on the Polish nation as a whole, whilst both priests and 
Church hierarchy had taken an active part in the national resistance movement.14 
A further factor to note is the national and religious homogeneity that became 
particularly evident in 1945. The loss of former Eastern Polish territories, and the 
massive transfer of Polish inhabitants to the newly acquired Western territories, from 
which the original German population had been removed, enormously strengthened 
the social basis of the Church.15 A 1970s survey revealed that nearly 99 per cent of 
the population identified themselves as Poles, and more than 93 per cent had been 
baptised as Catholics.I6 
11 N Dav1es, op c1t, pp 279-291. 
12 At the end of the 19th Century, Poland lost 1ts pohtlcal mdependence and was, effectively, 
partitioned among 1ts three ne1ghbours - Austna, Russ1a and Pruss1a 
13 J Nowak, .Q1!..£!!, p 3. 
14 More than 200 churches were destroyed Of the 12,000 priests and members ofrehgwus orders m 
the prewar Church, 2500 had been executed or severely deb1htated by therr expenences m Naz1 
concentratiOn camps All Pohsh semmanes had been e1ther closed or destroyed. 
15 L Dembmskt, op c1t. pp 176-177 
16 W ZolarueWlcz, The Cathohc Church m Poland 1945-1978, 1979 Poznan-Warsaw, Pallotlmum 
Press, p 21. 
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The position of the Roman Catholic Church in the Communist political 
system post-1945 was a specifically Polish feature. In Poland, more so than anywhere 
else in the Communist bloc, religious and national values were an integrated and 
indivisible element of national culture. During the Stalimst period, the Church and its 
clergy shared the suffering of the people. More importantly, however, as the only 
officially tolerated, substantially independent organisation within the Communist 
system, the Roman Catholic Church provided a readily accessible alternative system 
of values that stood in stark contrast to Polish reality. It therefore acted as the 
foundation stone upon which the social and moral expectations of most Poles were 
based. This is particularly significant with regard to the development of the 
opposition in the 1970s and 1980s, as popular resistance, in large measure, sprang 
from this moral foundation.l7 
Historical factors camiot be overlooked in any analysis of change in Eastern 
' Europe. All the above contribute to explanations as to how and why the Polish 
opposition developed to the extent, and in the form, that it did in the later stages of 
Communist rule. Poland's strong tradition of conspiring against foreign rule, for 
example, was much more conducive to the self-organisation of society agamst an 
imposed system of power than, say, was the case in Czechoslovakia. The former's 
freedom fighting and conspiratorial tradition offered ready-made patterns for anti-
government activity, and endowed people engagmg in it with a moral righteousness. 
It also helped secure widespread social support for opposition activities, if only at the 
level of individual consciousness, thereby preventing the unquestioned internalisation 
of Communist values. The long history of anti-Russianism and the general feelmg of 
alienation that Soviet rule inspired, coupled with the continuing and growing presence 
of the Catholic Church, figures prominently m any analysis of the illegitimacy of the 
Communist regime in Poland post-1945. Their relevance to Communist Poland 
became evident at an early stage when, uniquely in Eastern Europe and significantly 
for future decades, the totalitarian drive was weakened in order to mitigate the 
problems associated with Communist rule. This provided no effective solution, 
however, and the inadequate grounds of the Communist regime's legitimacy 
continued to lie at the roots of its problems until the final breakdown of the PZPR 
leadership in 1989.18 
17 See: A M1chmk, 'A Lesson m Digruty', Letters From Pnson and Other Essays, 1985 Berkeley, 
Uruvemty ofCahfomia Press, pp 160-168. 
18 V.C.Chrypmsla, 'Pohncal Traditions of the Poles,' Problems of Communism, Vol27 No 5 1978, 
pp 63-67; and A Bromke, 'A Pole VIews HIS Country,' Problems of Commumsm, Vol20 1971, 
pp.73-77 
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(3 1 2) The Establishment of the Communist Regime in Poland 
Stalinist institutions were imposed upon Poland during the period from 1944-
1949, and were clearly alien to the dominant political culture. For the reasons 
discussed above, many Poles vtewed the system as alien from the outset. The 
following account of the establishment of Communism in Poland is brief. My aim IS 
to highlight only those factors and themes that held a long-term significance for the 
evolution of the Polish opposition forces.t9 
Post-1945, the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) succeeded in effectively seizing 
power in Poland, only wtth Soviet support. Not until December 1948 and the 
founding congress of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), however, could the 
Communists claim to rule unchallenged. Early 1947 witnessed the elimination of the 
Peasant Party (PSL) as an independent political force, leaving only the Socialists 
(PPS) as a viable alternative to the Communist Party.20 Stalin's instructions for the 
formation of a new ruling party by an amalgamation of the rump PPS with the 
Commurust PPR in March 1948, successfully eliminated all official, autonomous 
political forces within Poland.2t With the consolidation of its political power, the 
PZPR proceeded briskly to bring Communism to Poland, and began to transform the 
state and society along the lines of the Stalinist modeJ.22 Significantly, however, 
Stalinism never gained the same ferocity in Poland that reigned in neighbouring 
countries. Dissidents were persecuted, for example, but the purges never reached the 
intensity evident in other satellites. 
19 For more detalied accounts, see N Dav1es, op c1t. Chapters I and II, pp.l-6 and 73-100. Also, 
J.Rothscluld, Return to Diversitv' A Political History of East Central Europe Smce World War I!, 2nd 
EditiOn 1993 Oxford, Oxford Umvers1ty Press, Chapter 3; Patnck Brogan, Eastern Europe 1939-1989, 
1990 London, Bloomsbury, Chapter 2; S.S Lotarsla, 'The Communist Takeover m Poland', m· 
Thomas Hammond (ed.), The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers, 1975 New Haven, Yale Umvers1ty 
Press 
20 For a bnef analysis of the political parties m existence m 1945 Poland, see: D.Ost, Solidantv and 
the Politics of Anti-Pohtics, 1990 Phliadelphia, Temple Umvemty Press, especially pp 35-38 
21 For the reasons belund Stalin's actions to consolidate "proviSional" arrangements w1thm the 
satellite states, see Ib1d, Ch4, pp 55-74 
22 For a personal account of the nnpact of Stalimsm, see A Szczyp10rski, The Polish Ordeal The 
VIew From W1thm, 1982 Beckenham, Croom Hehn Ltd, Ch 4 
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Furthermore, several factors are significant with regard to the development of 
opposition in Poland, as distinct from that in Czechoslovakia and Romania. Firstly, 
although the collectivisation of agriculture was boldly pushed forward m Poland, it 
was slow and incomplete, (the peasants were neither deported, nor driven to famine) 
and finally abandoned in 1956. After a policy of decollectlvisation, sizeable social 
groups retained a degree of autonomy from state control, which had a significant 
impact on the consciousness of society. In addition, the middle classes and the 
intellectuals, though severely harassed, were not liquidated. Having, initially thrown 
their support behind the new regime, following the relative failures of the first Five 
Year Plan (1950-55) and the death ofStalm in 1953, many intellectuals came to reject 
Stalinism and to feel responsible for the wrongs the regime had committed. 23 
Consequently, many enthusiastically joined the growing reform movement within 
Poland, thus, laying the early foundatiOn stones of opposition upon which later anti-
Communist activity could bmld. Furthermore, the Roman Catholic Church - despite a 
period of persecution, and the arrest and Imprisonment of Cardinal Wyszynski - was 
not suppressed, in large part due to the regime's desire to bolster its own legitimacy 
via the promotion of a relatively conciliatory policy towards the Church 24 In 1956, 
the Church remained both independent of the Communist regime, and in the best 
position to carry out Its service for the Catholic community. From the mid-1950s 
onwards, these three specific features of the Polish order - an independent Catholic 
Church, a relatively free peasantry, and a growing band of intellectual political 
dissidents -went from strength to strength.25 To quote Adam Michnik:-
"The Church's opposition to atheistic policies, the villages' resistance to 
collectivisation, the intelligentsia's defiance of censorship - all made up the 
Polish "syndrome" that bore fruit in the form of the August strikes and 
Solidarity."26 
23 The mterwar Pohsh regime had been strongly discredited for 1ts fallure both to solve social 
problems and to defend the country m 1939. The need for unmediate social reform- supported by the 
Communist Party - was recogmsed by most pohttcal groups m society. Others were attracted by the 
role of the USSR m the defeat ofNaz1sm, and by the "practJ.cahty" of the Marxist-Lenirnst ideology. 
24 For details see: J Nowak, op c1t. pp 3-8, J Jerschma, op c1t. pp 80-90 
25 N Dav1es op Cl!. pp I 0-16 
26 A M1chmk, 'A Year Has Passed,' Letters from Prison and Other Essays, op c1t, p 125. 
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(3.1.3) June 1976 Workers' Unrest 
On June 24th 1976, Edward Gierek's regime announced a steep and 
unanticipated increase in basic food prices,27 The combmed uproar of workers' strikes 
and street demonstrations forced the rescinding of the proposed price rises the 
followmg day. In the interceding twenty-four hours, however, hundreds of 
demonstrators had been arrested, scores maltreated and beaten by the police, and 
many eventually sentenced to imprisonment. 28 The ensuing persecution of the 
working class strike activists prompted intellectuals into positive and decisive action 
in September, with the formation of the Committee for the Defence of Workers 
(KOR), representing the first constructive efforts on the part of the Polish 
intelligentsia to bridge the gap that had prevented the formation of a united societal 
front against the Communist regime in 1956, 1968 and, again, in 1970-71. This was 
to prove, perhaps, to be the single most decisive turning-point in the evolution of 
political opposition as a whole in Poland, and is a central factor in distinguishing 
Poland from the two other countries under consideration here. In order to fully 
understand the formation of this alliance, it is necessary in the first instance however, 
to examine the course of opposition to Polish Communism under Wladislaw 
Gomulka and G1erek in greater detail. 
(3.1.3.1) Gomulka 's Regime 
In June 1956, protests by Polish workers against their worsening economic 
situation and increasing demands from intellectuals for greater freedoms threatened 
the status quo in Poland.29 In the late 1950s, despite a broad national consensus of 
support, Gomulka, the newly appointed leader of the PZPR, was to squander the 
reserves of popularity and legitimacy that had sustained his return to power. 30 A 
combination of ideological rigidity, mtolerance of any manifestation of dissent, and 
support for the increasing bureaucratisation of the system, appeared to alienate the 
PZPR further. 
27 J Rupruk, 'Dtssent m Poland 1968-78: the End ofRevlSlomsm and the Rebrrth of ClVll Soctety', in: 
R.Tokes (ed ), Ooposttlon tn Eastern Europe, 1979 London, The Macrmllan Press Ltd., p 80 For a 
dtscussron of the reasons behmd the econormc cnsrs whtch necessitated the mcreases, see: G Sanford, 
Pohsh Commumsm m Cnsrs, 1983 London, Croom Helm Ltd, Ch2. 'The Gterek Questlon', and 
J.Ltpskt, op crt. pp 30-32. 
28 J Ltpski, op crt. espectally pp.41-42. 
29 For fuller detatls of the 1956 crisis, see· A Kemp-Welch, The Btrth of Sohdamosc· the Gdansk 
Negotlatlons 1980, 1983 London, The Macrmllan Press Ltd, pp 3-7. 
30 N Bethell, Gomulka· Hts Poland. Hts Commumsm, 1969 New York, Rmehart and Wmston, p 229. 
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Admittedly, there was a brief honeymoon period. The hopes and aspirations 
raised in the latter half of 1956 seemed to be confirmed in Gomulka's acceptance 
speech. For example, he began by locating the "evil" accompanying the Stalinist 
period m Poland firmly in the ''irrevocable past;" repeated the call for a more 
powerful Sejm; and reiterated the need for a revised relationship between the PZPR 
and society.31 More than 80 per cent of cultivated land reverted to the private plots of 
individual peasant families.32 Gomulka also permitted the workers' councils that had 
been formed in I 956 to continue to operate, promising the "abolition of the 
explOitation of man by man."33 Important changes in the manner in which the PZPR 
ruled were introduced, and the autonomy and power of the secret police was curtailed 
and subjected to Party control, in the process, eliminating terror and fear as the central 
instrument of Communist rule. 
More importantly with regard to the genesis of a second society in Poland, in 
the cultural sphere, a less doctrinally rigid policy was instituted. Building on the 
independent activity that had begun to re-emerge following the death of Stalin in 
1953, artists were allowed to experiment with forms other than socialist realism, and 
intellectual life as a whole became less subjected to an ideological rigidity. An 
additional critical change was the cessation of blatant attempts to crush the Catholic 
Church, and the beginnings of efforts to arrive at a mutually-acceptable modus 
vivendi between Church and state. 34 While harassment and interference did not end 
completely, Church-state relations were normalised to the extent that the former could 
pursue its spiritual mission and the moral education of the public with little 
mterference. These efforts on the part of the Communist regime represented an 
acceptance on Its part of the existence of an alternative authority within Polish 
society. Significantly, the concessions granted would allow the Catholic Church to 
develop, relatively unhindered, into an alternative institutional framework, 
31 For th1s and other quotatiOns from Gomulka's acceptance speech delivered to the 8th Plenum on 
October 20th 1956, see· K Syrop, Spnng In October, 1957 New York, Praegar Publishers, pp 98-110. 
SeeN Bethell, op c1t, pp 232-233 Also, Z Pelczynsla, The State and CIVIl Soc1etv, 1984 Carnbndge, 
Cambndge Umvemty Press, p 9. 
32 See. F Lew1s, The Polish Volcano, 1959 London, Seeker and Walburg, pp 234-236 
33 K.Syrop, op c1t, p 107. 
34 For example, rellgwus mstructlon was to be remtroduced mto state schools, new churches were to 
be constructed; and 1mpnsoned pnests and b1shops (notably Cardmal Wyszynsla), under house arrest 
smce 1953, were released 
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propagating a particular moral stance in opposition to Communism's doctrinal 
ideology. The significant consequence of this for second society was that Polish 
Catholicism escaped the fate of other religious denominations in Commumst Europe, 
that of outright collaboration with, and control by the Party-State. The ensuing 
decades would bear witness to the PZPR's continual attempts to curb the growing 
moral and political authority of the Church and the second society it sheltered. Its 
failure to do so would have important ramifications throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
when the Church would play a central role in the evolution of the opposition 
movement. 
This re-emergence of a nominal degree of pluralism in society was echoed in 
the Sejm, when the existence of only one political party ceased to be the reality with 
the PZPR's acceptance of the Catholic club 'Znak.' Admittedly, such within-system 
changes were aimed at preserving the core of Commumst rule - in particular, the 
hegemony of the ruling party - and were concessions conceded with the aim of 
quieting a more outspoken public. Although Znak was, generally, to confine its 
activities to loyal support of official policies, the inclusion of the group in parliament 
was significant on two counts.JS Firstly, it was a symbol of the de facto recognition by 
the regime of social and cultural pluralism within society and, as such, would have an 
important psychological effect on the Polish opposition, particularly the intelligentsia. 
Secondly, Poles were given an opportunity to become acquainted with pluralism, 
through the promotion of a dialogue between the Church and intellectuals. This 
fostered a whole ethos of opposition hitherto unknown, and laid the foundation for an 
independent culture, and expanded second society co-operation in the 1970s and 
1980s.36 
In 1957, however, Gomulka moved to limit the re-emergence of second 
society and restore the paran10unt hegemony of the PZPR.37 From the peoples' point 
of view, the Gomulka leadership lost all credibility as a reformist or even a 
modernising body. Within the PZPR Itself, his attacks against those whom he termed 
"revisionists" and "liberals" were complemented by the reintegration of more hard-
35 See. A Bromke, Poland's Pohllcs· Ideahsm vs Reahsm, 1967 Harvard, Umverstty Press, Ch 12 
36 A.M1chruk, 'The New Evo1ullomsm', op Cit, pp 140-145. 
37 A.Ross-Johnson, 'Pohsh Perspecllves, Past and Present,' Problems of Commumsm Vol20 1971, 
pp 60-62 Also, Lech Walesa, A Path of Hope, 1987 London, Pan Books Ltd., pp.84-85. 
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line officials into the leadership team after 1959, to the detriment of reformist 
factions.38 
More significantly for the legitimacy of the Communist regime, the PZPR 
remained insufficiently concerned with genuine socio-economic reforms and the 
general improvement of living standards. The long-awaited economic reforms of 
1964-65 and 1969-70 were, therefore, limited. 39 Repeated attempts at economic 
decentralisation and the introduction of market economic mechanisms were frustrated 
by a combination of bureaucratic mertia, a desire by the Communist elite to protect its 
vested interests, and the general failure of the regime to admit the severity of socio-
economic cnsis.4o It was to be these blatant failures in the realms of economics and 
social justice that were to bring about Gomulka' s downfall in December 1970. 
Gomulka's early recognition that conceding to popular pressure and gammg 
legitimacy as the executor of the genuine popular Will, was replaced by a regime 
which grew steadily illiberal, adverse to institutional innovation or genuine 
participation and, consequently, lacking any semblance of real authority.4I The 
workers' riots accompanying regime-proposed price rises finalised the erosion of 
Gomulka's authority, and on December 20th, he was replaced as First Secretary by 
Edward Gierek.42 
38 For mtraparty changes see, m particular, A Ross-Johnson, 'Poland End of an Era?' Problems of 
Cornrnumsrn, Vol.19 No.l, January-February 1970, pp 28-40. 
39 G Sanford, op ctt. p 24 
40 See, m particular. N Ascherson, op ctt, Ch 3: 'Years of DisillusiOn;' J Rothschild, op et!. pp 184-
200 For the economy m the penod 1956-70, as a whole, see· M Gamarmkow, 'The Pohsh Economy 
m Transttlon,' Problems of Commumsm. Vo\19 No. I, January-February 1970, pp 40-47; and 
Z Fallenbuchl, 'The Strategy of Development and Gterek's Econormc Maneouvre', m. A.Brornke and 
J Strong, QP..£!!, pp.54-57 Also, S Markowski, 'Mr Gomulka's Econormc Legacy The Roots of 
Dtssent', World Today, February 1971, pp.56-67. 
41 p G LeWis, op et!. p 442 
42 For detatls of the January and February 1971 stnkes, see· R Laba, 'Worker Roots of Sohdanty', 
Problems ofCommumsm Vol35 No 4 1986, pp 47-67, P Green, 'The Third Round m Poland', New 
Left Revtew No 101-102, February-Apn\1977, pp 69-71; VC Chrypmski, 'Poland' m· A Brornke and 
TRakowska (eds), The Commumst States m Dtsarray 1965-1971, 1972 Mmneapohs, Umverstty of 
Mmnesota Press, pp 95-120 
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(3.1.3.2) Gierek's Regime 
When Gierek came to power in Poland in December 1970, his position was 
extremely tenuous.43 His basic problem was the same as Gomulka's: how to reconcile 
an alien Communist rule with deeply-entrenched national aspirations. His style in 
approaching it was distinct, and he moved qmckly to distinguish himself from his 
predecessor by presenting a much bolder vision of what he wanted to accomplish in 
Poland.44 In order to establish labour peace and stability, Gierek built his own 
personal appeal, and that of the regime, around society's craving for higher levels of 
material consumption, with plans to rapidly accelerate economic growth through an 
ambitious programme aiming at industrial modernisation. 45 This new strategy was 
accompanied by the announcement of a technocratic approach to economic growth 
intended to satisfY the rising expectations of Polish consumers.46 The policy 
programme was based on the hope that success and progress in the economic sphere 
would secure the support of society, particularly the recently rebellious workmg class. 
As one leading PZPR official stated at the time: 
"Our policy is based on the fundamental idea that the highest goal of 
socialism lies in the constant satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of 
the people on the basis of dynamic economic development."47 
The second major component of Gierek's new approach was a policy of 
consultations with representatives of important social groups, m particular, the 
workers. By offering such consultation, Gierek planned to make possible the 
rebuilding of order, and avoid a repetition of past errors attributable to the regime's 
43 For an evaluation of the situation m Poland at the tune of Gierek's takeover, see: A Bromke, 
'Beyond the Gomulka Era', Foreign Affairs. Apnl1971, pp 480-492; S Staron, 'The Wmds of Change 
m Poland', East Europe Apnl1971, pp 2-10. 
44 J Rothsclnld, op c1t. p 96. 
45 For analysis of G1erek's early econorruc pohc1es, see. A Bromke, 'A New Pohtical Style', Problems 
of Cornmumsm, Vol21 No.S, September-October 1972, pp 1-20 Also, Z Fallenbuchl, 'The Pohsh 
Economy m the 1970s', m· US Congress Jomt Econorruc Comrruttee, East European Economies Post-
Helsmki, 1977 Washmgton, Government PnntJ.ng Office. On changes specifically m agnculture, see: 
'Poland: Important Changes m Agncultural Pohcy,' 'The Week m Eastern Europe,' Rad1o Free 
Europe, (hereafter, RFE) No 72/21, 18th-24th May 1972, p 9. 
46 M Bemhard, QP..£!!.. p 42 
47 Quote from Edward Babmch, member of the PZPR Pohtburo and a CC Secretary, November 1971. 
See· A Bromke, 'A New Pohtical Style,' op Cl!, pp 24-27 
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isolation from wider society.48 In his radio and television speech of December 20th 
1970, Gierek stated:-
"The iron rule of our economic policy and our policy in general must always 
be respect for reality, broad consultation with the working class and the 
intelligentsia ... The most recent events reminded us painfully ofthe 
fundamental truth that the Party must always maintam a close bond ... with the 
whole nation." 49 
Taken together, Gierek's plan for economic growth and modernisation, and 
his scheme for consultations with society, comprised a legitimisation strategy for the 
new regime. so In reality, the consultation plank of the strategy soon collapsed, and the 
more formal aspects of the policy were almost entirely cosmetic. 51 Workers were 
permitted to express their views, but still within stnct bureaucratically-defined limits 
at carefully stage-managed mass meetings. The 1972-73 strike actions in defence of 
the concessions won in 1970 bore testimony to the real situation in the country, and 
the ongoing lack of genuine consultation.s2 The most damaging blow to the 
credibility of the policy and, thus, to the underlymg legitimacy of the regime, was 
delivered in June 1976, when the Gierek regime attempted to introduce a wage and 
price reform without preparing society for its introduction, or without prior 
consultation. His pledge to hold consultations was finally exposed as hollow. 
The retreat of the authorities from this policy had the effect of partially 
undermining the entire regime's legitrmisation strategy. Consequently, only the 
economic component of Gierek's vision for Poland remained, and support could thus 
be maintained only by "delivering the goods." The fact that the failure of his 
economic strategy became increasingly obvious, particularly in 1975-6, meant that 
Gierek's claim to exercise legitimate authority was as threadbare as his predecessors.' 
48 See P Green, Qll.£!!, pp 82-87 
49 Z Pelczynskt (ed.), The State and CIVll Soctety, 1984 Cambndge, Umverstty Press, pp.3-4. 
50 For a more m-depth analysis of thts form of "func!Ional prereqUisites" legt!Imacy - that ts, a 
"soctal contract" between state and soctety- see: JBtelostak, 'The Party· Permanent Cnsts', m· 
A Brumberg (ed), Poland· Genests of a Revolu!ton, 1983 New York, Random House, p.19. 
51 M K Dztewanowskt, The Communist Partv of Poland, 2nd Ed111on 1976 Cambridge, Harvard 
Universtty Press, p 318. 'The Week m East Europe', RFE No 72/38, 14th-20th September 1972, 
pp 13-14. 
52 For detatls of the 1972-3 stnkes, see P Green, op ct!. p 87. 
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A repeated sequence of elevated claims by the PZPR accompanied by a marked 
failure to deliver - that is, the credibility gap - was becoming ever more obvious as the 
1970s progressed, 53 and began to turn the public mood into one of intolerant anger. 54 
Undeniably, the early years of the 1970s did witness a noticeable 
improvement m economic conditions. In the early 1970s, Poland had one of the 
highest rates of economic growth in the world, and the country did experience an 
intense, although short-lived, consumer revolution.55 During the 1971-75 Five Year 
Plan, national income increased by 60 per cent, and industrial production by over 70 
per cent, with similar improvements in living standards and levels of consumption. 56 
Economic progress and development, however, was based on an import-led 
programme, with the main source of investment being Western credit. As the level of 
interest repayments rose steeply following the 1973 oil price crisis, and as Polish 
products remained generally substandard and, therefore, unexportable, the economy 
lurched towards deeper crisis,57 
The Party leadership had asked the Polish workers to judge its record above 
all by its ability to raise living standards. Apart from some initial concessions to the 
private sector peasantry, however, no serious, deep structural reform of the state-
owned industrial sector was undertaken. The short-lived economic boom succeeded 
only in producing a climate of rising expectations throughout the country. By early 
197 4, production shortages for the consumer sector of the economy had already 
appeared. More seriously, on the food front, any productivity gains that had actnally 
been achieved within Polish agriculture were still utterly inadequate to meet 
consumer demand. Under these circumstances, the population's frustration 
mcreasmgly manifested itself in open demonstrations of discontent. In the summer of 
197 4, there were lengthy disturbances among Gdynia dockworkers and, in the 
autumn, reports of unrest among the mmers at Katowice were widespread. In March 
53 For analysis of the growmg gap be!Ween official proclamal!ons and reahty, see. A Bromke, 'Poland 
Under G1erek", Ql!..£!l, pp 8-9. 
54 The maJonty of the pubhc conl!nued to have no confidence in G1erek or Poland's prospects, w1th 
most doubts focusmg on the state of !he economy See: 'Polish Confidence m G1erek', 'The Week m 
East Europe', RFE No 72/2, 6th-12Jh January 1972, Special Report, p 20. 
55 G Sanford, op c1t. p 29. 
56 A Bromke, 'A New Juncture In Poland', op CII, p 4 
57 G Sanford, op c1t. p 32 
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1975, a countryw1de meat crisis provoked exasperated housewives into action, and 
brought female workers out on strike. ss 
G1erek's dilemma came to a head in 1976. In an attempt to correct budgetary 
distortions, he took the same step that had tripped Gomulka: a steep increase in basic 
food prices. At the same time, the leadership also pushed through a number of Soviet-
inspired institutional changes.59 Workers across the country immediately went on 
strike6° Fearful of the volcamc situation in the country and the possibility of Soviet 
military intervention as per Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Party withdrew the price 
rises "for further consultations," and, simultaneously, moved quickly to crush the 
strike movement. 61 
(3.1 4) Summary 
By the mid-1970s, evidence of an increasingly vocal opposition could be 
found within Polish society. The intellectuals had opposed the rigidity of the 
Communist system from the mid-1950s; the students had protested in 1968; and on 
two separate occasions (1970-71 and 1976) the PZPR-Ied regime had bowed-down to 
working class protest. By 1976, the sources of legitimacy for Communism had, 
therefore, been exposed as threadbare. An historical antagonism to Russia combined 
with traditionally strong connections with the West, and the continued existence of 
the Roman Catholic Church as a viable moral alternative to Communist rule, ensured 
that attempts to impose orthodox Communist policies on Polish society would meet 
with little success, and that the opportunities for second society organisations to 
flourish were rife. 
(3.2) The Development of Second Society 
The Polish opposition of the I 970s and I 980s was unique in Eastern Europe, 
if only for its inclusion of a large number of industrial workers. Their continuing and 
58 L Walesa, A Path of Hope. op c1t, p 83. Also, A Szczpwrsla, op CI!, p 97. For a good analysis of the 
SituatiOn m Poland m the autumn/winter of 1975, see: T.Heneghan, 'Poland on the Eve of the 7th Party 
Congress,' RFE Research, December 3rd 1975 
59 For example, youth orgamsallons were merged mto a smgle Komsomo1-type body; and anll-
rehgious propaganda was escalated. P Green, op CI!. p 99. 
60 For a full account of the stnke movement see: M.Bemhard, 'The Stnkes of June 1976 m Poland,' 
East European Pohllcs and Soc1e1Ies I (Fall 1987), pp 363-92 
61 N Ascherson, op c1t. pp 113-114. 
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expanding participation was to prove crucial to the reconstruction of a second society 
m Poland. The activities promoted by intellectual dissidents and associated groups, 
throughout the 1970s, did secure a de facto toleration of nominal pluralism by the 
Communist authonties. They failed, however, to obtain the de jure recognition of that 
pluralism or of the organisational autonomy of the groups therein. It was not until the 
worker-led stnkes of the summer of 1980, and the historic signing of the Gdansk 
Accords at the end of August, that the opposition was able to secure a legal 
recognition of the alternative space it had created. Although the popular perception of 
the 1980 strikes IS, generally, one of spontaneity, an essential, directional role was 
played by workers - in conjunction with selected intellectuals - who had been 
involved in opposition politics in the late 1970s. These workers were able to steer 
government-worker negotiations to secure the legal recognition necessary for the 
reconstitution of second society in Poland. The following analysis considers the 
impact of two sets of factors on the possibilities of forming a society-wide alliance in 
1976, and its significance for the evolution of the Polish opposition in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. 
(3.2.1) The Evolution of Second Society 
(3 2 1.1) Change From Above 
In September 1976, fourteen Polish intellectuals announced the formation of 
KOR, an organisation devoted to assisting those repressed by the party-state m the 
aftermath of the June crisis 62 For the first time in postwar Polish history, the 
intellectual elite formally recognised that persecution of the workers as a social class 
affected them also. For Poland, specifically, and for the East European Communist 
regimes more generally, continuing stability throughout society had, since the late 
1940s, been dependent upon the continued lack of united action between different 
social groups and classes. 63 In 1968, attacks were launched agamst Pohsh intellectual 
and academic circles, yet the workers looked on with indifference. Similarly, in 1970, 
the Polish coastal cities witnessed the massacre of workers, which provoked no firm 
response from the intellectuals. 64 They stood aside, perhaps as Kolakowski suggested, 
62 For foundmg declaration of September 23rd, see· S Persky and H Flam ( eds ), The Sohdantv 
Source book. 1982 Vancouver, New Star Books Ltd, pp 67-68. 
63 A Kemp-Welch, op ctt. p 12 
64 For a bnef analysts of the tradttwnal gulf between the workmg class and the intelhgentsia, see: 
Waiter D Connor, 'Dtssent m Eastern Europe A New Coahtton ?' Problems of Commumsm Vol29 
No.! January-February 1980, pp 1-17. Also, Marc Rakovsla (pseudo), Towards an East European 
Marxtsm, 1978 New York, St Martin's Press, p 33 
-72-
because "they had been persuaded to believe in the complete inflexibility of the 
system under which they lived."65 1976, however, represented a decisive turning-
point in the evolution of the oppos1tion movement within Poland, and the decisions 
and events of that year are central to any comparative analysis of the opposition 
within the three Communist countries under consideration here. KOR served as an 
"ice-breaker."66 In its original form, KOR represented the first bridge between 
workers and intellectuals. Its work of coordination, and its role of maintaining 
contacts with dissident workers activated by their experiences of 1970 and 1976, 
transformed an embryonic political mobilisation into a more complete soc1etal 
movement. Consequently, by 1979, there existed in Poland the foundation of a second 
society: an alliance of workers, intellectuals and the Church, unprecedented in both 
Polish history and in the Soviet bloc, which was to grow into Solidarity in 1980. 
Initially, KOR was primanly an association of intellectuals zn support of the 
workers, not workers themselves, many of whom looked upon the organisation w1th 
suspicion. 67 Its formation represented the culmination of a much longer process than 
the immediate post-June 1976 response suggests. This process had increasingly 
gathered speed and momentum throughout the 1970s, particularly in response to the 
constitutional cnsis of 1975. In December of that year, the intellectuals' reaction to 
proposed amendments to the Polish Constitution, introduced by the PZPR at its 7th 
Congress, was unprecedented in postwar Poland.68 On December 5th, for example, a 
group of intellectuals sent a petition to the Sejm elaborating the principles that they 
felt should be included in the new constitution. The letter, which invoked the 1975 
Helsinki Final Act (to which Poland was a signatory) amounted to a plea for the 
restoration of democratic liberties. 69 The appeal was important, not only because it 
was the first in a flood of similar protests, but also because 1t contained a positive 
progranune of fundamental civil liberties. Many more letters about the Constitution 
65 L Kolakowslo, 'Hope and Hopelessness', Survey. Vol.l7 No 3, Summer 1971, p.51. 
66 T. Garton Ash, The Pohsh Revolunon, 1983 London, Jonathan Cape Ltd, p 18 See, also, 
J Haydn's account of an mterv1ew with Regma L!tynska, a leadmg Sohdanty dissident, m Poles Apart 
Sohdanty and the New Poland, 1994 London, Frank Cass and Co Ltd, p 14, m which she refers to the 
function of KOR as begummg "the process of crossmg the social dlVlde w!uch eventually led to the 
flowenng of a mass movement of oppos111on " 
67L.Walesa, A Path of Hope, op c1t, p 97. 
68 J L1pslo, op c1t. p 25 
69 For the full text of the "Letter of the 59," see RFE Research, December 31st 1975, p 2. 
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followed: several hundred people, of all ages and from all walks of social hfe, 
publicly expressed their support in the form of "open letters" addressed to the 
Sejm.70 In all, an estimated forty thousand people took part m the protests, and a full 
list of all the signatories conveyed a sense of the formation of open opposition 
throughout society. 71 This wiited action can be seen as the political consequence of 
the economic crisis which had erupted the previous spnng and, as such, played an 
important role in the crystallisation of political opposition and social resistance in 
Poland in the mid-1970s. 
Furthermore, voices within the Church were also raised over the reforms and, 
for this reason, the protests can be considered of significant importance.72 In January 
1976, for example, the Polish Primate Cardmal Wyszynski threw his moral authority 
behind the dissenters, and in three Warsaw sermons vOiced strong concern over the 
proposed changes. 73 In March, the Episcopate issued a statement calling on the 
government to cease its harassment of those who had expressed their views on the 
Constirution. The Church's voice was a decisive one: its links with the working class 
and peasantry m Poland meant that the entire issue was portrayed as one affecting the 
whole of society, not just a particular group or class as had been the case m 1968 or 
1970.74 Although, generally, workers were not party to the protest letters, their public 
silence at this time should not be seen as yet another example of the continuing 
alienation of social groups in society. Rather, their psychological identification with 
the intellectuals' cause in 1975 must be viewed as the precursor to the unity of society 
that would occur in Poland less than six months later. 
In June 1976, then, there already existed in Poland, a solid base on which any 
potential opposition movement could build. In May, a clandestine group, the Polish 
Coalition for Independence (PPN), appeared, and immediately circulated (in samizdat 
form) its manifesto, calling for the restoration of democracy and for Poland's 
70 A Os!oJa-Ostaszewsla et a! (eds ), Dissent m Poland 1976-1977, 1977 London, The Association of 
Pohsh Students and Graduates m Exile, pp.11-24. 
71 J.Llpskt, op et!. p.28. 
72 Indeed, A dam Mtchmk refers to the 197 5 cns1s as the "begmnmg of the self-orgamsa!lon of the 
oppost!lon m Poland." A New Evolu!lomsm. op ctt, p.141. 
73 J Ltpsla, op c1t. pp 25-29 
74 For Walesa' response to the cnSis, see· L Walesa, A Path of Hope, op et!, pp 93-94. 
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independence from the USSR. Issued in the name of an organised political group, it is 
significant because, for the fust time, It proposed a distinct alternative to the 
prevailing political and economic system.7s The idea of institutionalising the 
intellectuals support for the stnkmg workers in June arose in early July 1976. A 
"Declaration of Solidarity with the Striking Workers" had already been issued in late 
June,76 and a consensus to form a committee had been reached.77 This consensus and 
the practical work undertaken were a decisive effort to overcome the Communist 
regime's attempts to prevent communication among and between different social 
strata. Bolstered by the Episcopate's September lOth statement of support,78 and in 
response to a renewed wave of repression, the "Appeal to Society and to the 
Authorities of the PRL" was issued on 23rd September. The brief statement 
announced the first organised effort in Polish society to defend the rights of 
workers.79 More sigruficantly for this study, the Appeal represented the first moves 
towards a united society-wide opposition to Communism, and as such, one of the 
most significant steps towards the re-emergence of an independent second society in 
Poland. 
(3.2.1.2) Change From Below 
The Gomulka and Gierek eras and their respective significance for the 
evolution of second society in Poland have already been outlined. This section 
focuses on the ideological and theoretical development amongst opposition forces, 
that occurred during the 1970s particularly, because of the impact it had on the 
evolution of second society throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
The changes within the PZPR that accompanied Gomulka's early years in 
power, and the reforms it introduced, were a source of hope to the opposition that the 
75 A Bromke, 'A New Juncture m Poland', op c1t. p.14. 
76 See: S Persky and H Flarn, op c1t, pp 57-58, for full text 
77 For the texts of representative letters and "declarations of support" pnor to the formal creation of 
KOR, see: P Rama, Pohtical Ooposition m Poland 1954-1977, 1978 London, Poets' and Pamters' 
Press, and A OstoJa-Ostaszewsla, Q1t£!!, pp.76-78. 
78 The statement of the Episcopate Plenum in Czestochowa reiterated the Pnmate's calls for amnesty 
and dialogue, and also called for the Poles to work hard and make sacnfices for the common good and 
social peace. Part of the text IS quoted m J L1psla, op c1t, p 51. 
79 For the full text, see S Persky and H Flarn, op c1t, pp 67-68 
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Communist system could evolve into a more humane and democratic one.8o Two 
strands of thought (revisionism and neopositivism) developed against this backdrop. 
The two concepts (although each had certain peculiarities) shared the conviction that 
a greater degree of reform and change, affectmg the whole of society, would come 
"from above," that is, from the PZPR and, significantly, would not be the result of 
public pressure "from below," that is, from second society.8t Both were based on a 
specific intraparty perspective and, consequently, neither stream formulated a 
definitive political programme as a basts for action choosing, rather, to share the 
existing ideology and language of the Communists, criticising only specific issues or 
policies. Consequently, both were reduced to the articulation of an agenda for change 
without any viable means to implement it. For example, Kuron and Modzelewski's 
later crucial "Open Letter to the Party," calling for self-managing socialism in which 
workers and peasants would exercise the key role in political and economic decision-
making, was addressed to the Party, and not to workers and peasants themselves.82 
So, despite the fact that these appeals were distinctly more radical in tone than their 
predecessors, dissidents blindly maintained their faith in the Communist authorities as 
being a potential source of reform. Despite positive effects the failure of both streams 
can be attributed to this common factor. 83 Change "from above" had been an 
effective strategy to pursue during the relatively liberal period that followed de-
Stalinisation. However, confronted with crackdowns by the Party-State on the 
political disturbances of the late 1960s and the early 1970s, neither the revisionists 
nor the neopositivists had any other choice but to be either victims or disenfranchised 
spectators of state repression. 84 
The student and intellectual movement in March 1968, the ensuing anti-
Semitic campaign, and the Soviet backlash against the Czechoslovak "Prague 
Spring" in August of the same year, together delivered the death-blow to the 
intraparty opposition strategy faithfully followed since 1956.85 However, although in 
80 A.M1chmk, A New Evolut:tomsm, op c1t, p 135. 
81 These "pecuhant:tes" are d1scussed by M1chmk m h1s A New Evolut:tomsm essay. See, m 
part1cular, pp.l35·138. 
82 For the full text, see· S Persky and H Flam, op c1t. pp 35-57. 
83 A M1chmk, The New Evolut:tomsm, op c1t, pp 136-137 and 139-141. 
84 Ibld, p.142 
85 A Ross-Johnson, 'Pohsh Perspect:tves', QP..£!!, pp 63-65, and 'Poland: End of an Era ?' op c1t. 
pp 28-30 
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late 1968, it appeared as though the PZPR had restored its hegemonic status, the 
events in that year arguably represented a significant turning-point in the evolution of 
Polish opposition and of second society. Zygmunt Bauman, writing a decade later, 
states:-
" The importance of the March events lies in the fact that they closed a period 
of twenty years in which the Polish intelligentsia "flirted" with the political 
leadership." 86 
In his 'New Evolutionism,' Michnik wrote that 1968 marked "the death of 
revisionism," at a time when "the band tying the revisionist intelligentsia to the Party 
was definitively severed." 87 The opposition was forced to rethink the premises for its 
activities, and forced into formulating a new concept of opposition, one in which the 
focus was on the entire Pohsh society rather than on attempts to regenerate the PZPR. 
The workers stnkes of 1970-71 can be classed along with earlier 
mamfestations of discontent as a further example of the inability of certain sectors of 
society to form permanent, opposition-oriented organisations, and the general 
willmgness, especially of the working class, to accept government concessions at face 
value. Admittedly, in 1970, in spite of the increasing political content and overtones 
contained within their demands, the workers demonstrated that they were neither 
prepared nor ready to directly challenge the Party or the system itself, and normal 
working slowly resumed in February 1971. What should be highlighted, however-
for Its ultimate significance at the end of the decade - is the fact that, for the first time 
in Communist Poland's history, direct working class action had forced a change in the 
policy and leadership of the country. The assertiveness of the workers represented not , 
only a new element on the Polish political scene, but also a unique phenomenon in the 
Communist world. Thus, the lasting result of the 1970-71 stnkes lay in the veto 
power the workers gained over government economic policies, which would be 
remembered and reasserted in 1976 and 1980. The workers had demonstrated their 
capacity for resistance in defence of their own economic interests but, in addition, had 
shown that they were capable of coupling economic demands with those relating to 
the wider political system, for example, demanding democratically-elected organs of 
86 'Krytyka' No 1, Summer 1978, m· J Pre1b1sz (ed ), Pohsh DISSident Pubhca!lOns, 1982 New York, 
Praegar Publishers, p 77. 
87 A M1chmk, Letters From Pnson and Other Essays, op.c1t, pp 60-61. 
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the Party, trade unions and factory workers councils. 88 Although this political 
challenge did not manifest itself into a coherent alternative progranune and did not 
succeed in appealmg to other sections of society (notably, to either mtellectuals or 
students) the workers did prove themselves capable of undertaking coherent political 
activity without intellectual or other guidance. 
In the realm of state politics, Ost, however, refers to Polish life in the 1970s as 
"a great leap nowhere," a decade of both considerable change and concession, 
coupled with increasing stagnation (economically and politically) and government-led 
repression. 89 Throughout the 1970s, the PZPR seemed increasingly afraid of the 
situation It had helped to create, but appeared unwilling, or unable, to do anything 
about it. Aware of the erosion of its working class base of support as demonstrated by 
the 1970 strikes, Gierek did attempt to make the Party more responsive to pressures 
from below, which, however significant, failed to halt the disaffection of workers 
from the PZPR. 90 The erosion of the working class base of support continued steadily 
until 1975.91 In this condition of official stagnation, a new opposition emerged 
("new" in the sense that it adopted a different approach to both the Communist 
system and to the question of its political involvement within that system) that began 
to offer an alternative. Poland's intellectuals began to contend that the only way for 
things to change would be for the people to start rebmlding the independent social 
bonds (a second society) that the system had tried to destroy. Between 1970 and 
1980, intellectuals were, thus, responsible for putting dissent and social change 
proposals in an entirely new framework: the target of criticism and change was no 
longer to be the PZPR or specific government policies, but the lack of independent 
initiatives from society. This section, therefore, analyses the evolution of the Polish 
opposition forces along the above-mentioned lines. 
88 JRupruk, 'D1ssent m Poland, 1968-1978,' m R Tokes (ed), Opoos1tion m Eastern Europe, 1979 
London, The Macrrullan Press Ltd , p 71 
89 D Ost, op c1t. p 55. 
90 A Broruke, 'Poland Under G1erek,' Problems of Communism, Volt! No 5, September-October 
1972, p 6 
91 M K Dz1ewanowsla, The Commumst Party of Poland, 2'• Ed11lon, 1976 Cambndge Mass., Harvard 
Umvemty Press, p. 73. 
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The seminal work that introduced this new strategy of political opposition was 
Leszek Kolakowski's "Thesis on Hope and Hopelessness" published in 1972.92 In it, 
he aimed to demonstrate why the revisiorust strategy of reform from above was dead, 
yet why this need not mean that hope of change had died too. He refused to draw the 
conclusion that the state socialist system was unreformable, and cited four reasons for 
this belief, the most important one with regard to the development of a second society 
being:-
"The inflexibility of a social system is partially dependent on the degree to 
which the population is convinced of its inflexibility."93 
In essence, when people began to believe that change was possible - that is, that the 
system was in part flexible - they would have taken the first step on the road to 
systemic reform. This point, for example, can be used to distmguish 1956 and 1968 
from later periods of discontent. 1970-71 was the first occasion that the workers 
recognised the poss1b1hty of reform and that the PZPR was forced to back down as a 
result of their pressure and, thus, represented a psychological boost to opposition 
forces. Kolakowski introduced Ius programme of"societal democratisation":-
"What follows is that if the mechanism of the bureaucratic rule functions 
Without any res1stance on the part of society, it will inevitably keep 
reproducing .. .It does not, however, follow from these observations that these 
tendencies cannot be countervailed by a movement of resistance capable of 
ilm1tmg and weakening their operation ... The reformist position [must be] 
understood as an 1dea of act1ve resistance exploiting inherent contradictions of 
the system. "94 
Reform was therefore possible through independent social activity, via an 
independently organised second society. What is crucial here is the rejection of the 
state as the sole focus of opposition activity. 
Developing this theory, Jacek Kuron's 1974 article, "Political Opposition in 
Poland," was an important step towards the recognition of the potential for mass 
opposition activity oriented around society rather than the state.9s In 1t, Kuron argued 
92For full text see L Kolakowsla, 'Hope and Hopelessness,' op c1t For m-depth analysiS see D Ost, 
op c1t pp 58-64. 
93L Kolakowsla, QI!..£!!, p 42 
94Jb,d, p 42 (Emphasis added) 
95 See· J Kuron, Pohtics and Responsibiiitv, 1984 London, Aneks 
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that democratisation may not require state transformation as had been thought by the 
revisionists and neopositivists, and that it should be possible to bypass the state 
altogether and still effect political change. In short, his essay centred on a basic 
reconceptualisation of democracy. For him, democracy meant the continual expansion 
of the scope for autonomous, uncoerced social activity and, thus, represented a goal 
that could be realised within society, not the state.96 Consequently, any form of social 
activity that the Party-State did not control, insofar as it undermined the totalitarian 
tendency of the socialist system, constituted an act aimed at the rebuilding of a second 
society. The theory was also echoed by Kuron in late-1976 in his influential 
"Reflections on a Programme of Action" in which he specifically called for the 
creation of a "network of interlockmg social movements.97 Convinced in the 1960s 
that the system had to be reformed to enable independent activity to emerge, Kuron 
now contended that, given the nature of the system, independent activity must come 
first: activity, in itself, constituted a fundamental political transformation. 
It was Michnik's 1976 essay "The New Evolutionism," however, that 
developed the ideas of Kolakowski and Kuron into a coherent strategy for political 
opposition. It was written against the backdrop of the Soviet presence in Poland, 
which was recogmsed as the factor determining the possible liinits of evolution.98 
Like Kolakowski, Michnik rejected the apparent hopelessness of the Polish situation, 
. and suggested an alternative path of action. Believing that the opposition was 
foundering in the absence of a movement - albeit one which should not explicitly 
challenge state power - he followed Kuron's emphasis on independent social networks 
as the mainspring of a renewed opposition movement and re-conceptualised the 
strategy of political opposition as the turn from a focus on the Communist authorities 
to that on an independent public. Recognising the fact of continuing Communist rule 
and that the state would not be the source of reforms, Michnik argued that individuals 
must begin by acting as if basic human rights, liberties and freedoms were already 
guaranteed. In line with Kolakowski's position that the system was only as 
unreformab1e as the people believed it to be, Michruk effectively called for the 
reconstitution of second society. 
96 Ibtd. pp.! 07 -I 08. 
91] Kuron, 'Reflecttons on a Programme of Actton,' Pohsh Revtew (New York) No 22, 1977. 
98A Mtchmk, 'The New Evoluttomsm,' .Q1!..£!!, pp 142-144. 
-80-
Furthermore, echoing Kuron and Modzelewski's 1964 "Open Letter," Michnik 
recognised the centrality of the working class for the evolution of public life toward a 
democracy and, thus, the workers' strikes of 1970-71 and 1976, with their elections of 
independent strike committees wtthin the shipyards, represented a new stage m 
worker consciousness.99 Significantly, he saw the key future event as being the 
foundation of independent "institutions representing the interests of workers." He 
concluded that the democratic opposition must formulate its own political goals, 
forcing the govermnent to react, not Iead:-
"the democratic opposition must be constantly and mcessantly vistble in 
public life, must create political facts by organismg mass actions, must 
formulate alternatzve programmes."IOO 
It was to be the duty of the intelligentsia to formulate these prograrmnes and defend 
basic principles in conjunction wzth the activities of the working class, thereby giving 
necessary dtrection to the latter's' actions, and laying the theoretical foundations for 
cross-societal unity and for an all-encompassmg second society. 
The entire political opposition of the late- I 970s in Poland revolved around 
this basic proposition and, consequently, the main thrust of opposition activity was to 
get people, individually or in groups, to act independently of state control. The 
overridmg stgnificance of the 1970s intellectual essays and theoretical writings was 
that, although relatively little could be translated into actual social practice, it did 
express an attitude in potentia in Polish social life and one on which second society 
could build post-1976. 
(3.2.2) 1976-1980 
(3.2.2.1) KOR 
The formal emergence of KOR in September 1976 inspired other new 
opposition movements and institutions. In this sense, one of the significant 
consequences of the June crisis was a rapid emergence of unofficial opposition 
groups, and of a large and varied samizdat publication industry.tOt In the late 1970s, a 
new opposition - one based on the theoretical underpinnings outlined above - emerged 
that began to offer an alternative. Starting from the premise that the only way for 
99Ibtd pp 144-145 
100Ibtd. p.147. (EmphaSIS added). 
101 Walesa refers to 1976 as "the turrung-pomt on the road to Gdansk" (1980), A Path of Hope, 
op et!, p 97 
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things to change would be for people to start rebmldmg the independent bonds that 
the system tried to destroy, the organised opposition grew to a size and diversity that 
was unprecedented in the Soviet bloc.I02 What is significant, here, is that the 
opposition would expand to encompass social groups and political activists outside 
the original KOR milieu, thus extending the boundaries of the society-liberated public 
space and making it increasingly difficult for the Party-State to repress second society 
or the developing organisations within it.IOJ 
As discussed, the most significant of the independent groups to emerge post-
1976 was KOR. Two important points deserve mention here. Firstly, the 
transformation of KOR in September 1977 into the "Social Self-Defence Committee 
- KOR" ("KSS-KOR").l04 By July 1977, all imprisoned workers had been anmestied 
and reinstated and, in theory, KOR's work was complete. !OS However, having been 
approached during the course of the year by numerous other individuals who had 
been unlawfully persecuted by the Communist regime, on September 29th, KOR 
expanded its activities to the defence of the entire society. Supported by a "Social 
Self-Defence Fund" formed on October 11th, KOR's new progranune called for 
"social Initiatives from all sections of society.I06 KSS-KOR's subsequent appeals 
called for all forms of independent activity, and noted that a number of successful, 
independent social initiatives had already been undertaken.I07 After twelve months of 
activity, KOR succeeded m generating a definite mobilisation of public 
consciousness, which, although not on a mass scale, was broad-based. In 1978, self-
defence was expanded from the working classes to the defence of society as a whole, 
which involved independent and self-governing social initiatives. Consequently, by 
1978, a level of second society maturity and cross-class support not previously 
attained was identifiable. 
102 W Connor, 'Dissent m Eastern Europe', Qll..£!!, pp.1-17. 
103 M.Bernhard, op c1t. p 131. 
104 For the declaration of September 29th accompanymg tlus transformal!On, see. J.L1ps!a, Qll..£!!, 
pp469-70. 
105 In Its September 1976 "Appeal to Society", the foundmg members had stated that when all therr 
demands had been fulfilled, KOR would have no reason to contmue Its exiStence. Ib•d, p 469. 
106 lb!d, p 470. 
107 "Appeal to Society" October lOth 1978, translated in Ib1d, pp.474-482 
-82-
The second point is more closely related to the worker activists themselves. 
June 1976 did not Immediately produce many working class dissident activists, 
principally because the June events did not successfully promote the emergence of a 
"workers' elite." In certain factories, stnke committees were elected. However, with 
the PZPR's immediate rescmdmg of the price rises, those collective actions that had 
developed, died down rapidly before specific groups could form and leaders emerge. 
Initially, KOR entered this environment as a guardian and a rescuer, not as an 
organiser of formal structures for a continued opposition movement. September 1977, 
however, marked a decisive shift in emphasis: a new approach and strategy for the 
self-defence of society, involving the specific organisation of independent initiatives, 
which would feed directly into the creation of independent workers' bodies in the late 
1970s, and, thus, into Solidarity in August 1980. This expansion of activities to the 
general, society-wide defence of civil rights represented a distinctly new phase in the 
development of the Polish opposition, which moved from a purely defensive human 
rzghts campazgn towards a positive programme, which focused on the establishment 
of independent alternative institutions when limitations were placed on freedom of 
thought and action by the official ones. 
Among the most important of the independent organisations prompted by the 
formation of KOR were the Free Trade Unions, founded in 1978-9. Many of the 
activists of these organisations - including Lech Walesa, Andrzej Gwiazda and Anna 
Walentynowicz - would play a central role in the events of August 1980. The free 
trade unions were the most advanced forms of worker representation in the pre-
Solidarity period. All were formed from pre-existing, locally organised groups of 
worker activists. Their efforts and those of the samizdat journal 'Robotnik' ('The 
Worker') led to the expansion of the opposition to include a substantial number of 
workers. These were to change the quality and direction of KOR's activities and of 
the entire democratic opposition. The Founding Declaration of the 'Free Trade Union 
of the Baltic Seacoast,' for example, concluded with an appeal to all working people 
to form their own independent representations·-
"We would like our initiative to become a stimulus for a number of varied and 
independent social actions." IOS 
Likewise, the Founding Declaration for the Union formed in Katowice criticised the 
power of the PZPR and the dependent status of the official trade unions, and appealed 
for workers to unite "to resist the exploitation of the workers by the state and party 
apparatus," and to help create free trade unions as a mechamsm through which to 
108 S Persky and H Flam (eds.), op c1t. pp 68-70. 
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struggle for the improvement of their hves. 109 It was established to serve as an 
organisational framework "to be filled out with a spontaneous will to action." When 
asked for the reason behind the group, the whole committee replied that the 
"immediate azm was the creation of a free independent trade unzon. "IIO 
The establishment of the Free Trade Unions in 1978-9 is significant in this 
study, as they effectively and practically demonstrated the further development of 
working class opposition post-1976, which was earlier noted as a specific 
characteristic peculiar to Poland in the 1970s. 
(3 2 2 2) The Polish Catholic Church in the 1970s 
Towards the end of the 1960s, a marked shift in the self-perceived role of the 
Catholic Church became evident, following decisions reached at the 1965 Second 
Vatican Council. The Church adopted the role of champion of human rights, 
mespective of religious affiliation and, even when not directly attacked, It began to 
raise its voice in protest against the persecution of others. In the early 1970s, this new 
emphasis on the defence of human rights became stronger. Ill More significantly, the 
Church's new attitude promoted a rapprochement between different segments of the 
Polish intelligentsia. Formerly anti-clerical intellectuals, who had already begun to re-
evaluate the relevance of Christian ethics in their moral stance against Communist 
rule, began to see the Church as an institution in a more favourable Iight.112 This 
allowed for co-operation within the opposition between lay Catholics and non-
believers, as well as for both to agree on the fundamental importance of human rights. 
The unity of society promoted by the Church was a further factor that encouraged the 
overcoming of not only traditional class divisions, but also the divisions within them 
and, consequently, strengthened the emerging second society. 
109 RFE Research S1tuatwn Report, Poland/6 (1978), pp 8-9 
110 J Haydn, op ctt. p.22. 
Ill See· G Blazynsk1, Flashpomt Poland, 1979 New York, Pergamon Press. For details on the many 
statements 1ssued by the Ep1scopate appealmg for leruency towards worker actlVlsts and an end to 
regune-approved brutality, see·Jll:& Research S1tuat1on Report, Poland/42 1976, p.ll; RFE Research 
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On numerous occasions, then, the Catholic Church reaffirmed its commitment 
to the promotion of human rights, and took a number of stands against Party-State 
policies that it perceived as immoral. Three points require particular emphasis, 
however. Firstly, despite a growing convergence of views, it would not be wholly 
accurate to describe the Church and the dissident opposition of the 1970s as political 
allies. At times, they co-operated on specific cases, but the Church was constrained in 
just how far It could, or was willing to go, in its support of the opposition. In contrast 
to the 1980s Solidarity period, when the Church hierarchy played the role of mediator 
between the union and the regime, and provided space and shelter for independent 
cultural initiatives, Church political involvement in the 1970s was less direct because 
it courted greater risks than in the 1980s.m Secondly, in discussing the role of the 
Church, it is essential to bear in mind that the Church is a complex hierarchical 
organisation: its politics are not identical at all levels of the hierarchy, and vary 
according to individual beliefs and parishes or regions. Similarly, the role and stance 
adopted by the Church can be seen to change markedly over time. Before his death m 
1981, It was led by Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, who staunchly defended the 
independence of the Church in Polish life. Under his stewardship, official 
pronouncements on public issues and events were made that were seen as supportive 
of the opposition,114 On other occasions, the Church also worked to persuade the 
Party-State to release political prisoners or to be less repressive. Its Conversely, under 
the leadership of Primate Glemp, the Church was often accused of pursuing a policy 
!me too conciliatory towards the Communist authorities, something that would, later, 
threaten the uruty of the opposition as a whole. 
Finally, an event of supreme religious and political significance was the 
election of Karol Wojtyla, the Bishop of Krakow, as Pope in October 1978. His 
election was met with jubilation, and the new Pope's pilgrimage to his homeland in 
June 1979 had an important psychological effect on Polish society. As well as 
fortifYing both the Church's moral authority and the steadfastness of Polish 
113 M Bernhard, op ctt. p 137. 
114 Andrzej Mtcewskt, Cardmal Wyszynskt, 1984 New York, Harcourt Brace Janovtch, pp 318-319, 
372-373,431-432 
115 M Bernhard, op ctt. Ch s 4 and 5 for examples of Church statements or mterventtons m the penod 
1975-77 
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Catholicism, the 1979 Papal visit was akm to a "psychological earthquake." 116 The 
Pope expressed in public people's private thoughts and hopes, and his words gave 
them the necessary encouragement to take up opposition causes decisively. As such, 
the visit had an enormous impact on the development of second society. Promoting 
self-assertion amongst individuals and groups, the direct impact of the Pope's visit in 
1979lay in its strengthenmg of the organisation of second society (both in terms of its 
cohesiveness and visible identity) and in the subsequently more overt articulation of 
demands vis-a-vis the state. Furthermore, his visit was as influential upon non-
believers as upon Catholics. For the former, his visit was an occasion to demonstrate 
opposition to the system. For ten days, the state virtually ceased to exist, except as a 
censor for media coverage. During that time, people perceived Poland not as a 
Communist country, merely as a Communist state, m as it suddenly became obvious 
that "the emperor had no clothes." 11 8 Prior to his visit, articles appearing in 
independent publications expressed hope that the Papal visit would force the Catholic 
Church into taking firmer action against the regime in the future. Afterwards, many 
believed that It marked the beginning of a spiritual revolution in Poland and a new 
belief in the pursuit of human and civil rights. 
(3.2 2.3) Student Movements 
Throughout the early 1970s, specifically student groups or movements were 
relatively quiescent with regard to the ruling authorities. In contrast to the preceding 
decade, when student associations had openly voiced their opposition agamst the 
government's assaults on intellectual and cultural freedoms, not until the death of 
fellow student Stanislaw Pyjas in May 1977, did the students, once again, unite to 
form coherent opposition bodies l19 The Pyjas affair transformed the student 
movement into a distinct, separate component of the opposition with its own goals 
and methods of actiOn. The protests that followed Pyjas's death led to the creation of 
the Student Solidarity Committee (SKS) in Krakow. Prior to this, in the winter of 
116B SzaJkowsla, 'The Catholtc Church m Defence of CIVll Society m Poland,' In B M1sztal (ed ), 
Poland After Soltdanty, 1985 New BnmsWick, Transaction Books, p 79. 
117T.Garton Ash, 'The Pope's Hardest Journey,' The Spectator, July I O"' 1982, p.15. 
118A Tomsky, 'Poland's Church on the Road to Gdansk,' Rehgion m Comrnumst Lands, No 1-2 
1981, pp 28-39 
119 J.LipSki, oo CI!, Ch 6 A good account of the developments m Poland m 1977, With special 
attention to the activities of the umvemty and student opposition, IS presented m P.Osnos, 'The Poltsh 
Road to Comrnumsm', Foretgn Affatrs, Vol 56 No.!, October 1977, pp 209-220 Also, L Unger, 'Two 
Weeks that Shook Poland', International Herald Tnbune, May 30th 1977. 
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1977, student activists from Warsaw and Krakow had already begun to lay the 
groundwork for the SKS movement at a number of specific training sessions and 
discussion "camps" focusing on "the theme of the forms of action of the independent 
student movement."120 Dunng the 1977-78 academic year, five additional SKS were 
created, although individual committees were not linked by a single national structure 
or network.121 
Specific activities, though, were linked by common objectives: the defence of 
students' nghts and interests, the pursuit of issues of local academic interest (for 
example, the defence of oppositional activists in the academic communtty), the 
establishment of "underground" libranes to overcome the limited circulation and 
censorship of official text books, and the demand for greater academic autonomy and 
consultation wtthin universities.1 22 SKS also supported national opposition initiatives, 
and played a key role in bringing the uncensored lectures of the Society of Academic 
Courses (TKN) to local audiences, in addition to locally distributing underground 
publications. Active in the area of publishing, m the student movement of the 1970s 
would, later, contribute a large number of key Solidarity members.t24 
(3.2.2 4) Education 
Independent education has a strong tradition in Poland, dating from the end of 
the eighteenth century. By 1956, various semi-private seminars were run by eminent 
academics in their homes, and small study or discussion groups emerged. Any 
attempt, therefore, to challenge the PZPR's almost total monopoly in the field of 
education in the new opposition enviromnent of the 1970s, and to counteract 
censorship, could expect to fall on fertile ground. 
In October 1977, a group of Warsaw intellectuals began a series of lectures 
devoted primarily to the social sciences and history. It proved so popular that tt soon 
120 M Bernhard, op c1t, p 143. 
121 J L1psla, Qlli!!. pp.142 and 204. Also, A OstoJa-Ostaszewsla, Dissent m Poland, op c1t pp 141-
142. 
122 RFE Research, 'Review of Uncensored Pohsh PublicatiOns,' October 1977-January 1978', BR/51 
(1978), p 9 
123 RFE Research, 'Review of Uncensored Pohsh Publications Sept-Nov 1977' BR/255 (1977), pp 2-
4 
124 For details of specific names see: M Bernhard, op c1t. pp 145-6 
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acquired a degree of formalisation. Subsequently, on 22nd January 1978, fifty-eight 
eminent mtellectuals and academics signed a declaration calling into being the 
'Society for Academic Courses that became popularly known as the "flying 
university" (TKN). This was to open up a new chapter in the lustory of independent 
movements in Poland.I2S The first year of activities exceeded origmal expectations 
owing to unexpected levels of support from the academic and intellectual community 
and the Roman Catholic Church. Important support, for example, came from the 
Polish Episcopate's communique of March 1978, which expressed "disapproval of all 
actwns that restrain the human spirit from freely creating cultural values."I26 Both 
sources demonstrate the level of cross-class support and cooperation that existed in 
Communist Poland during this period. 
With the extent of support much wider than the number of lecturers and 
students participating, the greatest achievement of TKN was the breaking of the 
barrier of fear through bringing people together for the purpose of self-education. 
This, m turn, helped to produce a qualitative change in certain crucial basic attitudes. 
TKN never claimed to be a substitute for a specifically political discussion group. 
Rather, associated lecturers merely refused to honour the official taboos on politically 
sensitive topics, and aimed to break the government's institutional monopoly on 
knowledge, allowing for the pluralism they considered necessary for the development 
of the national culture. In other words, as proposed by the leading theorists of the 
early 1970s, TKN no longer attempted to press for the reform of Poland's universities 
through existing mstitutions. Instead, it turned towards society to reconstitute the 
national memory of Poland, and to redirect the nation to its independent and 
democratic sources of culture. 
(3.2.2 5) Peasant Movements 
During the late 1970s, four regional peasant committees were founded 
specifically to address growing dissatisfaction over new peasant retirement 
legislation, and a series of local issues.l27 Supported by specific underground 
newspapers, a peasant university was formed in February 1979, bringing intellectuals 
125 C.Pszemcla, 'The Flymg Umvemty,' Index on Censorshm Vol8 No 6, November-December 
1979, p 20. 
126J Llpsla, op c1t. p 212 
127 P Green, 'The Course of Events', Labour Focus on Eastern Europe 1.3 (1977), p 4; and 
N Ascherson, op c1t, p 140. 
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into the villages to lecture on subjects of importance to peasants.128 Self-defence 
committees were often supported by the village pnests, and assisted by advice and 
publicity from KOR, all of which bore testimony to the growing unity and cross-class 
support within society. In 1979, "peasants' centres for knowledge" appeared. These 
amounted to unofficial colleges organising not only debates on personal grievances, 
but also courses on the history of "peasant politics" in Poland. Although the total 
numbers involved were small, the activity did constitute a foundation on which to 
revive independent and organised peasant politics. There was also an attempt to 
establish a "think-tank" on the rural question, called "The Centre for People's 
Thought," including peasant activists and representatives from both KOR and 
ROPCI0.129 It did not, however, yield much in the way of direct action or concrete 
progranimatic materials. The independent peasant movement as a whole, though, did 
contnbute several of the future leaders of Rural Solidanty, and the existence of 
unofficial peasant groups demonstrated the breadth of support for independent 
initiatives in the late 1970s. 
(3.2.2.6) Independent Pubhshmg (Samizdat) 
The 1976-1980 change in political atmosphere was best reflected in the 
growing number of publications that defied official censorship, which were vital 
ingredients in independent Polish social and political life. Samizdat involved a 
considerable number of volunteers to help with editing, printing, distribution and 
collection of funds. Publications increased despite persecution and despite shortages 
of paper, difficulties with effective distribution and with access to duplicating 
equipment, which was strictly controlled. Millions of Poles, if not directly involved, 
were at least aware of this activity. According to Lipski, by early 1979, the total 
number of volumes of underground periodicals, books and brochures printed each 
month totalled one hundred thousand,l30 This meant that in the year preceding the 
foundation of Solidarity, underground printers had bombarded Polish society with 
over one million pieces of samizdat. According to Walery Pisarek, Director of the 
Krakow Centre for Journalism Research, one-quarter of Poles had read an 
128 J Ltpskt, op ctt, pp 260-261. Also, P Rama, Jndeoendent Soctal Movements m Poland, 1981 
London, LSE/Orbts Books, p.l63. 
129p Rama, tbtd, pp 169-80 
130 J Ltpskt, .QP..£!!, pp 304-5. 
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underground publication before 1980. This meant that, at one point or another, 
between eight-nine million Poles had contact with the underground press.I3I 
The publication of such a large body of independent literature helped to create 
a whole alternatzve culture. According to Tomasz Mianowicz, a former samizdat 
editor, their number was "several times greater than that of samizdat publications in 
all other Soviet-bloc countries." 132 In his words, the growth of independent 
publishing into a mass movement for greater political freedom in Poland categorically 
broke the Communist's monopoly of mformation and, consequently, was one of the 
chief causes of the Pohsh workers' success in August 1980.133 This was not only 
because publications succeeded in propagatmg the idea of free trade unions among 
workers, but, more siguificantly, because the Communist system depended on a tight 
control of information, permitting the authorities to propagate a specific mentality and 
Impose a certain life-style on the population. Consequently, the advances made during 
the second half of the 1970s in the field of independent publishing were of paramount 
significance in helping to tip the state-society balance-of-power and influence 
decisively in favour of the latter. 
Furthermore, the divisions witlun the opposition were played out within 
independent publications, wmch became testimony to the emergence of a variety of 
alternative views and ideologies in opposition circles. The ideological diversity 
represented in samizdat is an important point to note here, as it demonstrated the 
growing maturity and development of the Polish opposition into a markedly 
differentiated and complex society. The sheer scale of the independent press's 
activities was enormous and these activities were widely supported by leading 
opposition groups, notably KOR. The independent press expressed a variety of 
orientations and outlooks and, as such, was at the forefront of recreating a specifically 
Polish national consciousness.134 The diversity and breadth of publications, 
representing all spheres and walks of life in Poland, created an entire network that 
attempted to be a conscious and permanent alternative to state-sanctioned literary 
131 C1ted m· M K.Albnght, 'Poland. tbe Role of tbe Press m Poh!Ical Change,' The Washmgton 
Papers 102 (1985), pubhshed for tbe Center for Strategic and International Stuches, Georgetown 
UmvefSlty, by Praegaer Pubhshers, New York, pp.IS-19. 
132tndex on Censorshm Vol12 No 2 Apnl1983, p.l 
133 Ibid. p 24. 
134J Wale, 'Unofficml Pubhshmg,' Index on Censorshm Vol8 No 6 Nov-Dec 1979, p.14. 
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publications. As such, the great number of periodicals being published at any single 
point can be seen as a measure of the level of discontent in society. The emergence of 
free and uncensored news, information and publications was one of the essential 
foundations for the Solidarity trade urnon. Despite severe repression during the period 
of Martial Law, literary and political works contmued to be published by means of 
increasingly sophisticated technical machinery. The uncensored press and 
publications became such an essential element of life in Poland, to the extent that, by 
the early 1980s, publications were no longer being confined to an "underground life," 
but were increasingly sold openly on the streets. 
(3 2.2.6 1) Spotlight on 'Robotnik,' ('The Worker') 
Having largely accomplished its aims with regard to the June 1976 protests, 
KOR (as outlined above) began to focus on larger issues facing the working class, 
turning its practical and organisational attention to the creation of discussion groups 
or specific frameworks, which would facilitate the open exchange of information and 
foster economic and political agitation IJS The vehicle that finally translated this new 
approach into practice for the workers was the publication of "Robomik" in 
September 1977, based on material provided by worker correspondents. 
In this sense, Robotnik reflected the overall strategy and tactics of KOR, and 
was to serve as a vehicle for the process of worker pohticisation being engaged in by 
intellecmals.136 Its purpose and goals were made explicit in the first issue: Robotnik 
had been created so that workers could "publish their independent opinions, exchange 
experiences, and make contacts with workers at other factories." 137 This was 
significant in two ways. Firstly, because it provided evidence of cross-class co-
operation, and recognised the central role that workers would play in any process of 
systemic change in Poland. It was, therefore, an explicit link to the 1970s theoretical 
wntings that recognised the significance of continuous working class agitation. 
Secondly, it recognised the need to create a simation in which workers could defend 
their interests and have daily influence over government decision-making, working 
in-conjunction with the intellecruals. The founders ofRobomik sought to maintain the 
post-1976 worker-intellecrual cooperation, seeing it as the only way to overcome the 
135 'Robotmk Ed1tor on Unofficm1 Workers' Movement', Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, Vo13 
No 5, 1979-1980, p 11 
136 J Haydn, op c1t, p 77 
137 J.Pneb1sz ( ed ), op Cl!, p 207 
---------------------------
- ------------------
- 91 -
cycle of apathy-participation-apathy that had characterised worker attitudes during 
previous times of crisis. They also wanted to prevent a return to the Isolation of 
different sectors of society so evident in 1968 and 1970. 
Towards this end, Robotnik indicated and discussed methods and possibilities 
in comiection with the struggle for independent trade unions, including the election of 
authentic workers' representatives and the creation of independent workers' councils. 
Various texts including specific instructions - for example, "How to strike," "What 
to demand," "Guidelines for conducting a successful strike" - aimed at fostering self-
organisation an10ng the workers.1JS In this role of "facilitator of organisation," 
Robotnik did have a certain degree of political success. Lech Walesa refers to the 
journal in his autobiography: 
"It was through the paper that I got to know the Wyszkowski brothers [and] 
another group of graduates and young members of what was later known as 
the Young Poland Movement. .. These encounters added to the experience I'd 
gamed at the yard." 139 
Wtth distributiOn wide enough to reach all major industrial centres, combined with a 
focus not only on immediate social and economic issues, but also on broader interests 
concerning the nation, society and the state, Robotnik was a key and central factor in 
the evolution of a specific working class political consciousness that was to have such 
an explosive and destructive impact on the Communist system in Poland during the 
Summer of 1980.140 It was also responsible for turning KOR's general strategy into 
specific tactics, and it raised workmg class consciousness in key mdustrial centres, 
which had been the supposed heart of Communism. 
The Charter of Workers' Rights, as the germ of a future organisation, is 
undoubtedly the most important single document that Robotnik produced. In Issue 
No.35 of August 1979, the publication of the Charter can be seen as the first specific 
opposition programme (signed by over one hundred intellectual and worker activists), 
which can be read as an early draft of the demands of August 1980.141 With reference 
138 See. M Bemhard, op Cit. pp.168-170 
139 L.Walesa, A Path ofHope, op c1t, p 92 
140 For details and figures relatmg to pnnt runs, length of Issues and distnbution pohc1es and 
networks, see: J L1psla, op Cit, pp 228-231, and M Bemhard, op c1!, pp 161-164 
141 For full text see· J L1psla, AppendiX, op c1t, pp.492-500. 
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to the covenants and conventions of the International Labour Organisation and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Charter included 
sections on workers' wages, working hours and safety, privileges and the Polish 
Labour Code. This followed on articles that had appeared in earlier editions calling 
"for society to band together and defend itself," and those "emphasising the right of 
all workers to form independent associations." 142 Notably, the Charter's signatories 
stressed that any fundamental or effective solutions to Poland's problems depended, 
specifically, on the actions of the workers themselves, acting together in defence of 
their own interests, via truly independent trade unions,I43 
(3.2.2.7) Summary 1976-1980 
The movement of the 1970s, particularly developments following the 
constitutional crisis of 1975, encompassed all social strata in Poland. In contrast to 
both the immediate post-crisis years of earlier manifestations of discontent, the years 
1976-1980 witnessed the evolution and expansion of an organisational network of 
opposition social movements, inspired and nurtured by the activities of KOR, which, 
for the first time in Pohsh Communist history, successfully united all social classes 
against the ruling regime. A new mode of opposition politics, developed theoretically 
by such figures as Kuron and Michnik in the first half of the decade, was put into 
practice through consciously organised, permanent, independent social movements 
that strove to change the behaviour of the Party-State via "pressure from below." 
KOR nurtured this fledgling politics by publicising opposition activities, training 
activists, offering financial and moral support, and dissemmatmg knowledge about 
how to practice it. Consequently, this "new form" of opposition politics became the 
dominant mode of resistance to the Party-State. 
By the year 1980, many sectors of Polish society had successfully liberated a 
pubhc space, in which they had re-appropnated their own communities, ideals and 
language.t44 Numerous signals of the increasing ability of society to organise itself 
and present a united front to the Party-State abounded. In August 1980, the workers 
who participated m that process went on to lead a movement in their country that 
142 'The Economy Up Agamst the Wall', RobotrukNo.29, February 21st 1979, pI, in J Priebisz (ed), 
op c1t. p 222 
143 MBernhard,.Qili!tp 167. 
144 Regardmg the reappropnatmn of a "pohtically-meanmgfullanguage" by opposition activists, see· 
L.Walesa, A Path of Hope, op c1t, p 95. 
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went well beyond the "psychology of captivity" decried by Michnik,I45 and advanced 
the process of the breakdown of Communist rule in Poland by securing the legal 
prerequisites for the reconstruction of second society. At the end of the 1970s and 
beginning of the new decade, there were two significant turmng-points for the Polish 
opposition, w!uch were to have a direct impact on the course of events during the 
1980s. Firstly, the June 1979 Papal visit of John Paul 11, during which the population 
momentarily became a coherent community displacing the Communist state; and, 
secondly, the introduction, on July 1st 1980, of a new pricmg system for meat and 
derived products.I46 
(3.2.3) August 1980 
The incompetence and isolation of the Gierek regime, combined with the 
widespread feelings of injustice it provoked, provided the necessary tinder and spark 
to ignite the economic crisis in Poland in 1980. A combination of a groWing 
economic indebtedness to both Western and Soviet credit sources and a Jack of 
serious structural reform of the state-owned industrial sector, began to take its toll as 
the dawn ofthe 1980s approached. To quote Walesa:-
" We kept going, for better or worse, but with no recognisable goal to head for 
on the horizon. Our rigidly centralised economic system, inefficient and 
unworkable as it was, couldn't be saved by loans, technology, or occasional 
contracts with the West." I47 
1979 saw the first actual (officially admitted) decline in post-1945 national income. 
Attemptmg to correct budgetary distortions, and in an attempt to eliminate Poland's 
trade deficit by the end of 1980, Gierek felt himself driven to the same decision that 
had tripped Gomulka: a steep and unanticipated increase in basic food prices. Having 
learnt a little, however, from the blunders of 1970 and 1976, price rises were 
introduced in a covert way, for example, better cuts of meat were to be transferred to 
so-called "commercial shops," where prices were already much higher; and the news 
was to be broken quietly, at the beginning of the July sununer holidays.I4S 
145 A Mtchruk, 'On Reststance,' m· Letters From Pnson, op ctt, pp 50-51. 
146 For further detatls of the pnce mcreases see: 'Pohsh Commerctal Shops Increase Theu Meat 
Allocatton,' RFE Research, Sttuatwn Report Poland/14, July 9 1980, p 3. 
147 L Walesa, A Path of Hope. op cit, p 93 
148 See K Ruane, The Pohsh Challenge, 1982 London, the BBC, pp 1-2, for the pubhcatton of the 
offictal announcement by the offictal Pohsh News Agency, PAP. 
-94-
The 1980 events were triggered by workers as a result of the same failures and 
pressures of the Gierek era that had concerned the dissidents throughout the 1970s. 
The disciplined wave of non-violent strikes that rolled over Poland in response to the 
August price rises was energised not only by immediate economic grievances.149 The 
regime's general "remoteness, exclusiveness, arbitrariness, unacc01mtability, 
incompetence, repressiveness and illegitimacy" were also contributory factors. 150 The 
growing inequalities in a supposedly egalitarian society were in glaring contrast to 
official statements proclaiming "You've never had it so good !"151 What is more, 
there existed no official institl!tion through which the population felt It could 
effectively express discontent. An increasing upward social mobility came to an 
abrupt halt in the latter half of the 1970s. A skillful and educated workforce found 
itself thwarted by the ability of middle- and higher-level management employees to 
protect their positions and mterests. Only administrative and, to a degree, agricultl!ral 
reform progranunes had had any significant effect on traditional practices and had 
produced any fundamental change.1s2 In 1980, therefore, many potential crisis areas 
of the political, economic and social systems remained unaddressed. The strikes were 
a spontaneous result of those failures, and the real life experiences of Gdansk workers 
in battling against government troops, winning concessions and then seeing them 
come to nothing. The organisational strength that the workers demonstrated far 
exceeded the expectations of intellectl!als. 
Having learned valuable lessons arising out of the failures of the 1970s, m 
1980, workers retl!med to the traditional tec!miques of occupation strikes, and formed 
effective, ad hoc negotiating committees, pressing, initially, for compensatory wage 
increases.l53 They rejected the temptation of a solution based upon workers' councils 
149 For a deta1led descnpl1on and analysis of the 1980 stnkes, see: 'August 1980· the Stnkes m 
Poland,' RFE Research, October 1980 For an ms1ght mto the mol1val1ons behmd workers' actions: 
J Staniszkis, 'The Evolunon ofFonns ofWorkmg-Class Protest m Poland: SociOlogical Reflecnons on 
the Gdansk-Szczecm Case,' Soviet Studies, Apnl 1981, pp 204-31. For a comprehensive account of 
successive regune pronouncements throughout 1980-1981, see: K Ruane, The Pohsh Challenge, 
op CII, Chapters One and Two 
150 J Rothsclnld, oo c1t. p.199. 
151 N .Ascherson, op c1t. pp.125-6 
152 See VC Chrypmski, 'Pohncal Change Under G1erek', m· A Bromke and J Strong (eds.), Gierek's 
Poland, op CII pp 36-51. 
153 Jan B de Weydenthal, 'Worker-Management Bargammg m Poland,' m· 'August 1980' RFE 
Research, October 1980, op c1t, pp 38-41. 
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and, instead, building on the theoretical work of the late 1970s, stood out for a 
permanently mdependent form of representation via free trade unions. Whilst there 
was no general strike, by the end of the month, the stoppages affected every region of 
Poland, with the exception of the Stlesian coal basin. Official news of the strikes was 
heavily censored and suppressed However, butldmg on the maturity of second 
society achieved in the late 1970s, KOR estabhshed itself as a form of information 
exchange, ensuring that any plans to isolate news of the strikes and prevent them 
spreading would fail, and so the workers soon became aware of all the major strikes 
and settlements agreed in different regions. In so doing, KOR, acting as the only 
source of news both internally and to the foreign media, helped to transform the 
strikes from a scatter of local disputes into a self-aware and co-ordinated movement 
of national protest. Significantly, however, the KOR dissidents did not initiate a 
single strike: they only reacted to the actions of the workers themselves.154 
Throughout 1980-81, the latter reacted to events, initially serving as important 
channels of information as the strike movement developed, and then providing initial 
programmatic and theoretical conceptualisations for action. The strikes of 1980 would 
almost certainly have occurred without KOR's existence, and the workers movement 
would almost certainly have reiterated its 1970 and 1976 demands for the creation of 
independent trade unions. What KOR did do, however, was to influence the 
subsequent development of Solidanty, both as a trade union, and as a mass movement 
in defence of the second society, bypassing the organisational structure of the 
Communist state. Such collective actions symbolised the more general emergence of 
a cross-class united movement of opposition, distinguishmg 1980 from earlier 
manifestations of discontent in Poland. The regime's control over society, in turn, had 
visibly diminished. 
Although this minimal co-operation between the workers and dissidents 
appears to have been crucial in the initial stages of the strike movement, and 
contnbuted significantly to its expansion and success, arguably one of the single most 
important factors in the development of the strike movement was the ambiguity of 
the Party and government response to the workers' actions. No clearly defined 
posttion regarding the strikes was ever adopted by the authorities who, whilst 
obviously hostile to such developments, preferred to ignore their extstence. Repeated 
but largely abortive attempts to halt the workers' demands merely led, however, to the 
growing politicisation of those demands and, ultimately, to the expansion of the strike 
154 See Jan B de Weydenthal, 'Workers and Party m Poland,' op ctt, p 6. 
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movement and its focus from demands for wage increases only, to those that would 
affect the operation of the entire Polish system of rule. 
This growing politicisation was best exemplified with the creation, on August 
16th, of an Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS) in Gdansk, with its headquarters at 
the Lenin Shipyard.1SS This action marked the beginning of the second phase of the 
strike movement. The new stage, which was to extend until the end of August and the 
signing of the Social Accords, was characterised by the workers' conscious attempt at 
large-scale self-organisation, directed by the advice of intellectuals. In contrast to the 
earlier stnkes, which had been somewhat inchoate and geared to locahsed action, the 
workers' movement now became more cohesive and purposeful. This growing sense 
of unity found its practical expression in the establishment of co-ordinating 
committees that directed strike efforts in a number of plants and factories 
stmultaneously.t56 
Concurrently, the strikers broadened their demands from basically economic 
issues to include more political ones. The main emphasis was now placed on the need 
to alter the political relations within the existing system, in such a way as to ensure 
the direct participation of the working class in decision-making on issues affecting 
their interests.m The government's immediate response to such developments was 
clearly antagonistic. A range of intimidating measures culminated in Gierek's August 
18th live address to the nation, in which he ruled out the acceptance of any demands 
that would challenge the existing sociopolitical order.158 On August 22nd, however, 
the first signs of a breakthrough were in evidence when Deputy PM Barctkowski 
began negotiations with the Szczecin stnkers, quickly followed by talks between the 
government, and the Gdansk MKS on the 23rd.159 More significantly, on August 
24th, the government took symbolic steps to mark what can now clearly be seen as 
the passing of the previous pohtical era. During a special session of the Party's 
Central Committee, four Politburo members and the main economic planner were 
155 L Walesa, A Path ofHope, op Cl!, pl24. 
156 K.Ruane, op c1t, pp.l8 and 26. 
157 Ibid, pp 21-23. 
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removed from their posts. All had been directly involved in policy formulation with 
respect to either the economy, or the Party's relations with the workers. More 
politically significant, all had been members of the PZPR' s inner circle of Gierek 
loy~ists. After their departure, it was clear that Gierek's personal power would be 
sharply curtailed and his authority within the Party seriously undermined. An official 
statement issued on August 25th portrayed the true significance of the August strikes, 
as a whole, and of the growing strength of the workers' movement and of second 
society in particular:-
" Our party wants to correct its policy honestly, taking to heart the criticism 
and proposals of the work crews and of all society. We want a genuine 
broadening of the public's participation in deciding on matters of the 
workplace, towns and villages, the entire country ... " 160 
With this statement, the Party formally accepted what had long seemed mevitable: 
official negotiation with second society and an organisation created by the workers 
themselves. On August 30th, a formal settlement of the strike was signed by the 
representatives of the government and the strikers in Szczecin, and a tentative 
agreement was concluded in Gdansk.I6I 
VIewed from the perspective of Polish politics, the Gdansk and Szczecin 
Agreements constituted a milestone. At a bare minimum, they served to emphasise 
the importance of self-organisation and determmation m the successful defence of 
specific interests. They were also, however, the first occasion in the history of the 
socialist system, that the Communist authorities had formally agreed to the principle 
of a an independent group being allowed to legally organise itself outside the direct 
control of the Party and state. This, more than anything else, made the Polish 
developments unique. In August 1980, the Polish working class successfully turned 
their recently-learnt collective ability to influence the system into a positive force, 
and, combined with the guidance of the politically-activated intellectual elites, were 
responsible for the articulation of distinct political and economic alternatzves. 
Thus, in August 1980, the Polish Communist regime found itself confronted 
by a formidable and consolidated social movement, in particular, and a re-emerging 
second society, more generally. Having generated economic expectations beyond its 
160 J B de Weydentha1, 'Workers and Party m Poland,' op ctt. p 10. 
161 English langnage transla!tons of the texts of all agreements m: 'Augnst 1980 The Stnkes m 
Poland,' RFE Research, October 1980, op ctt, pp 423-434 and 439-443. 
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capacity to fulfill; having discredited itself via the promotion of social inequalities; 
and having resisted fundamental political reform, the PZPR was compelled to respond 
to irresistible pressures emanating from second society. With the subsequent creation 
of Rural Solidarity and an Independent Student Union, the regime, confronting an 
alliance of the working class, intellectuals, farmers, and the Roman Catholic Church 
became merely one part of a pluralised political structure.t62 The mere fact that the 
August Agreements had been concluded bear testnnony to the growing strength of the 
second society beneath the surface of the Communist system, and laid the basis for its 
increasing centrality to Polish events throughout the 1980s. Admtttedly, second 
society confronted a ruling party that was probably at its weakest pomt since coming 
to power: the PZPR was riven by facttonalism and shaken by a succession of serious 
policy failures.t63 Furthermore, tolerance of second society was within certain distinct 
and restricted limitations - mdependence, but wzthm the existing system of power 
relations. Subsequent to tts first National Congress in 1981, the Solidartty opposition 
would graduate to demands and policy progrartnnes focusing on the overthrow and 
demise of the prevailing system of rule, and its replacement with a democratically-
oriented one. 
(3 2 4) August 1980- December 1981 
The period between August 1980 and the imposition of Martial Law on 
Poland in December 1981 was charactensed by a continumg see-saw of power 
between a maturing and developing second society, on the one hand, and on the other, 
a Communist state which, although attempting to reform itself and secure popular 
legitimacy, saw its membership base dwindle. This section will not provide a 
comprehenstve record of the eighteen months of Solidarity's legal registration.164 Its 
focus, rather, is on the specific development of the Union and of second society, on 
developments within the PZPR itself, and on certain key events which visibly 
demonstrated the apparent strength and maturity of the second society in Poland vis-
a-vis the PZPR-led regime, and which prompted the imposttion of Martial Law in 
December 1981. 
162 K Ruane, op c1!, pp 148-151 for the legal reg1stranon ofRura1 Sohdanty. 
163 Jan B de Weydenthal, 'Workers and Party m Poland,' Problems of Commumsm, Vol29 No 6, 
November-December 1980, pp.13-16. 
164 For a detatled account, mcludmg extracts from offictal and Sohdanty pronouncements, see. 
K Ruane, op c1t, Ch s 7-14. 
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(3 2.4 1) The Crrsis wzthm the PZPR 
Although Solidarity failed to effectively capitalise on the gains and successes 
of August, the PZPR leadership, in order to contain the threat of a further decline in 
support for the Party and to arrest the spread of popular discontent, developed a wide-
ranging policy of appeasement.I6S In the early euphoric days of Polish society's 
"awakening," however, the eclipse of the Party seemed not only inevitable but also 
finaJ.I66 
"The orgamsation that had claimed for itself the right to set directions for all 
aspects of social and economic development was suddenly forced into relative 
obscurity .. .Its leaders appeared inert ... signs of organisational deterioration 
proliferated, and the entire party was affected by widespread disillusionment, 
internal dissension and factional strife." 167 
It is significant that, in 1980, perhaps for the first time in the history of the PZPR, 
intra-party conflict developed largely as a response to external events, and continued 
to evolve under the influence of such events and developments.I68 There were two 
important consequences of this factor, both of which were significant for the further 
evolution of second society. Firstly, mtra-party conflict was particularly intense in 
those Party sectors that were seen as responsible for the formulation and 
implementation of social policies. The military, police and security sectors by contrast 
remained relatively isolated. The significance ofthis would become evident at the end 
of 1981. Secondly, as second society developed, divisions between the various 
elements in the Party's organisational hierarchy emerged, particularly between the 
rank-and-file and all levels of officialdom.I69 Paralleling the wider moves towards 
social self-organisation within society, a process of "horizontal collectivism" within 
the Party, begun shortly after the conclusion of the August 1980 Accords, was a clear 
indication of crisis. In essence, as society expressed its dissatisfaction, so too did the 
Party's ordinary members, demanding an overhaul of both organisation and 
operatiOns. In Apnl 1981, the movement attained a level of organisational identity, 
with the establishment of the "Forum for Social Accord," which demanded essential 
165 Jan B de Weydenthal et al, The Polish Drama. 1980-1982, 1983 Toronto, Lexmgton Books,p 31. 
166 L Wa1esa, A Path ofHope, op c1t, p 145 
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changes to the tradition of democratic centralism within the Communist Party.I70 This 
resolution marked the first instance ever in wluch local Party activists had met in a 
national gathering to prepare their own positions independently of the leadership. 
Similar signs of crisis were evident in the calls for pluralism within the Party made by 
leaders of official organisations. 
During the "Extraordinary Party Congress," hastily called for early July, the 
Party leadership attempted to solve the serious and protracted economic crisis facing 
the country, and to put an end to the widespread popular agitation, and intense 
ferment within the Party.I7t The explicit purpose of the Congress was twofold. 
Firstly, to sketch out the Party's future progranune of action; and secondly, to rid the 
Party of its image as a mere appendage of Gierek. It did successfully complete 
proposed changes in Party personnel, and did democratically elect a new Politburo 
and Secretariat under the leadership ofStaruslaw Kania. The process ofhonzontalism 
was also arrested. However, the future progranune of action amounted to little more 
than a vague declaration supportmg the principle of sociahst renewal; the rapid 
decline in Party membership was not halted; and, more importantly, the Congress 
failed to improve relations between the Party and the public. During 1981, the PZPR 
lost over four-hundred-thousand (13 per cent) of its members; m and in August, a poll 
revealed that 68 per cent of the populatiOn blamed the authorities for fostering the 
country's crisis. By contrast, only 9 per cent latd the blame at Solidarity's door. m 
The replacement of Kama as General Secretary by Wojciech Jaruzelski on 
October 18th appeared to confirm the frulure of the PZPR leaderslup to strengthen the 
Party's role wttlun Polish society. Despite the formulation of a progranune of socialist 
renewal, Kania had failed to ensure sufficient support either within the Party, or 
throughout society for its subsequent implementation. Underlying the renewal 
strategy had been the assumptiOn that the newly-emerging second society would 
support, and be satisfied by, lnnited change. However, as the movement of social self-
organisation developed, it became obvious that the policy would not receive the 
170 K Ruane, Ql!..£!!, pp 151-2 
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172 IbJd p 153. 
173 Jan B de Weydentha1, op c1t, p.50. 
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support of the public and, in this sense therefore, Kania's replacement can be taken as 
an indication ofthe relative strength of second society vis-a-vis the state. 
Hopes and expectations that Jaruzelski's appointment would lead to a decisive 
improvement m internal affarrs soon proved false. Having called a ninety-day truce 
and outlined an anti-crisis programme in his first speech, J aruzelski attempted to 
restnct the advances recently won by the independent opposition, through a series of 
agreements with farmers and students, and moves to begin legal proceedings against 
KOR and Solidarity acttvists.174 Social agitation continued, however, and by the end 
of November, it was officially announced that demands for the "removal of party 
organisations from industrial enterprises" had been made in nearly 50 per cent of 
Polish provmces.m The entire system of government and state instirutions appeared 
to be engulfed in insurmountable problems. As far as the public was concerned, the 
government appeared to be passive and lagging behind events, reacting to them, as 
opposed to leading society out of crisis. In this sense, according to Walesa, the 
Communist regime missed a real opporturuty to maintain popular support by 
upholding the August Accords and admittmg Solidarity to governrnent.I76 Successive 
changes in party and government leadership appeared to have no impact on operations 
and ultimately contributed to the pervasive image of indecisiveness and 
procrastination. This failure to act was perhaps typical of an establishment facmg 
serious disarray in its ranks. More significantly, it also contnbuted to the growing 
determination of various autonomous groups to take matters of economic and social 
policy into their own hands. 
(3.2.4.2) The Further Development of Second Society 
In August 1980, Solidarity's aim had been to secure the legal existence of the 
developing second society in Poland. Once secured, its aim had to be to defend that 
society, yet, intellecruals and workers alike, had not considered the 1980 
developments as being remotely possible. Post-August, consequently, Solidarity had 
no specific policies or programme on which to build. To quote Walesa: 
"Dunng the strike, we had been the driving force ... the movement had 
followed a programme which itself dictated the tempo of events. Now the 
174 L.Wa1esa, A Path of Hope, op c1t, pp 181-2 
175 Henry Kamm, The New York Times. December4~ 1981, p 5. 
176 L.Wa1esa, A Path of Hope, op c1t, p 160 
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situation had changed. It was a race against the clock and we no longer had 
control of events." 177 
This lack of clear direction manifested itself in visible disputes between members of 
the Union's leadership, in particular concerning the question of whether to establish 
an overtly political party post-August, or whether to continue to operate within the 
bounds of the Solidarity Trade Union.t78 Such divisions and general lack of direction 
"at the top" was, paradoxically, paralleled by increasing activity and social initiative 
"from below." The success of Solidarity in liberating a legal public space in August 
encouraged a further flourishing of independent groups and associations, all of which 
sought legal recognition in what appeared to be a qualitatively changed political 
system. For example, on September zz•d 1980, a national "Independent Association 
of Polish Students" was constituted;I79 TKN was able to extend its activities among 
both independent students and Solidarity supporters;tso and intellectual life, more 
generally, bloomed in terms of what was being written and published. There were 
also growing demands for a loosening and revision of media censorship. In effect, one 
of the most important changes brought about by August 1980 occurred in the 
consciousness of the public. As opinion polls revealed an increasing political 
irritation at the operational deficiencies of the Communist system, the legal 
emergence of Solidarity served to break the mood of apathy, as the union provided 
the means to fill an institutional void. In tins sense, as a consequence of legal change, 
the public became more confident and more determined to effect a permanent reform 
of the system. 
Although the PZPR had formally conceded the right to organise independent 
trade unions in late August, it probably hoped to exercise a major mfluence over the 
form these would take by retaining control of registration procedures. IS! The Party 
had also stipulated that the new unions recognise the PZPR's continued leadmg role 
and that they declare therr loyalty to socialism. This issue led to the first real 
177 Ibtd p 147. 
178 For detat1s of dtvtstons wtthm the Sohdanty leaderslup, see: K Ruane, Qll.9!, pp 113, 147, 207, 
and 261. See, also, A.Tourame, Sohdan!v· The Analysts of a Soctal Movement Poland 1980·81, 1982 
London, Cambndge Umverstty Press, pp 53-4 
179 G Sandford, QJl.9!, p 99. 
180 See InformatiOn Centre for Pohsh Affatrs (hereafter ICPA) 2/1981 for the TKN Declaration of 
January 6"1981. 
181 G Sanford, op ctt, p.lOO. 
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confrontation between Solidarity and the PZPR m September-November 1980 over 
the former's registration.182 However, this major contention only masked a wide 
range of subsidiary disputes, concerning such issues as wage increases, "free 
Saturdays," and access to the mainstream media. The significant point to note here, is 
that demonstrations of Solidarity's influence and strength and the levels of support it 
received from second society (the October 3nt warning strikes received 100 per cent 
backing in major industrial regions, for example) were decisive factors in the ability 
of the union to successfully press its claims against the wishes of the Communist 
regime. The final registration of Solidarity, and the later registration of Rural 
Solidarity inspite of the crisis which developed over the Bydgoszcz incident in March 
1981,183 marked the end of what has been termed "the first gestation period," in 
which the independent union had been formed and its place in the social structure 
more clearly defined. Solidarity's registration and its subsequent "victory" at 
Bydgoszcz confirmed to the authorities that their ability to control pubhc activities 
was rapidly waning, and demonstrated that any attempts to use force to quell social 
agitation would merely strengthen the resolve of public opposition. For Solidarity, 
however, these conflicts provided testimony to the widespread popular support for 
their cause, whilst simultaneously indicating the government's relative weakness. 
In summary, by March 1981, Solidarity was a highly integrated movement, 
increasingly identified with the whole of Polish society by virtue of the size of Its 
membership and its ability to rally the population. More significantly, Poland had 
essentially witnessed the formalisation of second society via the legal registration of 
the Solidarity trade umon. What had initially been a working class strike in mid-1980 
had developed into a cross-societal movement encompassing all social strata. 
Identifiable working class and intellectJialleaders had emerged; and, on an mdividual 
level, political behaviour was less marked by fear and mtimidation. Polish society had 
effectively become pluralist with an identifiable and active second society in 
opposition to the Communist Party and state. The next stage in the evolution of the 
opposition would be "Solidarity's involvement in the constructive resolution of the 
country's problems."l84 
182 K.Ruane, QJl.£!1, pp.71-75. 
183 For detalis of the inctdent, see· tbtd, Chapter 8, espectally pp 137-140; Jan B de Weydenthal, 
op ctt, pp.70-71; and G Sandford, op ctt, Chapter 5 
184 G Sandford, op ctt. p I 06. 
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In mid-April, Solidarity highlighted the PZPR's general alienation from the 
population by publishing a lengthy document entitled "Directions of Union Action m 
the Country's Present Situation." It was, in effect, a statement of Solidanty's 
ideology and a programme of action offered for discussion inside the union. 
Proclruming an allegiance to political democracy and socialist-oriented social 
policies, and placing the blrune for the Polish crisis on the faults of the existing 
system, Solidarity declared that the reserves of Communism had been exhausted, and 
that only the union was capable of safeguardmg the renewal process.185 This is 
siguificant, here, for two reasons. It was tangible evidence, firstly, of the maturity of 
second society, generally, and more specifically, of the extent of evolution of 
Solidarity post-August 1981. Secondly, it represented one of the first occasions on 
which Solidarity formally chose to challenge the primacy of the PZPR in the political 
arena. The demands of the workers in 1980 had to an extent challenged the mrumer in 
which the PZPR governed. However, the evolution of Solidarity in early 1981 and the 
publication of the Directions for Union Action suggested the emergence of a clear 
alternative to the Commumst system in Poland. The explicit formulation of a rival 
political programme which undermined the political resources of the PZPR and, more 
importantly, attracted the support of the masses. This alternative vision assumed a 
more mature form at Solidarity's first National Congress in 1981. 
The National Congress, held in September and October 1981, was an 
important landmark. At no point in Communism's history had an independent public 
movement been able to hold a formal gathering to debate its role and functions within 
the political system. The Congress, with Solidanty increasingly being seen as 
representing society as a whole rather than just the workers, emerged as a quasi-
legislative body, adopting positions on the most important issues of public life, 
proposing solutions to various problems, and formulating social and economic 
programmes for the future.t86 In addttion, the Congress elected Solidarity's national 
leadership and adopted uniform statutes for the organisation as a whole. By providing 
a formal organisational underpinning to the movement and a specific programme of 
action, the Congress turned perceptions into reality. Envisaging major changes in 
Poland's political system, the programme stated: 
185 K.Ruane, QJl.Q1, p 150 
186 For an account of the maJor events and debates that occurred dunng the Congress, see· S Persky 
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" Sohdanty can no longer confine itself to waiting ... We are the only 
guarantor for society and that is why the union deems it its basic duty to take 
all possible short- and long-term steps to salvage Poland from ruin ... There is 
no other way to attain this goal but to restructure the state and the economy on 
the basis of democracy and public participation." I87 
By unambiguously pointmg to the PZPR as the cause of Poland's crisis, Solidarity 
called into question the possibility of it continuing to exercise power and directly 
challenged the Party. In addition, the progranune demanded access to the media; 
reform of local elections; the creation of a second legislative chamber and a "social 
council" to direct the economy; and, ultimately, free elections to Parliament.I88 All 
these provisions provided the elements behind the concludmg appeal for the 
establishment of a "Self-Governing Republic," which would reflect the existing 
pluralism within the social, political and cultural spheres.J89 
The formulation of such a comprehensive and distinctly political progranune 
undoubtedly reflected the shifting balance-of-power between the PZPR and Solidarity 
in the period to November 1981. During that period, the effectiveness of the political 
system and the ability of the PZPR to govern within It had declined considerably. 
Independence had spread throughout societallife to the extent that the opposition was 
capable of not only enforcing concessions onto the authorities, but also of strongly 
influencing decision-making at all levels of the political and institutional hierarchy. 
The system became overburdened with demands that it could not meet; and the 
rapidly deteriorating economic crisis weakened the PZPR's ability to lead. By 
December 1981, the second society in Poland had evolved to the extent that it 
occupied a legal public space and had been recognised by the Communist regime as 
being fundamental to Polish developments Furthermore, the numbers who joined 
Solidarity alone testify to the fact that second society was all-encompassing, uniting 
all social classes in opposition to the PZPR which, in turn, ensured that when 
Solidarity formulated a distinct and viable alternative political progranune, with the 
support of the public, the threat to the existmg regime was too great to ignore. 
187 'The SohdantyProgramme,' ibid, pp 205-225. 
188 Ibid. pp.211-218. 
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(3.2.4 3) Declaratzon of Martial Law, December 13'h 1981 
On December 13th 1981, General Jaruzelski declared Martial Law in 
Poland.190 Throughout the autunm of 1981, there were increasing signs that the 
government was preparing to resolve the on-going crisis within society. At the end of 
September, for example, a six-man "Committee of National Salvation" (PRON) had 
been formed, headed by General Jaruzelski; and special units of the army and police 
had been formed to quell popular resistance. On November 4th, Jaruzelski met with 
Walesa and Cardinal Glemp. His offer of symbolic consultations and representation 
for Solidanty and the Roman Catholic Church was refused by both parties, as all vital 
posts and crucial decisions would continue to remain the prerogative of the PZPR.l 91 
It is, perhaps, significant that, inspite of second society's and Solidarity's evident 
strength, even in November, the PZPR did not permit independent orgamsations 
access to political power. Undoubtedly, the constraints imposed by the Soviet Union 
will have been a primary consideratiOn in the imposition of Martial Law.I92 However, 
it was also evident that a growing percentage of the population was increasingly 
disgruntled with recurrent strikes, and disillusioned with the ongoing feuds within 
Solidanty. Within certain regions, polls revealed that over 25 per cent of respondents 
felt that the most recent strikes had been urmecessary; and similar numbers supported 
the Central Committee imtiative to ban strikes completely.I93 It would be a mistake, 
however, to attribute the success of the Communist authorities in imposing a "state of 
war" on a slight waning of popular support for independent initiatives. A lack of 
preparation on the part of Solidarity for such an evenruality undoubtedly helped the 
authorities in December. In addition, the reaction of Primate Glemp was a decisive 
factor in reducing immediate resistance. In a sermon delivered on December 13 .. , he 
stated: 
"The authorities consider that the exceptional natirre of Martial Law is 
dictated by a higher necessity ... Assuming the correctness of such reasoning 
the man in the street will subordinate himself to the new siruation ... " 194 
190 For an English translation ofh1s speech, see ICPA 20/1981, p 8. 
191 T.Garton Ash, The Pohsh Revolution Sohdanty 1980-82, op Cit, p.243-6 
192 K Ruane, oo Clt, p.165, 275-7. 
193 !bid, p 250 
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In theory, Jaruzelski's move demonstrated the extent of the PZPR's 
continumg strength inspite of the gains made by Solidarity and second society during 
the preceding fifteen months. Walesa referred to the fact that Solidarity was no match 
for "the overwhelming measures undertaken by the government to bring Polish 
citizens to heel." 195 Conversely, however, Martial Law also demonstrated the Party's 
weakness v1s-a-vis second society: the subsequent chaotic struggle between it and 
society merely served to destroy, irretrievably, any remaining legitimacy the PZPR 
may have enjoyed. 
(3.3) Second Society and the Breakdown of Communism in 1989 
On August 31st 1988, Lech Walesa met with Interior Mmister General 
Czeslaw Klszczak for high-level negotiations aimed at ending a new wave of strikes 
sweeping across Poland. Eight years after the signing of the Gdansk Accords, and 
more than SIX years smce the imposition of Martial Law, government and the 
institutions representative of second society were talking face-to-face. Attempting to 
make sense of Polish developments in the period after December 1981 is a daunting 
task. The post-Solidarity period (I take, here, the Solidarity period as being August 
1980-December 1981), however, can be divided into two distinct stages, with the 
crucial turning-point occurring in September 1986, when the PZPR declared a general 
anmesty, launched a series of meaningful reforms, and began to recognise second 
society as a fundamental part of any stable political system. It was the first period, 
December 1981 to September 1986, however, that led to this realisation. 
Part III of this case-study chapter will not provide a comprehensive account of 
events throughout the 1980s. Certain years and events will be covered in far greater 
detail than others. The reason for this is deliberate and relates to the respective 
relevance of certain events and thetr contnbution to the re-emergence of a second 
society in Poland, and to their effect on the mode of breakdown experienced by the 
Communist regime in 1989. The year 1982, for example, was crucial, if only for the 
developing arguments between underground opposition leaders over the most 
appropriate strategy and tactics to adopt following Jaruzelski's declaration of Martial 
Law. The end of that year witnessed the emergence of a concrete opposition 
programme aimed at the deliberate creation of an underground society. A large part of 
this section, therefore, focuses on the arguments and discussions that were rife 
amongst underground Solidarity activists during 1982, because of their significance 
for the re-emergence and further development of second society in Poland. 
195 L.Walesa, A Path of Hope, op cit, p 204 
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Furthermore, the discussions were testimony to the degree of maturity achieved by 
independent organisations pre-December 1981. In contrast, the years between 1983 
and 1986 represented an effective stalemate between the opposition forces and the 
Communist regime, and, although events such as the release of Walesa did have a 
significant impact upon the fortunes of second society, the maJority of opposition 
activity centred on protecting those structures that existed, as opposed to the 
construction of new ones. 
This section, therefore, will outline the main lines of the opposition's internal 
response to Martial Law in terms of political strategy, tactics and organisational 
development; the internal debate over its political aims and programme; and its 
reaction to the authorities' policies. The main analytical and practical problem faced 
by the Solidarity-led opposition from the outset was whether to prepare for a single 
general strike, or whether to organise long-term social resistance.196 The issue of a 
"smgle outburst" versus a "long march" conditioned views as to whether an 
underground state or underground soc1ety should be the principal aim, and the 
consequent degree of centralised or decentralised leaderslup and organisation. 
(3.3.1) Underground Structures of the Opposition Post-December 1981 
Post-December 1981, the reconstruction of Solidarity was of pnmary 
importance. By resorting to Martial Law in order to deal with a situation it felt it 
could no longer control, the Party had effectively declared war on a huge section of 
society and, in so doing, turned general dissidence into an all-encompassing mass 
movement for the liberation of second society. The process of reconstruction was to 
prove difficult, however, not only because of the virtual elimination of its leadership, 
but also as a result of the polarisation of programmes observable following the 
imposition of Martial Law. 
Only approximately 20 per cent of the principal Solidarity leadership escaped 
internment at the outset of Martial Law in December 1981. The principal aim of 
dissident activists was to keep Solidarity "alive." Given the conditions discussed 
briefly above, it is hardly surprising that the undergroundl97 never succeeded in 
196 See, for example, an appeal for an rmmed~ate general stnke 1ssued m December 1981, Labour 
Focus on Eastern Europe, Vol5 Nos 1-2, Sprmg 1982. 
197Here, 1 defme "the underground" as the sum of the Sohdanty, Nanonahst and Catholic groupmgs 
that existed and conlinued to operate, m some form, post-1981. 
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creating a nation-wide, hierarchically based orgamsation.I98 Its main characteristic 
was the local, autonomous, spontaneous and decentralised nature of its constituent 
parts. The underground's first National Resistance Committee (OKQ)199 was 
established in early 1982 by members of Solidarity's former National Presidium. 
Although it operated with the express consent of Walesa, it was organised without the 
support of the main leaders-in-hiding and was severely criticised for the anonymity of 
its leadership.2oo It adopted the generally accepted view that conspiratorial structures 
and terrorist measures were unnecessary and dangerous as Martial Law would be 
short-lived. What was required was a secret leadership body to stimulate and co-
ordinate social opposition. The leaders, therefore, adopted the strategy of"organising 
a mass, society-wide underground resistance movement" calling on society to form 
autonomous "Circles of Social Resistance" (" KOS") to force the Communist regime 
to lift Martial Law and to negotiate an agreement with it on the basis of Solidarity's 
Ohwa Congress progranune. 20I The organisation did, at least, fulfill a pressing need: 
the people needed to see and hear that Solidarity had recovered from the initial shock 
of Martial Law. It is also true, however, that, in practice, OKO barely existed. It had 
no organisational structures, no regwnal or propaganda base, and very few open 
supporters or activists.2o2 Witlnn one week of the imposition of Martial Law, it 
appeared that the regime had effectively crippled Solidarity, specifically, and second 
society more generally. 2o3 
OKO was replaced on Apnl 22nd by the Provisional Co-ordinating 
Committee (TKK).204 It represented specifically Solidarity's first effective 
underground, national leaderslnp body.205 Its founding communique was the first 
198 The changmg vanety of structures ts chromcled m: M Lopinskt et al ( eds ), Konspira: Sohdanty 
Underground, 1990 Los Angeles, Umverstty of Cahfornia Press. 
199 Established at a secret meetmg ofSohdanty actiVISts on January 13th. M.Lopmskt, op et!, p 49. 
200 M.Lopmskt, Ql!£!.!, pp 49-51. 
201 ICPA, News Bulletin 1/1982, pp 7-11 
202 N Ascherson, The Struggles for Poland, 1988 London, Pan Books, p 217. 
203 M.Lopmskt, op ctt, p.36. 
204 Also known as the 'Intenm Coordmatmg Commtsston', see tbtd, pp 74-77. 
205 D.Ost, Sohdanty and the Pohttcs of Antt-Pohttcs, op ctt, p.l53. 
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comprehensive programmatic declaration under Martial Law.206 The "Statement on 
the Methods and Forms of Action" stressed that the reconstruction of the Union's 
activities entailed more than moral opposition. The three main efforts were to be 
directed towards the formation of KOS, the extension of publishing activity, and the 
creation of discussion clubs to formulate the movement's strategy and tactics.207 The 
TKK's regional structure emerged earliest in Gdansk, Wroclaw, Warsaw and Krakow, 
and by the latter half of 1982, the bulk of its regional organisations had been 
established.208 Most were styled as "Regional Co-ordinating Committees" (RKK); 
and, although largely autonomous, did back the TKK' s calls for nation-wide action. 
Overall, the underground was a haphazard mosaic of loosely connected and 
often parallel organisations. These formed and reformed depending upon the interplay 
between the Solidarity-KOR hardcore, social discontent, and state-police repression. 
The TKK operated as the "official" Solidarity, with individuals forming their own 
"Solidarity cells." 209 Despite the transitory nature of many groups, however, the mere 
fact that independent organisations were able to form and operate under the 
restrictions imposed by Martial Law, effectively demonstrates the maturity of second 
society achieved pre-1980. 
(3 3 2) The Development ofthe Underground 
Arguably, the entire underground's greatest success in the early Martial Law 
years (in spite of the continual arrest of writers, printers and distributors) was its 
publication and propaganda drive. Its supporters claimed that this was at over twice 
the level attained under what they termed the similar conditions of the first year of the 
German occupation in 1939-40.210 By Aprill982, some 149 separate titles could be 
206 An Enghsh translatiOn can be found m· B SzaJkowski, Next to God, 1983 New York, StMartms 
Press, Appendix lhree. 
207 ICPA, 9/1982, pp 3-5. 
208 See· M Lopmski, op c1t. pp 59-60 for details of the "bottom-up" tactics leadmg to the emergence 
of vanous regional structures and orgamsabons. Also Chapter 5 for details concernmg the construcnon 
of regional factory orgamsabons, and the history/specifics/orgamsabons peculiar to each mdlVldual 
region 
209 D Ost, Solidantv and the Polincs of Ann-Polincs. op CI!, pp.l53-4. 
210 'Poland's Flounshmg Independent Culture', Index on Censorshm Vol15 No 6, June 1986, pp 24-
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identified; by December, this number had more than trebled.211 Some reference 
should also be made here to the printing of leaflets, banners, flags, and badges; in the 
early 1980s, of Solidarity bank notes; to the emergence of clandestine newsletters and 
papers within the internment camps; and to the establishment of two news services: IS 
giving information on Solidarity activities; and NAI, providing foreign and domestic 
news. All are evidence of the depth of organisation and sophistication of the growing 
second society m the early 1980s.2I2 
During the nineteenth century Partitions, the Poles developed a specific 
tradition of political emigration, which re-emerged during the Second World War, 
and continued post-1945 in the early years of resistance to Communist rule. What 
concerns us here Is that the growing number of emigre Poles had a significant impact 
on internal Polish developments especially in the 1980s. Although regime propaganda 
denounced opposition activists in the West as CIA agents, and made the most of 
Solidarity's links with what it called the "Western centres of Ideological diversion" 
and "information aggression,"2I3 these external sources of opposition cannot be 
ignored, if only for their continuing psychological, financial and informational 
support for the internal opposition. They were also an important additional arena for 
debating tactics, strategy and progranunatic aims during the entire period of Martial 
Law. As the flourishing underground cultural life bore witness, thousands of Poles in 
Poland looked to this exiled intellectual elite for their standards and inspiration. This 
"spiritual government-in-exile" was more representative of the people than 
Jaruzelski's government could ever hope to be.2I4 
(3.3.2.1) Solidarity's Underground Strategy, Tactzcs and Programme 
As discussed above, the first Solidarity political reactions to Martial Law were 
inevitably of a local or individual character, and Solidarity leaders themselves were 
divided in their assessments.m Zbigruew Bujak and the majority were optimistic 
about the level of social support. Their strategy was, therefore, to operate 
211 H.Gordon Slallmg, Samtzdat and an Independent Soctetv m Central and Eastern Europe, 1989 
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underground to organise peaceful resistance. The pessilTilsts were a minority, led by 
V!lctor Kulersla, who had earlier been the most prescient Solidarity leader on the 
possibility of armed repression.2I6 They saw no point in going underground as they 
predicted the situation would last many years and, thus, emphasised "long-term 
information activity.''2I7 
Under Martial Law, however, KOR's pre-1980 strategies and organisational 
experience became very relevant. With the debate centred on whether Solidarity 
should retain Its non-violent commitment, whether it should establish a centralised 
alternative state with clear lines of command, or whether it should establish a loose 
structure to help co-ordinate and encourage peaceful resistance, KOR's 1970s concept 
of the second society became central to the strategy that would be pursued by the 
opposition forces throughout the early 1980s.2I8 This increased the influence of the 
interned KOR leaders - Kuron and Michnik - and of their ideas concermng the 
deliberate building of a political underground movement capable of long-term, 
comprehensive opposition to the Communist regime. The workers' Solidarity leaders 
- Bujak, Lis and Frasymuk - however, thought, until the Spring, that Martial Law 
would prove short-lived and, thus, their problem was not so much to build permanent 
underground structures and to present a new Solidarity programme, as to organise 
widespread and continuing social resistance to demonstrate Solidarity's capability to 
force the authorities to end Martial Law and to negotiate with second society. In 
essence, then, from the very beginning of the Martial Law period, Solidarity"s 
thinking on strategy and tactics revealed sharp differences of opinion that determined 
the way in which individual regions organised themselves. 
The notion of the underground society was formulated in Warsaw as an 
alternative programme to that proposed by Kuron. The internal Solidanty debate was 
fuelled by his "Theses for Getting Out of a Situation Without Issue," winch predicted 
massive and widespread social discontent, as a consequence of the "complete" 
economic disaster and the recent "militarisahon" of society.2I9 He considered that a 
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"massive and well organised resistance was the only chance for the Poles to force the 
authorities into a negotiated compromise to prevent a social outburst or to head off 
Soviet intervention."220 The opposition, therefore, should demonstrate its strength 
through a variety of actions designed to encourage the reformist elements within the 
PZPR regime into an agreement. Kuron's blast provoked a further major exchange 
concerning strategy between Bujak and Kulerski in March. The former wanted to 
form "an alternative, decentralised, informal and invisible union structure." 221 His 
recipe was for a multi-centred movement consisting of mutually dependent, and 
loosely connected, social resistance, informational and assistance groups. Kulerski, by 
contrast, argued that a peaceful, legal organisation would be more advantageous to the 
regime in coming to terms with the socio-economic crisis than a violent underground. 
This second line would succeed in encouraging them to accept political 
compromises.222 Kulerski foresaw an erosion of the regime's power leading to 
gradual liberalisation and the rebirth of autonomous social life. The opposition 
should, therefore, seek refuge in an underground society not state.223 Perhaps more 
sigruficant here than the semantics of the opposition discussions that occurred is the 
mere presence of such high-level theoretical debate in the first instance. The 
undeground contained many political ideas and tendencies which was evidence of a 
real and thriving political pluralism within Poland. The fact that progranunatic 
exchanges were evident is proof of the maturity achieved by the second society in 
Poland, with leading dissidents able to discuss viable alternatives in an effort to 
ensure that the opposition did not falter as in the past. 
Demands from Kuron, Lis, their Western emigre supporters and grassroots 
pressure emanating from the large Warsaw and Wroclaw factories moved the TKK 
leadership to begin preparations for a general strike in June 1982, after the lessons of 
the first round of major disturbances in May had been digested.224 The subsequent 
protests were particularly strong in Wroclaw. 2zs The TKK then called off its 
220 T.Garton Ash, 'The art of the nnposstble,' The Spectator, September IIth 1982, pp.7-8 
221 IaA, 8/1982, pp 8-10. 
222 ICPA, 6/1982, pp.?-10. 
223 ICPA, 11/1982, pp 8-14 
224 On the May 1982 disturbances see L Walesa, A Path of Hope, op ctt, p 230. 
225 Tad Szulc, 'Can Poland Be Free?' Parade (Washington DC.), July 18th 1982. 
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offensive, and all strikes and demonstrations in late June, for the period of one month. 
It claimed that the street demonstrations had decisively shown that "Solidarity is still 
a real power." This moratorium was proof of the TKK's willingness to reach an 
agreement, government rejection of which would merely "force the umon to resume 
all sorts of pressure including a general stnke."226 "The Underground Society: the 
Basic Principles for a Progranunatic Declaration" set out TKK's strategy for the 
second half of 1982, and argued in favour of the organisation of a decentralised 
movement of passive resistance within the framework of an underground society.227 
By August, decentralised "Regional Co-ordination Centres" existed in many of the 
main industrial centres throughout Poland, Wroclaw being by far the strongest of 
these with 60 per cent of its workplaces supporting underground Solidarity. Along 
with the broadcasting of the first Radio Solidarity transmissions in the sununer, these 
provided evidence of a maturing second society inspite of Martial Law restnctions. 
In sununary, the rhetoric of the first Solidarity documents published after the 
imposition of Martial Law, revealed a characteristic change in the assessment of the 
democratisation of political life. In 1980-81, Solidarity looked for ways ofrestrictmg 
the PZPR's leading role with mechanisms that would broaden independent 
participation. Post-1982, the principal problem became how to replace the Party. At 
this stage, the numerous declarations issued by underground structures began to 
portray distinct and well-formulated alternatzve programmes and principles, which 
would giVe necessary direction and purpose to the activities of a maturing second 
society. lnspite of the fact that the Communist regime had won the battle for control 
of the legal public space, second society organisations were able to demonstrate their 
resilience in the face of a worsening crisis within Polish social and political life. 
On August 31st 1982, to commemorate the second anniversary of the 
foundmg of Solidarity, massive demonstrations were held throughout Poland.228 
Significantly, the protests were hailed by the regime as a failure, in that they did not 
lead to a massive mobilisation of the population as predicted. Admittedly, during the 
first half of the year, Solidarity had shown that it had no power to influence the 
government or to force it to change course. Subsequently, many leading activists were 
of the opmion that the demonstrations merely allowed the military regime to make a 
226 ICPA, 13/82, p 3. 
227 Ibid. pp 4-8. 
228 M Lopmskt, op et!, Chapter 8 
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calculated decision regarding the costs and benefits of delegahsing Solidarity. 
Conversely, the impact on social consciousness cannot be ignored: the TKK had tried, 
and did succeed, in organising a mass demonstration and, in so doing, the events did 
have significant psychological consequences for the wider society. In that sense, 
August 1982 was a serious and developed social challenge to the authorities under the 
restrictions of Martial Law, and demonstrated the continuing ability of second society 
organisations to mobilise the public. 
By Autumn 1982, however, the Jaruzelski regime had effectively won the 
battle for the banning of Solidarity229 (the delegalisation of the Union in October 
1982, for example, had revealed the wider-suspected weakness of the TKK) and had 
forced the Church to accept its conditions for normalisation, and the forthcoming 
1983 Papal visit.230 The TKK, thus, lost much of its political standing, especially 
when its role as the main opposition spokesman was largely taken over by Walesa 
following his release on November ll th. However, although a number of activists 
subsequently abandoned clandestme activity, the underground still constituted a 
strong informational and propaganda network with considerable support in specific 
workplaces. 231 This allowed it to pursue its own interests, and to support independent 
initiatives in the period followmg the suspension of Martial Law in 1983.232 
By 1983, Jaruzelski had separated Solidarity and the Church, and was able to 
begin a long-term process of stabilisation. In spite of regime successes, however, it 
must be recognised that the Communist Party barely existed in the factories; and, 
although he had maintained cohesion Within the leadership ranks, J aruzelski had not 
gained the minimum social support required for effective economic reconstruction. In 
addition, the TKK continued to operate as an important working class pressure group, 
229 On the course of events between August-December 1982, see: L.Weschler, 'A Reporter At Large 
Poland. A State of War- 11', The New Yorker, Apnl18th 1983, pp 71-93; J Kifner, 'Poland Will Lift 
Basic Restnct:lons by the Year's End,' The New York Times, December 13th 1982; 'Poland Under 
Jaruzelskt- Part 11' SurveY. Vol38 No 4, Aut:l!mn 1982, pp 60-68. 
230 For more on the Church and the opposit:lon m late 1982, especially the debate concenung a 
suspected "qmd pro quo" between the PZPR and the Church, and worsenmg relat:lons between the 
latter and Sohdanty, see· D Ost, 'November 1982: Opposinon at a Turnmg-Pomt,' Poland Watch, 
No 2 1983. 
231 ICPA, 22/1982, pp 9-10 
232 December 12th saw the formal "suspension" of Mama! Law For details of Jaruzelskt's 
broadcast, see· Contemporary Poland, January 1983, pp 36-40 For the oppositiOn's response, see· 
ICPA. 14/1983, p 3, ICPA. 1511983, pp 11-12; ICPA. 16/1983, p.l4. 
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whilst the authorities also found It Impossible to silence Walesa himself, through 
either police or JUdicial methods.m On the one hand, therefore, the Communist 
regime was the strongest actor within Poland in the early 1980s. Although 
Solidarity's delegalisation was both symbolic and effective, the authorities were, 
however, unable to dissolve the resistance movement and the developing second 
society. The TKK continued to appeal to all social groups to demonstrate the regime's 
complete isolation. In essence, the regime's apparent strength was accompanied by a 
number of identifiable weaknesses which, in turn, allowed second society to survive 
and mature inspite of the restrictions imposed by Martial Law. 
(3 3 3) 1983-1986 
Whilst Solidarity floundered, Jaruzelski rebuilt the foundations of Communist 
Party rule at the various levels of the administration, and throughout the economy. By 
mid-1986, Poland had returned to Soviet-type normality. However, it must also be 
recognised that a hard-core of permanent oppositiorusts had been created by the 
events of 1980-82, who could be neither eliminated nor reintegrated into a partially-
reformed system. Subsequently, observers of the Polish scene post-1982, witnessed a 
familiar cycle of opposition activity, and regime repression (for example, the legal 
sanctions, such as the two-three year prison sentences passed on Lis, Frasyniuk and 
Michnik in 1985).234 Furthermore, the Roman Catholic Church, although often 
dampening-down social outbursts agmnst the regime, guaranteed that the latter was 
condemned to living With an uncontrolled society. In addition, second society groups 
remained relatively autonomous and consequently, the discontent of workers, 
peasants and intellectuals continued to have a destabilising effect on the entire system 
of rule. 
A potent indicator of the continued vitality of second society was evident m 
elections to the provincial and lower-level People's Council of June 17th 1984, which 
were the first open test of the regime's mobilising powers following Martial Law. The 
results showed both the extent of regime stabilisation, and of national dissatisfaction. 
Turnout in the key provincial elections was just under 75 per cent, and between 66.8-
233 Contemporary Poland. January 1983, pp 38-48 
234on the vanous methods of repressiOn employed by the Jaruzelsla government, see: 'M1htary Penal 
Camps' m 'Poland Under Jaruzelsla - Part II', Survey, Vol38 No.4, Autumn 1982, pp 69-70, 
HFlhpowicz, 'From Sohdanty to Arts Control', Ib1d, pp.B-26; TMianowicz, 'The Department of 
M!Smformanon at Work' m 'Poland Under Jaruzelsla- Part I', Survey, Vol38 No 3, Summer 1982, 
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78 per cent for the Peoples' Council. The abstention rate was, thus, unprecedentedly 
high for a Communist election. In additiOn, 85 mainly rural districts m East Poland 
failed even to achieve the 50 per cent turnout for the election to be valid, and were 
forced to hold repeat ballots.23S The number of voters who refused to support the 
PZPR was put at a figure of 25 per cent (siX million) even by official sources. To 
quote Walesa:-
" Our country was changing: people were beginning to reject the idea of a 
double standard ... More and more people wanted to be able to express 
themselves openly." 236 
The Sejm election of October 15th 1985, again, showed both the successes 
and the failures of the Jaruzelski regime in extending and strengthening its hold over 
Polish society. Officially, a national turnout of just over 78 per cent was recorded, 
although the opposition considered the true figure to be nearer 65 per cent. Although 
candidate selection had been controlled, the voters had the opportunity to signal their 
discontent with individual candidates. Differential rates of individual support were 
again evident, highlighting areas of deep-rooted opposition. These individual 
distinctions were, however, much less significant than the battle over turnout. The 
opposition called for a boycott, while the regime attempted, and failed, to achieve a 
much better result than in the local elections. Predictably, the most disaffected areas 
were the Solidarity working class strongholds. It was admitted, officially, for 
example, that turnout reached only 65.81 per cent in Gdansk, and 68-71 per cent in 
Nowa Huta, Lodz, Lublin and Warsaw, as compared with the highest of 88 per cent in 
Bydgoszcz.237 
The latter half of 1984, therefore, saw the beginning of a confusing period in 
Poland. On the one hand, most of the remaining interned figures were released during 
the summer as part of a general anmesty On the other, the anmesty failed to remove 
the causes of social discontent. However, as the anmesty was so comprehensive, It did 
remove an opposition rallying-point from Polish political life. In October, perhaps the 
foremost clerical ally of the opposition movement, Father Jerzy Popieluszko, was 
kidnapped and murdered by renegade security agents.m The end of the year 
235 See: G Sanfonl, Mthtary Rule m Poland. op ctt p 84 
236 L Walesa, A Path of Hope, op c1t p 298. 
237 For detatls of the election results, see. G Sanford, M1htary Rule in Poland, op c1t pp 274-5. 
238 For further details, see: M.T Kaufman, Mad Dreams, Savmg Graces Poland, A Nallon In 
Conspiracy, 1989 New York, Random House; J Cave, 'The Murder of Father Popteluszko,' Poland 
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witnessed a succession of arrests, releases and then rearrests of interned Sohdarity 
leaders, and it would not be until the September 1986 amnesty, that virtually all key 
figures were released. 
Between 1984 and 1986, the gradual strengthening of the Communist system 
was demonstrated by the lOth "Congress of the VIctors" in 1986, and the slow pace of 
economic improvement. By 1986, Jaruzelski appeared to have won the gamble 
undertaken in December 1981. The great question was whether Polish society would 
reassert itself, or whether the reconstructed Communist system would this time 
succeed in forcing it into the Soviet mould. The multiplying protests in the early years 
of Martial Law had reached their peak in the demonstrations of May and August 
1982. Subsequently, their intensity and frequency diminished, as they failed to bring 
any tangible results. The failure of the November 1982 general strike was a 
significant watershed in this respect. After that date, pubhc protests took place only 
sporadically, usually following Mass on anniversaries of patriotic or union 
significance. The reduction of the role of public demonstrations was accompanied by 
- . a return to the belief in activity at "lower levels," however, for example, in individual 
enterprises and under the protective mantle of the Church. 
During the next year-and-a-half, the TKK continued to function. The 
leadership met and Issued statements, and the underground publishing movement 
continued as prolifically as ever. Repression became somewhat more sporadic, and 
for the most part, detentions were limited. In part, the level of repression subsided 
because the regime became convinced that, for all mtents and purposes, it had won: 
that after over six years, it had outlasted Solidarity, and achieved an acceptance -
albeit an apathetic one- on the part of the public. 
(3 3 4) 1986-1989: Protracted Death 
The year 1986 was a watershed in the history of the post-1981 opposition, as 
the amnesty of September, which freed practically all remaining political prisoners, 
surpnsed the opposition forces.239 The new policies of liberalisation and tolerant 
Watch 7 (1985), pp 1-26; deta!led press reports in all 1984 publications of Uncensored Poland; 
PG LeWJs, 'Turbulent Pnest, Pohtlcal Implications of the Pop1eluszko Affarr,' Pohncs Vol5, No 2, 
October 1985, pp 33-39, R Boyes and J Moody, The Pnest Who Had to D1e· The Tragedy of Father 
Jerzy Pomeluszko, 1986 London, VIctor Gollancz Ltd 
239 Interview With General Klszczak on Pohsh TV, September 11th 1986, repnnted m Uncensored 
Poland News Bulletin No 18, September 23rd 1986, p 15 For det01ls of the d!ffenng v1ews ofvanous 
released Sohdanty activists, see· Anna Pomam's summary m RFE Research, 'Pohsh Independent 
Press Review,' No 13, November lOth 1986, pp 3-8 
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repression demonstrated the extent to which the Communist regime now regarded 
opposttion activities as trivial. When the remaining underground activists were 
released, many opposition supporters became resigned to inevitable defeat. 
Conversely, the anmesty also demonstrated an official recognition that the opposition 
was a permanent fixture of Poland's political landscape. Despite the fact that there 
was no formal dialogue or negotiations with Solidarity, the government displayed its 
desire to maintain some contacts.240 Even if these initiatives were aimed at creating 
the impression of an opening wtthout allowing for any real changes, they did contain 
an element of official recognition of independence, especially of the Solidarity 
opposittOn.241 The release of political detainees also demonstrated the govermnent's 
readmess to tolerate various forms of soctal pressure. 
Immediately after the 1986 anmesty, new Solidarity organisations began to 
form above ground, parallel to those underground. For example, Solidarity's Interim 
Council was active alongside the TKK, which was to remain intact in case of 
worsening relations with the PZPR.242 However, Lech Walesa and a group of his 
closest advisers acted as a separate entity, leading only to confusion, 
misunderstandings and a marked lack of co-ordination between various initiatives and 
dectsions. Thus, inspite of the recognition of the opposition forces, by 1986, 
Solidarity was "a disparate collection of political oppositionists held together by the 
authority of Lech Walesa." 243 Essentially, the opposition found itself tom between 
the hopes and expectations of the "great past" and an increasingly apathetic society. 
Significantly, it was primarily the Solidarity opposition that had the identity crisis, 
with the focus of debate being whether solely trade union activity remained the way 
to proceed, or whether it should concentrate its efforts on systerruc political reform.244 
r Solidarity activists openly established "Regional Executive Committees of 
Solidartty," but failed to formulate a positive progranune to haul the country out of 
the prevailing crists. 
240 For example, the VIce President of the official labour uruon, Jerzy Uziemblo, met with 
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In 1987, however, Jaruze1ski's strategy that had been applied since 1981 broke 
down. Instead of an economic take-off, there had been stagnation and a further 
lowering of the general living standard.245 The political liberalisation after the 
amnesty of 1986 did not produce any greater support in the population. The 
fragmentation of the opposition and its difficulties to adapt to the new conditions did 
not strengthen the position of the Party. In November, the PZPR organised a 
referendum, looking for popular acceptance of the economic and political reforms, 
and particularly of the plarmed austerity measures including important price increases. 
The newly formed National Executive Commission of Solidarity (KKW) advised 
voters to boycott the referendum as a demonstration of the lack of public appeal of the 
Communist regime. 246 Although the boycott was not a complete one, falling 5 per 
cent short of its required maJority, the answer of the population was negative.247 The 
reform proposal was deemed too vague and contradictory, and Its costs too high.248 
The abstentions and the votes against the authonties expressed protest against the 
planned price hikes, as well as a profound skepticism toward the officially declared 
determination to reform the economy and the polity. The referendum was, however, 
an indication that the government appeared to be seriously considering reform and 
that a definite pro-reform faction existed within the Party. The defeat, which came as 
a surprise for both the authorities and the opposition, was certainly an Important 
destabilising factor, showing the limits of control and submission. Shortly after, the 
Warsaw Regional Executive Committee of Solidarity declared:-
"all of us in Solidarity realise at last that we have entered a new phase ... we 
know for certain: the war is over ... The Polish referendum proves that the 
restructuring of the economy, of social ties, and of public life cannot be 
achieved against the wishes of society ... We are ready to enter [into a] pact for 
the common good, but on one condition; that our right to express and 
represent social interests is respected."249 
245 ARRachwald, In Search of Poland The Supemowers' Response to Solidanty 1980-1989, 1993 
Stanfonl, Hoover Institution Press, p 36 Also, L.Weschler, 'Deficit,' The New York Times, May !I~ 
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Facing an increasingly independent second society, the regime had conducted an 
honest referendum, released political prisoners, relaxed censorship, legalised 
mdependent associations, and reduced central planning. Henceforth, the possibility of 
a pro-reform coalition began to emerge. By late 1987, both sides had come round to 
the idea of a new accord; and both had something that the other needed. The 
government needed the legitimacy and social stability that the opposition could 
provide; whilst, the opposition sought the guarantees of societal pluralism that the 
regime could give. Within this context, Bronislaw Geremek came forward with an 
"anti-crisis pact" in January 1988. In it, he argued that the opposition would help 
provide social stability, if the government would recognise the right to independent 
self-organisation, and agree to discuss political reforms.2so The government's 
response was unexpectedly positive. There would be little movement on the issue, 
however, until after the wave of strikes across Poland in early 1988. In August, Kuron 
had written:-
" The opinion can still be heard that all the recent changes in the system are 
just words without much substance." 251 
By December, however, such an opinion could have been said to betray a major 
misunderstanding of both the prevailing situation, and the entire basis of Communist 
Party rule in Poland. 
The price increases that were introduced at the beginning of 1988 accelerated 
the change of mood within the country, especially among workers in large enterprises. 
Only a few months earlier, Solidarity was considered, on the one hand, as a symbol of 
the social, political and national aspirations of the population; and, on the other, as a 
symbol for an organisation in decay. In May, with the state of the national economy 
worsening, a new generation of workers activists made the reinstatement of Solidarity 
their principal demand. Although the KKW had not anticipated the force and strength 
of this new upsurge, its members maneuvered to offer support and guidance. 
Following the conclusion of the strikes, the government formally recognised that it 
could not contmue to govern without the support of second society, and began to 
work with independent advisers, including former Solidarity activists, to draft a new 
law on association. By August, both the PZPR leadership and Walesa had explicitly 
recognised the need for negotiations. 
250 D Ost, op ctt, p 181. 
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On August 31st 1988, the regime offered Walesa the prospect of a series of 
roundtable talks in which anything, including Solidarity's status, could be proposed 
for discussion. Undoubtedly, one of the main motivating forces was the series of 
Solidarity-inspired stnkes in early 1988. With the economy in a state of collapse and 
no permanent settlement of the Solidarity-Party conflict in sight, Jaruzelski claimed in 
a 1990 interview that it became clear that stability was impossible without "social 
support." 252 Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Poland's last Communist Prime Minister, has 
since claimed that the intention of the negotiations was to expand the political 
legitimacy of the regime: 
"My belief was that we could arrange a political, social and economic 
situation that would allow us to retain power."253 
It is apparent that Jaruzelski, Rakowski and their leadmg advisers felt that without 
negotiations, the PZPR would be unable to stabilise the economy or to either 
eradicate Solidarity or retain the Party's position within the existing system. The offer 
represented a major breakthrough in itself. The PZPR had recognised that the political 
future had to involve a genuinely and legally independent opposition withm a 
pluralist society. 
Negotiations between the regime and the Solidarity Citizens Committee (that 
was widely referred to as the official shadow cabinet)254 began in February 1989 and 
culminated in Apnl with the relegalisation of Solidarity as an independent trade 
union, and the calling of an election, to be held on June 4th 1989. Solidarity and other 
independent groups or parties were to be permitted to contest 35 per cent of the 460 
seats in elections to the Sejm. The remainder were to be reserved for PZPR candidates 
and its two allied political parties (the United Peasant Party and the Democratic 
Party}, and for official Catholic organisations. In addition, a new Senate was to be 
created with freely elected members. This electoral arrangement ensured that the 
Communist Party would retain its domination, but that Solidarity would be granted a 
voice in government. To quote Jaruzelski, he perceived the agreements as an 
252 Interview of General Jaruzelsk1 by J Haydn m 1992. Details m J Haydn, op cit, pp 142·3 
253 lb!d, p 90. 
254 D Ost, QP.£!!...p 186 
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opportunity to promote reform within the existing system through "a particular 
philosophy of sharing power."255 
Against all expectations, Solidanty swamped the much better organised 
Communist Party. During the first round of elections in June, the union captured 160-
out-of-161 Sejm seats and 92-out-of-100 Senate seats. In run-off elections, these 
figures rose to 161 for the former, and 99 for the latter. During the official 
presidential elections, Jaruzelski received only one vote more than the stipulated 
minimum-vote.2s6 The roundtable negotiations had been intended as a process to 
guarantee incremental constitutional and political freedom to Solidarity in return for 
social peace and gradual economic development. However, the PZPR had failed to 
predict the possibility that the population would reject the Party outright.2S7 
Solidarity's immediate response to the results also appears to have been one of 
disbelief. Fearing a military backlash, leading activists maintained their pre-election 
stance that the union would be represented in parliament, but would not be taking part 
in or forming a government. One successful Solidarity candidate is quoted as saying: 
" ... we cannot partake in a coalition or help form a govemment ... We 
must not lose the confidence of the Warsaw Pact [and]we must leave space for 
the party to change ... "258 
Nevertheless, when the actual result finally registered, it proved so staggering 
and damaging to the Party's morale, that the Communist regime began to literally 
collapse. To quote J aruzelski: 
"trying to stop Solidarity taking power after the election would have had a 
catastrophic effect, hke trying to stand in front of a car going at 100 miles an 
hour."259 
General Kiszczak, the official PZPR candidate for the position of Prime 
Minister, found it impossible to form a government when the United Peasant Party 
255 J.Steele, I Traynor aod P Lennon, 'The Fall ofCornmumsm Ten Years On: What Pnce Freedom?' 
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and the Democratic Party declared their support for Solidarity.260 Thus, the task fell to 
Tadeusz Mazowieclo, a leading Solidarity activist and wnter throughout the 
preceding two decades. In theory, the PZPR had guaranteed Itself control of the 
government no matter what the outcome of the vote. Undoubtedly, the formation of 
the first post-Communist government went beyond the roundtable agreements. In 
effect, Solidarity was forced to fill the political vacuum once it became clear that 
there would be no military defence of the old order or dismissal of the election results 
by a party anxious to hold onto power. On August 24"' 1989, Solidarity took 
command of the levers of power in Poland. 
(3 3 5) The Role of the Roman Catholic Church m the 1980s 
During the 1980s, the Catholic Church remained one of the principal actors in 
Polish political life. Its role varied, however, between different periods in time and at 
different levels of its organisational hierarchy. Wtth regard to the latter, for example, 
a distinction must be drawn between the opinions and actions of the Episcopate and 
those of the various pmsh pnests who appeared to have far greater room for 
manoeuvre than dtd the Catholic hierarchy.26t Furthermore, when assessing the role 
of the Church, the 1980s must be divided mto three distinct periods. 
(3.3.5.1) August 1980-December 13'h 1981 
1980 witnessed a broadening of the dialogue between the regime and the 
Church that resulted in the establishment of the "Joint Commission of the 
Government and the Episcopate" on September 24"'. It was concerned with such 
problems as the legal and political status of the church, the catechisation of children, 
and the building of churches and chapels. In early 1981, it was responsible for the 
establishment of three working groups for legislation, publications, and for the 
upbringing of Catholic youth. In addition to the work of the Joint Commission, a 
number of meetings between the Primate, Jozef Glemp, and Jaruzelski were held 
throughout 1981 with the aim of securing "national salvation."262 
With specific regard to the activities of second society and of Solidarity, the 
policy of the Church did not differ considerably from previous years. Undoubtedly, 
260 A Korbonski, op et!, p 144. 
261 SAns, 'The End ofSoiidanty?' The Spectator, October 9" 1982, pp.13-14. 
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the Church did consolidate its own authority during this period, however, its principal 
objective remained the preservation and broadening of the scope for independent 
second society actiVIties insofar as they safeguarded the rights of the individuaJ.263 
(3.3.5.2) December 13'h 1981-July 22•d 1983 (Suspensron of Martial Law) 
Subsequent to the imposition of Martial Law, those who assessed the attitudes 
of the Church tended to condemn it for the lack of a determined stance vis-a-vis the 
actions of the PZPR. Inspite of an apparent declaration of support on December 
14'\264 it was expected that the Church would declare itself more firmly in defence of 
Solidarity.26S Furthermore, such events as a meeting of the Jomt CommissiOn in early 
1982 were widely criticised. The Church was blamed for having focused attention on 
the forthcoming Papal visit instead of defending second society. 266 Undoubtedly, 
Church proclamations did include exhortations for agreement and conciliation during 
this penod. The adoption of a relatively conciliatory stance towards the regime was, 
however, necessary at this point: the Church contended that its main task was to 
prevent further bloodshed. Therefore, although the Church did participate in regular 
meetings with the Communist authonties, it also committed Itself to the relegalisation 
of Solidarity and to assistance to victims of Martial Law.267 
In its frequent role of mediator between the two parties, the strength of the 
Church in Poland systematically increased. Improved relations with the PZPR and the 
latter's recognition of the need for Church support, bestowed upon the Church certain 
privileges (lower taxes and the development of church building, for example) and a 
position of increased influence in domestic affairs. For second society, the Church 
remained a shelter for organised opposition, especially at the district and parish 
leveJ.268 The population again turned to it as the only organised independent 
institution m Poland. On a practical level, the infrastructure of the Church offered a 
foundation for the organisation of resistance. 
263 Ibtd, p.l59. 
264 K Ruane, QJl.£!!, pp 279-280 for a transenpt ofPnrnate Glemp's sermon 
265 T.Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution Sohdanty 1980-82, op et!, p.196. 
266 Ibtd, p.197. 
267 H LISleka, QJl.£!!, p 160 
268 SAns, op et!, p.l4. 
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(3.3.5.3) July 1983-1989 
In 1988, the strike movement in Poland effectively demonstrated that the 
PZPR's reform effort had failed. Once more, the Catholic Church became a crucial 
negotiator between Solidarity and the Communist regime. 269 The presence of Church 
representatives during tbe Roundtable negotiations was crucial to their success. 
Although the Church abstained from representing a political programme, the 
Episcopate was active in the preparations for the negotiations, bringing the two sides 
together and forcing a compromise over certain issues. 
Although the Church in general, and Primate Glemp in particular, had been 
criticised throughout the 1980s for their apparently supplicant policies VIs-a-vis the 
regime, the Church (via its moral authority and organisational structure) continually 
supported the aspirations and programmes of the opposition. Throughout the electoral 
campaign of June 1986, it visibly supported Solidarity's candidates. The role of the 
Catholic Church in bolstering a scattered and weakened second society cannot be 
overlooked in any account of the breakdown of the Communist regime in 1989. 
(3.3 6) Mode of Breakdown· Distingmshing Factors 
It is important here, to assess the particular mode of breakdown experienced 
by the Communist regime in Poland in 1989. In order to do so, the typology outlined 
in Chapter 11 will be referred to. 
The Polish example appears to demonstrate characteristics associated with the 
negotzated mode of regime breakdown. In the first instance, the gradual and peaceful 
nature of the breakdown is evident. It could be argued, for example, that the 
Communist regime in Poland began to break down in 1980 with the PZPR's legal 
recognition ofSolidarity.270 Admittedly, the imposition of Martial Law m December 
1981, interrupted the process of change within state-society relations, and attempted 
to restore the pre-1980 power equilibrium. In 1988, however, having recognised the 
necessity of political and economic reform and following two damaging strike waves, 
269 A Korbonsla, 'East Central Europe on the Eve of the Changeover: The Case of Poland,' 
Cornmumst and Post-Cornmumst Stud1es, Vol32, 1999, p 150 
270 Th1s claun 1s supported by T.L Karl and P.Schrmtter, 'Modes of Trans1tion m Latm Amenca, 
Southern and Eastern Europe,' Internal!onal Soc1al Sc1ence Journal, No.I28, 1991, pp 276-7; and 
S P Huntmgton, 'How Countries Democral!se,' Pohl!cal Sc1ence Quarterly, Vol.106 No 4, 1991-2, 
pp 608-611. 
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the Communist regime willingly admitted the banned Solidarity trade union and the 
Catholic Church to roundtable negotiations. These were concluded in the partially 
free elections of June 1989. In response to an overwhelming vote-of-no-confidence, 
the PZPR effectively Withdrew from government and permitted Solidarity to take 
over the reins of power. Thus, whether the starting point for the breakdown of the 
regime is taken as August 1980 or the strike wave in early 1988, It is evident that the 
process occurred gradually. In addition, at no point during the roundtable negotiations 
did either side attempt to sway the balance-of-power through resort to overt violence. 
Jaruzelski adhered strictly to constitutional principles, and Solidarity remained loyal 
to its pledge of non-violence. 
Furthermore, at all stages in the process of change, second society actors 
played a significant role. This was particularly evident throughout 1980 and, in 1988, 
opposition forces figured prominently m the preliminary and roundtable negotiations. 
Even in the late 1980s, when the support for opposition irutiatives had waned relative 
to 1980, second society actors were able to mobilise the people in public 
demonstrations against the Communist regime. The roundtable negotiations, 
therefore, were attended by two principal parties (the Catholic Church being a 
significant non-political participant) of relatively equal strength. Admittedly, it has 
been shown that the strength of second society in general and of Solidarity in 
particular had weakened during the 1980s. However, it must also be recognised that a 
similar process had occurred within the Communist Party. Martml Law restored the 
political initiative to the PZPR, yet it failed to return the pre-1980 status quo and an 
acceptance of the leading role of the Communist Party to Poland. By 1988, the failure 
of the PZPR in addressing the economic, social and political problems it faced was 
evident in the failure of the party to gain a "yes" vote in the 1987 referendum on 
reform. However, it must also be recognised that the 1989 negotiations were, in a 
sense, regime-led and, therefore, would appear to characterise the elite-led negotiation 
model outlined in Chapter II. The PZPR invited Solidarity as the main representative 
of second society to begin talks. Although both sides had formally admitted the need 
for a negotiated compromise, in early 1989, it is unlikely that Solidarity was in a 
position of sufficient strength to have forced them unilaterally. 271 Inspite of this, 
however, the central role of the Polish opposition at all stages of transition must be 
taken into account. The sigmficance for Poland's political future of second society 
and Solidarity had been recognised by the PZPR. Therefore, I would argue, the 
271 A Korbonsla, op et!, p.l52. 
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Party's recognition that it could not continue to govern without some form of power-
sharing agreement is more characteristic of opposztion-led negotiations. 
The roundtable negotiations produced an exphcit, yet restricted power-sharing 
agreement and provided for partially free elections to be held in June 1989. It was 
expected that the PZPR would continue to be the majority political party in the Sejm 
and the newly established Senate. In this sense, there would have been a degree of 
contmuity between the old and the new regime, which has been noted as a 
characteristic of negotiated breakdowns. However, the unexpected victory for 
Solidarity in the June elections and subsequent second ballot presented the 
Communist Party with no alternative than to accept a Solidarity-formed government. 
Essentially, having witnessed the extent of its unpopularity m June, the PZPR 
virtually collapsed and voluntarily withdrew from government. Therefore, June 1989 
did represent a definitive break with the past as the PZPR withdrew from power. This 
particular factor is more typical of an extrication mode of breakdown, in which an 
incumbent government Withdraws from power prompting the transition to a "new" 
pohtical system. Therefore, I would argue that Poland demonstrates characteristics of 
both the negotiatzon and extrzcatzon modes of breakdown outlined in Chapter II. 
(3.4) Conclusion 
This case-study chapter has demonstrated the dynamics of the second society 
in Poland. Undoubtedly, because of repression and the widespread sense of a lack of 
clear perspectives, the society's energy dissipated post-1981. However, the history of 
Polish second society during the 1980s is not simply one of decay. Even though its 
ranks thinned, the Polish opposition survived on a scale unknown in the history of the 
Communist states. Despite growing public apathy, and Solidarity's fragmentation and 
dispersion, it was still a mass movement. Even during times of crisis, there was no 
real likehhood that second society would once again be reduced to the limited, 
intelligentsia-led protests accompanied by periodic workers' revolts of the past. On 
the contrary, various opposition groups continued to demonstrate a new dynamism 
and an ability to adapt to the changed conditions created by the more liberal policies 
of a government attempting to reform the economy and modify the political system. 
The fragmentation of second society post-Martial Law can also be viewed in a 
positive way. It represented a way of adapting to the prevailing conditions. Post-1981, 
there existed no reahstic prospect for a mass organisation of several million that could 
threaten the ruling system by its very existence. Consequently, second society 
remamed a real actor in pubhc life with which the authorities had to reckon, if only 
because they were well aware that behind the tens of thousands of active opponents 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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were millions of silent supporters. The very fact that the PZPR attempted to wedge 
elements of pluralism into the existing socio-political system represented an explicit 
recognition of the success of second society in Poland. 
Two further functions fulfilled by the second society in Poland must be 
mentioned here. First, It was the source of an independent circuit of information, 
breaking one of the most important monopolies held by the Communist regime. By 
the end of the 1980s, it was impossible to conceal information concerning many 
spheres of social life. Even those who did not directly identifY with the opposition 
used its press to disseminate information. The Solidarity period prior to December 
1981 also led to an explosion in the articulation of mdependent interests, and the 
emergence of a widespread belief that various interests had to have institutional 
expression and representation. So prevalent was this belief that the authorities were 
forced to accept the pnnciple, despite the fact that the system was founded precisely 
on rejecting it. Thus, the continuation of the 1970s strategies of oppositional activity 
succeeded in spite of Martial Law. The pre-December 1981 period had been so 
successful in recreating an independent second society, that the Jaruzelski 
government had no choice but to maintain It. 
Secondly, an essential monopoly held by the PZPR concerned the formation 
of social elites. The opposition, however, was a breeding ground of new elites able to 
influence the future of Poland. Walesa, in particular, was identified with second 
society and the independent opposition as a whole, and widely recognised as a 
"leader-in-waiting." By 1989 m Poland, there many independent activists from all 
social groups, who had organised collective actions throughout the period of Martial 
Law, and who henceforth became legitimate leaders of society. All these facts should 
be borne in mind when assessing the role of the opposition and the growth of second 
society in Poland. Its gains should be seen not only in the actions that were readily 
visible, but also in its indirect and unintended effects, which stemmed from the mere 
fact of the opposition's existence. It is not an exaggeration to say that the opposition 
of the 1980s, in particular, changed Poland's prevailing cultural, social, political and 
even economic landscape. 
The process of fragmentation and the weakening of the opposition post-1981 
were partly reversed in 1988. Admittedly, it was not possible to aclneve the unity of 
the opposition that had existed in 1980. The old Solidarity often million members no 
longer existed, but what had taken Its place was a vibrant and vigorous mdependent 
second society in which citizen initiatives of all kinds were emerging and matunng. 
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Poland's Communist system of rule had been under real and constant pressure since 
the formation ofKOR in 1976. However, it was not until 1980 that society witnessed 
a real opening of the public space with the legal registration of Solidarity. In effect, 
Poland became a pluralist society within a socialist framework. The 1988 strike wave 
successfully demonstrated that the myth of Solidarity was not dead after nearly a 
decade of illegality and the repression of Martial Law. Illegal, divided into competing 
regional councils, and out-maneuvered by the PZPR, Solidarity remained the symbol 
of second society in Poland. As long as it was capable of suppressing or dispersing 
social conflicts, the continued existence of the PZPR and the Communist system 
seemed unthreatened. When faced with an organised resistance movement on a mass 
scale, which succeeded in surviving all the political reprisals aimed at destroying it, 
however, the political equilibrium of the system was so disturbed that the destruction 
of that system was inevitable. 
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CHAPTER IV: ROMANIA CASE STUDY 
By 1989, Nicolae Ceausescu had governed Romania for twenty-four years, 
and his regime was the longest standing in Communist Europe. Having firmly 
resisted all calls from Moscow to adopt a reformist stance, and having consistently 
crushed any open manifestation of opposition, Ceausescu appeared to be standing his 
ground. In late November, however, unable to resist the cry for change - and in 
contrast to the other East European countries - the revolution in Romania was a 
violent and bloody affair. It resulted in the replacement of a hated ruling family, and 
the collapse of all Party and government structures. Bereft of power and authority, 
Communism appeared to simply collapse. 
With respect to this thesis, the Romanian revolution is of significance as a 
counter-case. Located at one extreme of the continuum of modes of breakdown 
outlined in Chapter I, it serves to demonstrate (by means of contrast) the significance 
of the role of second society in the other two case-study countries. At least up until 
1989, Romania exlubited a very low degree of second society development, and the 
Romanian revolution can, therefore, be taken as an example of a regime collapsing, as 
a duect consequence of its inherent weakness, rather than a negotiated transitiOn as a 
consequence of second society activity. Furthermore, due to the lack of autonomous 
second society actlVlty, regime collapse was both sudden and violent, with social 
movements virtually absent until much later in the process of transition 
The Romanian case study will follow the same structure as that of Poland. 
Section I focuses on cultural, lustorical and political factors, and will specifically 
highlight those that had a direct beanng on the evolution (or not, in this case) of a 
second society in Romania. I do not intend, in this first section, to provide a 
chronological history of the Communist Party of Romama (RCP) during its early 
years, or indeed, a history of Romania itsel£ Rather, certain key historical dates and 
events will be referred to and examined, only when they are of significance for the 
(non-) development of second society. Section Il will map out the development of 
opposition against the RCP regime because, having stated that there was little 
evidence of an active second society in Romama, some limited autonomous activity 
did occur. Dissident intellectuals spoke out against Ceausescu, and opposition did 
exist amongst workers, peasants and students alike. The final section will demonstrate 
how the under-development of a distinct, identifiable and coherent second society 
contnbuted towards the particular mode of breakdown experienced by the Communist 
Party in Romania. 
(4,1) History and Political Traditions 
( 4.1.1) The Romanian Setting 
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Stephen Fischer-Galati has referred to three dominant characteristics of 
twentieth century Romama: "autocracy, orthodoxy and nationality." 1 In a similar 
vein, Vladimir Tismaneau cited the prevailing traditions of the Communist political 
culture as being those of "authoritarianism, sectarianism, anti-intellectualism, 
clientelism, ideological conformity and dogmatism." 2 These elements formed the 
fundamentals of the broadly accepted political culture of Romania, particularly dunng 
the Communist period, and contribute to an explanation of the evolution of the 
specific features of the Communist regime and the opposition forces that responded to 
its rule. 
(4.1.1.1) Orthodoxy 
Christian Orthodoxy had been the faith of most ethnic Romanians since at 
least the twelfth century,' and was synonymous with Romanian identity in all parts of 
the country, except in the Hungarian-dominated region of Transylvania. The 
Romanian Orthodox Church was by far the largest of all denominations with a 
membership of thirteen-fourteen million out of a total population of nearly twenty 
million. 4 In the twentieth century, from August 1944 until the establishment of the 
Romanian People's Republic (RPR) in December 1947, neither the Romanian nor 
Soviet Communists made any overt moves against the institution of the Church. Its 
Patriarch, Justinian Morina, was a willing servant of the Communist government: in 
keepmg with a long tradition of collaboration by the Eastern Orthodox Church with 
the state, which dated back to the Byzantine Empire, the Romanian Patriarch set his 
clergy the task of serving the workers in a Communist society, believing that this was 
the best, and indeed the only, way in which to ensure survival. The hierarchy and the 
clergy were regarded, for tactical purposes, as patriotic Romanians supportive of the 
interests of the people and of the socio-economic and political goals of the Romanian 
Communist Party. Similarly, Church pronouncements regarding morality, honesty 
1S Fischer-Gala!i, 'Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Na!ionahty' m the 20th Cen!ilry. the Romaman Case,' East 
European Quarterly, Vol 18 No 1, March 1984, p 25. 
2V.T1smaneau, 'Personal Power and Political Cns1s m Romama,' Government and Oupos1tlon Vol 24 
No 2, 1989, p 177. 
3For a lustory of Orthodoxy m Romama, see. D Clurot, Social Change m a Penpheral Soc1etv: The 
Creation of a Balkan Colony, 1976 New York, Acadenuc Press. 
4 
'Eastern Europe Towards a Religious Revival,' RFE, RAD Background Report/88, May 23"' 1984. 
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and justice were acceptable to the Communists, as long as belief in God did not 
mterfere with commitment to the creation of a socialist Romania. Nonetheless, all 
Romanian churches were placed under the orders of a Department of Rehgious Cults, 
which controlled their appointments and administration, notably, with the help of 
church leaders. The Church, thereby, became thoroughly integrated mto the state-
Party organisation, adopting many of the same nationalist positions and other policies 
as the RCP itself.' 
Furthermore, the Orthodox Church had traditionally concentrated its activity 
within a hierarchically independent, national organisational framework, to serve the 
interests of the local authority. In the Communist era, this ensured the existence and 
legitimacy of a single, undisputed source of authority and was, indeed, often 
instrumental in the process of nation and state building, helping to create a sense of 
indigenous national identity. The direct consequence was that the Romanian 
Orthodox Church "let itself be dominated by the interests of the state." 6 In short, 
unhke the pohcies adopted by many other dominant churches, that of Romania had no 
policies of its own, and only followed that of the state. This Situation was in striking 
contrast to the policies pursued by the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, where 
independent religious affiliation was a constant reminder to the Communist Party of 
growing dissidence within society. 
When Ceausescu assumed control over the RCP and the Romanian state in the 
mid-1960s and pursued an overtly nationalist policy, which he wanted legitimised by 
the Romanian histone tradition, the convergence of historic nationalist concepts with 
Communism was inevitable. His political emphasis on national independence singled 
out the Orthodox Church as a natural ally. The primary role of the Church in the 
historical evolution of the Romanian nation, from the Dacians to the Communists, 
was acknowledged by Ceausescu, while the Orthodox Church, in turn, agreed to bless 
Ceausescu's national goals and policies. Patriarch Justinian constantly stressed the 
traditional patriotism of his Church and its loyalty to the Communist state. Romanian 
Orthodox theology stressed the elements of social justice implicit in the doctrine of 
the Church, as Church officials joined t!Ie Front of Socialist Unity. Its aims were 
5W1th the electiOn of the new Patnarch, Justmian Marma (a member of the Commumst Party) on May 
24th 1948, the state, wh1ch had always controlled the Orthodox Church m certam respects (the clergy 
was pa1d by the state, for example) entrrely took over the drrectmn of eccles1ast1cal affarrs For 
example, all estates and funds belongmg to the Church were nationalised and 1t effectively became 
another branch of the Commumst government. 
"M Shafrr, 'Political Culture, Intellectual D1ssent, and Intellectual Consent: The Case ofRomama,' 
Orb1s, Vol 27 Part 2, Summer 1983, p 406 
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declared compatible with the historic Orthodox commitment to the attainment of the 
ultimate traditional goal of the Romanian people: an independent, socialist Romania. 7 
The Romanian Communist regime made constant use of the Orthodox Patriarchate 
and of the upper clergy m its promotion of Romanian nationalism and both were used 
by the regime as tools via which it hoped to gain legitimacy. Despite accusations from 
the proponents of" true Orthodox nationalism," who criticised both the Patriarch and 
his hierarchy as tools of the Communist regime or, at least, as opportunistic 
collaborators with a non-Orthodox regime, the policies espoused by the Church 
sought to secure the general acceptance of Ceausescu as the legitimate leader of all 
Romanian nationalists. 
The Church's tradition of deference to authority, although saving it from 
widespread persecution, undoubtedly played a functional role in quelling discontent 
and contributed to the prevention of the full emergence of an independent second 
society within Romania. As a consequence of its official loyalty and subservience to 
the Communist regime, the Orthodox Church dJd not provide the kind of "shelter" 
for opposition activities witnessed in other Communist states (notably Poland}, nor 
any degree of support for individual or group initiatives that ran contrary to the 
policies of the Communist Party-state. Minimal talk of independence or of freedom 
could be found in the sermons delivered from the Church pulpit; and no alternative 
leadership authority could be found in the Church hierarchy. Easily manipulated by 
every government both pre- and post-1945, the Romanian Orthodox Church was 
neither a major intellectual, nor a political force. 
(4.1.1.2) Nationalism 
As outlined above, during the 1960s and 1970s, one of the greatest sources of 
Ceausescu's strength was his ability to capitalise on Romanian history in general, and 
on the process of nation building in particular. During the formative years of the 
Communist regime in Romania, the RCP based its legitimacy primarily on 
ideological grounds, arguing that the Party embodied the interests of the working 
class and peasantry, and emphasised the international aspect of socialist patriotism.• 
Dunng the early 1960s, however, there was a noticeable shift in the treatment of 
nationalism by the Party leadership, which was related to the evident change in the 
7See: The Romanian Orthodox Church in the" Front of Soctahst Umtv" of the Soctahst Repubhc of 
Romama, 1974 Bucharest, State Pubhshmg House. 
8 R Kmg, Htstory of the Romaman Commumst Party, 1980 US, Hoover Press Pubhcattons, pp 120-
121. 
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RCP's relationship With Moscow. Two aspects of this were crucial. Firstly, a greater 
emphasis on the positive values of national sentiment, and a significant decline in that 
given to the international aspects of Communism. And, secondly, the portrayal of the 
Party as the culmination of the whole process of Romanian history. Given Its most 
explicit formulation in the Party programme adopted at the 11th Congress in 
November 1974, the RCP attempted to hnk Itself with the nation's history. It 
repudiated certain inter-war policies, and lay the blame for Romania's stand during 
that period firmly at Moscow's door! During the 1970s also, various historical 
national leaders (Prince Michael the Brave and Vlad the Impaler, for example) were 
made the object of officially-approved myths, their progressive policies portrayed as 
similar to those pursued by Ceausescu himself. 10 
Nationalist sentiments were not merely a consequence of, or a reaction to 
Communism, however. The policies evolved by the RCP reflected the fact that, to a 
far greater degree than citizens of Communist regimes elsewhere, Romanians were 
obsessed With national unity, tending to view regional autonomy, ethnic diversity and 
foreign domination as a constant and very real threat to their independent existence." 
During the 1900s, Romania was a nation-state, but not a state for all Romanians, as 
millions remained under the control of the Habsburg and Russian emprres. The 
unification of all Romanians in 1918, however, failed to institute a satisfactory 
arrangement, with the inclusion of the economically and culturally advanced 
Hungarian-dominated province of Transylvania into the new Romanian nation. 
Between 1918 and 1939, Romania was continually beset by its neighbours' territorial 
demands, and by deepening economic crisis. 12 Anti-Russian sentiment, in particular, 
was further intensified by the Soviet occupation during World War II. More 
importantly for an ardently nationalistic Romanian population, unity could only be 
achieved via the incorporation of many other ethnic groups. Thus, post-1918, 
9 R Kmg, op Cl!, p 123. 
10 G C10ranescu, 'MIChael the Brave- Evaluations and Reevaluations of the Wallach1an Prmce,' RFE 
RAD Background Report/191, September 1st 1976; 'The Pohtical S1gmficance of the ThraCians,' !bid, 
Background Report/128, October 22nd 1976; and 'VIad the Impaler- Current Parallels w1th a 
Medieval Romaruan Prmce,' Ibid. Background Report/23, January 31st 1977. 
11 B Haddock and 0 Cara1aru, 'Nationalism and Civil Society m Romania,' Pohtical Studies, 47(2), 
1999, pp 258-9 
12 In th1s century alone the frontiers slnfted five times 1913, 1918-19, 1940, 1941 and 1944. 
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Romania became a nation-state in which only one third of citizens were ethnically 
Romania.13 
Appeals to Romanian nationalism post-1945, and particularly post-1960, then, 
can be seen as a means via which the RCP intended to secure a measure of popular 
support, by minimismg its image as an alien, Soviet-imposed regime, and 
emphasising its indigenous national roots. In addition, appeals to nationalism were 
seen as a useful means to achieve Party goals by mspiring greater popular effort to 
achieve national economic progress. Thus, the Party sought, by inculcating patriotism 
and respect for natiOnal traditions, to win increased support and credibility, and to 
strengthen its legitimacy among the population. There is no doubt that nationalist 
appeals and calls for austenty among Romanian citizens did succeed. With a 
population generally willing to refram from questioning the privations imposed upon 
it, one of the foundation stones for the creation of second society organisations was 
absent. 
(4.1.1.3) Autocracy 
Contentions that autocracy was one of the essential fea!Jires of the Romanian 
political cul!iire have abounded since the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Autocratic, paternalistic authority was almost universally accepted by both Romanian 
leaders and the masses before 1918, although advocacy, and even formal adoption in 
some cases, of democratic parliamentary institutions did occur throughout the lands 
inhabited by the Romanians.14 Traditionally, then, attitudes towards power and 
authority were typically accepting ones. Radulescu-Motru also notes that, in 
economically under-developed, predominantly agrarian societies (of which Romania 
was a typical example) with the bulk of the population living in isolated villages 
where contact with individualist, liberal, Western-oriented values was practically non-
existent, the predominant characteristic was one of a peculiar "individualism": 
"The Romaman kind of individualism includes no spirit of initiative in 
business and very little feeling for social and political independence ... [here] 
very seldom arise enterprising persons willing to risk their tranquillity and 
13 For a bnef discussion of the posi!J.on of the natJ.onal mmontJ.es m Romama, see R Kmg,lll!.£!!, 
pp 128-134 
14In Transylvama, for example, the democra!J.c tendencies of the Romaman leaders were more 
pronounced than m Wallaclna, Moldav1a, the Old Kmgdom or Greater Romama. Even so, democratic 
pronunc1a!J.ons dtd not go so far as to questiOn the ul!J.mate poh!J.cal authonty or leg1tunacy of the 
d1ctatonal Habsburg rule 
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their assets .. .For the Romanian peasant, to step out of the prescnbed order-
line zs not merely a risk, zt is sheer insanity." " 
In addition, fatalism was perceived to be a widespread attitude amongst the Romanian 
peasant society. Individuals believed that the events of their lives were pre-ordained 
and determined by either fate or supernatural forces. Common attitudes, therefore, 
towards the self-control of future events included passivity, pessimism, acceptance, 
endurance, pliancy and evasion.16 In turn, such attitudes inevitably had a significant 
bearing upon political behaviour. Sidney Verba has remarked: 
"In a culture in wluch men's orientation toward nature is essentially one of 
fatalism and resignation, their orientation toward government is hkely to be 
much the same." 17 
Shafir notes that such fatalistic attitudes were discernible in both Romanian folklore 
and in literary publications, many of which considered opposition and independent 
thought or action to be both meaningless and pointless.18 The one point to be stressed 
here, because of its bearing on the development of an independent society within 
Romania, is that the political-behavioural implications of such dommant attitudes 
must be recognised. A strong belief that any participation that was permissible was 
also futile underpinned the average Romanians' perception of the political, social and 
economic spheres of everyday life. This belief not only survived into the Communist 
period post-1948, but was further strengthened by the peculiarities of that system, 
which further enhanced the citizen's understanding that his independent participation 
was not required unless officially directed. Such factors go a long way to framing an 
explanation of why the Romanian public appeared so acquiescent in the face of 
extreme adversity dunng the period of Ceausescu's rule, and why it took until 
December 1989, when a question mark over the process of change no longer existed, 
for the population to speak out against that rule. 
(4.1 2) The Establishment of Communism in Romania 
Post-1948 and the initial transition towards socialist forms of production, 
histories of the RCP have tended to divide the evolution of the regime mto three main 
15C Radulescu-Motru, 'Psychology of the Romaruan People,' Romaman Sources Vo12 Part I, 1976, 
pp 5-6. (Emphasis added) 
1~ M Rogers, Modermsallon Among Peasants· The Impact of Communicallon, 1969 New York, 
Rmehart and Wmston, pp 273-4. 
17S.Verba, 'ConclusiOns,' m· L Pye and S Verba, Pohllcal Culture and Pohllcal Development, 1965 
Pnnceton, Umvemty Press, p.522 
18M Shafrr, op Cl!. p 405 
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phases.19 Firstly, the years 1948-1956 are seen to have encompassed the building of 
the base of socialist society. The second phase encompasses the period from 1956 to 
1969 and is generally labelled the consolidation of the socialist society. The final 
stage began in 1969, lasted until the ousting of Ceausescu on the eve of the 1990s, 
and can be described as that of the multilaterally developed socialist society.20 In this 
section, it is the first period that I mtend to focus on, because of their relevance to the 
opposition- or rather the lack of it- in the final stages of Ceausescu's rule. I do not 
intend, as I stated above, to provide a detailed account of the early wranglings of the 
RCP as it fought to establish itself in Romania in the immediate aftermath of World 
War II.21 It IS sufficient, here, to state that the RCP, established in the early 1920s, had 
little place m the country's life before the War. In 1945, advocatmg the 
dismemberment of the country, guided by leaders appointed, dismissed or murdered 
on Moscow's behalf, and claimmg to represent the workers in a country which was 
overwhehningly agrarian, fervently nationalistic and devoutly religious, the Party 
stood little chance of winning power via democratic means.22 
Similar problems were experienced by Communists in other East European 
states. However, the Bulgarian and Hungarian parties, for example, could claim credit 
for having led anti-Nazi rebellions within their own states; whilst the Czechoslovak 
and Polish parties could point to some serious pre-1945 parliamentary activity. In 
contrast, the Romanian Communists had little on which to fall back.23 Their party 
failed to benefit from the substantial economic and social dislocation accompanying 
Romanian unity,24 despite subsequent efforts to exaggerate their participatory role.25 
191 Cetercln, 'The Exerctse of Self-Management m the Pohttcal System of Sociahst Romarua,' m: 
I Cttercln et a! (eels), The Pohttcal System of the Soctahst Repubhc ofRomama, 1979 Bucharest 
20 M Shafrr, op et!, p 39 
21For a detatled account and lnstory of the RCP and an extensive debate on the ongins of the Party, 
see· RobertR Kmg, lll!.£!!, pp 9-38. Also, G Ionescu, Commumsm m Romania. 1944-1962. 1964 
London, Oxford Umvemty Press, pp.l-70. 
22Romaruan Communtsts failed to generate mass pohttcal ac!tvi!tes and were generally percetved as 
ahenated elements They formed a small mmority- before August 1944, never exceedmg 1,000 
members - who were unwavenngly conmutted to the Stalmtst Commtem. 
23 There ts some evtdence to suggest a mmrrnal degree of partisan ac!tvtty m Romanta See 
G Ionescu, Commumsm m Romama, op c1t, p 81; and R.Kmg, op ctt. p 162 note 13. 
24E. Weber, 'The Men of the Archangel,' Journal of Contemporarv Htstory, Vol I No.!, 1966, pp.! 01-
127. 
25See. S F•scher-Galati, 20th Century Romama, 1970 New York, Columbta Umverstty Press, p 35. 
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In 1945, this Jack of national roots mattered little, for the rule of Romania's 
Communists was overwhelmingly based on the employment of terror backed by 
Soviet control. The feeling of detachment and alienation from the nation, however, 
did have important consequences. For example, it spurred Romania's Communists to 
pursue their socialisation policies with a speed unencountered among their 
counterparts elsewhere in Commurust Europe. Especially when the interests of the 
RCP began to diverge from those emanating from Moscow (concerning, in particular, 
foreign policy initiatives), the establishment of a truly national base became a 
questiOn of political survival. For the RCP, whose membership grew from 1000 to 
800,000 in the four years after emerging from illegality in 1944, institutionalisation 
was a serious domestic concern. 26 Difficulties were further compounded by the other 
political, social and economic tasks that required simultaneous attention. 
By early 1948, the RCP had succeeded in eliminating all organised opposition 
and was, thereafter, able to concentrate on developing a higher degree of 
institutionalisation that was furthered by a number of factors. Firstly, Soviet support 
and encouragement was certainly an element that should not be minimised. In 
addition, six years of dictatorship and war had resulted in the collapse of most 
traditional political organisations, and large segments of the population were 
politically inert or skeptical of the traditional parties.27 At no time, however, could the 
Party pursue its policy single-mindedly, as it sought to simultaneously reorder the 
structure of the countryside, industrialise the economy, and carry out a social 
transformation in keeping with Soviet practice. Subsequently, there are important 
points to highlight during this early building stage that would have a direct and 
specific impact on the evolution of a second society particular to Romania. 
(4 1 2.1) Politics 
In the political sphere, the rapid expansion of Party membership between 1944 
and 1948 carmot be overlooked. Members were admitted with minimal formality and 
membership requirements. Membership was accompanied by a strict and thorough 
ideological indoctrination. 28 From the beginning, the RCP had demonstrated its 
concern about the instructiOn of Party members. After 1948, the training of such 
2~e Party had been outlawed m 1924. For membership figures, see· R FJscher-Galall, 20th Century 
Romama, op c1!, p 78; ME F1scher, Ceausescu, op c1!, p 45 Table 2.1; and G Ionescu, .Q1!..£!!, p 119. 
27 H L Roberts, Romama, 1951 NewHaven, Yale Umvemty Press, p 261. 
28P.Selzmck, The Orgamsallonal Weapon· A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tac!ics, 1952 New 
York, McGraw-Htll, pp 17-73. 
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members increased in importance?• A verification of members in late 1948, and a 
purge emphasising newly imposed and more stringent membership requirements 
confirmed the higher standards required of those already in the Party, helping, in turn, 
to further institutionalisation.30 It also guaranteed that those existing members thought 
along, and were active only within Party-defined guidelines. In turn, this ensured an 
increase in coherence and the reduction of disunity within the Party. Ultimately, these 
and similar restrictive policies reduced the potential for intra-Party splits, which, 
elsewhere in Eastern Europe, were sympathetic to the demands of opposition groups 
in society. 
Stricter membership guidelines were accompanied by the increasing 
complexity of the Party apparatus post-1944 .. 31 Initial steps in this direction were 
taken in early 1947, with the creation of Central Committee (CC) sections for trade 
unions, women, peasants and youth.32 These were paralleled by similar organs at the 
district level. Subsequently, all levels of Party bureaucracy, from central to local, 
grew in both size and complexity. This facet of Party development is significant for 
the consequences it held for the emergence of any viable challenges to Communism's 
leadership monopoly specifically, and to the non-development of independent 
opposition more generally. An expansion of the number of CC representative sections 
appeared to offer an effective channel of participation and representation to the 
Romanian public, thereby reducing the possibility that independent opposition aimed 
at securing greater participation would emerge. In addition, it further discouraged the 
development of intra-Party opposition. 
Also significant was the offensive launched against actual or potential rivals 
outside the Party that started in earnest in mid-1947 with the arrest of National 
Peasant Party (NPP) leaders.33 The obliteration of official political opposition was 
completed in February 1948 with the merging of the Communist and Social 
Democratic Parties. Significantly, the elected leadership of the new party (renamed 
29By 1955, most members had completed at least evenmg courses m ideology and other topics 
considered essential by the Party. 
30 R Kmg, op c1t, pp.60, 72-77. 
31The mere growth m the number oflocal party orgarusatlons IS a good md1cator- between July 1945 
and 1974, the number rose from 2,500 to 70,000 
32 R Kmg, op c1t. pp 68-72 
33 !bid, pp 50-51. 
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the Romanian Workers' Party (RWP) unti11965, when Ceausescu restored its former 
name) remained in the hands of Communists at all1evels. This absorption of some 
260,000 members of the Social Democratic Party was an expedient required by both 
the Soviet Union and the need to consolidate the RCP's domestic power.34 
Consequently, the RCP effectively became the only mass party in Romania, with a 
large percentage of the Romanian population associated, directly or indirectly, with 
the RCP, and enjoying the benefits of Communist Party membership. 
April 13th 1948 saw the adoption of the first post-war Romanian Constirution, 
marking the fact that Romania was in a state of transition from capitalism to 
socialism." On January 15th 1949, a new law on Peoples' Councils' ensured that 
citizen representative instirutions never acqurred power of decision or leadership in 
the state. In addition, the decree was paralleled by the introduction of a judicial 
system modeled on that of the USSR that was amended in late January to include the 
death penalty for treason and economic sabotage. On August 12th 1950, it was further 
extended to cover crimes against order and domestic freedom; agamst national 
independence and sovereignty; negligence by workers leading to public disaster; theft 
and destruction of military equipment; and plotting against the state. The high level of 
control of the population and of any act deemed to be anti-state that this formal 
extension of the Constirution and legal system represented, must figure in any 
explanation of the non-development of independence and second society in Romania. 
For example, Romania was the first East European country to extend the use of the 
death penalty so widely, which undoubtedly discouraged a large proportion of the 
population from expressing any support for opposition activities. In essence, the legal 
pnce individuals would have to pay was too high, and the penalties too harsh to 
consider independent action a viable option. 
(4.1.2 2) Economics 
On June 11th 1948, the Grand National Assembly passed a bill nationalising 
industrial, banking, insurance, mining and transportation enterprises, which paved the 
way for the transition to a full-blown Communist economic policy. By 1950, 90 per 
cent of total industrial production enterprises had been nationalised. The command 
economy system was Immediately adopted, with a State Commission of Planning in 
charge of the whole economy from mid-1948. The major target was industrialisation, 
34 Illli!. pp. 70-71. 
35G Ionescu, Ql1.ill pp 156-8 
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with little attention paid to the consmner sector or to the inevitable hmnan costs. 36 
Investments were consequently onented towards "Group A" categories (heavy 
industry), with the ratio of investments to consmnption as one of the highest in th~ 
world.37 In addition, a campaign for the fulfillment of the first five-year-plan (1951-
55) m only four years, put the country on the path of "industnal mobilisation," 
urging individuals to contribute as much as they could in the pursuit of the regime's 
economic goals. 38 This drive towards the fulfillment of national goals, and individual 
sacrifice for the sake of goals, would be a theme strongly echoed by Ceausescu. 
Industrialisation was accompanied by a drive towards the collectivisation of 
agriculture. The declSlon to begin collectivisation was adopted at the Central 
Committee Plenmn of3-5th March 1949, and in July, this forum and the government 
jointly approved the establishment of the first five collective farms. Although 
resolutions provided for gradual reform, based on the principle of free consent, the 
countryside was subjected to an unprecedented reign of terror. Eighty thousand 
peasants, who resisted collectivisation efforts, were placed on public trial accused of 
supporting the class enemy. Despite such manifestations of opposition, at no point did 
the Party leadership envisage abandoning village transformation as a strategic policy, 
and the policy of collectivisation was decreed complete in April1962.39 
( 4.1.2.3) Society 
The RCP's decision to transform its agricultural economy and largely peasant 
society into an industrial and urbanised one, led to rapid and fundamental socio-
economic change in the late 1960s and 1970s. During this period, economic growth 
ranked amongst the highest not only in Eastern Europe, but also the world. This 
growth was reflected in increases in industrial production; in social terms, a dramatic 
3
"For detailed studies of the mdustnahsation dnve, see: M Montias, Economic Development m 
Commumst Romama, 1967 Cambndge Mass, MIT Press Also, M R Jackson, 'Industnahsat10n, Trade 
and Mobihsal!on m Romama's Dnve for Econormc Independence' m: East European Economies Post-
Helsmki A Compendmm of Papers Submitted to the Jomt Economic Committee. Congress of the US. 
1977 Washmgton, US Government Pnntmg Office 
37 Accordmg to official data, dunng the first five-year-plan (1951-55), over 57 per cent of investments 
were charmeled mto mdustry, ofwh1ch nearly 87 per cent went to Group A. In 1951, mvestments were 
7.3 tuues higher than those m the hght and food mdustnes, rismg to 9 8 tuues by 1953. 
38M Monl!as, QI!..£!t p 117. 
39The agncultural sector encompassed 96 per cent of arable land; 93.4 per cent of the agnculturalland 
area, wlule 77.4 per cent of the arable land belonged to state and collecnve fanns. The members of the 
former culnvated some 7 8 per cent of arable land m pnvate plots, but these were not therr own 
property. 
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movement of the population to urban areas; an improvement in medical care 
provisions, mfant mortality rates, and life expectancy; and an expansion of the 
numbers entenng higher education. Inspite of mounting hard currency debts, trade 
imbalances and labour-based problems, the RCP pledged to persevere in Its drive 
towards the 1990 achievement of the status of a "developed socialist state." Such a 
policy, however, entailed heavy demands on worker productivity, high rates of 
industrial development, and a deferral of major consumption gains.40 
The drive for both industrialisation and collectivisation is significant in this 
thesis in that it was accompanied by widespread social change.41 By 1965, the 
proportion of the labour force employed in agriculture and forestry had fallen from 
74.3 per cent to 56.7 per cent.42 The 1966 census, moreover, indicated that the rural 
labour force tended increasingly to consist of women and the elderly, since many men 
and members of the younger generations - attracted by the benefits of urbanisation, 
such as better incomes and relatively better conditions in the industrial sector -
became commuters, or migrated to urban sectors.'3 This transformation of society 
occurred not without its opponents, however. The years 1950-52, in particular -
descnbed as the "culmination of Stalinism" 44 - were also the years during which, in 
Romarna, as in the other Communist satellite countries, the economic and political 
strains of government were at their most severe. As a consequence of the hardship and 
social dislocation that had accompanied rapid industrialisatiOn, and the general 
opposition towards the regime's unpopular policy of forced collectivisation, the RCP 
found itself the obJect of a general loathing. This had been intensified by severe 
economic hardship and would be further exacerbated by the currency reforms of 
1952. It is significant, though, that the three main productive groups within society -
workers, peasants and the intelligentsia (mcludmg the technocratic elites) - had all 
400n Romania's econolllic s!tuallon and plannmg, see: Marvm R.Jackson, 'Perspecllves on Romama's 
Economic Development m the 1980s,' m DaruelNNelson, Romama m the 1980s, 1981 Boulder CO, 
Westv1ew Press, pp 254-305. Jackson notes (p.275) that, dunng the 1970s, Romania allocated an 
mcred!ble 35-40 per cent of the new increments of 1ts nallonal mcome to mvesllnent 
41 CA Taylor and D A Jod1ce, World Handbook ofPolillcal and Soc1al Ind1cators, 3"' Ed1tion, 1983 
New Haven, Yale Umvemty Press, Part I, pp 204-220 
42N Spulber, The Econom1es ofCommumst Eurooe, 1957 New York, W!ley, p 5. Also, D Nelson, 
'Romarua,' Qlli!!, p 199. By 1981, tins figure had fallen to 28 9 per cent. 
43M R Jackson, op c1t, p 933. The populallon of urban and suburban areas grew from 23.4 per cent m 
1948 to 33.7 per cent m 1965. By 1981, the figure accounted for 50.1 per cent of the populallon. 
44G Ionescu, op c1t, p 197. 
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been so absorbed within the Party-state apparatus, or become so controlled by it, that, 
at no point, did their opposition amount to any kind of serious challenge to the 
continued hegemony of the Communist Party, or lead to the emergence of second 
society institutions. The reasons for this are important. 
Following the purge of Party members and the ensuing venfication campaign 
at the end of the 1940s, the May 1950 CC resolution noted an increase from 38 per 
cent to 42 per cent m the proportion of worker-members, keen to capitalise on the 
benefits of Party membership. This figure, however, was still considered to be 
unsatisfactory, and the report set a goal of 60 per cent before 1953.'5 In the leading 
Party and state organisations, working class elements were further strengthened. The 
proportion of workers in leading Party bodies rose from 53 per cent to 64 per cent; 
and in the state, from 24 per cent to 40 per cent. Overall, the report specified that 80 
per cent of new members should be from the working class, with the remaining 20 per 
cent to cover all other social categories. This drive to increase the proportion of 
workers was evidently successful after 1955. A CC resolution issued m June 1958 
reported a 72.5 per cent worker-membership of the Party, and in industrial areas 
(Bucharest, Brasov, Ploesti, for example), the figures appeared higher.'6 At the same 
time, a greater emphasis was placed on drawing engineers and specialist technicians 
into the Party, a logical requirement in view of both the growing sophistication of the 
economy, and the need to command, at least a forced, sense of loyalty and 
Communist duty from the newly emerging technocratic sphere.41 
Significantly for the evolution of working class opposition, although great 
numbers of workers (especially those employed in heavy industry) were absorbed into 
the Party and state apparatus, at no time was there a crystallisation of the desire by 
workers to attain leadership in mdustry, either individually, through the official trade 
unions, or through workers' councils. Some studies have attributed this phenomenon 
to such factors as the generally low levels of education experienced by new urban 
workers and the fact that large numbers were employed as unskilled labourers.'' In 
addition, control of management was demed to the workers. The technical 
45R Kmg, op ctt, p 73. 
46 See, ME Ftscher, Ntcolae Ceausescu A Study m PohtJ.cal Leadership. 1989 Boulder Co., Lynne 
Rlenner Pubhshers Inc., espectally pp.38-47. 
471btd, pp 73-5 
48 P Ronnas, Urbamsat!On m Romama A Geography ofSoctahst Change, 1984 Stockhohn, European 
Research Insntute, p.148. 
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intelligentsia, both old and new and especially the RCP Itself, ensured that no 
workers' opposition would endanger appointments to key industrial posts, or pohcy 
decisions. Official trade unions negotiated collective agreements, and failure to live 
up to these was punishable under the 1948 penal code. Absenteeism and stnke actions 
were also punishable under the Jaw. Such levels of control were unprecedented in 
Eastern Europe, and increased the dependence of the individual worker on the Party-
state apparatus. When combined with the admission of large numbers of workers to 
the "lofty status of Party memberslup" which effectively muted any opposition to the 
Party, the two factors served to undermine the possibility of any serious or prolonged 
working class opposition. In essence, the personal costs of opposition to the RCP 
were too high for the individual Romanian worker to pay. 
Turning to the peasantry, in the immediate aftermath of World War 11, this 
social group came under specific attack from the Communist Party:• Not until 1949, 
however, did the RCP begin real efforts to subjugate the peasantry. These efforts were 
met with widespread, yet uncoordinated resistance. By the early 1950s, some 180,000 
people were in jail or concentration camps as the RCP, effectively, found itself in a 
state of war with a large proportion of its populal!on.50 The collectivisation drive 
launched in 1957 aimed at rapid, thorough transformation of the agricultural sector. 
There was peasant opposition, as before, but in the late 1950s the situation was quite 
different from that earher in the decade, and was one that precluded the emergence of 
a coordinated and coherent opposition to Communist rule. For example, 
collectivisation was better planned, less brutal, more beneficial to the peasants, and 
carried out more flexibly than the earlier attempt. Whatever opposition there was, was 
neither as effective nor as bitter, and, consequently, neither large-scale violence nor 
mass arrests occurred. Years of msecurity combined with the lack of agricultural 
investment had caused severe stagnation and, since a firm decision of some sort had 
to be made (one which would guarantee that Romania did not return to an atmosphere 
of agricultural backwardness), it appeared that the modified collective system did 
make life more bearable for the peasantry than it previously had been. The Party was 
able to allow a certain degree of flexibility (private plots, for example), secure in the 
knowledge that, as a potential political opposition, the peasantry had been decimated 
as a direct consequence of the Party's urbanisation and collectivisation progranunes. 
4911ns was partly mo!ivated by the fact that, m 1945 wtth the Fascists and poh!ical nght wmg m 
disgrace, the Peasant Party (NPP) was undoubtedly the most popular, and would have been victonous 
m any free elecnons. 
5
°For a personal memoir, and a detailed analysiS of social change amongst the peasantry m the 1940s, 
see: P Dwmtnu, Incogmto. 1964 New York, Macnnllan 
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Industrialisation and the changed composition of the labour force that 
accompanied rapid urbanisation resulted in a massive migration to the cities 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s.51 However, the social problems generally associated 
with rapid urban growth (crime, prostitution, and alcoholism) did not occur. In large 
part, this was due to the pervasive power of the state apparatus that served to ensure 
the prevention of hostile political opposition growing from social or economic 
concerns. In addition, as industrialisation occurred relatively evenly throughout the 
country, the state was able to regulate the entire urbanisation process. 52 This pattern of 
industrialisation also meant that the new urban workers were able to maintain strong 
links with their old families in particular, and with the whole rural sector more 
generally. In the early 1960s, over 60 per cent of the urban workforce consisted of 
individuals born and raised in the countryside." Furthermore, a large number of 
villagers commuted between employment in factories and homes in the villages.54 
This had two significant consequences. 
Firstly, the political development and demands that generally accompany the 
process of rapid urbanisation did not emerge. With large numbers of workers 
maintaining close familial ties, and such factors as the relatively slow and insufficient 
growth of urban housing and services, industrialisation did not produce the level or 
kind of political demands that might have been expected, and which were evident in 
other East European countries. Secondly, urban-rural links meant that, when times 
were hard, the production of food and crops on privately run plots meant that familial, 
rural sources were able to readily provide when the state could not." Consequently, 
food shortages did not become political problems: political demands along, say, 
Polish lines for "Bread and Meat," were rarely uttered by the Romaman population. 
In addition, urbanised workers did experience a rise m living standards, a factor that 
carmot be overlooked when explaining the relative lack of opposition to the 
51T G1lberg, Modern1sat1on m Romama Smce World War Two, 1975 New York, Praegar, pp 97-206 
52 See. G.Turnock, An Economic Geography ofRomama, 1974 London, G.Bell, Introduction 
53 J Cole, 'Farmhes, Farm and Factory· Rural Workers m Contemporary Roman1a,' m D Nelson (ed), 
Romania m the 1980s, 1981 Boulder, Wes!Vlew Press, p.75. 
54 J Cole, 'Fieldwork In Romama: An Introduction,' D1alect1cal Anthropology, No 3 1976, p.245. 
"J Cole, 'Farmhes, Farm and Factory Rural Workers m Contemporary Romama,' Ql1.£!!, pp.90-91 
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industrialisation drive.56 The particular forms that Romanian industrialisation and 
collectivisation took prevented the political mobilisation of the workers, and resulted 
in a situation where Romanians were able to "get by'' with the help of family, friends 
and connections. Problems were solved on an individual or familial basis, not 
collectively, making it more difficult to mobilise large numbers to achieve long-term 
social goals via second society or independent activities. These factors are significant 
in this study for their cumulative ability to undermine both the desire and the potential 
to build collective second society organisations in Romanm, and therefore contribute 
to an understanding ofthe lack of political opposition to Communism. 
The final potential domestic source of opposition to the Communists was the 
intelligentsia. Here, it is essential to distinguish between the technical and the creative 
intelligentsia, as political acquiescence, though appearing at first sight to be similar 
for both groups was differently induced. In the case of the former, throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, the growing sophistication of the economy and the increasing 
complexity of society made the need for techrucal expertise evident to the RCP 
leadership. The leadership also recognised, however, that it was not sufficient to 
merely recruit large numbers of individuals, but that the latter would require 
"coachmg" in the appropriately defined "Party spirit." In order to achieve this ideal 
combination of revolutionary enthusiasm and technical competence, the Party adopted 
a dual approach. Firstly, a deliberate effort to eo-opt technocrats into the Party ranks. 
By the end of 1971, 60 per cent of academicians, doctors of science, and university 
lecturers, and 52 per cent of engineers were RCP members. 57 This was combined with 
a policy aimed at the development of technical competence amongst existing Party 
activists. The most vigorous efforts in this respect were launched by Ceausescu in 
February 1971.58 Specialised training prograrmnes emphasising non-ideological areas 
of study were established under the direction of the Party; and Party workers were 
required to undergo periodic educational retraining. He further stressed that a Party 
member would be expected to "constantly increase his knowledge" in order to secure 
both his position; and his promotion, whether employed in production, economic or 
social spheres. 59 Admittedly, divergence did exist between the technical intelligentsia 
56 S B1aler, Stalm's Successors· Leadershm, Stab1htv and Change m the Soviet limon, 1980 
Cambndge, Cambndge UmversJty Press, p 156 
57 M Shafrr, Romama, op c1t, pp 86-92 
58 G Turnock, QI!£Jl, pp 73, 195-197. 
59D Nelson, Democrallc Centrahsm m Romama A Study of Local Comrnumst Pohllcs, 1980 New 
York, Pergamon Press, 1980, pp 121 
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and the political elite. However, because of the mter-twining of the Party and state 
apparatuses, these tended to be "issue" rather than "system" conflicts_.' 
Disagreements arose only over the means most likely to achieve common aims, rather 
than a questioning of the aims themselves. 61 In addition, studies demonstrate that a 
large percentage ofthe new technocratic elite consisted of individuals of peasant and 
manual worker backgrounds, whose upward social mobility had been promoted by the 
process of industrialisation_.2 Notably, however, the integration of the technocratic 
and Party elite occurred without significantly altering the existing power relationships 
therewithin: the latter remained predominant at all times.63 
With very few exceptions, the creative intelligentsia appeared willing to 
comply with the new ruling elite after 1945. Such compliance, however, is not easily 
accounted for. Romanian emigre sources have suggested as one possible explanation, 
the scarcity of Communist intellectuals in both pre-war and immediate post-war 
Romania. 64 In contrast to the situation m other East European countries (Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, in particular), in Romania, the lack of intellectuals able 
to argue against the Communist regime on Marxist terms, hampered the development 
of socialist intellectual opposition in both 1945, and later during the 1960s, when 
revisionist politics and demands were common to the intellectual oppositions of the 
other satellite states. Indeed, by 1945, those intellectuals that did exist in Romania 
were generally too tainted by past nationalist and anti-Communist positiOns to have 
any real choice but to compromise and collaborate with the new regime. 
This explanation is a limited one, however, and additional factors must also be 
considered. A fuller explanation should incorporate Romanian intellectual and 
political culture in general, as well as the deliberate exploitation of the intellectual 
60por a discussiOn of the difference between the two, see: LaPalombara, Pohncs W1thm Nallons. 1974 
Englewood Chffs, Prenllce·Hall, pp 315-16, or S P Hunllngton, 'Social and mslltullonal Dynarrucs m 
One-Party Systems,' in. S.P.Hunllngton and CH Moore (eds.), Authontanan Pohl!cs m Modern 
Soc1etv, 1970 New York, Bas1c Books, p 37. 
61D.Nelson, Democrallc Centrahsm , op c1t, pp 110-120. 
62 W.D Connor, Soc~ahsm, Pohllcs and Equahtv H1erarchy and Change m Eastern Eurooe and the 
USSR, 1979 New York, Colurnb1a Umvemty Press, p.128. 
63For a thorough exarmnallon of the top1c, see· J B1elos1ak, 'Pohl!cal Change and Econormc 
Development. A Study ofEhte Composition m Eastern Europe,' PhD D1ssertat10n, 1975 Comell 
Umvemty, pp 153-9,241-51, 283-90. 
"P Dmutnu, 'Soc~al Structures and TensiOns m Roman1a,' The Review, Vol4 No.4, 1962, for 
example. 
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classes by different regimes both pre- and post-1945. Shafir, for example, points to 
the "long-entrenched Ottoman tradition of dissimulation and in the similarly 
imported, but deep-rooted, traditions of corruption, nepotism and bribery." 65 An 
historical tendency to deference, dissimulation and conformity formed a recipe that 
many established literary figures had little difficulty in following, when the new 
Communist political elite came to power. A traditional passivity, typical of peasant 
societies, did lead to an almost inevitable degree of political inactivity. In addition, 
the customarily bestowed positive sanctions for the politically submissive in Eastern 
Europe were apparently more common and more rewarding m Romania than 
elsewhere. In exchange for their political acquiescence, Romanian writers were 
offered a level of rewards too high for must to ignore. 66 Under Ceausescu in the 
1960s, also, a similar policy line was pursued. Wnters demonstrating, or suspected of 
having, independent thoughts, were successfully tempted into at least public silence 
by being given positions of substantial material reward, guaranteeing a level of 
acceptance and submissiveness unknown in the rest of Communist Europe. 
In addition, the acquiescent attitude of the creative intelligentsia is attnbutable 
to the overtly nationalist line adopted by the Party leadership, especially in the 1960s. 
For the creative intellectuals, an overtly nationalistic line was accompanied by an 
emphasis on specifically Romanian political and cultural traditions. One of the 
principal functions of intellectuals in Communist systems was to legitimise the 
central source of power. During the RCP's period of external legitimisatiOn, the 
support of the Soviet Umon had been sufficient to safeguard against the emergence of 
a serious internal challenge. In the early 1960s, as rifts between Romania and 
Moscow emerged and widened,"' the RCP attempted to portray itself not only as the 
embodiment of the struggle for social justice, but also that of national aspirations to 
independence. 68 The intelligentsia subsequently found itself with a specific functional 
role. Intellectuals were permitted to give vent to suppressed nationalistic sentiments, 
aimed at Romania's traditional enemies (the USSR and Hungary), thereby 
charmelling dissent and possible demands for reform away from mternal problems. 
Very few intellectuals were unenthusiastic and, for the first time since the 
65M.Shafrr, The Intellectual and the Partv· The Romaman Commumst Partv and the CreatJve 
InteliigentSJa m the Ceausescu Penod, PhD Dissertalion, 1981, The Hebrew Umvemty, pp 401-2. 
66G Ionescu, QJ!..£!!, p.180. 
67 JF Brown, 'Romama Steps Out ofLme,' Survey. 49, No 40ctober 1963, pp.19-35. 
68 K.Jowttt, 'InclusiOn and Mobdisalion m European Lenm1st Regrroes,' World Pohlics, Vol28 No 1, 
October 1975, pp 79-80, and 93-4. 
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establishment of the RCP, Communists and intellectuals could cooperate on the basis 
of partially shared values and goals:• In short, an intense anti-Russian and anti-
Hungarian nationalism, shared by all strata of the population easily lent itself to 
manipulation by a regime determined to deflect internal discontent to external 
referents, and did not lend itself to the development of a sphere of second society 
independence. 
This liberalisation of the early-mid 1960s did not in any way renounce the 
monopolistic hegemony of the RCP, however. At best, it was intended as a guided 
liberalisation, with the specific purpose of eo-opting intellectuals, who would, in turn, 
be responsible for steering the general population in the envisaged direction. The RCP 
faced no obstacles in its attempts to prevent the process from assuming a character 
different from that originally intended, for two principal reasons. Firstly, liberalisation 
had been induced by external (the conflict with the Soviet Union and the subsequent 
necessity of finding an alternative means of regime legitimation), not internal 
motives. And, secondly, it had not been initiated in response to intellectual pressure 
(as in Czechoslovakia and Poland) "from below," but by the Party's own initiative 
"from above." The former responded to the Party, as opposed to wznnzng concessions 
from it. When combined with the decimation ofboth the peasantry and the workers as 
potential opposition forces, and the creation of a loyal working class by a cleverly 
manipulative regime, the likelihood of the emergence of an independent sphere of 
opposition activity was negligible. 
( 4 1.3) Ceausescuism 
From his predecessor Gheorge Gheorghie Dej in March 1965, Ceausescu 
inherited a relatively dynamic economy, an embryonic national consciousness, and a 
growing prestige on the international stage. During the first stage of his rule (1965-
71), the new General Secretary sought to consolidate his authority and power by 
stressing the values of national independence and patriotic consciousness, wlnlst 
simultaneously ensuring that any potential sources of opposition were eradicated. By 
the early 1970s, it had become evident that his regime had been founded on certain 
identifiable pillars: a supposed de-Stalinisation particularly of the cultural sphere; 
patriotic appeals to nationalism and a degree of independence from the Soviet Union 
in respect of foreign policy, combined with a certain rapprochement with the West; 
and a combination of policies directed at altering the Party-state and the Party-leader 
69See G Schopflm, 'Romaman NatiOnalism,' Survey Vol20 Nos 2/3 1974, pp 77-104 
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relatiOnships, including the "cult of personality." All these factors had a specific 
impact on the evolution of a second society in Romania 
(4.1.3 1) Lzberalzsatzon 
Romaruan culture was to suffer widespread persecution during the latter half 
of the Ceausescu era. However, at least until 1971, Romanian creativity and learning 
temporarily gained some leeway. In the social sciences, for example, there was an 
expansion of research into topics and methodologies that had been repressed since the 
1940s.7° Ceausescu's guided liberalisation, launched shortly after his election, 
furthered Dej's re-glorification of the national heritage and allowed for the 
rehabilitation of many of the historical, literary and political figures who had fallen 
victim to Ius predecessor's reign of terror.71 The dogmas of socialist realism were 
criticised, and the right to cultural diversity acknowledged. What followed was the 
first genuine thaw in post-war Communist culture, with the Party encouraging 
intellectual de-Stalimsation and temporarily renouncing the employment of 
bureaucratic-administrative methods in cultural matters.72 Consequently, the writers 
were "free to criticise" the immediate past, including such "distortions of socialist 
legality" as forced collectivisation and the imprisomnent of innocent individuals 
provided that, the responsibility for such actions was clearly laid at Dej's door and not 
that of his successor, or even that of the Communist system itselC' In short, criticism 
was acceptable as long as it also inversely expressed an acceptance of Ceausescu and 
his rule. 
1971, however, saw the abrupt interruption of Ceausescu's limited 
liberalisation policies, in an attempt to restore the Party's absolute control over 
society. Following an official visit to China in 1971, he apparently became convinced 
that a cultural mini-revolution would cure the tendency towards liberalism amongst 
the intelligentsia.74 Ceausescu presented his views in the so-called "July" or 
700 Nelson, 'Romania' in W A Welsh (ed ), Survey Research and Public Attttudes m the Sovtet 
Umon and Eastern Europe, 1981 New York, Pergamon Press. 
71For Ceausescu's early cultural pohctes, see. ME Ftscher, op ctt, pp 148-150. 
72V.Ttsmaneau, 'Personal Power .. ', .QO..£!!, p 181. 
73lbtd p 183, for the full extent ofCeausescu's efforts to portray Dej as the" Stalmtst cnmmal." See, 
also N Ceausescu, Report to the Nmth Congress of the Romaman Commumst Partv, 1965 Bucharest, 
Poh!tcal Pubhshmg House, and Z BrzezmskJ, The Sovtet Bloc· Umty and Confhct, 1967 Carnbndge 
Mass , Harvard Umverstty Press, pp 92-95. 
74M E Ftscher, op ctt, p 166 
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"Cultural Thesis," a model of Stalinism and political orthodoxy. This was followed 
by the November 1971 plenum's rehabilitation of Stalinist ethics, an attack on 
reformism within the RCP, and a call to combat intellectualism. By the end of 1971, 
his personal power had been effectively consolidated and he no longer needed to court 
specific groups in society. 75 The impact on second society was significant: 
independence had been curtailed at an early stage of development and its effective 
annihilation left practically no trace on winch later generations could bmld. 
(4.1.3.2) Nationalzsm and the Western Connectzon 
The greatest source of Ceausescu's strength and apparent popularity, 
particularly during his early years, was his ability to capitalise on Romanian history in 
general, and on the process of nation building in particular. Between 1962-65, Dej 
had mounted a successful nationalistic propaganda campaign against increasing 
Soviet economic pressure on Romania. Policies included an interpretation of Party 
history with special emphasis on the struggle between Romanian and Soviet 
Communists; a gradual de-Russianisation of Romanian culture and a certain 
relaxation in domestic policy; and an April 1964 Declaration voicmg the RCP's 
discontent on Romania's status within COMECON and the Warsaw Pact."6 The Party 
was portrayed as the "champion of national interests. Ceausescu maintained Dej's 
course of distancing Romania from the Soviet Union. In order to bolster domestic 
legitimacy, the RCP began to give free rein to the nationalism that had remained 
latent, particularly among intellectuals. Such steps, however, should be seen less as a 
deviation from the Stalinist pattern, and more as a shrewd experiment on the part of 
the Ceausescu elite to avoid the path of even moderate de-Stalimsatwn. Foreign 
policy independence, because it ran the risk of a potential Red Army invasion, had to 
be accompamed by stnngent orthodoxy in domestic politics. 77 
Ceausescu's stress on orthodoxy at home, then, was tempered by a strong 
attachment to the concept of the national road. In short, he repeatedly rejected rigid 
and unquesttomng application of a supranattonal model of socialism, instead 
75 See. R Kmg, op ctt, p.117. 
76See: Gheorge Gheorgluu-DeJ, Arllcles and Speeches. June 1960-December 1962, 1963 Bucharest, 
Mendtane Pubhshmg House, pp 257-93 
77For comments on an mdependent fomgn pohcy !me complemented by domesttc orthodoxy, see: 
'Report of the Delegallon of the Romaman Workers' Party which attended the 22nd Congress of the 
CPSU,' m· tbtd, pp 257-293 
- -- - - ------------------
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advocating a specifically Romanian way. 78 On virtually every major occasion, 
Ceausescu made plain his conviction that the RCP was a "national leadership vehicle 
which [would] propel Romama to its rightful place among nations and restore to the 
country a prominent place in the world ... " 79 This nationalistic aspect of Ceausescu's 
outlook proved highly popular among the Romanian masses in a multi-ethnic country, 
which had always tended to view itself as an "outpost of Latin culture in a sea of 
Slavic underdevelopment." 80 The rejection of foreign interference held a double 
emotional appeal to the Romanians, because it made use of both tradition and 
nationalism, and it thus served as an effective tool oflegitimisation for the Party post-
1960. Ceausescu's refusal to allow Warsaw Pact military manoeuvres on Romanian 
soli, and his unequivocal anti-Soviet stand in a speech he gave in Bucharest following 
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, prompted the Romanian press and 
radio to portray Ceausescu as a national hero. 81 In fact, the impact of the 
Czechoslovak invasion on Ceausescu and on Romama cannot be overemphasised. In 
the 1970s, Romanians disillusioned with other aspects of Ceausescu's policies would 
point to the events in Czechoslovakia as the major reason for supporting him and the 
RCP which, in turn, prevented the emergence of a viable source of independent 
opposition to Communism. 
Romania's quest for independence and a national road had Its greatest impact 
on relations with the USSR. However, it also involved the deliberate - and accidental 
- development of closer ties with the West. This opening up to the West served 
several policy ends. Domestically, it was part of Ceausescu's drive to achieve internal 
legitimacy via the manipulation of nationalist symbols. The implicit aim of the 
historical founders of the Romanian nation had been its transformation via the 
imposition of Western-oriented institutions and their rejection of Balkan status. 
Romania's subservience to Moscow was resented, particularly by the intelligentsia 
and therefore, Ceausescu's Western policy was initially very popular with most 
Romamans and contributed to the building of a base of genuine personal popular 
support. The development of closer economic relations was also important on two 
78T.Gtlberg, 'Ceausescu's Ltttle Cui!Ural Revolu!ton m Romama,' Osteuropa, October 1972, pp 726-
28. 
79T.Gt1berg, 'Ceausescu's Romanta,' Problems of Commumsm. Vol23 No 4, 1974, p.33. 
80Ibtd, p.95. Also, G Schopflm, 'Romaman Na!tonahsm,' Survey, Vol20 No 2/3, 1974, pp 77-104. 
81 M Ahnond, The Rtse and Fall ofNtcolae and Elena Ceausescu, 1992 London, Chapmans Publishers 
Ltd, pp 66-68, for Ceausescu's unrnedtate reac!tons to the Prague Sprmg and excerpts from hts 
speech 
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counts. Firstly, It was a prerequisite for the entire reorientation of Romania's foreign 
policy. Secondly, the policy was led by practical considerations: access to Western 
technology, raw materials and markets were necessary in order to supplant Soviet ties. 
In 1957, 84 per cent of Romania's imports came from COMECON countries, in 
particular the USSR.82 By 1965, the Soviet Union's share of total foreign trade had 
been reduced to 38 per cent, and that of the West increased to 36 per cent.83 The world 
market presented the prospect of substantial economic advantages for Romania, 
allowing the country to exploit its natural resource base (over 80 per cent of Eastern 
Europe's total 011 reserves) in exchange for Western raw materials and equipment not 
easily avrulable m the East, whilst maintaining links with COMECON for trade in 
"soft" goods that could not find a market in the West. 84 This participation in the 
world market provided financing and technology that allowed the central command 
economy to survive longer than it could have, enabling the RCP to avoid the question 
of economic reforms undertaken in other East European countries, which could have 
provided the springboard for opposition as in Poland. Romania's independent course 
had significant political ramifications also. A visibly independent course, and a 
specifically Romanian interpretation of "peaceful co-existence," convinced many 
Western leaders and officials that Ceausescu was worthy of support. 85 They feted him 
personally with honours, and the country with billions of dollars of Western credit 
and investment. 86 This increased standing is also significant for the absence of 
opposition to Communism early in Ceausescu's rule: the special position he held 
meant that Romanian dissidents had no Western audience to whom they could appeal. 
On the contrary, Ceausescu was persistently courted by Western leaders, who felt he 
represented an independent voice within the Warsaw Pact, and Western media 
portrayed him as a "good Communist." 87 Who would listen to Romanian dissidents: 
82G Gross, op c1t, p.24. Also, The T1mes, June 12'" 1959, p 6, for detads ofRomama's volume of 
fore1gn trade w1th Western Europe 
83W Crowther, 'Romanian Pohncs and the Internallona1 Economy,' OrblS, Vol28 No 3, Fall1984, 
p 556 See, also, A C.Tsanlls and R.Pepper, Romama· The Industnalisallon of an Agranan Economy 
Under Socmhst Planning, 1979 Waslungton, The World Bank, pp 554-557. 
84A.Brown, Romaman Foreign Pohcy Since 1965, 1978 New York, Praegar, p 4 
85For example, Romama's moderate v1ewpomt adopted on specific East-West ISSues, especmlly the 
1962 CubanMISsde CnSls, the V1etnam War, and over JOmtacllons w1th the UmtedNallons. See. 
G Gross, op c1t. pp 24-5. 
86 M.Ahnond, op c1t, p 142 
87 J Sunpson, The Darkness Cmmbles, 1992 London, Hutclunson, pp 222-225 
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certainly not the workers or the dwindling peasantry; and, now, certainly very few 
who mattered in the West. 
(4.1.3.3) The Party and the State- the Cult ofPersonalzty 
Immediately upon his accession to the post of General Secretary in 1965, 
Ceausescu made clear his intention to change the mechanics of both the Party and 
state machinery." The old Politburo, for example, was replaced with a new leaderslup 
body, the Executive Committee; and the Standmg Presidium was to function as its 
operative nucleus. Despite institutional changes, political power was to be 
increasingly vested in the Secretariat, however, a body filled with Ceausescu's then 
unconditional supporters. 89 
The CC Plenum of April 1968 further revealed Ceausescu's intention to 
strengthen his legitimacy through an indictment of his predecessor's abuses:• The 
Plenum Resolution condemned DeJ as personally responsible for the suppression of 
political adversaries; and the surviving members ofDej's Politburo became targets of 
attack.91 Gradually, Ceausescu was successful in eliminating all survivors of the Dej 
regime and having rid himself of his predecessor's shadow, was able to claim sole 
credit for the nationalist line, adding it to the image of democratiser of a regenerated 
Party.92 In addition, the 1965 decision to rename the RWP the Communist Party of 
Romania stripped Dej of the mantle of "founding father." The proclamation of 
Romama as a "socialist state" (instead of the former Peoples' Republic) opened up a 
new era associated specifically with Ceausescu, whilst simultaneously claiming for 
the new Socialist Republic a status equal to that of the Soviet Union. The effect of 
these policies on society and on the potential for opposition cannot be ignored. 
Ceausescu's attempts to forge an effective legitimacy based on policies appealing to 
88See· N Ceausescu, Report to the Nmth Congress of the Romaman Cornrnumst Partv, 1965 Bucharest, 
Pohtical Pubhshmg House. 
89See· M Shafrr, Romama· Pohtics. Economtcs and Societv. op et!, pp 64-84. 
90 
'Romania,' m· Richard F Starr (ed.}, Yearbook on International Cornrnumst Affairs 1969, 1970 
Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, pp 714-727 
91 V.Ttsmaneau, op ctt, pp 70-71. 
92W tth regards to the dynamtcs wtthm the RCP ehte under Ceausescu, see T Gtlberg, 'The 
Cornrnuntst Party m Romama,' m. S Ftscher-Ga1ati (ed.}, !lll.£!l, pp.281-325. 
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popular nationalism undoubtedly contributed to the unprecedented levels of popular 
support enjoyed by the Communist leader and the RCP!' 
Having stipulated at the July 1965 Congress that the principles of democratic 
centralism and leadership were to remam key components of Communist rule, by the 
end of 1967, it was obvious that the institutionalisatiOn of collective leadership had 
merely been the first step towards the accumulation of Ceausescu's own personal 
power. The principal purpose of the 1965 stipulation had been to weaken the power 
base of Ceausescu's potential adversaries and to prevent intra-party opposition. Once 
the ruling had served its purpose, however,- the statutes were duly changed, in 
December 1967, making it possible for Ceausescu to hold a number of positions in 
both state and Party.94 Instead, the Party was to simplify the decision-making process 
and enhance responsibility by "having one comrade" deal with a particular sector in 
both Party and state.95 Most importantly, it was suggested that the Party General 
Secretary should simultaneously serve as President of the Council of State (that is, 
President of the Socialist Republic of Romania), with the latter adoptmg a far more 
prominent role in policy formulation and implementation. A further consequence, 
therefore, of the 1967 amendment, adopted with the intention of consolidating 
Ceausescu's power, was the strengthening of Party control over the state apparatus at 
all levels. The measure was justified on the grounds of efficiency, but it also opened a 
new phase in the process of personal power consolidation as, from 1971, a "rotation 
pnnciple" - "rotatle" - required the top Party elites to periodically (generally every 
two-three years) change positions in the central state and Party apparatus. The 
principle enabled a constant check on possible contenders for power who had 
advanced since 1965, with the Foreign Service and official trade unions expenencing 
especially high turnovers of top personnel. Whilst the rotation of cadres appeared 
somewhat arbitrary, the process occurred with a frequency which suggests that its 
main purpose was to prevent anyone from building a stable intra-party support base as 
a potential challenge to the leader's power• and consequently act as a rallying-point 
for opposition witlun second society.97 By the spring of 1973, nearly 50 per cent of 
93 M Shafrr, Romama, op Cit, p 51. 
9
"N.Ceausescu, Romama On The Way ofBmldmg Up the Multilaterally Developed socialist Societv, 
Vol2. 1969 Bucharest, Mendian, p 553. 
95 !bid, p.554. 
9
'R. Kmg, 'Reorgamsatlon m Romama,' Osteuropa January 1974, pp.37-46. 
97M E Fischer, Ql!..£!!, p 33 Also, M Shafrr, Romama, op Cit, pp.72-5. Turnover m CC memberslnp 
was smularly lngh, reachmg more than 50 per cent at the 12th Congress m 1979 Cntena were also 
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top government jobs were held by individuals belonging to one or more of the three 
principal RCP bodies. The remaining posts were filled by members of the CC, either 
as full or alternate members.98 
Upon his appointment as President in 1974, Ceausescu personally held the 
most important political positions in both the Party and state hierarchies. His control 
over joint bodies such as the Supreme Council for Socio-Economic Development 
ensured his influence on matters pertaining to socio-economic planning, forecasting 
and production in the economy. He was also Commander-In-Chief and Chairman of 
the Council of National Defence, giving him complete control over the armed forces. 
His 197 4 actions, therefore, united the functions of the Party leader, head-of-state and 
head-of-government at the national level. At the local county level, too, state 
administrations were headed by local RCP leaders personally subordinate to 
Ceausescu. This represented an unprecedented formal concentration of power in one 
man's hands, unique in Eastern Europe. Ceausescu effectively represented the main 
motor of Romanian politics: elites responded to his initiatives, criticisms and 
exhortations. In addition, however, it is also Significant that the system was 
Ceausescu, and he, therefore, would be held personally accountable for any anomalies 
in that system. In essence, its weaknesses would become hzs personal weaknesses. 
This would be particularly evident m 1989, yet is crucial to an understanding of why 
Romanian dissidence did not move beyond cnticisms of the way the system 
functioned under Ceausescu, and did not seek to develop a viable alternative to 
Communism. The peculianties of the RCP-led regime were attributed to Ceausescu, 
not to the underlying ideology. 
In addition, large proportions of top elite pos1tions were held by members of 
Ceausescu's immediate family. A policy of"Party familiahsatwn" (the promotion of 
direct family members into the hierarchy)99 resulted in the pre-eminence of his family 
adopted m 197 4 to ensure that not less than one-thrrd of the members of the bureaux oflocal 
orgarusallons and of Party conmuttees, mcludmg the CC, were freshly promoted cadres In 1979. 
However, the l!rrnover m CC membership alone far outnumbered the spec1fied cntena, agam 
suggesllng that the measure was not armed at mner Party democral!sal!on but at strengthenmg the 
power of the leader VIS-a-VIS suspected uncontrollable elements. 
98
'The Romanmn Party Leadership,' RFE Research, S!tnallon Report Romama/4, March 30th 1973, 
p.4. 
99By the 1970s, up to 50 farmly members enJoyed e1ther semor- or h1gh-rankmg government or Party 
pos1bons. For example, Ius son, N1cu, m December 1983 was "elected" First Secretary of the Umon 
of Communist Youth, member of the RCP CC, deputy m the Grand Nal!onal Assembly, and secretary 
m the Romaruan Parharnent. See M.Shafrr, op c1t, pp 76-80, for deta!ls and analys1s. 
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unit best exemplified by Ceausescu's wife, Elena.100 New criteria for the promotion of 
cadres were devised to permit the General Secretary's wife to reach the second-in-
command position within the apparatus. The Party's Thirteenth Congress in 
November 1984 witnessed a deluge of praise bestowed upon the couple.101 
Ultimately, their relatives were to control the most strategic positions in the state: 
central planning, the capital city, the army, security services, foreign intelligence, the 
Party cadres, and its youth movements. The promotion of farmly members created a 
sophisticated advanced warning mechanism completely separate from Party 
institutions and state security services: the family firm saw to It that any threats to 
personal survival were located and eliminated well before they became dangerous. 
This factor undoubtedly prevented the development of intraparty revisionist 
ideologies, in particular, and of second society in general. 
The cumulative effect of Ceausescu's blatantly manipulative policies found its 
ultimate expression in the "cult of personality" which began to penetrate the public 
arena in the late 1960s and, by 1974, had turned Ceausescu into the seemingly 
ommpotent ruler of his country.102 The Party leader became a demi-god, portrayed as 
being adored both by his nation and by the world at large. Any observer of Romania 
in the Ceausescu era would be Immediately confronted by this extreme adulation, 
which had the characteristics of a modern-day religious cult, with an iconography; 
inspired scriptures; an infallible leader; and rituals of mass worship. 103 In March 1974, 
when the position of President of the Republic was created especially for him, 
Ceausescu was sworn into office wearing a sash and carrying a mace: both suggestive 
100Eiena was Romama's second htghest offictal In addt!ion to her membership of the Bureau of the 
PEC (she JOmed the Bucharest Mumctpal Party Comnuttee m 1968, was elected a full CC member m 
1972 and became an EC member m June 1973), Elena was director for the Inslitute ofChenucal 
Research m Bucharest, and Charrwoman of the Na!ional Counctl ofSctence and Technology in 1979 
(a postlion wtth mimstenal status) In 1980, her mmtstenal status was ratsed as she became one of the 
three ftrst Deputy PMs m the Romantan Government. In January 1979, she became Charr of the CC 
Comnusston for State and Party Cadres, responstble for the appomlinent or dtsnussal of personnel. 
A Mater, 'Elena Ceausescu Marches On and Up,' RFE Romaruan Sttualion Report/17, December 17 
1985, pp 21-25 Wtth respect to her status m the Party hierarchy, see: M.E.Ftscher, 'Women m 
Romaruan Pohlics: Elena Ceausescu, Pronatahsm and the Promolion of Women,' m S L.Wolclnk and 
A G Meyer, Women. State and Partv m Eastern Europe, 1985 Durham, Duke Umverstty Press, 
pp.121-137. 
101Foreign Broadcast Informal! on Servtce, (FBIS) Eastern Europe, December 3rd 1984; and FBIS, 
Eastern Europe, January 16th 1986, p H2. 
102J.T.Palttel, 'The Cult ofPersonahty· Some Comparal!ve Refleclions on Pohttcal Culture m Lemmst 
Regrmes,' Studtes m Comparalive Commumsm, Spnng/Surnmer 1983, pp 49-64, G.Gtll, 'Personably 
Cult, Pohlical Culture and Party Structure,' Ibtd, Summer 1984, pp.111-121. 
103M.E.Ftscher, op ctt. Ch 7, 'From Revolu!ionary to Idol The Emergence of the Leadership Cult ' 
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of royal supremacy as opposed to revolutionary leadership on behalf of the workmg 
, masses.I04 
In summary, Ceausescu sought to control Romanian society through the 
encouragement of nationalism, the fusion of the state and Party, and the destruction of 
any alternative power base. It is important to note that his aim was never to rely solely 
on sheer terror for his survival. Although many stories were created around the 
infamous Romanian Securitate, the organisation generally remained an instrument of 
last resort.Ios Romanians did believe that one-quarter of their eo-nationals were 
Securitate informers; and that the orgamsation listened in to every phone call, and 
mtercepted every piece of correspondence. Undoubtedly, it did employ a large 
number of informers and did intercept communications. Its predominant strength, 
however, lay in the common belief that it was all knowing, and in the fact that it 
operated in an effective legal void.I06 From the early 1960s, most East European 
dissidents knew the cost of their opposition: loss of employment, harassment, 
imprisonment, exile. The Securitate's response to opposition within Romania, 
however, was usually too arbitrary to avoid classification. Dissidents, although few 
and far between, were never put on trial; some escaped harassment, whilst others 
"disappeared" or experienced fatal "accidents." The Securitate's tactic was one of 
perpetual deference through the unpredictability of the potential punishment, and the 
effects of this factor on the development of second society should not be 
overlooked.I07 In essence, the stability of the Communist regime post-1945, rested, in 
part, on the deference of the population underpinned by the activities of the 
Securitate; and also on the successful construction of an encompassing and repressive 
regime centred on Ceausescu himself. It must also be recognised, however, that the 
perceived onmipotence of the Securitate also contributed to the pervasive weakness of 
the state structllre, for once the fear of the Securitate disappeared in late 1989, so too 
did the fear of active opposition to the Ceausescu regtme. 
I""oan Ionescu, 'A Touch of Royalty,' RFE Romaman St!ual!on Report/2, January 22 1985, p 13. 
I05The Independent, November 28th 1987, reported that the secunty forces played only a margmal role 
m rnamtainmg the stability of the re gun e. Accordmg to tins report, the RCP was the principal 
mstrument of control. 
I06 S Sampson, 'Rumours in SocialiSt Romarua,' Survey, Vol28 No 4, Wmter 1984, pp.142-164. 
I07See: RFE Research, Romania SI!ual!on Report 12, November 6th 1987. Also, Romania Today, June 
1989, p.35, for a report on how the populanon did beheve the rumours surroundmg the Secuntate's 
omnipresent strength 
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(4.2) The Development of Second Societv 
C 4.2.1) Introduction 
At first glance, Romania in the 1970s and 1980s presented a bleak scene of 
profound socio-economic crisis in which no second society was visible. Although 
unspoken dissent was, in the opinion of Vlad Georgescu, "deeply entrenched" in the 
minds of the people, open public expression of independent views (the necessary 
foundation stones for the subsequent development of a second society) was almost 
completely absent in a system characterised by a combination of ruthless repression 
and a generally inward-looking and submissive population.108 Dissent was limited to 
committed individuals acting alone, and often took the form of emigration (not 
always voluntary).I09It would, however, be a mistake to conclude that dissent in 
Romania was completely non-existent. Public opposition did emerge during the 
1970s. Although it received little attention in the West (since it lacked the drama and 
newsworthiness of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980) 
small vocal movements were evident amongst workers, intellectuals, ethnic minorities 
and religious groups in particular."0 Indeed, dissent in Romania ranged across all 
segments of society, and all occupational groups, from the peasantry and industrial 
working class, to the top Party elites. Although the challenges posed to the system 
were not substantial, the RCP and government were quick to recognise the broader 
significance of such manifestations of opposition, and reacted quickly and brutally to 
suppress dissident activity. Opposition leaders were arrested, harassed, eo-opted into 
the Party-state apparatus, physically abused, exiled (internally and externally), or 
incarcerated either in forced labour camps, or psychiatric hospitals. 
' ( 4.2.2) Worker Perspectives 
In Romania, worker-Party conflict was explicit in high levels of job 
dissatisfaction, workforce instability and low productlVlty levels. The particular 
pattern of Romanian worker-Party conflict reflected the country's level and pace of 
development. Bucharest, for example, consistently rejected the label of a "developed 
IOSy Georgescu, 'Romaman Dissent: Its Ideas,' m: J L.Cuny (ed ), Dissent m Eastern Europe, 1983 
New York, Praegar Pubhshers, pp.l89-191. 
I
09Errngratlon was most Widespread amongst the German and Jewtsh populations Although often 
hmdered by obstacles and lengthy bureaucratic delays, sigmficantly, errngration, particularly of the 
potentially troublesome etlm1c mmontles, served to elimmate a poSSibly potent source of oppositiOn to 
the Communist regime. 
no For a general overv1ew of manifestations of dissent under Ceausescu, see: T Bearrnsh and 
G Hadley, The Kremhn's Dilemma, 1979 London, Collins and Harv11l Press, Ch.5. 'Deep Freeze m 
Romarua.' 
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socialist state." 111 Instead, Romania was officially portrayed as a developmg rather 
than a developed system. Domestically, such a classification provided a greater 
rationale for sacrifice by citizens in a developing environment, than in an allegedly 
higher socio-economic stage. Whereas in Poland, by 1980-81, the inherent 
contradictions of the developed Communist system had led to repetitive worker-Party 
conflict with the working class unwilling to accept the political status quo, Romanian 
society found itself at an earlier stage in the developmental cycle. Its labour force was 
just beginning to question Party hegemony in 1981, expressing its dissatisfaction 
through opinions that diverged from the RCP's accepted priorities that led to the Jm 
Valley disturbances of 1977 and demonstrations centred around Bucharest in late 
August of the same year.112 Such sporadic outbursts were, however, very much the 
exception rather than the rule. 
Romania's path- towards developed socialism generated working class 
disenchantment with both political and material conditions. In a survey conducted in 
the early 1970s, of6000 workers aged 14-30 years, 50 per cent wanted to change their 
JObs; 25 per cent had changed employment at least once. In a system with few 
incentives, workers contended that productivity could best be increased by 
strengthening the connection with wage levels. A plurality of workers of all ages, and 
58 per cent of 40-49 year olds, were dissatisfied with pay levels.113 Overall, job 
dissatisfaction (focusing on the material aspects of employment) and the resulting low 
productivity and high turnover of the workforce, were severe and persistent problems 
for the regime. 
Workers complaints focused upon inegalitariamsm and a general lack of 
consumer goods. Furthermore, for Romanian workers watchmg the consumer 
societies of neighbouring Yugoslavia and Hungary, appeals to increase productivity 
were likely to fall on deaf ears, and inevitably led to the growth of potentially 
political grievances amongst the Romanian workforce. Such grievances, however, 
were not evidenced in forms familiar to both Western and East European experience, 
either in political parties, government lobbying groups or independent second society 
lllRomama's "developing status" was portrayed as late as the early 1980s L.Graham, Romama· A 
Developmg Socmhst State, 1982 Boulder CO, Westv1ew Press, Introduction 
112 V.Socor, 'EyeW1tuess on the 1977 Mmers' Strike m Romama's Jm Valley,' RFE RAD Background 
Report/118 (Romama), August 13 1986, p 9. 
113 D N Nelson, 'Worker-Party Confuct m Romama,' Problems ofCommumsm, Vol30 No 5, 1981, 
p46. 
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associations, for example. Rather, discontent appeared to focus on bodies such as the 
Workers' Councils (COM), intended by a 1971 statute to be the organisational basis 
for worker participation. In other words, manifestations of discontent were channelled 
through official as opposed to independent channels.114 Discontent did explode into 
genume outbursts of worker dissatisfaction, for example, in the Jiu Valley in 1977 
and in 1979 when attempts to form a free trade union movement surfaced. m Both 
demonstrated the persistence of disaffection from the RCP, yet the regime's harsh 
response to both incidents demonstrated two important factors. Firstly, the RCP's 
continued rejection of pluralistic voices; and, secondly, the extent to which the Party 
was out of tune with the real views of the average Romanian, which would ultimately 
undermine the entire party system in 1989. As the 1980s dawned, there were some 
grounds for believing that new outcroppings of pluralism would challenge the 
hegemony of the RCP given that 1t had eliminated neither inequalities nor other bases 
for discontent. Although Romarua was far from replicating the volatile conditions of 
Polish society, signs of working class discontent and a restive society were in 
evidence. 
The first sign of public worker dissent was evident in 1971.ln reacting to the 
Polish events of December 1970, the Ceausescu regime, launched a programme 
designed to "Improve the Functioning of the System of Trade Unions." The launch 
was accompanied by official media encouragement to workers to participate actively 
in discussion on the issue. Vasile Parischiv, a former petro-chemical plant worker in 
Ploesti who, having resigned in 1968, had been associated with Paul Goma and the 
human rights movement, took the call for participation at face value, and sent a letter 
to the Central Committee (CC},116 calling for the creation of free trade unions 
independent of Party control, to defend the workers' socio-economic and political 
rights and interests.117 Trade unions, it was suggested, should have democratically 
114 D N Nelson, 'Romanta,' m. WE. Welsh (ed ), Survey Research and Pub he At!ttudes m Eastern 
Europe and the Sovtet Umon. 1981 New York, Pergamon Press, p 460. 
115Founded m February 1979 by 20 mdlVlduals, andJomed, m the same month, by 1,487 members of 
another free trade umon created at the end of 1978 m Mures County. There was an attempt to create a 
tlurd trade unton m February 1980, but swtft repressiOn prevented tls emergence An mcomplete hst of 
SLOMR members shows that in Apnll979, tt had approx. 1,600 members AFL-CIO Free Trade 
Umon News. Vol.34, May 1979, pp 3-5. 
11
"¥ Paraschtv, 'A Worker's Plan for Independent Uruons,' Labour Focus on Eastern Europe Vo12 
No. I, March-Apnll978, p 24 
117See: D Nelson, 'The Worker and Pohttcal Ahenatton m Commumst Europe,' paper presented at the 
Mtdwestem Pohttcal Sctence Assocta!ton Meeting, Cmcmnatt Ohto, Apnl1981, p 15 
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elected leaders, and should be represented in all relevant administrative bodies, with a 
power of veto. He also demanded the abolition of censorship of the trade union press 
and freedom of thought and expression more generally. His proposals, however, were 
ignored, and he received no formal reply from the CC. Instead, Paraschiv found 
himself forcibly detained in a psychiatric hospital, and then, in late 1977, was 
permitted to leave Romania. Similar strategies of swiftly removing the dissenter from 
society before his concerns could be made public were employed frequently 
throughout the 1970s-80s. This policy prevented the generation of group or 
community support for independent thought and action, something that, in turn, could 
have formed a basis for the emergence of a coherent and active second society in 
Romania. 
This miXture of coercive measures complemented by minor structural and 
procedural reforms remained clearly in place until the end of the decade. The Jiu 
Valley uprising in August 1977, for example, was met by the movement of 
government troops into the area, followed by an RCP-led campaign for workers' self-
management in 1978.118 The demonstrations that took place were, significantly, some 
of the largest witnessed in Communist Europe prior to the formation of Solidarity in 
1980.119 Earlier, in 1972, the area's miners had demonstrated their reluctance to toe 
the party-line, and in 1977, protested against increasing food shortages, and new 
regulations that forced many workers to take early retirement with reduced benefits. 
Recognising the seriousness of workers' strike in a supposedly workers' state, 
Ceausescu dispatched two CC members (Ilie Verdet and the Minister of Mining, 
Constantin Babalu) to negotiate with the strikers. The workers, however, expected 
nothing less than a face-to-face "discussion" with the General Secretary himself. 120 
To isolate the distlirbances and prevent them spreading to other key industrial areas, 
the district was entirely sealed off from the rest of the country before Ceausescu 
appeared in person.'" In order to pacify the restive miners, he promised to give all 
their grievances due consideration, and make the necessary improvements. Measures 
were taken to shorten the working week, improve conditions, reverse the pension plan 
118 Re the stnkes and the arrest of stnke connruttee leaders, see· Amnesty Jntemattonal Bnefmg, 
Romama, 1980 Nottmgham, Amnesty Jntemattonal, pp.5-6. 
"
9 Approx. 35,000 people parttc1pated. M Ahnond, op c1t, p.121; and E Freund, 'Nascent Dissent m 
Romama,' m J.L Curry ( ed ), op c1t, p 61. 
120See Z Csalog, 'Ceausescu and the Mmers. Istvan Hosszu's Story,' New Hunganan Quarterly 30 
(Wmter 1989), pp 5-11, for a personal account 
121
'Roman1an Workers' Stnkes,' RFE Background Report Romama/112, June 5th 1978, pp 7-8 
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reforms, and to increase salaries. In addition, the chief spokesman of the strikers, 
Costica Dobre, was ultimately eo-opted into the Party-state apparatus, and, in the 
early 1980s, placed in charge of Securitate activities in Western Europe. This was 
typical of Ceausescu's regime that attempted to avoid head-on clashes at all costs. It 
preferred to isolate the area of discontent and reduce any opposition to its hard-core. 
So long as it could prevent news of discontent spreading from one area to another and 
igniting a bush-fire of revolt, the Party was able to restore its control relatively 
quickly and with little loss of life or authority. By eo-opting potential opposition 
leaders into the Party and system hierarchy, and thereby bestowing on them the 
benefits and privileges associated with elevated status in Romania, the regime 
successfully removed those individuals from society who could have engineered the 
development of widespread opposition. Cumulatively, such policies prevented the 
emergence of popularly supported second society organisations and movements, and 
quashed any attempt to generate widespread sympathy for opposition causes. 
A further significant pomt to highlight, here, is the miners had only 
formulated demands regarding their living and working conditions. That is, strike 
demands had been limited to the socio-economic sphere only. They had not 
developed into demands for political change that could have allowed them effective 
participation in the decision-makmg process. More significantly, miners' 
representatives had limited their demands regarding the official trade unions to the 
removal of untrustworthy or disliked officials; there had been no mention of formal 
political independence. Consequently, and also as a result of the fact that there were 
no links with the intellectuals that prevented the emergence of a viable opposition 
grounded in theory, the 1977 strikes brought down a works manager not the 
government itself as had occurred in Poland in 1970. It is significant in the context of 
second society development that these limited demands were typical of those 
promoted by Romanian dissidents throughout the 1970s and 1980s, calling for minor 
not extensive reform of the Communist system. However, although the immediate 
demands of the strikers were dealt with in the late 1970s, the underlying, root causes 
of discontent and the system's troubles, had not been tackled.122 The subsequent effort 
by Romanian workers in 1979 to form a free trade union suggested the persistence of 
disaffectiOn from the Party. It is important to examine these efforts to establish an 
mdependent trade union in detail, for the insight they provide into the reasons 
underlying the lack of opposition evolution in Romania more generally. 
1220ver the course of 1977-8, the concesstons granted to the mmers were gradually revoked For 
Ceausescu's measures after the stnkes, see· R F.Starr (ed ), op ctt, 1978, pp 60-61. 
- 165-
(4.2.2.1) SLOMR 
In March 1979, an attempt to form a Free Trade Union of Romanian Workers 
(SLOMR) was initiated by forty people (sixteen of whom were workers, the rest 
intellectuals) dissatisfied at the progress that had been made m fulfilling Ceausescu's 
1977 promises in relation to the Jiu Vailey events.123 In February, a group of twenty 
intellectuals and workers had signed a document with the hope of encouraging 
workers to organise themselves outside the control of the Party. The Charter set forth 
a series of economic, and also political demands. These included the recogmtion that 
Romania had an unemployment problem; demands for changes in retirement laws and 
improved working conditions; the abolition of" forced patriotic labour" at weekends, 
of elite privileges and of censorship; and the observance of human rights. The 
declaration included in its preamble ail the legal rights supposedly guaranteed to 
workers by Romanian law, and ail the international guarantees of the fundamental 
rights of man that Romania had ratified. 124 However, it must be noted that the union 
saw itself only as an addztzonal voice for the workers, not an alternative, and, as was 
the case with the Solidarity Trade Union in Poland in 1980, did not chailenge the 
political hegemony of the RCP. Although the declaration contained concrete 
demands, these were carefuily formulated so as not to chailenge the Party's right to 
exclusive political rule. 
The Charter, however, was significant, not only as evidence of discontent in 
society, but also as an example of working class and inteilectual cooperation, that, in 
theory, had the potential to act as a springboard for the evolution of a cross-class 
movement of opposition united against the Communist regime. The symbolic attempt 
and the growing appeal of the union by the regime, however, were not tolerated by 
the regime. 125 Union leaders were arrested or forced to emigrate, members harassed, 
and the union organisation was effectively crushed by the regime.126 The RCP was, 
therefore, successful in demonstrating, again, its power over ail forms of dissent in 
society. However, its actions also demonstrated that the Party continued to ignore 
indications of possible future weakness. The dissatisfaction that had led to SLOMR's 
formation remruned. The 12th RCP Congress in November 1979 did little to further 
reduce the cause of discontent. It delayed the reduction of the working week, and 
123 Amnesty InternatJ.onal, op c1t, pp 6-7. 
124
"The SLOMR Charter,' AFL-CIO Free Trade Umon News, Vol34 No.5, May 1978, pp 3-5. 
125It eventually gained the support of 1500-2000 people G Schopflm, op c1t, p 194. 
126M Shafrr, Romama, op Clt, p 173. 
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offered only modest pay increases whilst demanding ever greater productivity."' A 
number of stnkes and workers' protests was reported m January and October 1981; 
and between 1983-87, there were strikes protesting government legislation which 
replaced guaranteed wages and imposed restrictions on compensation. There was 
little incentive, however, for workers to form another independent union. Instead, 
they tended to express their dissent in less overt ways: general apathy, maintaining 
low productivity levels, and absenteeism, 128 behaviour which, by itself, was not 
conducive to the evolution of independence or of second society organisations. 
In summary, it had become evident by the mid-1970s that, among Romanian 
workers, there was an increased willingness to air material gnevance, and a nominal 
rejection by some of officially sanctioned channels for participation in the workplace. 
The strikes that did occur in the 1970s were certainly impressive and they could have 
posed a serious challenge to the Communist regime had they had the opportunity to 
develop further. They were impressive, however, precisely because they were set 
against a background of overwhelming conformity. The nascent grievances of 
Romanian labour, although an indication of worker discontent, in particular, and a 
restive society more generally, were far from replicating the volatile conditions of 
Polish society however. SLOMR failed to develop into a Solidarity-type movement 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, the government was successful m immediately 
isolating both the stnke and its participants, with the result that very few Romanians 
were even aware that the union existed. SLOMR was effectively decapitated with the 
arrest and isolation or exile of1ts leaders. Secondly reforms, however transitory, were 
introduced where discontent appeared most hostile and vocal. This combination of 
force and early co-optation served to effectively weaken the union, and precluded its 
growth into a mass movement. More significantly, there was no ongomg, effective 
alliance or cooperation between the workers, the peasantry and the intellectuals, 
which could have formed the basis for cross-class co-operation against Communism. 
(4.2.3) Intellectual Dissent 
Some of the most vocal and articulate dissidents were intellectuals, many of 
whom were products of the Communist system 1tself.129 The signing of the Helsinki 
Accords and the formation of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia were sigmficant events 
127D Nelson, 'Worker-Party Conflict m Romama,' QU.£!!, p 48. 
128T.Gliberg, 'Ceausescu's Romama,' op cit, pp 39-40 
129M Shafrr, 'The Intellectual and the Party: The Romanian Communist Party and the Crealive 
Intelhgentsm m the Ceausescu Penod,' Qll£!1, pp 123-160. 
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for many Romanian intellectuals, with Charter 77's emphasis on human rights 
appeanng to offer the possibility of outside support to bolster domestic opposition. 
On February 8th 1977, a group of intellectuals led by prominent writer Paul Goma,130 
addressed an open letter to the CSCE's Belgrade Review Conference, attacking the 
Communist regime and condemning its violation of fundamental human rights. 131 The 
letter was unprecedented in Romania, and demonstrated a level of dissatisfaction and 
willingness to act, openly and publicly, that had not been witnessed before from the 
mtellectuals. By Apnl 1977, the letter had the support of two hundred signatories.132 It 
marked, therefore, a significant turning pomt smce, through signing, many declared 
that they were no longer prepared to remam silent or isolated in their opposition to the 
Communist regime. As with examples of working class discontent, however, the 
authorities reacted swiftly and brutally. Many signatories were arrested or harassed, 
and eventually forced to leave the country, thereby effectively quashing overt dissent 
in its infancy.133 What the incident did accomplish, though, was to bring the whole 
questiOn of intellectual dissent to the forefront of Romanian politics. 
In contrast to the situation in both Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1970s-
80s, however, few if any dissidents adopted a directly confrontational stance against 
the Romanian Communist regime, arguing that such an unrealistic course would 
merely provide the RCP with a ready excuse for severe repressive measures. Their 
principal concern was to reform not overthrow the regime, yet many texts also 
recognised that the main stumbling block on the road to reform was the lack of active 
popular support for opposition activities.134 Dissidents did focus on the general 
timidity of the population and its reluctance to join opposition movements and 
hypothesised on the reasons why. Some accepted submissiveness as being part of the 
Romanian national character, whilst others pinpomted the tactics and repressive 
strategies employed by the regime to crush and isolate manifestations of dissent from 
the masses. Significantly for the evolution of second society, there were very few 
130 M Shafrr, 'Who 1s Paul Goma ?'Index on Censorshm. No I, 1978, p.32. 
131P Goma, Oren Letter to the Part1cmants at the Belgrade Conference, Document Arclnves, Columb1a 
Untverstty, Romarua 9 It defmed the Romaman d1ctatorsh1p as a system that d1d not recogmse any 
human nghts or respect the Constttut10n, and one in whtch the mdlVIdual was a mere tool m the hands 
of the state See: M Almond, op c1t, pp 134-6 for analysts and commentary. 
132 M Shafrr, Romama, op c1~ p.170 
133 Ibld, p.l71. 
134 T Bearmsh and G Hadley, op ctt, pp143-146. 
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attempts to actively address the question of how to attract genuine mass support for 
opposition activities. 
Although many leading dissident theorists and others were forced to emigrate, 
d1ssent in intellectual c1rcles d1d not merely fade away. However, as with workers' 
opposition, it tended to adopt more muted forms. For example, in the mid-late 1980s, 
there were demonstrations in Bucharest and certain Transylvanian towns, protesting 
violations of the Constitution, the Helsmki Fmal Act, and the UN Covenant on 
Human Rights. Intellectuals sought also to form a Romanian Association for the 
Defence of Human Rights.135 Dissidents drafted a message of support for the four-
country statement m 1986 to mark the anniversary of the Hungarian revolution but, as 
a result, were subjected to repeated interrogations and beatings.136 During 1986, there 
were reports of demonstrations by small groups against Ceausescu's regime, and of 
zndividuals apprehended when trying to cross the frontier. 
In the literary world, also, there were examples of independent thought 
amongst officially published works and, during the 1980s, the Writers' Union once 
again became a platform for public opposition, challenging the regime's cultural 
policies and the degree of censorship. 137 Between 1984-6, there were a number of 
typewntten letters circulated by distmguished professors, architects, leading cultural 
figures and members of the clergy, condenming the demolition of historic buildings in 
Bucharest.138 These followed a significant statement critical of the regime's policies 
of urban and mral development in general, which had appeared in 1984. Overall, 
however, no serious attempts were made to circulate works in samizdat journals. 
D1ssident thought did not reach or appeal to a mass readership, therefore, and 
' produced no opportunities to build a base of mass support. Protests were centred on 
the individual or small groups only with no subsequent development of a society-
wide coalition of support. 
135 For an overview of the Situation m Romama m the early 1980s, see: P.Moore, 'Romama m 1983,' 
RFE Research, RAD Background Report Romama/24, December 30 1983, pp 14-17. 
13
'For examples of the dracoman measures employed by the regune, see: V Socor, 'Pnsoner of 
Consctence Radu F1hpescu,' RFE Romaman S1tuation Report/17, November 17 1984, pp.21-23. Also, 
D Funderburk, 'Defiance m Romama? LookAgam, Anderson,' Washington Post, September 7 1985. 
137 RFE Romanmn S1tuation Report February 24th 1982, p.12. For earherpohc1es and attitudes of the 
Umon, see· M Shaftr, Romama, op.ctt, pp 414-420. 
138See: D G1uresa, The Razmg ofRomama's Past, 1989 New York, for a thorough hst of the bmldmgs 
destroyed by Ceausescu Also, M Ahnond, op c1t, pp.l87-190 
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One further factor for the general inactivity of the intelligentsia should be 
noted. The power to move members of the intelligentsia from one post to another was 
one of the strongest levers of control that the Party and the state could exercise on this 
class. A large proportion of Romania's newly industrialised urban areas, although 
providing adequate urban services for the masses did not satisfy the cultural demands 
of intellectuals. Established bureaucrats in larger cities, therefore, considered transfers 
to newer industrialised towns as demotions and tried to avoid them at all costs, the 
price of which was an acceptance of the Party line and obedience with regards to its 
directives. 139 
Of all the issues raised by Romanian diSSident writings, two appear to have 
been constant: the character of Romanian socialism, and the question of civil and 
political rights. 
(4.2.3.1) Romanian Socialism 
The aim, here, is not to list or detail the various letters and texts published by 
the intellectuals. Rather, I intend only to highlight certain points that had a specific 
bearing on the evolution of independent thought and activity and of second society in 
the 1980s. 
The fust significant point to raise is that, despite labelling Romanian socialism 
as a purely dictatorial system, the open letters of the Goma group accepted the 
generalised East European dissidents' approach that the Communist system per se 
could have been much improved, if" true" socialist values had been respected.140 That 
is, they criticised the system's functionzng, without being too condemning of the 
system itself, in the hope of effecting change by forcing that system to respect Its own 
constitutional laws.141 Such a revzsionist approach was typical of East European 
dissidents during their early, formative years of activity. It typified an approach that, 
appealing principally to Communist Party members and intra-party reform 
movements, fostered neither widespread independent thought and activity; nor intra-
139 A.Amalnk, 'Open Letter to Kuznetzov,' SurveY. No 74-5 1970, p 97. 
140 T Beam1sh and G Hadley, Q1!..£!!, pp.144-145. 
141See· V Frunza, 'Open Letter to Pres1dent Ceausescu,' RFE Background Report Romama/201, 
September 1978, p 19 Frunza declared that very few Manust pnnc1ples had been put mto practice m 
Romania, where "soCJahst democracy [was] JUSt an empty word, a theory covenng the real facts." He 
spoke ofRomama's neo-Stahmsm, dogmatism w1thm the RCP, and lack of respect for the 
Constitution, yet continued to v1ew soCJahst democracy, eqmty, equality, and Mannsm 1tself, as 
potentially vahd bases for the future 
-----------------------------------------------------
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societa1 coalitions based on shared ideas, values or opposition activities. It is 
significant with respect to Romania, then, that unlike Poland and Czechoslovakia, 
where leading dissidents had broadly abandoned the revisionist approach in response 
to the Prague Spring m 1968 in favour of democratic alternatives to Communism, that 
Romanian dissidents persisted with revisiomst sentiments until the late 1980s. In turn, 
consequently, second society remained backward compared to other East European 
Communist states that had abandoned revisionism in the late 1960s. 
Admittedly, not all intellectuals shared Goma's approach. Mihai Botez, for 
example, condemned outright the ideas of Marxism as well as their implementation 
by the RCP; and others viewed Romanian socialism as a "lost cause," especially after 
the failure of the limited liberalisation experiment of the late 1960s, which had 
subsequently given way to a kind of neo-Stalinism.142 However, their early acceptance 
of the Communist regime and their faith in Ceausescu's liberal promises ofthe 1960s, 
is one of the main explanatory factors for the relatively late start of Romanian 
intellectual dissent as a whole. In the 1970s, criticism of the system and the theory 
underpinning it, and of Ceausescu personally, was similar to that expressed by 
dissidents in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1960s.143 
(4.2.3.2) Human Rights 
It was widely perceived that human rights existed only in official reports. 
Intellectuals put forward demands, in particular, for citizens to exercise their right to 
travel. Several texts pointed to the feudal bondage of individuals to their place of 
employment, and to the impossibility of freely choosing a place of residence. This in 
itself is significant for the development of opposition and of second society in the 
wider sense: a concentration on securing the right to freedom of travel meant focus on 
only one single cause of intellectual discontent in Romanian society, and on a limited 
freedom, both in the sense of Its lack of appeal to the workers and the peasantry; and 
also, in its failure to focus on a comprehensive list of rights and freedoms 
Although they ultimately failed, the 1977 attempts to establish an independent 
human rights movement in Romania did challenge the RCP's claim to infallibility, 
and did succeed in bringing discontent into the open.144 Unlike in Poland or 
142Many mtellectuals placed great hope and fa1th m Ceausescu's early protmSes. a vtvid descnptlon of 
the intellectuals' chlemma dunng those early years was made by Dotez. A summary can be found m: 
V.Georgescu, 'Romaman Dtssent Its Ideas,' op ctt, pp.183·4 
143 1btd. pp 185-6 
144 !utemew wtth Romaman Embassy offictal, Dr. Gheorghe Dragos, June 1996. 
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Czechoslovakia, though, opinions differed considerably about the kinds of rights to 
demand, and over how reasonable It was to expect these demands to be granted. This 
marked lack of unity amongst the intelligentsia as a social class precluded the 
evolution of a mass movement encompassing all social strata, and the formation of a 
common ground for action. In his Belgrade letter, for example, Goma appeared to 
push for radical political demands, includmg free elections. His followers, however, 
were less aggressive. Consequently, the movement's first text limited itself to an 
appeal for respect of constitutionally granted rights.145 Such rights were considered 
sufficiently liberal by most dissidents; whilst other groups followed the lead, pressing 
simply to have existing laws respected. Very few questioned whether such human 
rights could be realised under a Communist system at all, and, therefore, did not 
threaten the system's rationale or longevity. Admittedly, intellectuals did form the 
most articulate and, therefore, potentially the most dangerous element in Romanian 
dissent. They did challenge some of the basic cultural and political symbols that had 
been used to legitimise both the Party and the regime. However, the common lack of 
questioning of the fundamentals of the prevailing system provided no basis for the 
evolution either of second society orgamsations, or of an alternative to Communism. 
In addition, whilst dissident intellectuals were primarily concerned with 
secunng general human rights and moral freedoms, workers, conversely, tended to 
emphasise economic and self-interest rights, With neither group being generally aware 
or concerned with the plight or interests of the other. Furthermore, dissident 
mtellectuals were often prominent and potentially influential mdividuals, particularly 
from the viewpoint of the West, and herein lies their downfall. Frequently forced to 
emigrate, these dissidents did succeed in creating relatively strong centres of dissent 
outside Romania, albeit never on a scale akin to that of Poland.146 This very fact, 
however, served to diffuse the opposition. Emigres lost contact with intellectual 
circles inside Romania and with the prevailing situation therein. In addition, because 
of Romania's tenuous position as the "odd-one-out" within the Soviet camp, those 
dissidents that did exist within Romania tended to be courted by official 
representatives of foreign countries. In turn, the traditional isolation of Romanian 
mtellectuals was reinforced. Western contact proved to be counter-productive with 
respect to the building of a mass base of public support, given the general popular 
suspicion of foreign conspiracies. A suspicion of foreigners, even among disaffected 
145 T Beamtsh and G Hadley, op ctt, p 144 
146 Intervtew wtth Romaruan Embassy offictal, Dr. Gheorge Dragos, June 1996 
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Romaruans was exacerbated by the fact that Ceausescu himself enjoyed good 
relations with many Western govemments.147 For the masses, there were two principal 
consequences. Firstly, they had no regular contact with dissident intellectuals, either 
in person or via their theoretical and ideological works in such as samizdat literature. 
Consequently, they had no intellectual leaderslup or guidance to follow. And 
secondly, it further widened the traditional gulf that existed between the intellectuals 
and the workers in Romania, With the latter group treating claims from emigres, that 
they remained concerned with the plight of the average Romanian, With a certain 
degree of cynicism. 
( 4 2 4) Religious Dissent 
Movements of religious dissent in Romania were shaped by the state 
authorities' refusal to tolerate any group that did not adhere to the regulations 
stipulated by the Department of Cults.148 Religion was further regulated by legislation 
prohibiting any religious activity outside officially designated places of worslup. In 
exchange for permission to be active (along strictly regulated lines), furthermore, 
religious leaders were expected to be completely obedient to Party directives. Any 
signs of deviation or independence were not tolerated. 
However, several religious groups (predominantly the neo-Protestants and 
Baptists) did fall outside the limits of officially permitted cults and demonstrated 
signs of independent actlVlty. In Autumn 1976, for example, Baptist Pave! Nicolescu 
made a public statement broadcast by Radio Free Europe, denouncing the harassment 
of two of his students, in particular, and of the population in general. 149 In March 
1977, six Evangelical Christians issued a "Call for Truth" which, by July 1978, had 
grown to include both Orthodox and Protestant Christians. This set forth a programme 
of demands, including demands for a "free church in a free state," and for human 
rights in accordance with international covenants.150 In August 1977, a clandestine 
Committee for the Salvation of the Romanian Uniate Church addressed a letter to 
Ceausescu and to the Umted Nations Human Rights Committee, stressing its rights to 
147 M Almond, op c1t. pp 143-4 
148 The Department officially approved and supported 14 religious groups 
149 
"Eastern Europe Towards a" Religious Revival''?' QJ1.£!!, p 17 
150 !bid 
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independence from the Orthodox Church.'" A larger, primarily Baptist group 
organised itself to establish a "Romanian Committee for the Defence of Freedom of 
Religion and Conscience" (ALRC), 1s2 which sent a letter to the government 
demanding, amongst other things, a restructuring of Church-state relations, an end to 
state intervention in religion, and to the forced indoctrination of the population with 
atheism. 153 In April 1981, five Orthodox priests issued a "Testimony of Faith" in 
which they were critical of the regime, and called for the release of Father Gheorghe 
Claciu-Dumitreasa.1s4 
Rehgion in Romania did, therefore, experience a short-lived revival, with non-
sanctioned groups forming throughout Romania, ranging from standard neo-
Protestant sects to Transcendental Meditation groups. Due to the official atheism of 
the regime, support for non-acquiescent religion proved a popular mechanism v1a 
which znd1viduals could demonstrate public disapproval of the Communist 
govemment.'ss It must also be remembered, however, that the Orthodox Church 
remained the dominant religion for Romanians. Gestures of political defiance, such as 
those of the ALRC and Father Claciu, were unique and Romanians, in general, were 
prepared to accept the obvious acquiescence of the Church in political affairs. An 
article published in 1982 referred to the decreasing popularity of traditional religious 
denominations, especially amongst the youth, and furthermore, the Orthodox Church 
itself repeatedly collaborated With the authorities to silence individual priests who 
spoke out against official polic1es.1s6 Official attempts to stem this rise in religious 
fervour ranged from outright repressiOn, including dismissals, fines and arrests -most 
leading members of the ALRC, for example, were arrested or persuaded to emigrate-
to more subtle forms of pressure and persuasiOn, such as lengthy articles in the 
ISI P Moore, 'DISsent m Romama An Overview,' RFE Research Background Report, Romama/112, 
June 5" 1978, p.12. 
1s2 Anmesty Intemanonal, Ql!.£!!, pp 5-7. 
1s3See: T.Beamish and G Hadley, Ql!.£!!, pp 140-147. See, also, Anmesty Internanonal Bnefmg, op c1t. 
pp 5-7, for details of the demands and the harsh response from the regime. 
1s4Clacm-Durmtreasa, an Orthodox pnest, had connnually cnttc1sed the atheist and anti-religious 
policies of the Communist government. He openly expressed sympathy for the ALRC, and for the 
earlier SLOMR, and had been associated With the banned Anny of God movement Withm the Church. 
In so domg, he clearly broke With the Orthodox Church's policy of subservience and cooperanon w1th 
theRCP. 
Iss M Shafrr, Romama, op c1t, p.154. 
IS6 Jb1d pp 152-5. 
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official media}57 In a 1982 article published in the Young Communist League paper, 
for example, the regime warned of the dangers of independent religious activity, 
declaring that individuals who jomed unofficial groups were, in effect, displaymg acts 
of "anti-socialist activity." 158 Such subtle, and more direct, threats in the press 
demonstrated the regime's anxiety to deter the further development of unofficial 
religious commitment, as well as its continued policy of avoiding a head-on clash 
with the population if at all feasible. The regime further sought to undermine 
independent churches and religious leaders via the isolation of outspoken individuals, 
and a reduction of religious exposure for the population as a whole.159 Employing 
such tactics, the govermnent did effectively reduce Church attendance, and gradually 
strangle the anti-regime influence of religion more generally. Romanian citizens, 
therefore, were unable to look to the Orthodox Church or to other denominations 
either as a real source of potential opposition to Communism or as one of its main 
supports, as was the case particularly in Poland. 
(4.2.5) Minonty Dissent 
Of all the elements of dissent that became evident in the 1970s-80s, minority 
dissent proved itself to be the most emotional and irreconcilable.160 Among the 
substantial Hungarian minority, predominantly concentrated in Transylvania, there 
were constant protests against alleged national discrimination. The regime's 
deliberate policies of appointing ethnic Romanians as mayors of predominantly 
Hungarian regions; and strategies of subtler discrimination via policies of cultiiral 
assimilation, all combined to reduce the possibility of advocating national or cultiiral 
identities which deviated from the officially-prescribed Romanian.'" Certainly, most 
ethnic minorities did not receive the benefits set forth under Article 22 of the 
157 Anon, 'Religwn Under" Real Socialism,"' RFE Research Background Report, Eastern 
Europe/123, May 31 1979, p.9. A press campaign aimed at discrediting these cults was launched m the 
late 1970s, and continued mto the 1980s 
158RFE S1tuanon Report Romama, Apnl20th 1982, p 11. 
159For example, religious educa!ion for the young was prolubited, and" voluntary labour" mtroduced 
on Significant religiOus hohdays 
160T.Gilberg, 'Etluuc Mmonnes m Romama Under Socialism,' in B L Faber, The Soc~al Structure of 
Eastern Europe· Transi!ion and Process m Czechoslovakia. Hungary. Poland. Romama and 
Yugoslavl3. 1976 New York, Praegar Publishers, pp 195·224 Ethnic Hunganans who were Romaman 
Ci!izens numbered between 1 6-2 million- the largest minonty withm Romama - cons!itutmg 7 9 per 
cent of the popula!ion Ethnic Germans numbered approxunately only 100,000, less than 1 per cent of 
the country's populanon. 
161 See The New York Times, February 1" 1978, for Krraly's letter re" Romamamsanon" protests by 
ethmc mmonttes m Romama 
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Romanian Constitution that, in theory, prescribed the right of representation on all 
official bodies.162 Very few officials of non-Romanian descent could be found holding 
important positions either at local or national levels. Between 1981-3, a Hungarian-
language samizdat journal - "Ellenpontok" ("Counterpoints") - appeared, focusing 
on the lack of fundamental human nghts accorded to the national minorities within 
Romania.163 Organisers were, typically, systematically harassed, arrested and forced 
to emigrate. In May 1983, a further samizdat publication, the "Hungarian Press of 
Transylvania," appeared and was still publishing in 1986. It recorded not only the 
plight of Hungarian minonties, but also the 1lls of the Romanian system in general, 
and carried reports of strikes throughout the country. Such samizdat publications are 
noteworthy examples of sustamed opposition. They failed to attract a wide all-
Romanian readership, however, if only due to the underlymg and traditional 
nationalist feehngs of anti-Hungarianism that were to be found throughout most 
social strata. W1th any manifestation ofpubhc d1scontent portrayed by the Ceausescu 
regime as being the product of foreigu, hostile subversion, these ethnic dissidents 
stood little chance of attracting wider sympathy or support for their grievances. 
The leader of the official Hungarian National Workers Council, Karoly 
Kiralyi, was perhaps the most prominent dissident voice.164 In 1977, he sent a letter to 
the RCP leadership protesting the treatment of ethnic minonties in Romania and their 
relative lack of influence w1tlnn the workers' counclls. In a second letter, he criticised 
Party policy in general, attnbuting the evident problems of the Communist system to 
errors in the interpretation and application of fundamental socialist principles.165 In 
1979, a second high-ranking Party member, Laja Takacs, and Vice-President of the 
Hungarian Workers' Counc1l, made public his "Eighteen Demands for Improved 
Minority Rights," outlining the measures necessary to improve the lot of Romaman 
minorities. 166 In addition, a small movement of young Swabian German writers 
162 G Schopflm, 'The Hunganans ofRomama,' Mmontv Rtghts Group Report, No 37, 1978 London, 
Mmonty Rights Group, p 8. 
163Jts edttor, Geza Szocs, tssued a memorandum to the 1982 CSCE Review Conference m Madnd, and 
m February 1985, prepared a proposal for the formation of a UN-supervised mtematwnal agency for 
the protection ofRomaruan mmonties' ngbts. In October of the same year, he sent a message focusmg 
on the lack of freedom for wnters to the offictal Cultural Forum in Budapest 
'"'In the early 1970s, Krralyi had been promoted to the RCP Secretanat as part ofCeausescu's po!tcy 
to eo-opt loyal "agents of control" from all groups withm Romaman society. See· M A!tnond, op Cit. 
pp 69-71 
165G Schopflm, op ctt, p 176. 
16
"E Freund, .Qil.£!l, p 66. 
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protested agmnst the restrictions on German cultural tradJttons.' 67 All attempts to 
build bridges between divided national minorities, however, were effectively crushed 
by the force of a pervasive mutlial distrust. It is significant, for example, that none of 
the Hungarian intellectlials who protested the infringement of minonty rights, 
denounced other forms of repression, and, conversely, that none of their demands 
were supported by Romanian dissidents other than by Paul Goma.168 
(4.2.6) Technocrats 
Rare strikes by industrial workers were swillly quashed either by force or by 
the granting of concessions. Both were employed, for example, during the 1977 Jiu 
Valley miners' strikes, with the result that, although potentially dangerous, such 
examples of class conflict did not threaten the continued stability of the government. 
In the long-term, however, potentially the most dangerous class conflict was that 
between the technically skilled mtelligentsia - the technocrats - and the Party. This 
potential conflict remained latent at all times and did, at times, break out into the 
open.169 
During the 1960s, industrialisation and the rapid growth of higher education 
had greatly increased the size of the technocratic-managerial class, and the post-1965 
liberalisation reform programme, with its emphasis on greater efficiency, precipitated 
a conflict. One of the forms the crisis took followed from the fact that these 
technocrats were eo-opted mto the Party hierarchy at all critical levels replacmg loyal, 
but technically incompetent functionaries. Although a cause for rejoicing amongst the 
former, such policies, threatening as they did the old Communist political elite, in 
tlirn, threatened Ceausescu personally. Having briefly supported the rise of the 
technocrat reformers in 1965-69 for the sake of economic progress, by the end of the 
1960s, he was forced to consider his then still unconsolidated position and recognise 
that it continued to rest on his control of, and loyalty from, the Party orgaiiisation. On 
his retlirn from an official visit to China m 1971, Ceausescu initiated his "little 
cultural revolution" that reversed the late-1960s trend. RCP control over "economic 
managers and plarmers, technical experts, academic personnel, and the literary 
167G Schopflm, op c1t, p 195. 
168 E Illyes, Nal!onal Mmonl!es m Romama Change in Transylvania, 1982 New York, Columbia 
Umversity Press, p 148. 
169Such a conflict emerged m 1957, for example, and was resolved, ull!mately, w1th the VICtory of the 
professwnal Party funcl!onanes D Chrrot, op c11, p 495. 
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intelligentsia" was reaffirmed. With the simultaneous encouragement of the growth 
of the personality cult, the renewed ascendancy of former Party functionaries, or their 
institutional followers, was assured. The crux of the problem lay, however, with the 
fact that such a return, albeit a partial one, to ideological purity threatened efficient 
economic growth as it attacked and reduced the room for manoeuvre of the very 
cadres who were responsible for managing the increasingly complex and advanced 
economy.17° Continued growth would further enlarge both the size and the functional 
role of the technocrats, and it would, therefore, no longer be so easy to gloss over 
discontent. 
The mcreasing sophistication of the economy and the stratification of 
Romanian society inevitably resulted in more influence for the managerial and 
technical experts, who had emerged in large numbers from the country's universities 
and research institutions. So long as the Party apparat remained in the hands of 
professional polztzcal cadres, whose technical education was basic, conflict was a 
distinct possibility. The former, admittedly, did need the latter in order to advance 
their careers, while Party cadres needed the technocrats to improve social and 
economic conditions, and to propel Romania forward to the over-riding goal of 
modernity and development. As their services became increasingly crucial, it became 
ever more improbable that they would perform those services without demanding 
greater political power. The technocratic opposition to the regime, however, remained 
an opposition in potentza.111 Primarily as a consequence of the RCP' s ultimate control 
over the bestowing, or otherwise, of elite privileges, and its ability to move those 
cadres who demonstrated any independence of the official Party line, the RCP was 
successful in preventmg the emergence of technocratic opposition to the regime. 
( 4.2. 7) Peasant Dissent 
By the end of the 1970s, the primary aim of the Communist Party (the creation 
of a modern industrialised working class distributed throughout the country and the 
gradual elimination of the peasantry as a distinct class) was well on the way to 
completion. Over the longer term, also, the proportiOn of the population employed or 
involved in agriculture would further decline, as an increasing percentage of overall 
production came from large, mechanised collectives and state units. Many examples 
170The early 1970s changes were accompamed by a renewed emphasis on the •deolog1cal education of 
Party cadres, and on" 1deolog•cal appeals rather than material mcentlves " R K Kmg, 'Ideological 
Mob1hsat1on m Romama,' RFE Background Report 40, February 21st 1977, p 16 
171 V.T1smaneau, 'Personal Power and Poht1cal Cns1s m Roman1a,' op Cl!, pp.177-198 for an account 
of the potential for ehte oppos111on to Ceausescu at the end of the 1980s. 
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of gross inefficiency were detectable; and the synchronisation of production and 
transportation frequently created severe problems, yet the peasantry, especially in the 
1980s, tended to remain silent. The reasons for tlus are significant. 
In the early 1970s, in order to resolve some of the apparent contradictions 
between socialist collectivised agriculture and private interests, a series of reforms 
were introduced, emphasising the right of collective members to use privately worked 
plots, and allowing families who satisfied certain criteria to cultivate more land 
privately. What is notable is that, although production had been partially reprivatised, 
the reforms did not represent a retreat from the formal socialist principle of 
collectivised agriculture. The Party remained adamantly opposed to any return to 
private holdings in any area that had been collectivised. 
Yet private production remained vitally Important to Romanian agriculture. 
For example, while only 9.4 per cent of land in 1974 was privately owned, it 
produced 20.6 per cent of all fruit, 20 per cent of milk and 14 per cent of eggs. Private 
collective production fared even better, for while it represented only 6.5 per cent of 
land, it produced 33 per cent of potatoes, 29.5 per cent of vegetables, 38.5 per cent of 
fruit, 33.8 per cent of meat, 37.8 per cent of milk and 52.7 per cent ofeggs.172 Whilst 
the RCP remained willing to adopt a flexible approach, then, (albeit one within strict 
parameters), the sitl!atlon remained under control, and, more significantly, so long as 
individuals were able to satisfY their own personal food consumption needs - and 
those of their immediate and dependent families - there was no need to press the 
government to satisfY unfulfilled promises. 
These factors are important in an explanation of the under-development of 
second society in Romania, as they undermined the possibility of political opposition 
developmg out of socio-economic protest along Polish lines. In Romania, unhke 
Poland or Czechoslovakia, informal networks were generally able to fill the gaps left 
by the failures of the official economy. The legacy of an overwhelmingly agrarian 
economy was one that tended to prevent the mobilisation of either the peasantry or the 
working class in opposition to Communism, as individuals maintained extensive links 
to the countryside and familial ties for such as food supplies. The extent of these 
networks successfully countered any attempts to mobilise large numbers in support of 
opposition activities 
172D Chrrot, op et!, p 483 
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Furthermore, it must also be noted that alongside the improvements in living 
standards enjoyed by the Romanian workers as a result of the industrialisation drive, 
as a consequence of reforms m the 1970s that granted minimum incomes and thereby 
reduced the peasant-worker differential, peasant family incomes rose significantly.173 
Although differences in remuneration remained substantial, and that benefits such as 
educational opportunities in rural areas were negligible, and that low status was 
generally associated with agricultural work, these factors tended merely to encourage 
further social migration of agricultural workers to the new urban areas, rather than to 
serve as the basis for a united oppos1tion movement against the regime. 
(4.3) Second Society and the Breakdown of Communism in 1989 
By the 1980s, it has been shown that the establishment of second society 
institutions and practices was negligible in Romania. Admittedly, there was evidence 
to suggest the existence of independent thought and activity amongst all strata of the 
general population. It has been argued in Sections I and 11, however, that the 
development of opposition peculiar to individual social classes in Romama precluded 
the emergence of cross-class unity in opposition to Communism. When combined 
w1th a lack of leadership from alternative sources of authority within society such as 
the Romanian Orthodox Church, to speak of an established second society would be a 
mistake. The regime that Ceausescu had built since 1964 was, it seemed, "safe," an 
example of an orthodox Marxist-Leninist state, within which there existed no area 
where opposition ideas could be sown and grown extensively. Although Ceausescu 
and his wife had engendered the intense hostility of the majority of the Romanian 
people, except for several scattered and ineffective strikes, there was no persistent, 
overt resistance to the Communist regime. Personally, Ceausescu was sure of his 
political survival, despite the democratic murmurs emanating from elsewhere in 
Eastern Europe in the late 1980s.'74 So much so that, on November 20th 1989, in a 
speech to the Congress of the RCP, Ceausescu declared, "Scientific Soc1alism is in 
absolutely no danger." 175 
173 M R.Jackson. 'Industnahsanon, Trade and Mob1hsanon m Romama's Dnve for Economtc 
Independence,' m· East European Economtes Post-Helstnkl, 1977 Washington DC, US Government 
Pnnhng Office, pp 394-6. 
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What made the end of 1989 distinct from earlier public outbursts, however, 
was that, for the first time, the people recognised a real possibility for change. 
Throughout the 1980s, the Romanian system had altered. For example, the role of 
television had developed, and was to have a crucial effect on the evolution of the late 
December 1989 riots into a system-overthrowing revolution; individuals were 
begmning to recognise that formal organisation held the key to continuing success; 
and Ceausescu's treatment of the regular armed forces was to be central to the success 
of the opposition.176 Although the army was, on the whole, weak and poorly trained, 
by December, it was "ar!Xious to demonstrate the extent of 1ts new allegiance to the 
people." 177 In order to make up for its failure to side with the popular cause earlier, it 
aimed to demonstrate its fitness to carry on serving the people, and to create a new 
public trust in its loyalty. This loyalty to the Romanian people was to be the decisive 
factor in the sustenance of the revolutionary momentum in late December. 
However, accepting the non-development of d1stmct second society 
phenomena, how can the demise of Ceausescu's regime best be explained, given the 
fact that the instruments of control over the Romanian population were in place by the 
end of the 1970s, and still very much in evidence throughout the 1980s? With the 
benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the roots of the Romanian revolution are located in 
the early 1980s, when the pohc1es of the RCP began to unravel. To this end, a number 
of potential weaknesses were highlighted throughout Section II. It is important 
therefore, to briefly summarise the key points that constituted the Romanian 
economic, cultural and political scene during the mid-late 1980s. By doing so, it will 
become evident that the December 1989 revolution was a consequence of the newly 
apparent weaknesses of the Communist state apparatus, as opposed to the result of 
sustamed second society activity. It is my contention that, m December 1989, the 
state effectively imploded. Once Ceausescu and the Communist government had lost 
control of events, the state collapsed in on itself. It could not, as in the case of Poland, 
collapse mto the hands of a Solidarity. Because of the absence of sufficiently 
developed second society associations that could have taken over the reins of power, 
power could only be "caught" by the support structures of the former Communist 
state- in this case, the army and the National Salvation Front (NSF). 
176 For example, reducmg therr defence and rrnhtary role m order to employ large numbers Withm a 
cnppled agncultural sector, margmahsmg the army m favour ofh1s personally-directed Secuntate. 
177J Sunpson, op CI!, pp 260-262. 
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(4.3.1) Economics 
The continued pursuit of economic development and the rhetoric 
accompanying it had been part of Ceausescu's natiOnalist vocabulary for years. 
However, development did not imply that the Romanian citizens would share much, 
if at all, in economic advances. Indeed, as so much of the national income was 
ploughed back into investment, increases in consumer consumption were consistently 
deferred. 178 By the mid-1970s, a definite plateau had been reached in Romarnan 
economic growth, and by the end of the decade difficulties and a definite downturn 
were in evidence. Accumulated debt grew rapidly, and by 1981, the debt service ratio 
had reached more than 33 per cent.179 In the same year, Romania sought and received 
rescheduled payments on outstanding loans that, by then, had reached more than $10 
billion. 
At this point, Ceausescu made a critical decision. To him, the looming 
economic crisis had nothing to do with his flawed policies. Instead, the foreign debt 
was portrayed as the villain, and he proceeded to attack It, relying entirely on 
domestic austenty to produce the necessary results.180 Exports were maximised, 
imports strictly forbidden, and investment in the agricultural sector was squeezed 
even further in order to allow for the accelerated pace of industrialisation. By 1982, 
rationing had been introduced; by 1985, most food products were persistently 
unobtainable; and by 1987, the population was subjected to serious malnutrition. 
Living standards fell by an average of 40 per cent.'" Inspite of the increasing hardship 
experienced by the average Romanian, social and economic crises did not encourage 
the emergence of an identifiable or sustained opposition to the Ceausescu regime. 
There were reports detailing over fifty work stoppages, sabotage and other acts of 
spontaneous protest during 1980-1981.182 However, the combination of the 
178 - -M R Jackson, 'Perspecllves on Romama's Econormc Development m the 1980s,' Qll.£l!, p 275. 
179S.Orescu, 'Mulnlaterally Developed Romama An Overview,' m: V Georgescu ( ed ), Romanian· 
Fortv Years 0944-1984), 1985 Washington DC, Praegar, pp 13-15. 
180 A Ma1er, 'The Ceausescu Era - An Era of Restncnons,' RFE Romaman S1tuanon Report, June 
26th 1985, p 21 Also, P Lew1s, 'Economy Tight, Romamans Face a Long Wmter,' New York Times, 
December 15th 1985, p 3 
181For details of the late 1980s austenty measures, see· R Gillette, 'Romama. A New Winter of 
Desparr,' Los Angeles T1mes, November 28th 1985 Also, GLee, 'Austenty Leaves Romanians Short 
of Food, Fuel and Fun,' The Washmgton Post, August 24th 1987 
182 The Globe and Ma1L November 2'' 1981, and December 3"'1981 
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pervasiveness of the Securitate, and the fact that familial networks and communal ties 
were able to compensate for state failures ensured the continued acquiescence of the 
population, and that mamfestations of opposition were both isolated and sporadic. 
Within the agricultural sector, since production failed to live up to 
expectations, Ceausescu formulated a programme of "systematisation": a plan to 
erase thousands of villages, partly in order to destroy the last vestiges of private 
agriculture, partly in order to eliminate the peasants as a group, and partly simply to 
increase the avrulable area of arable land."' The policy aimed to demolish thousands 
of villages that were considered "less developed" and resettle the people where 
housing and population density would be optimal.184 The response to the policies was 
one of widespread and vocal discontent. Indeed, the opposition was sufficient and the 
policy delays so prolonged, that some observers were led to conclude that the 
programme had been set aside.'" However, and significantly for this study, 
manifestations of discontent failed to develop to establish identifiable opposition 
groups, and, subsequently, demands did not coalesce around a particular opposition 
platform. The Communist regime, therefore, was able to maintain political control 
over a demoralised society which was peppered with evidence of individual and 
Isolated anti-state feelings amongst both the workers and the peasantry, but one 
which, without leadership and guidance form the intellectuals, failed to develop any 
kind of concrete or viable alternative to the status quo 
(4.3.2) Socio-Cultural Sphere 
Twenty-five years of Ceausescuism had been catastrophic for RomaJiian 
culture, and divisive for society, exacerbating tensions between Romanians and ethnic 
minorities, and creating cleavages between sections of the population, all of which 
had prevented the development of a viable society-wide base of opposition to the 
Communist regime. 
Ceausescu's minorities policies have been outlined above. By the late 1980s, 
the consequences were evident. One dramatic sign of particularly Hungarian 
183 
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frustration, for example, was the large flow of refugees across the border in the late 
1980s.186 Within Romania, prominent Hungarians became increasingly strident in 
their criticism of Ceausescu, as samizdat publications once again circulated within 
Transylvania, reporting on human rights limitations, and cultural and educational 
repression.' 87 Hungarian minority claims failed to attract any significant degree of 
support from the wider population, however. Decades of intensely natiOnalistic 
policies ensured that the majonty of Romanians continued to perceive the Hungarian 
minority as the enemy within national borders. Despite the fact that policies harmful 
to Hungarians inside Romania enflamed old disputes with Hungary about 
Transylvania, and that, by 1989, Hunganan complaints at meetings of the CSCE and 
other human rights forums, signaled that Ceausescu was losing support even from his 
fellow Communist leaders, minonty dissent within Romania failed to present a 
senous challenge to the Ceausescu regime."' 
Culturally, since the mid-1970s, Romanian intellectuals had existed within the 
most constrained enviromnent in Eastern Europe. During the 1980s, inspite of the 
loommg penalties they faced for their opposition, greater numbers did join the lists of 
d1ssenters. 189 All shared a common antagonism towards the cultural deprivations they 
experienced, but, significantly, and distinct from both Poland and Czechoslovakia, 
most were relatively pro-Marx1st in their politicalleanings.190 Although they criticised 
the regime for its deviation from true Marxist theory, at no point, did dissidents 
formulate a viable alternative to Communist rule, as in Poland in the early 1980s or 
Czechoslovakia towards the end of the decade. This apparent failure to develop a 
post-revisionist alternative ensured that, inspite of evident state weaknesses and of 
increasing independence in society, intellectuals remamed isolated and failed to 
capitalise on the growing discontent amongst, particularly, the workers in Romania. 
18
"rhe number of cttlzens who fled ts still unclear. Estimates range between 12-15,000 between 
January 1988 and June 1989 alone. By the end of 1989, between 250-300 were seekmg permanent 
restdence m Hungary every week. W.Echlkson, 'Hunganan Refugees Spark rare East-Bloc Row,' 
Chnstlan Sctence Monitor, June 13th 1988, p 6 Also, M McGrory, 'Hungary For Change,' The 
Washmgton Post, National Weekly Edttlon, July 24-30 1989 
187V Socor, 'Dorm Tudoran on the Condttlon of the Romantan Intellectual,'~ Sttuatlon Report 
Romama/15, 1984, pp.29-31. 
188
'The Dtspute wtth Hungary over Transylvanta,' RFE Sttuat10n Report Romarua/4, 1988, pp.15-19. 
189C Stefanescu, 'Wnter denounces dtctatorsh!p,' RFE Sttuatlon Report Romama/4, February 22nd 
1985, p 19. For an example of the mtellectuals' condemnation ofCeausescmsm, see: V.Socor, op et!, 
pp 29-31. 
190 T Gilberg, 'Romama's Growmg Dtfficultles,' Current Htstory, November 1984. 
~ '-
- 184-
The formers' reluctance to broaden their concerns to include worker-oriented 
demands, ensured that the historical divide between intellectuals and workers in 
Romania remained un-bridged, and provided no impetus for the generation of mass 
public support for a united opposition. 
It is significant, however, that dissent did surface in 1989. Idoina Cornea, a 
former university lecturer, for example, accused Ceausescu of crushing, humiliating 
and terrorising the Romanian people.'91 In addition, in early 1989, SIX men who had 
served in the RCP leadership signed a letter of protest to Ceausescu, accusing him of 
betraying both the nation and socialism. They expressly condemned the policy of 
systematisation, human rights violations, and the basic food shortages faced by the 
average citizen as threatening the future of the nation. Although they recognised the 
personal danger they would consequently face having written the letter and sent It 
abroad for broadcast, they stated that they felt compelled to do so because "the very 
idea of socialism, for which we have fought, is discredited by your policy." 192 
Furthermore, it was rumoured that problems within the Securitate had emerged, 193 and 
the public silence of, particularly intra-Party, Romanian elites appeared to have 
reached Its end. 194 Nevertheless, Ceausescu showed no signs of wavering and he 
appeared to remain firmly in control. In late 1987 and early 1988, following the 
Brasov disturbances of November, the security forces clamped down on critical 
intellectuals, heralding a heightened rigidity within the media, the arts and education, 
and policies aimed at eliminating the vestiges of Romanian culture which might have 
served as alternative symbols for allegiance. Unlike the increasingly vocal ethnic 
minonties, however, the presence of the Secuntate and the sense of fear that preceded 
it, guaranteed the silence and the acquiescence of the majority of intellectuals. Fear 
operated daily to imobilise even the most alienated individuals.195 
191 D Deletant, 'Crones Agamst the Spmt,' Index on Censorshm. August 1989, pp 25-34. 
192 The letter was translated m New York Review of Books, Apnl27th 1989, p 9. See, also, the 
analysis by M.Shafrr and related matenals m RFE Romaman Situation Report/3 March 29th 1989, 
pp 1-14. 
193 Rene de Fleurs, 'Are There Problems m the Secret Service?' RFE Situation Report, Romania/4, 
February 22"• 1985, pp.25-7. 
194 On the Widenmg gulf between Ceausescu and the RCP see: The EconomiSt March 8 1986, p 52 
195For an explanation of how" fear" prevented the overt mobilisation of mtellectual opposition, see. 
M Sturzda, 'Interviews With Romaruans Published in Pans,' RFE Situation Report Romarua/6, 1988, 
p 17. 
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( 4 3 3) Politics 
During the 1980s, Romania lost diplomatic credibility and aroused 
considerable enmity abroad. In the sphere of foreign policy, Romania's international 
role between East and West had become more limited by 1980-81. A combination of 
high levels of foreign debt, the regime's human rights abuses and espionage activities 
abroad,196 and Ceausescu's personal distance from the new reformist leader in 
Moscow served to undermine the RCP's policies internationally.197 
Domestically, the political disaster of the Ceausescu era was more evident, 
and potentially more threatening. Despite having commanded relatively widespread 
popular approval in the late 1960s, Ceausescu's unrelenting pursuit of an orthodox 
Stalinist economic model, and his contmual repression of dissent, incrementally 
weakened his base of personal popular support. Before the onset of the 1980s, for 
example, domestic antagonism towards Ceausescu or Ius policies was largely 
restricted to the individual or to local environs. Rarely did strikes or protests emerge 
that affected the national population. The majority generally held the belief that the 
excesses of the Ceausescu system would not affect them personally. The economic 
and domestic austerity of the later 1980s, however, removed any remaining hope for 
the Romanian population, and towards the end of the decade, sporadic stnkes that 
posed a real threat to the regime did become visible. 198 
Given the above disasters, the question of how Ceausescu was able to 
maintain his position throughout the 1980s must be posed. A number of factors 
should be noted. There are, for example (noting the average Romanian's deference 
towards authority figures) few instances in Romanian history of large-scale popular 
revolt against authority. Furthermore, there had been very little contact between the 
intellectuals and the workers within Romania, a factor that was perpetuated and 
emphasised under Ceausescu. In addition, there was no alternative political or moral 
authority in society, such as an independent -~hurch to provide the nucleus around 
196 Amnesty Internattonal Report. 1983 London, Amnesty Intemattonal, pp 272-73. 
197 M Shaftr, '" Ceausescmsrn" agamst "Gorbachev!Sm,"' RFE Research RAD Background 
Report/95, May 30th 1988, pp.l-5; and V Socor, 'Romaman-Sovtet Relattons on the Eve of 
Ceausescu's V!Stt to Moscow,' RFE Sttuatton Report Romama/12, October 14th 1988, pp 17-20. 
198For example, workers and students demonstrated m last in February 1987, wtth mdustna1 actton 
spreadmg throughout the summer In CluJ and Ttrmsoara, intellectuals and students protested, wtth 
rumours offrre-bombmgs m Bucharest m the Autumn of 1987. The most senous diSturbances 
occurred m Brasov m November, wtth thousands of workers protesttng addtttonal restncttons on heat 
hght and other domesttc essenttals 
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which a dissident movement could develop That is, there was no rallying-point to 
unite the opposition. The tenacity and resourcefulness of Ceausescu personally should 
also not be overlooked. He understood how to discourage political opposition, and 
how to disrupt it in its nascent stages. For an opposition to emerge or even coalesce, it 
needed visibility, and the ability to appeal to a variety of groups both internally and 
externally. Given the peculiarities of the Romanian neo-Stalinist political culture, 
however, the consolidation of such a collective dissident effort failed to materialise. 
The cult of personality must be given credit in Ceausescu's ability to retain power 
inspite of failed policies and popular antagonism; and his skills of personnel 
manipulation via the policy of "rotatie" should not be overlooked. Even though, by 
the late 1980s, the enforced adulation of the Romanian leader had exceeded the 
credibility of most citizens, Ceausescu's ever increasing reliance on the Securitate as 
a tool of repression safeguarded his position. What it also succeeded m doing, 
however, was damage the overall legitimacy of a socialist system in Romania. Yet 
intellectuals still failed to formulate ideas regarding any possible alternative. 
(4.3.4) Revolution 
(4.3.4.1) The Events 
It is not my intention to describe the Romanian revolution in detail. Rather, 
the following section Will highlight the events and factors that distinguish the events 
of late 1989 in Romania from those in Poland and Czechoslovakia. It will also 
identifY the Impact of second society on the mode of breakdown experienced by the 
regime in December. 
The triggering event in the downfall of the Ceausescu regime was the 
escalation of a local issue in the city of Timisoara.199 In December 1989, when 
Communist authorities exiled Laszlo Takes, a Hungarian pastor, for preaching against 
the regime, Romanians m T!misoara, for the first time breaching nationalist-inspired 
animosities and, therefore, historical divisions within society, joined their fellow 
Hungarians in protest. 200 This evidence of mutual support within Romania was 
extremely significant as a sign of united opposition to Communist rule. Therefore, it 
was an important signal to the rest of society that December 1989 represented a 
qualitatively different point in time compared to previous manifestations of 
discontent. The reasons for this spontaneous demonstration of support are not 
199 For an authonta!Ive verswn of events, see· L Tokes and D Porter, The Fall ofTvrants· The 
Incredtble Storv of One Pastor's Wttness, the People ofRomama. and the Overthrow ofCeausescu, 
1991 Wheaton, Crossway Books 
200The Observer, Tearing Down the Iron Curtam, 1990 London, Hodder and Stoughton, pp.125-146. 
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immediately obvious. However, there were a number of contnbutory factors. For 
example, the "domino effect" of the peoples' revolutions throughout the rest of 
Eastern Europe undoubtedly played an important role. Domestically, the unpopularity 
of recent policies such as the proposed systematisation of villages and increased 
rationing may well have further distanced the RCP from the Romanian population. 
Following perhaps the most severe repression in the whole of the Communist bloc, It 
is arguable that the discontent increasingly evident within Romanian society could 
have boiled over into crisis at any time. 
Significantly, however, it was a senes of miscalculations that followed that 
were more significant for the futirre of the regime, than the increasing voices of 
opposition within society. 201 The first mistake was the assumption that Romanians 
would remain insulated from the events in other East European states. In reality, 
Romanians were aware of what was happening in neighbouring countries from 
television stations broadcastmg in Hungary and Yugoslavia, and from the BBC and 
Radio Free Europe. Secondly, Ceausescu's belief that the traditional use of force 
would contain the uprising was misplaced. The declaration of a state of emergency in 
Timisoara and the ensuing massacre ordered by Ceausescu simply fuelled discontent 
throughout the country, with the result that attempts to contain the demonstration as 
in the past ultimately failed. 202 His third mistake was to rely on the Securitate to 
maintain control. In the context of the "contained" challenges the regime faced in the 
Jiu Valley in 1977 or Brasov in 1987, the Securitate had proved sufficient to restore 
order. However, once the popular riots had spread to neighbouring cities in the 
aftermath of the Timisoara massacre, Ceausescu was forced to deploy the regular 
armed forces to work alongside the Securitate. The formers decision to support the 
popular demonstrations against Ceausecu was a deciSive factor in maintaining the 
mornentiun of events in December 1989.203 
On December 20'\ only five days after the beginning of the riots, Ceausescu 
retirrned to Bucharest following a three-day visit to Iran, and delivered an address to 
the nation, blaming the troubles on "foreign agents, hooligans, fascists and traitors," 
201 G Pnns ( ed), Sonng In Wmter The 1989 Revolutions, 1990 Manchester, Manchester Umverstty 
Press, p 156. 
202 V Socor, 'Pastor Tokes and the Outbreak of the Revolution m Romanta,' Reoort on Eastern 
Europe, February 2 1990, pp 19-26. 
203The Observer, op ctt, pp 129-130 
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and scheduled a demonstration of support for the regime the following day. 204 Having 
ignored the real opinion of his people for so long, he felt sufficiently confident to 
discount the evident warnings of crisis and to believe in the continuity of his 
omnipotence!"' At the scheduled rally on December 21st Ceausescu unexpectedly 
found himself facing a hostile crowd. Instead of chanting the usual adulatory slogans, 
the people (surprisingly both to Ceausescu and to themselves) called for free elections 
and laid the blame for the deaths in Timisoara personally with him!06 The fact that 
Ceausescu's address to the nation had been televised was a significant factor in the 
subsequent development of the revolution. The population had witnessed a moment 
of weakness, however brief, that appears to have been the only encouragement they 
needed to join the demonstrations. According to eye witnesses, many joined the 
thousands on the streets believing they had an opportunity to protest against such 
problems as the worsening state of the economy.207 Between December 22-25'\ many 
of Romania's major cities bore witness to a bloody civil war, as Securitate forces 
battled with the people and the regular army for control of the revolution. 
The transition to a new govermnent in Romania effectively began only on 
December 22.nd2os Within hours of the Ceausescu's escape from Bucharest, a group of 
predominantly former Communist Party members joined together to form a 
provisional govermnent, the Counc!l of the National Salvation Front (NSF).209 
Immediately emphasising that it did not seek dictatorial power, and that Its authority 
and membership were temporary, the NSF's earliest statements appeared to project 
weakness, panic and confusion, as it began to calm the population and to gamer 
support. It is significant that, only that evening, did NSF leaders devise a progranune 
204 ibid. p.132. 
205 There have also been suggestions that Ceausescu was deliberately nusmforrned as to the real extent 
of the mass demonstrations. J Sunpson, Q1!.£!!, p.242 
206 E Behr, Kiss The Hand You Cannot Bite· The Rise and Fall of the Ceausescus, 1991 New York, 
VIllard Books, pp 3-27. For a detailed eyewitness account of events m December see: J Sunpson, 
op cit, pp 244-249. 
207 J Sunpson, op cit, p 245 
208 For details of the confusmg events between December 22-25, see. M.Calmescu and V.Tismaneau, 
'The 1989 Revolution and Romarua's Future,' Problems ofCommumsm, Vol40 No sl-2, January-
Apnl1990, pp 42-55 
209 The group mcluded Communist officials, mtellectual and political dissidents, and some nuhtary 
officers See, K.Verdery and G Khgrnan, 'Romania After Ceausescu· Post-Commumst Commumsm ?' 
m· I Banac (ed ), Eastern Europe m RevolutiOn, 1992 Ithaca, Comell Umverstty Press, pp.117-147. 
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for the immediate future, one that implied political change!'" This fact alone is 
indicative of the surprise with which the Romanian events of late December 1989 
took opponents. Given the complete absence of a recognisable opposition and the lack 
of viable alternatives, if anyone had been able to predict the fall of the dictator 
himself, few would have foreseen the collapse of the entire system of rule. 
It is important here to emphasise the nature of the opposition to Ceausescu in 
1989. Growing public protest in late December did not represent the emergence of a 
mass movement for reform commanding widespread popular appeal, along the lines 
of Solidarity or Charter 77. Manifestations of opposition, although spreading across 
the country, failed to generate either the desire or the willingness to establish a cross-
class opposition to Ceausescu. Rather, the events should be understood as a 
spontaneous reaction to a perception of the possibility for some degree of change or 
reform of the existing systemic framework. 
(4.3.5) Mode of Breakdown· Distinguishing Factors 
Romania's revolution was altogether different from those witnessed 
throughout the remainder of Eastern Europe. Whilst Party chiefs were bowing to the 
will of the people in Poland and Czechoslovakia throughout 1989, in Romania the 
system remained unchanged. In late December, Communism was ousted in an 
altogether different way, in a spontaneous battle that no one had anticipated. After it 
had started, however, the momentum of events was unstoppable. 
It is Important, therefore, to assess what the Romanian example signified. In 
many respects, it displays characteristics associated With the revolutionary mode of 
breakdown outlined in Chapter II. In the first instance, the events of late December 
were preceded by mass mobilisation throughout Romania as support for the exiled 
Hungarian, Laszlo Tokes, spread from Timisoara to other regions. In addition, regime 
breakdown was both rapid and violent, as the population defeated Ceausescu's 
Securitate forces. Furthermore, the establishment of coherent opposition groups after 
initial public demonstrations is evident in the formation of the NSF as late as 
December 22•d. These four factors were noted as predominant characteristics of 
revolutionary regime breakdown. 
However, certain factors do not fit into this catogory and are more 
charactenstic of the coup mode of regime breakdown. Within this category, military 
210 ME F1scher, 'The New Leaders and the Opposition,' in· D N Nelson ( ed ), Romama After 
Tvranny, 1992 Boulder, Westvlew Press, pp 45-65. 
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or other ehtes play a predominant role in ousting the incumbent government from 
power. In Romania, the central role of the Romanian political elite m dislodging the 
Ceausescu regime can be seen in the actions of the NSF. Certainly, it cannot be 
denied that thousands of Romanian citizens supported the revolutionary momentum 
in Romania. However, second society played virtually no part m creatzng a situation 
in which opposition to Ceausescu would bnng about a system-overthrowing 
revolution, or in directing the momentum of events once begun. This task fell to the 
NSF as the only group capable of portraying itself as a viable alternative to 
Ceausescu's Communism. Other sWiftly formed groups had no experience or 
organisational structures, however informal, on which to bmld. 211 What is significant 
is that, given the prevailmg conditions within Romania and the lack of established 
independent orgamsation in society, this group could only have been composed of 
members of the Communist elite.'12 
Furthermore, it must be noted that the Romanian revolution produced 
something of a paradox. The overthrow of Ceausescu's regime produced a 
government led by a party devoted to the pnnciples of the Communist system, albeit a 
reformed one. This fact was adequately demonstrated in the hastily arranged 
"democratic," yet restricted elections organised in early 1990. In addition, the 
provisional government established by the NSF was organised along Communist 
lines. For example, although mimstenal government was established, real power was 
vested in an Executive Council reminiscent of the former Communist Politburo. At 
the provincial level, the new government included many Communist army generals 
and bureaucrats who had switched sides when it became evident that Ceausescu's 
regime was crumbling. In this respect, the Romanian "revolution" did not produce a 
definitive break with the Communist past. Therefore, the mode of breakdown 
experienced by the Communist regime in Romania should be located between the two 
categories of revo/ut1on and coup. 
(4.4) Conclusion 
On the surface, Romania demonstrated many of the necessary conditions for 
the emergence and development of a second society: serious economic difficulties; in 
211 The abihty of the NSF to effecnvely seiZe power so sWiilly has led to many theones concemmg the 
possibihty of a coup d'etat m Romania. For a discussion of the vanous theones, see. N Ratesh, 
Romania: The Entangled Revolullon, 1991 New York, Praegar Pubhshers, With the Centre for 
Strategic and Intemanonal Studies, pp 80-119. 
212The NSF was, mdeed, an amalgam of former Conunumst officials The President was Ion Ilhescu, 
the 1960s Party youth leader; Ins deputy, Durmtru Mazllu had served as a Secuntate officer, along 
With SIIvm Brucan, former editor of the Party dally and Romanian ambassador. 
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the political sphere, a ruhng Communist Party with a powerful leader that was 
increasingly unrepresentative of the popular will, and in which institutionalised 
opposition was not tolerated; nationalistic traditions of anti-Soviet or Russian 
sentiments; and extensive citizen dissatisfaction with the internal economic and 
political scene. However, whereas a similar situation in Poland led to the formation of 
the Solidarity Trade Union, and in Czechoslovakia to Charter 77, in Romania the 
results were less significant: lower productlVlty levels, sporadic protests, incessant 
complaining, widespread apathy and cynicism, and mass emigration. Organised 
dissent did exist (in the Jiu Valley, via SLOMR, for example), however, no extensive 
second society or mass movement emerged. Why was this the case? 
It has been suggested that not only were the Romanians a passive population, 
but that, also, the effectiveness of the security apparatus, particularly in the 1970s-80s 
precluded the development of any opposition to the Communist regime. Both 
explanations are important. However, a number of additional factors need to be noted 
here. Firstly, the interplay between the goals of industrialisation and nationalism must 
be considered. During the 1970s, in particular, Romania's industrialisation became a 
national goal, which demanded that sacrifices were accepted for a brighter tomorrow. 
Industrialisation was also seen as a means to achieve a greater independence from the 
USSR, thereby capitalising on the intensely nationalistic sentiments shared by the 
majority of the population. Secondly, with the focus of industrial and economic 
investment being on heavy industry, the predictable outcome could have been a 
massive rise in the number of calls to satisfy increasing demands and needs within the 
consumer sector which, as in Poland and Czechoslovakia, was crucial to the 
maintenance of systemic stability. Although shortages and queuing were an accepted 
part of everyday life, so, too, was an increasing reliance on extensive informal 
networks and underground economies. In Romania, these networks appeared to 
function adequately, as individuals maintained extensive links to the countryside and 
to familial ties for food supplies. The traditions of the Romanian agrarian economy 
-prevented the Romanian working class from mobilismg in support of economic 
demands. In addition, in contrast to Poland, the urbanised working class was a much 
smaller entity in numerical terms and, therefore, not as threatening to the survival of 
the Communist regime, despite the very real protests and challenges that emerged in 
the late 1970s. 
In addition, Romanian workers lacked the experiences of the working classes 
in other Communist states, paralleling the generally lower levels of socio-economic 
development in Romania. The 1977 strikes, for example, brought down, not a 
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government, but the works' director, which reflected the limited extent of Romanian 
workers' demands. Furthermore, the working class was highly fragmented, with few 
living within industrial towns or cities, as the majority maintained close links with the 
countryside. There were also further divisions along ethnic lines. Most significantly, 
however, a large gap between the workers and the intelligentsia existed, the two 
classes divided by mutual suspicion, if not outright hostility. In early 1977, Paul 
Goma criticised the RCP on the grounds of its anti- or non-socialist development.213 
Not only was this revisionist stance typical of early East European dissent as a whole, 
and indicative of the lack of development and progress within Romanian opposition 
forces in particular, it IS also significant for its focus on issues of human rights. By 
contrast, those espoused by the working class continued to centre on economic and 
self-interest demands with no reference to the wider political system. This was in 
stark contrast to the distinctly political and socio-economic demands put forward by 
the Polish Solidarity Trade Union in 1980-81. Admittedly, in Romania, SLOMR did 
begin to develop a distinctly political emphasis With, for example, demands for civil 
rights for soldiers, and free access to the press and radio. However, its predominant 
emphasis was on economic bread-and-butter issues. There was notably, moreover, no 
subsequent attempt by intellectual dissidents to protest against the impnsonment or 
exile of SLOMR' s leaders or to form a society-wide alliance in support of the 
workers. Even informal contacts between working class activists and intellectual 
dissidents were almost non-existent, a situation in large part attributable to the 
policies enacted by the Communist regime which successfully isolated manifestations 
of dissent, and to the level of overall control exercised by the Securitate. 
This lack of real, mass popular support was a major stumbling block, which 
could, perhaps, have been overcome if the intellectuals had been successful in 
developing popular or viable alternatives to the Communist system of rule, which 
could have convinced the average Romanian of the possibility of change. Here, is one 
of the single most important factors that distinguishes the Romanian events from the 
Polish and Czechoslovakian. Through its inabilitY to formulate and develop a society-
wide alternative, the Romanian opposition was unable to put itself in the position of 
being a force that could attract the support of the population or one that the 
Communist regime would have to contend with. Because of its lack of well-
established and extensive second society institutions and practices, the Romanian 
opposition was unable to portray itself as a government-in-waiting. In 1989, therefore, 
the revolution could only have been a spontaneous one; the people buoyed up by the 
213 T Bearmsh and G Hadley, QJli!!, pp 143-145. 
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recent events in neighbouring Communist countries, protested without intellectual or 
other independent leadership prior to the emergence of the NSF. 
With regard to the issue of nationalism, it must be recalled that Romanians 
were ardently nationalistic. During the Communist period, there were no Soviet 
troops within Romanian borders; the RCP pursued policy initiatives independent from 
Moscow, particularly in the foreign policy sphere. Consequently, capitalising on 
historic anti-Russian sentiments, the RCP leadership commanded a relatively higher 
degree of popular legitimacy than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Anti-Soviet 
nationalism had the effect of binding the state and the people in such a way that the 
RCP was able to use this ideology to stifle internal d1ssent and the emergence of 
second society institutions. The Party elite consistently used the threat of a Soviet 
invasion to justify its retreat from liberal reform. This threat helped to keep a rein on 
domestic protest, particularly among intellectuals. The Orthodox Church, too, adopted 
many of the same nationalist positions as the RCP and, therefore, was thoroughly 
integrated into the Party-state organisation. At no time, unlike the Roman Catholic 
Church in Poland, did it act as a saviour of independence or as a shelter for 
independent dissident activity. 
Romania provides us with an example of an apparently strong and repressive 
state apparatus and a very weak second society. It has been shown, however, that the 
Communist state did have a number of inherent weaknesses. Consequently, when 
these were exposed in 1989, the system, having no effective support structure, 
collapsed. Furthermore, as a consequence of the under-development of second 
society, regime transition was predominantly dependent upon former RCP members 
cashing in on the popular uprisings throughout Communist Europe, to give leadership 
and direction to the spontaneous demonstrations that occurred in Romania. The 
second society, such as it existed, lacked any form of organisational basis with social 
movements forming distinct political opposition groups only post-1989. 
Consequently, in many respects, Romania represents the counter-case of this 
thesis, With its marked absence of second society or other independent activity during 
the 1980s. The absence of a well-developed second society and of organised dissident 
movements meant that, even when the weaknesses of the regime were exposed, it 
proved more resilient to genume political transformation. 1989, therefore, saw a 
relatively old guard of dissident Commumst elements within the existing state 
structure take-over the reins of power. The "from below" spontaneous revolution was 
eclipsed by a coup "from above" which aimed at preserving the old system w1th only 
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a minimum of concessions. Furthermore, the lack of restraint that would have been 
imposed by the existence of an organised second society resulted in high levels of 
accompanying violence. Only later in the 1990s would the process of second society 
strengthening and coalition building occur in Romania. 214 
214See. V.Ttsmaneau, 'The Revtval ofPohttcs in Romama,' in Ntls H.Wessell (ed ), The New Europe: 
Revolutton in East-West Relattons, Proceedmgs of the Academy ofPohttcal Sctence, 3811, New York 
1991, pp 85-91. 
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CHAPTER V: CZECHOSLOVAKIA CASE STUDY 
Waves of East Germans flowing through Czechoslovakia and Hungary to the 
West towards the end of 1989 held the attention of young Czechs and Slovaks, 
opening their minds to the possible impotence of their security police and the 
potential for mass action. In August 1989, not one Czechoslovak foresaw the collapse 
of November. Miroslav Holub, for example, could only have predicted a "burst of 
positive feeling." I The possibility of change had been represented in neither 
opposition theorising, nor in the more popular medium of Czechoslovak literature, 
and it was, therefore, neither foreseen nor expected. The surprisingly rapid collapse of 
Communist power in Czechoslovakia, however, was representative of the failure of 
the Soviet system to secure legitimate popular support throughout Eastern Europe 
post-1945. In a sense, if the Soviet Union could not impose Communism on 
Czechoslovakia, it stood no chance of doing so elsewhere. The Czechoslovak 
Communist Party (CCP) and government apparatus were never as repressive as in 
Poland or Romania; Czechoslovakia, Itself, had emerged from World War II, the least 
damaged country economically in Eastern Europe; and both the Czechs and Slovaks 
had retamed a minimal cultural and political affinity with the Russians. 
However, m the late 1980s, the Soviet Union often appeared blind to the 
steadily eroding base of popular Czechoslovak support for the Communist regime and 
the alliance with the Soviet Umon. In Czechoslovakia, there was a growing sense that 
the enormous Soviet power network - permeating the Party, the trade unions, the 
secret police, the army and the media - was profoundly out of touch With the realities 
of the country, precisely because those mstitut10ns appeared out of touch themselves. 
The Czechoslovak population was turning mward, engaging in what was called" anti-
politics," or internal immigration into their own private hves. 2 
The intention of this case-study chapter is to analyse the impact of the second 
society on the mode of regime breakdown in Czechoslovakia. Post-1945, the country 
witnessed a relatively low development of second society. Periodically, independent 
activity was certainly intense, however these efforts were strongly controlled or 
repressed, and tended to be isolated from mainstream political life. It is my contention 
I Jntemew wtth Mrroslav Holub by A.S Byatt, 'In Search of an Enemy Symposmm,' Cheltenham 
Festival ofL1terattrre, Fnday 6"' October 1995 
2 V.Havel, 'The Power of the Powerless,' m· Vaclav Have! et a! (eds.}, The Power of the Powerless, 
1985 London, Pa1ach Press, pp 23-96 See also Ins essay 'Antt-Pohttcal Pohttcs' m: J Keane (ed }, 
CIVIl Soc1etv and the State. 1988 London, Verso, pp 381-398. 
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that, as a direct consequence of this, in 1989 the country experienced sudden regime 
collapse following some of the most severe repression of the decade, with second 
society playing only a mmimal role in conditioning the mode of breakdown 
experienced by the Communist regime. Only during the actual period of transition can 
we talk of coherent social movements embedded in a second society having a distinct 
impact on the political process. The transfer of power in 1989 from the Communist 
Party to the democratic wing, represented by "Civic Forum" and "Public Against 
Violence" was, however, peaceful, suggesting that the unofficial activity that could 
be witnessed had a tempering effect on the potential violence of the breakdown 
situation. In this respect, the Czechoslovakian "velvet revolution" 3 takes on 
significance being the case-study example located between the two extremes of 
Poland and Romania. 
The Czechoslovak case-study chapter will follow the same structure as that of 
the precedmg two. Section I will consider historical cultural and political factors, and 
will specifically highlight those features that had a direct bearing on the evolution of 
second society in Czechoslovakia. To that end, only certain aspects of the country's 
history will be examined in the light of their Impact on the development of opposition 
to Communism. Section II will examine the development of opposition to 
Communism, focusing on the post-1968 period until the early to mid-1980s, in 
particular. Principal attention will be paid to the Immediate post-1968 oppositiOn and 
to the issuing of the Charter 77 document and its Impact on Czechoslovak society. 
The final section will examine the late 1980s and the impact ofMikhail Gorbachev's 
policies introduced in the Soviet Union on the Czechoslovak Communist regime 
itself, and Will demonstrate how the particular form of second society that was in 
existence contributed towards the form the breakdown of Communism took in 
Czechoslovakia. 
(5.1) History and Political Traditions 
The purpose of this section is to examme certain characteristics of 
Czechoslovak history that had an impact on the evolution of a second society in the 
post-1945 Commumst period. In that respect, particular conditions in Czechoslovakia 
pnor to the establishment of the Communist system differed in many ways from the 
other East European satellite states, and indicate the existence of a qualitatively 
3 The Observer, Teanng Down the Iron Curtam. 1990 London, Hodder and Stoughton, pp 100-101. 
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different state in 1945 when compared to both Poland and Romania.4 Reflected in the 
country's level of econoffilc development, social structure, culture, political 
organisations and traditions, as well as in the values, attitudes and beliefs of the 
population, such factors had a significant impact on the way in which the Communist 
system was established, and on the evolution of second society. Although certain 
elements did undergo a process of change between 1945 and 1989, the distinctive 
features of the country's history influenced both the options open to political leaders, 
and the way in which the citizenry reacted to elite initiatives and they are, therefore, 
significant to any analysis of the development of opposition to Communism in 
Czechoslovakia. s 
Economically Czechoslovakia had a relatively developed economy from the 
outset, with higher levels of industrialisation and urbanisation than neighbouring 
Poland and Romania.6 Consequently, wlule political leaders elsewhere in the region 
embarked upon programmes of rapid industnalisation and were forced to deal with 
accompanying social demands, the process in Czechoslovakia was already weii under 
way in 1945. In the political realm, also, Czechoslovakia diverged.7 Unlike 
neighbouring Communist regimes, democratic government survived in 
Czechoslovakia until "ended" by outside forces, 8 and did not succumb to pressures to 
establish a republic or constitutional monarchy in the name of stability. 9 The 
persistence of democracy was also facilitated, firstly, by the existence of the 
acknowledged social prerequisites (widespread literacy, a large middle class and 
strong traditions of autonomous pluralistic activity, for example) and by the values 
and actions of many Czech and Slovak leaders. Their general respect for democratic 
4For a htstory ofCzechoslovalaa dunng the mter-war penod, see: R. W.Seton Watson, A Htstory of the 
Czechs and Slovaks. 1943 London, Ch 16, andRobertJ Kemer (ed ), Czechoslovakia· Twenty Years 
oflndependence, 1940 Berkeley. 
Sfor a bnef overv1ew of the nnportance ofhtstoncal factors, see H Gordon Slallmg, Czechoslovakia's 
Interrupted Revolution, 1976 Pnnceton, Pnnceton UmveTSlty Press, Ch.l. 
6Vaclav L Benes, 'Czechoslovak Democracy and Its Problems,' m: V.S Mamatey and R Luza (eds ), 
A H1story of the Czechoslovak Repubhc, 1919-1948,1973 Princeton, Pnnceton Umversity Press, 
pp 42-3. See also. A.Janos, 'The One-Party State and Soctal Mobthsatton. East Europe Between the 
Wars,' m S P Hunttngton and C Moore (eds.), Authontanan Pohtics m Modem Soctety, 1979 New 
York, Baste Books, p.208. 
1JosefKorbel, The Commumst SubversiOn of Czechoslovakia 1938-1948 the Fatlure ofCoextstence, 
Prmceton, Pnnceton Umverstty Press, 1959, pp 67-71. 
8 V L Benes, op c1t, p.44. 
9 Josef Anderle, 'The Frrst Repubhc 1918-1938,' m· Hans Bnsch and Ian Volgyes (eds.), 
Czechoslovakta. the Rentage of Ages Past, New York, Columbia Umverstty Press, 1979, pp 89-112. 
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procedures and awareness of the necessity for compromise in a democracy, were 
reflected in the general stability of the coalition govermnents throughout this period. IO 
Notably, Czechoslovak democracy also benefited from the fact that there were 
fewer alienated groups within society than in many other East European countries. In 
particular, the CCP remained legal throughout the life of the Czech Republic and 
succeeded in attracting a considerable degree of genuine support. Founded in 1921, 
the Party had emerged out of a long-standing socialist movement that had substantial 
public support before the country gained its independence. The fact that it existed in 
what was to remain the only functioning democracy in the region was a mixed 
blessmg for the Party leadership. On the other hand, the necessity of operating in an 
electoral democracy did impose certain constraints and led the CCP to adapt its 
structures and actions to the particular demands of the Czechoslovak environment.11 
The impact of certain aspects of the pre-Communist culture was evident in a 
number of ways throughout the Communist period. The continued influence of the 
pluralistic elements in Czechoslovakia's political traditions, for example, was 
reflected in the reform movement of the 1960s. Although revisionist in orientation 
and led by intra-Party reformers, the movement evoked broad support for political 
reform and pluralism amongst the wider population. These democratic tradihons 
adopt a greater significance via thetr apparent absence during the 1970s and early 
1980s, however. This would appear to indicate that despite having the appearance of a 
state that would be supportive of democratic procedures in the polity, economy, and 
society, Czechoslovakia succumbed to Communism by the early 1970s. Furthermore, 
it was the particular characteristics of that Communist system which prevented the 
emergence of independence in society during the later stages of Communist rule. 
(5.1 1) The Czech Lands and Slovakia 
In 1939, Czechs and Slovaks experienced very different levels of economic 
development, political experiences, national traditions, and histories.I2 The cultural 
heritage of these two peoples also differed substantially and it is significant that these 
10 J Korbel, op ctt. pp.38-62, and VS Marnatey, 'The Development of the Czechoslovak Democracy,' 
m. V.S Mamatey and R Luza, op ctt, pp 99-166. 
11 Zdenek Suda, Zealots and Rebels· A Htstory of the Ruhng Commumst Partv of Czechoslovakia, 
1980 Stanford, Hoover InstitutiOn Press, Ch 2 
12 Z.Krystufek, The Soviet Regtme in Czechoslovakia, 1981 Boulder, Columbia Umverstty Press, 
pp 13-14 
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differences continued into the Communist period also and ultimately prevented the 
evolution of a united cross-societal movement of opposition to Communism. 
In the economic sphere, the differences were most noticeable. The Czech 
Lands were, for example, far more developed industrially than Slovakia, and were 
more urbanised. In 1921, for example, 336.4 of every 1000 inhabitants in the country 
as a whole were employed in industry, and 395.6 in agriculture. In Bohemia and 
Moravia-Silesia (Czech Lands), the figures were 406 and 378 per 1000 employed in 
industry respectively, but only 175 in Slovakia, where much larger proportions of 
citizens were employed in the agricultural sector (606.3 per 1000).13 Slovak 
experiences during World War II, when the republic suffered more extensive war 
. 
damages than the neighbouring Czech Lands, merely served to reinforce these historic 
economic disparities. In 1946, Slovak na!Ional income accounted for only 21.6 per 
cent of the Republic.I4 During the 1950s and 1960s, Slovakia' s share of industrial 
production did gradually increase, and the stratification of the population did level off 
considerably. Complete equality with the Czech Lands, however, was never achieved. 
Post-1968, differences in the average annual income of the two increased further. 
The political experiences of the population also differed in the two parts of the 
country. Ruled from VIenna, the Czech Lands benefited from the moderation of 
Austrian rule that occurred in the late 1800s. Czech politicians and citizens, therefore, 
had an mcreasmg number of opportunities to participate in public life within the 
framework of imperial and regional institutions. Is In Slovakia, by contrast, as in other 
areas under Hungarian rule, there was little room for non-Magyars to participate in 
the political sphere.I6 In addition, Slovaks faced much greater pressure to relinqnish 
their cultural identity altogether and to assimilate to the dominant nationality.J7 Such 
historical divergences are important in explaining the relative lack of commitment to 
opposition causes on the part of the average Slovak, when compared to that of the 
Czech population during the 1970s and 1980s, and is significant with regard to the 
l3Qwen V.Johnson, Slovakta. 1918-1938· Educatton and the Makmg of a Natton. New York, 
Columbta Umverstty Press, 1985, p 77, and V L Benes, Ql!.£!!, p 43 
I4 Z.Krystufek, op ctt, p 13. 
IS O.Johnson, op ctt, pp 15-49 
I6 S H.Thornson, Czechoslovakia m European Htstorv. 2nd Edttton, 1953 Prmceton, Prmceton 
Umverstty Press, pp 260-275. 
11Q Johnson, Ql!.£!!, pp 15-49. 
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failure of dissidents to form a united national movement of opposition against 
Communist rule. 
(5.1 2) Religion and the Role of the Church 
The Czechs and Slovaks who came together in the inter-war republic were 
also separated by religious differences which influenced the political ideas and values 
of each group post-1945, and had a specific impact on the development of second 
society. Although the majority of both groups were nominally Roman Catholic, the 
nature of Catholicism differed among the two, as did the relationship of religion and 
nationalism, and the overall impact of religion on politics. Although most Czechs 
were Catholics, a more secularised culture had come to predominate in the more 
developed Czech Lands before independence, and the Roman Catholic Church played 
a negligible role in the political life of the Czechs during the inter-war period, a 
feature which prevailed after 1945.18 This was in sharp contrast to the historical role 
of the Church in Poland, where Catholicism had long served as a bulwark of the 
Polish people in their various struggles for independence against foreign rule. 
Catholicism in the Czech Lands was not tied to a sense of national identity that grew 
out of the efforts of historical leaders as in Poland, or Slovakia. 
Slovakia, too, developed a Protestant tradition during the period of the 
Reformation; and Protestant intellectuals did play a prominent role in early efforts to 
develop a national movement in Slovakia. However, despite the continued 
sigruficance of Protestantism in Slovakia, the Catholic Church came to exert a much 
stronger influence on the personal lives and political beliefs and behaviour of Slovaks 
pre-1945. Given the lower urbanisation and literacy levels there, the Catholic clergy 
became important public figures, and, as the inter-war period progressed, clerics used 
their traditional authority as a base for developing a more explicit political role. 
Giving voice to mountmg Slovak resentment, they became leaders of the movement 
to promote Slovak national aims.19 Furthermore, it is significant that the tie between 
Catholicism and nationalism in Slovakia was strong. When national aspirations were, 
to an extent, fulfilled by the 1969 reform of the country's federal structure, the 
Church was seen to adopt a more regime-supportive role, and did not switch its 
attention to the defence of human and civil rights as did the Catholic Church in 
Poland. It therefore failed to become a shelter and a support for a democratically 
oriented opposition. 
!Ss H Thomson, Qll.£!t pp 69-119 and 257-259. 
19Jbtd, pp.334-5. 
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(5.1.3) A Submissive Nation 
A particular facet of Czechoslovak tradition which should not be overlooked 
is the supposed willingness of the nation and its leaders to adapt passively to any 
given political system, and their apparent reluctance to oppose authority via violent or 
revolutionary means. A traditional Czechoslovak saying states that, "The 
Czechoslovak population may dissent but they do not actively oppose." 20 The 
opposition was traditionally done by a much smaller group of active dissenters on 
behalf of the people.2I It must be pointed out, however, that such traditions relate 
primarily to the Czechs and not to the Slovaks. The former do lack a revolutionary 
past along the lines of that of the Poles, and this particular Czech characteristic was 
very much in evidence during World War II. Czechs generally contented themselves 
with acts of passive resistance or adaptation and collaboration with the German rulers, 
which did not bode well for the future of opposition.22 Unlike in Poland, Czechs did 
not have a conspiratorial or revolutionary tradition on which to build post-1945. In 
Slovakia, by contrast, a country with a history of opposition to social injustice and a 
strong sense of Slovak nationalism, opponents of the regime did organise themselves 
more effectively during the war. In August 1944, for example, the resistance 
movement staged an armed uprising. Although unsuccessful it did, however, give 
Slovaks a basis for nationalist claims of consideration in the formulation of the post-
war order, the non-fulfilment of which would provide the foundations for all forms of 
Slovak opposition to Communist rule until1969.23 
(51 4) 1945-1948· Institution of Communist Dominance 
(5.1 4.1) The Establishment of Communism in Czechoslovakia 
In many of the East European states that became Communist after 1945, a 
Communist system was clearly imposed by outside actors.24 Such factors also played 
an important role in Czechoslovakia, where the proximity of Soviet troops and the 
advantages the CCP derived from the country's special relationslup with the Soviet 
20 J Korbel, Twentieth Centurv Czechoslovakia The Meaning 1f1ts H1storv. 1977 New York, 
Columbia Umvemty Press, p 253. 
21 J Pehkan, Soc1ahst Oopos1tion in Eastern Europe· The Czechoslovak Example, 1976 London, 
Alhson and Busby Ltd, p 36. 
22Jbid. pp 160-4 
23Anna Josko, 'The Slovak Resistance Movement,' m VS Mamatey and R Luza (eds ), op c1t. pp 362-
86 
24 J Rothsclnld, Return to DJVers1tv, 2•• Edition 1993 Oxford, Oxford Umvemty Press, pp 76-8. 
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Union and its association with the liberating troops clearly aided the imposition of the 
Communist system. However, the CCP also had a substantial degree of indigenous 
domestic support. In part, this reflected the Party's strength during the inter-war 
period, when Czech and Slovak Communist leaders were able to capitalise on 
generally progressive political traditions. In addition, although liberated in large part 
by the Red Army, Czechs and Slovaks managed to retain some freedom of action and 
to sustain a political system in which non-Communist forces played a significant role 
longer than any other country in Eastern Europe. From 1945 to February 1948, the 
country enjoyed a modified form of pluralism, with the CCP sharing leadership of the 
state with representatives of other parties.25 From 1945 onwards, however, the CCP 
did enjoy certam advantages over its democratic opponents, which were crucial to its 
consolidation of power at the end of the decade. These included, for example, the 
political and other benefits derived from the Party's association with the liberating 
Red Army.26 The Communists were also the beneficiaries of post-war agreements that 
banned those parties that had collaborated with the Nazis and the wartime Slovak 
state. This effectively !united the number of legitimate parties to four Czech and two 
Slovak.27 The CCP also benefited from the fact that it controlled numerous key 
industries, including the Ministries of Information, Education and Agriculture. These 
positions allowed the Communist Party to have a disproportionate influence on the 
availability of information and control of the police, as well as to gamer popular 
support by distributing confiscated German lands, and controlling admission to 
educational institutions. They were thus able to attract genuine support through 
measures that consistently appealed to the patriotism ofthe population. 
As a result of these factors (and also, to a certain extent, of the opportunism of 
those who saw the CCP as the probable victor in any post-war political struggle) the 
CCP's membership increased substantially, and reached over one million in 1946.28 
Furthermore, the Party enjoyed considerable support amongst non-members in the 
immediate post-war years, particularly in the Czech Lands, a fact supported by the 
results of the 1946 elections, in which the Party received 36.8 per cent of the national 
25 Z Brzezmskt, The Sovtet Bloc· Umty and Conflict. Cambndge, Harvard Umverstty Press, 1967, 
pp 18-19 
26 H Seton-Watson, The East European Revolutton. New York, Praegar Publishers, 1956, pp 339-71. 
27z.Suda, op ctt, pp 178-84 
28Jbtd, p 195. 
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vote, the largest percentage gained by any political party.29 By means of fierce anti-
German campaigmng - especially following the annexation of the Sudetenland - and 
other nationalistic propaganda, the CCP portrayed itself as the most consistent 
guardian of national mterests. In addition, in domestic policy, there were no radical 
socio-economic transformations beyond a limited commitment to the nationalisation 
of certain industries and the redistribution of large land estates to the peasantry; and 
the CCP dtd not abuse its control of the police apparatus or other instruments of 
intimidation to the extent of its Communist comrades throughout Eastern Europe. 
Thus the CCP nourished the widespread impression that it was different from other 
Communists and embodied the principles of patriotism, reform and reliability. 30 
During the 1946 election campaign the Party adopted a pragmatic policy progranune, 
tactfully omitting any reference to socialism, instead emphasising nationalism as 
opposed to the class struggle or other Marxist-Leninist inspired doctrines.3t Thus, 
whereas in Poland, the Communist system had clearly been imposed by the Red 
Army and was therefore perceived as illegitimate from tts inception, in 
Czechoslovakia, the new system originally had a sizeable number of genuine 
supporters. In 1945, the USSR did not move into Czechoslovakia as an enemy: it was 
a victorious power and more-or-less welcomed as a "big brother" with Germany 
perceived as the natural enemy.32 
In essence, threats of German revisionism gave the Czechoslovaks a powerful 
national interest in an alliance with the Soviet Union as a guarantor of their territorial 
integrity after 1945. In Czechoslovakia, therefore, the Commumst Party could draw 
on attitudes that were favourable towards the Russians. This factor was in marked 
contrast to the post-war situation in Poland and Romania, where the Soviet Union was 
perceived as the country's traditional aggressor. The popularity of the CCP overall 
was attributable to a number of factors: to its pre and inter-war nationalistic positions; 
on its central role within the resistance movement, especially in Slovakia; and to the 
traditional pro-Russian stance of both Czechs and Slovaks. It must also be noted, 
however, that the CCP held specific attractions for virtually all social strata, with the 
29See S L Wolchik, Czechoslovakia m Transttton· Pohtics. Economics and Society, 1991 New York, 
Pmter Pubhshers, pp.17-19. Also, P Zmner, Commumst Strategy and Tactics m Czechoslovakta 1918-
1948, 1963 New York, Praegar Pubhshers. 
30 J Rothscluld, Qll.£!!, p.91. 
31H Renner, A Htslory of Czechoslovakia Smce 1945, 1989 London, Routledge, p 15 
32Mrroslav Holub, Intervtew, Cheltenham 1995, Ql!..£!1 
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workers and youth being particularly susceptible to aspects of Communist politics.33 
Given the collapse of the democratically onented inter-war system, sections of the 
population - particularly the academic and scientific ehtes - were seeking, and willing 
to support some kind of viable alternative in 1945. 
A further point should be made here, which relates to the divergence between 
the Czech and the Slovak experience post-World War II. In 1945, out of a total 
population of 12.2 million, Slovaks numbered 3.4 million, living within a 
predominantly agrarian Slovakia. Slovak national income accounted for only 21.6 per 
cent of the entire Republic reflected in an income per capita equal to only 70 per cent 
of that of the Czech Lands.34 In 1945, the declarations of Communist Party leaders 
appeared to suggest their support for Slovak national requirements. However, the 
discrepancy between words and intentions particularly with regard to the question of 
autonomy, meant that Slovakia resisted the Communist lure much more effectively 
than its Czech counterpart. In the immediate post-war years, for example, CCP 
membership in the Czech Lands increased rapidly, by nearly 700,000 between March 
1945-March 1946. In contrast, Slovak!an membership of the CCP reached only 
197,000 (including 20,000 former Social Democrats) at the end of 1945. By March 
1946, this figure had dropped to 151,330.35 These figures were reflected m the May 
1946 elections to the Constituent National Assembly, in which the Czech Communist 
Party received 40.1% of votes, the Slovak only 30.37%.36 Although the 1948 
Constitution did provide for organs of Slovak self-government and, rhetorically, the 
CCP did continue to recognise the separate identity of the Slovak nation, in 1946, the 
CCP reacted to the election results with a sharp reversal of its previous policies re 
Slovakia. All promises of autonomy were forgotten, and in June 1946, via the 'Third 
Prague Agreement,' Slovak Party autonomy was abolished altogether, thereby 
creating the basis for the relations that existed until 1968.37 Internal Party 
arrangements also completely ignored Slovak desires for autonomy.JS It is particularly 
significant With regard to the evolution of second society that the evident pre-war 
33 H Renner, op c1!, pp 16-18 
34z.Krystufek, op c1t, pp 13-15. 
35 Ibl!i p.l9. 
36fbld, Appendix 6, p 229 
37 Ibld, pp 19-20 
38The 1969 Const1tut1on openly articulated extreme centrahsm and reduced the ex1st1ng forms of 
Slovak self-government to ml. 
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divergences continued post-1945 which, in turn, had a specific impact on the 
possibilities for national unity. 
The 1948 Coup 
The uneasy truce between the CCP and other political forces in 
Czechoslovakia ended in February 1948.39 The immediate catalyst for the institution 
of a government clearly dominated by the Communist Party was a crisis over control 
of the police that led to the resignation of the non-Communist ministers in 
govemment.40 Although other parties continued to be nominally represented, the 
reconstituted government was clearly controlled by Klement Gottwald and the CCP. 
The May 1948 elections, which offered voters a choice between candidates approved 
by the CCP only, reflected the new political realities. A perceived declining public 
popularity after the high of the 1946 elections had also been reflected in an increased 
militancy amongst Party leaders, which had intensified efforts to ensure Communist 
dominance in positions of power in both the state bureaucracy and the police force.4t 
It is also significant, however, that the Communist take-over was legal, constitutional, 
and free from overt violence. This factor is significant with regard to the claims of 
legitimacy the CCP could make post-1948.42 
1948-1962: Imolementation of Stalinism 
Post-February 1948, the CCP leadership began the implementation of the 
Stalinist model of political organisation, social transformation and economic 
development in eamest.43 The desrre to emulate the Soviet experience, though it 
conflicted with the dominant historical political and cultural values, was evident in 
the severity of the purges and the terror that accompanied the consolidation of 
Communist authority. In the political realm, earlier attempts to discredit and reduce 
the power bases of non-Communist actors were escalated, as were measures designed 
to strengthen the organisational base of the CCP, and ensure its domination over all 
39For a more detailed analysis-of the Commumst t3ke-over of Czechoslovakia, see: Karel Kaplan, The 
Short March· The Communist Take-over in Czechoslovakia 1945-1948, London, C Hurst and Co. 
Ltd, 1987. Also, M Myant, Socmhsm and Democracy m Czechoslovaloa 1945-8, 1981 Carnbndge, 
Carnbndge Uruvemty Press 
40J Korbel, QlliJ!, pp 210-20 
411bid. p 244. See also: J Lettnch, Historv of Modem Slovaloa. 1955 New York, Praegar Pubhshers, 
pp 236, 257-8 
42 V F Kusm, 'Czechoslovaloa,' m. M McCauley ( ed.), Communist Power in Europe 1944-9, 1977 
London, p 92 for detalls of the levels of popular support for the coup 
43 D Adarns Sclurudt, Anatomy of a Satelhte, 1952 Boston, Little and Brown, pp 109-110, 134-5. 
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things political. 44 Party loyalists were brought in to fill government offices, and 
government organs at all levels were subordinated to the Party. A system of strict 
censorship was imposed, as the CCP attempted to politicise all areas oflife, including 
education, culture and leisure. Anti-Communist newspapers and periodicals were 
closed and non-Communist ones purged, followed by universities, professional 
bodies, sports clubs, the publishing mdustry and the civil and military services. The 
Party leadership also embarked on a renewed campaign of recruitment. By sprmg 
1948, membership had reached two million, approximately one-fifth of all adults.45 
The campaign supplemented the influx of members from the former Social 
Democratic Party, which, significantly, further diversified the CCP's social 
composition by bringing in large numbers of middle class and white-collar 
members 46 The associational life of the country - which traditionally reflected the 
pluralistic and multiparty history of the country - was further simplified. Voluntary 
associations - including trade unions, student groups and women's associatiOns - had 
been centralised since 1945, reflecting the requirement that they be part of nation-
Wide umbrella organisations and the National Front. After February 1948, the non-
Communist groups were dissolved, and all unified mass organisations subordinated to 
the CCP. A system of mass, umfied organisations was established in order to mobilise 
members to carry out goals determined by the CCP. 
Prior to the Communist take-over of power m 1948, legal parties m 
Czechoslovakia, not just the CCP, were committed to a policy of nationalisation, 
which was essentially completed before the Communist coup. In 1948, earlier 
natiOnalisation policies were supplemented with a progranune designed to increase 
central control over the economy. Political measures were, therefore, supplemented 
by economic policies, including the further nationalisation of all enterprises 
employmg more than fifty workers, all breweries, bakeries and dairies, and all those 
engaged in foreign or wholesale trade; severe restrictions on private inheritance; and 
currency reform.47 The policy was specifically designed to reduce the economic 
44Ib1d. p 255; and P.Zmner, Commumst Strategy and Tactics m Czechoslovakia. 1918-1948, New 
York, Praegar Publishers, 1963, pp 196-223, for details of the propaganda campaign agamst the 
leaders of other parties. 
45 J.Rothsclu1d, op Cit, p 96 
46z.suda, Ql1£!t pp 225-6 
47 For bnef discusSion of soc10-econonuc changes between 1945-8, see: J Korbel, Q11£!!, pp 38-41; 
and J Stevens, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads· The Economic Dilemmas of Commumsm m Post-
war Czechoslovakia, Boulder CO, East European Monographs, 1985, pp 7-11. 
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power base of non-Communist elites m society. The process was so rapid that, by 
1949, all but 4% of the labour force were employed in state enterprises,48 and, 
ultimately, legislation was enacted abolishing all private ownerslup.49 As was the case 
throughout Eastern Europe, planners adopted ambitious progranunes of rapid 
industrialisation, with a particular emphasis on heavy industry and the mobilisation of 
all available labour resources. A typical Stalinist five-year plan was adopted on 
January 1" 1949,50 and the agricultural sector was transformed through a 
collectivisation drive that began in' earnest in 1950.51 A mixture of material incentives 
and coerciOn was used to induce farmers to join collective farms and, thereby, 
succeeded in greatly increasing state control over the entire sector. By 1960, over 
90% of all farmland m Czechoslovakia had been collectivised. 52 
The CCP recognised the Roman Catholic Church to be a potentially dangerous 
factor and mounted a concerted campaign against religion during this period. 53 Until 
the 1948 coup, the CCP had refrained from religious persecution and, consequently, 
there had been no radical changes m the status of the churches. After February 1948, 
however, the CCP launched a campaign to bring them under complete state control. 
Directed mainly against the Roman Catholic Church, which embraced 75% of the 
population, the campaign passed through several stages. Between February 1948 and 
the summer of 1949, the regime adopted an outwardly conciliatory attitude toward the 
Church, but one also combined with measures designed to destroy its economic 
independence. Seminaries and religious schools were closed, and Church property 
confiscated. The second stage from Summer 1949 to February 1951, was 
characterised by the regime's all-out offensive with policies aimed at converting it 
into a pliable instrument of domestic and foreign policy, and culminated in the 
breakdown of the Church's open resistance. Priests were subjected to political 
48 J Korbel, Twenlteth Century Czechoslovakia, op Ctl, p 261. 
49P.Zmner, op ctt, pp 226-8 
so J Rotltschtld, QO..£!!, p 96. 
51 M Myant, The Czechoslovak Economy 1948-1988 the Battle for Econotmc Reform. 1989 
Cambndge, Cambndge Umverstty Press, pp 4-8. Also, A.Tetchova, The Czechoslovak Economy 
1918-1980, 1988 London, Routledge, p.101. 
52J.Stevens, op ctt, pp 16-57. 
53for a more m-depth analysts of relattons between the Church and the state m Czechoslovakta, 
mcludmg an htstoncal background, see· Vattslav Butek, 'Church and State,' m: V.Butek and 
N Spulber ( eds }, East-Central Europe Under the Commumsts· Czechoslovakta, New Yorlc, Praegar 
Publishers, 1957. 
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controls and their numbers significantly reduced, with members of the clergy virtually 
becornmg state-paid civil servants following the introduction of a late 1949 decree 
which demanded that an oath of loyalty to the government was required of all 
clergymen. Harassment of churchgoers was widespread and, consequently, outward 
manifestations of religious belief declined.54 With the final capitulation of the 
Bishops to the regime's demand for all to sign the loyalty oath, instead of their 
traditional role of spiritual guardians, the priests were then forced to echo the Party 
line and to preach unquestioning obedience to the state. In February 1951, the CCP 
took steps to further the disintegration of hierarchical authority within the Roman 
Catholic Church, which had effectively born the brunt of the regime's attacks on the 
churches. In addition to 43 per cent of parish priests, all dignitaries who were 
unwilling to compromise were purged. 
Concurrent with its principal campaign against the Catholic Church, the 
regime gradually destroyed the autonomy of other denominations. As with the 
Catholic Church, all international connections of the remaining churches were 
severed. When combined with their general numerical weakness55 and traditional 
dependence upon the state for financial support, the non-Catholic churches found 
themselves in the position of being "out-numbered, isolated and surrounded" from 
1948 onwards. 56 Intimidation, arrests and other repressive measures swiftly broke any 
remaining open resistance. The "Association of Protestant Pastors" and the 
"Evangelical Union," for example, were disbanded, their property confiscated, and 
their collaboration effectively secured by removing all dignitaries and officials and 
replacing them with men of "progressive" persuasion. The Slovak Lutheran Church 
(which had played a prominent role in the nation's cultural and political history) 
initially refused to surrender its spiritual independence, but found all its leadmg 
officials replaced with men of the CCP's choice. The Church's publishing house was 
placed under state management and Its admmistrative regions delimited to enable 
more effective control of contacts among them. In so doing, the Communist Party 
successfully removed the one existing alternative source of authority within 
Czechoslovak society, and effectively undermined the evolution of an opposition 
movement even before the seeds had been sown. 
54p Rarnet, 'Chnsllamty and Nallonal Rentage Among the Czechs and Slovaks,' m· P Ramet ( ed ), 
Rehgwn and Nallonahsm m Soviet and East European Pohllcs, 2nd Ed11lon, Durham, Duke Umvemty 
Press, 1989, pp 279-281. 
55 MP., 'Protestant Churches m Czechoslovakia· Less Than Complete Loyalty?' RFE Background 
Report/93, July 10" 1986, pp 1-8 
56y Butek, .QP..£!!, p 151. 
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As in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Czech and Slovak 
leaders increasingly relied on coercion to implement these and associated policies. 
Despite the fact that there had been a degree of genuine support for the CCP in the 
inter-war and immediate post-war periods and, regardless of the fact that there was no 
serious challenge to the mstltutlons of the new system post-1948, Czechoslovakia 
also experienced political purges and widespread use of terror as the Stalinist system 
was consolidated. The Communist Party's seizure of power by the skillful application 
of non-violent force in February 1948, followed by the imposition of a highly 
repressive regime that contrasted vividly with the apparent moderation of the years 
1945-7, cuhninated in a succession of Party purges that, arguably, left the country the 
most Stalinist in Eastern Europe bar Albania. 57 The intra-Party purges, which began 
in 1949 with the wholesale replacement of members of several regional Party 
organisations, were amongst the most severe in Eastern Europe.58 The Slovak Party 
was particularly hard hit, the purges involvmg show trials of numerous leaders -
including Gustav Husak - on charges of bourgeois nationalism. 59 As the Stalinist 
system was consolidated, the secret police came to play an increasingly important 
role.6o 
(5.1 6) De-Stalinisation 
In contrast to Poland, the Stalinist system persisted relatively unchanged in 
Czechoslovakia after Stalin's death in March 1953.61 Throughout the 1950s, the 
country remained insulated from the Khrushchev1an "thaw" that was the cause of 
domestic opposition in neighbouring Communist states. In January 1957, Party Chief 
Antonin Novotny still denounced the term "de-Stalinisation" as being synonymous 
with "weakness and yieldmg to the forces ofreaction." 62 Admittedly, some surviving 
57 J Rothsch1ld, op c1!, p 166. 
58 J Pehkan, The Czechoslovak Pohtlcal Tnals, Stanford, Stanford Uruvemty Press, 1971, pp.3 7-147. 
59See: H Gordon Slallmg, op c1t. 1976, Ch 13; and Z Suda, op c1t, pp.233-57, for analyses of the 
purges and subsequent tnals 
60Some estlllllltes placed the ratm of c1t1zen secret pohce at 2-5 per cent, an unprecedented figure m 
Eastern Europe V.V Kusm, 'Husak's Czechoslovakia and Economtc Stagnanon,' Problems of 
Commumsm, Vol31, May-June 1982, p.26. 
61 R.Selucky, Czechoslovak~a· The Plan That Faded, 1970 London, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, for 
an analys1s of Stahmsm m Czechoslovakia. 
62 G Golan, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement, 1971 Cambndge, Cambndge Umvemty Press, 
p4. 
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VIctims of the CCP purges were quietly released in 1956-7, but without publicity or 
exoneration. Aside from minor shifts and the division of certain top positions, there 
was little change in leadership personnel. The secret police remained a crucial 
institution, and there was little change in the relationslup between the CCP and the 
populace, or in the former's style of rule. 
The persistence of the Stalinist system until the mid 1960s had a significant 
impact upon the development of opposition to Communism in Czechoslovakia, and 
can be traced to a number of factors that differentiated the country from its 
neighbours. These factors influenced both the pressures for change from below, and, 
therefore, the evolution of second society. Due to its higher level of economic 
development prior to Communist rule, for example, the Czechoslovak economy was 
not as severely affected by Stalmist economic policies as, say, Poland by the mid 
1950s. In turn, this meant that economic discontent (one of the primary reasons for 
mass pressure for change in Poland in 1956) was not as pervasive in Czechoslovakia. 
For example, the workers' riots that had taken place in Plzen m 1953 had protested 
against proposed currency reforms not against the system itself. 63 Indeed, the 
Communist system had brought about a situation in which the workers fared far better 
than they had previously. CCP efforts to improve the status of previously 
disadvantaged groups, and the need to use financial incentives to draw workers into 
high priority branches of the economy such as heavy industry, led to marked changes 
in the wages of particular categones of workers and other employees. These policies 
had also resulted in a decrease in income differentials between Czechs and Slovaks 
and to a substantial levelling of the living standards of the population. 64 Thus, 
workers generally had little incentive to protest and provoked no significant shows of 
resentment that could possibly have resulted in political action. The swift response of 
the Commumst authorities and the harsh prison sentences given to strikers also acted 
as an effective deterrent after 1953.65 
In addition, the CCP benefited from a loyal intelligentsia and there was, 
consequently, less pressure for change from either Communist or non-Communist 
intellectuals during the 1950s. During the spring of 1956, the first rumblings among 
the intelligentsia, noticeable in all Commumst states, dtd find an echo among writers 
63 R.Selucky, op c1t. p 29. 
64W.Connor, op c1t. 1979, pp 83-6 
65R Selucky, QO.£!!, pp.30-31. 
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and university students in Czechoslovakia. However, the culminating explosions in 
Poland and Hungary only convinced the CCP of the correctness of its orthodox 
Stalinist policy, which duly took every repressive step necessary to quell opposition 
forces. 
Unlike the situation in Poland, by the mid-1950s, no potentially powerful 
opposition movement of workers and/or intellectuals had been created. Furthermore, 
the Party also benefited from the fact that there was no real tradition of animosity 
towards Russia or the Soviet Union in either SlovakJ.a or the Czech Lands. The 
seventy of the 1948 purges and the high levels of political controls also inhibited 
demands for change, the harshness of the Stalinist system generally precluding the 
possibility of a political challenge. Finally, the differences in cultures, levels of 
economic development, and the historical experiences dividing Slovakia and the 
Czech Lands Inhibited the emergence of a unified, countrywide opposition. 66 
Consequently, the almost complete lack of pressure from below, combined with the 
leadership's clear lack of interest in steps that may threaten its position, allowed 
Czechoslovakia to avoid the kind of developments that rocked the Polish system in 
1956.67 
(5.1.7) The Prague Spring 
By the early 1960s, the economy, the one principal factor in keeping the 
population quiet, slowed markedly. 68 The crisis of the economy affected every facet 
of life and evoked discontent among all social groups, and, in increasing numbers, the 
rank-and-file of the Party.69 In the early 1960s, creative intellectuals began to 
challenge the prevailing intellectual orthodoxy and Party control of cultural life. 
Philosophers, historians and social scientists, whose work was heavily influenced by 
official views concerning the natlrre of socialist society, participated in a rethinking of 
the basic tenets of that society. Consequently, Czechoslovakia experienced a relative 
cultlrral revival. Literature, theatre and Czech films impressed critics throughout the 
world; and in 1965, a group of writers was able to publish an independent literary 
journal "Tvar" ("Face"). In 1967, several writers spoke out boldly at the annual 
66z Brzezmsla, The Soviet Bloc· Umtv and Conflict 1967 Cambndge Mass., Harvard Umvemty 
Press, Ch 8. 
67Mrroslav Holub, Interview, Cheltenham 1995, op Cit 
68 W Shawcross, Dubcek. 1970 London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p 96 
69 G.Golan, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement Cambndge, Cambndge Umvemty Press, 1971. 
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meeting of the official writers' union. 70 Youth also began to voice its discontent with 
the regime. Student radicalism - which arose from concerns over housing, poor 
employment prospects, and the nature of a controlled educational process - soon 
came to reflect the thinking of older intellectuals concerning the need for political 
change.7I The activities of certain mass organisations displayed reformist tendencies, 
most notably the womens' organisations and the writers' union, durmg the mid to late 
1960s. There were also pressures from the legal profession throughout the country, to 
restore the rule oflaw, with protection of individual rights and judicial independence. 
This pressure succeeded in yielding a series oflaws and decrees between 1963-9 that 
went far toward correcting the "distortions of socialist legality" that had been rife 
since 1948.72 Reformist pressure also extracted some changes in the economic 
system, entailing less comprehensive centralised planning, fewer controls for plant 
managers, more flexible prices, and realistic incentives for workers. 
In reaction to these developments and to the general cnsis that was, in large 
part, the product of the imposition of an alien system, as well as growing Slovak 
dissatisfaction with the position of their country within the common state, Party 
leaders and affiliated intellectuals became the chief articulators of the need for social 
change.73 Divisions developed between those who wished to maintain the status quo 
(Novotny) and others (Alexander Dubcek) who supported economic and/or political 
change. The latter proposed reforms in an attempt to alter the system to make it 
conform to the needs of a developed European country. The fact that the outburst of 
demands for change did not come until the mid to late-1960s is testimony to the 
special intensity of Stalinism in Czechoslovakia and the overall slowness of de-
Stalinisation that can be attributed to an official realisation of the danger of opposition 
forces that being unleashed as had been the case in Poland and Hungary.74 
The effort to create "socialism with a human face" became popularly known 
a~ the "Prague Spring." Under the leadership of Alexander Dubcek, CCP leaders 
attempted to remove the distortions that had occurred during the Stalinist period and 
70 Gale Stokes (ed ), From Stahmsm to Pluralism, 1991 New York, Oxford UmvemtyPress, p 153 
7I V.Kusm, The Intellectual Ongms of the Prague Spnng, 1971 Cambndge, Cambndge Univemty 
Press, pp 125-142. Also, H Gordon Slalhng, op Cit, pp.72-82. 
72 J Rothscluld, Return to D1vemtv, op c1t, p 168. 
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Alhson and Busby Ltd , pp 17-19. 
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to create a socialist system that would attract genuine support and legitimacy. 75 
Dubcek later referred to the objective as being the creation of" a Marxist democracy 
genumely responsive to the wishes and aspiratiOns of 1ts people."76 As the Party 
began to call for more participation by citizens and recognised the need to d1scuss far-
reaching changes in the mid-1960s, debate over the nahlre of Czechoslovak 
Communism was widely reported in the official media. At first wary of what 
appeared to be only a further change in Party leadership, the population gradually 
came to take advantage of the new freedom to criticise past mistakes and to discuss 
public events. By 1968, the growth of public pressure had become a broader 
movement for political reform. 77 After initial scepticism, public opinion polls showed 
that 90-95 per cent of the population supported the basic ideals of the movement.78 
The Prague Spring can be seen simultaneously as a reform plan espoused by 
the forward-looking leaders of the CCP, and as a spontaneous social movement in 
support of these reform Communists. The reform movement was genuinely popular 
and national, wiuning support from all sectors of the population.79 During the eight 
months of the Prague Spring, the CCP unprecedently became a genuine mass 
movement that could claim the support of the vast majority of the nation. As a social 
movement, however, it is vital to point out that the Prague Spring could and would 
not have evolved if the Party leadership had not taken a reformist him. The impetus 
for reform would not have emanated from independent society itself. During the 
1960s, the public was able to express its discontent precisely because the CCP 
contained a group of pro-reformists who, while retaining their belief in socialism, 
beheved the system could be softened and made to work in a more democratic way.8o 
Dubcek's 1968 "Action Programme" did produce enormous ferment m 
Czechoslovak society. Characteristically, however, there were no calls for the 
75 W.Shawcross, rut£!!, p.l31. Also, J.Pehkan, rut£!!, p 14. 
76 W.Shawcross, tbtd, p.223 
77For an m-depth analysts of the Prague Sprmg, see: H Gordon Slallmg, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted 
Revolu!ton, op et! For good, bnefaccounts of the 1968 events, see· A Pravda, 'Czechoslovak Soctahst 
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abandonment of Communism 81 In July 1968, opinion polls revealed that 87 per cent 
of the population was satisfied with the Communist government, and only 5 per cent 
wished to see a return to capitalism. 82 The social movement in support of the Prague 
Spring reforms must be seen, therefore, as a movement of support not of opposztwn. 
The active participation of the Czechoslovak population in the late 1960s should not 
be interpreted as evidence of an independent second society. Rather, it should be seen 
as the public endorsement of a regime-initiated reform policy. This interpretation is 
·crucial to explanations of the lack of political opposition post-1968. 
(5.1.8) Summary 
The purpose of this sectton was to examine particular characteristics of 
Czechoslovak history that were crucial to the evolution of opposition and of second 
society. In this respect, the pre-Communist historical divergences (political, social 
and economic) between the Czechs and the Slovaks cannot be ignored for their 
legacies during the post-1945 era. Their persistence ensured that a national movement 
of opposition against Communism was virtually impossible to attain. The level of 
genuine public support for the Communist Party in 1945 was also unique in Eastern 
Europe, where the installation of Communist systems post-World War II was largely 
achieved by the force of the Soviet Red Army. Undoubtedly, this factor had a 
delaying effect on the emergence of an opposition to the Communist system in 
Czechoslovakia in the 1950s. In addition, the fact that, once established, the CCP did 
not initiate a period of de-Stalinisation post-1953, as did the regimes in Poland and 
Hungary, had an undeniable effect on the prospects for opposition from society. There 
were instances of discontent in Communism's early years. However, bolstered by an 
economy more buoyant than elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Czechoslovak workers, for 
example, protested specific Party policies, yet failed to turn their attention to more 
politically-damaging demands or to attract mass support for their stnke actions. The 
traditionally subservient role of the Church, especially in the Czech Lands, deprived 
any potential opposition of, perhaps, its staunchest ally against Communism. The 
campaign of repression enacted by the CCP during the 1950s against all religious 
denominations not only bears testimony to the fear with which the regime regarded 
the potential impact of Church-led dissent in society, but also ensured that any futlire 
role played by the Church m Czechoslovakia, in stark contrast to Poland, would be a 
Communist-dictated one. Furthermore, in a cultliral atmosphere still suppressed by 
81 V.Havel, Ouen Letters: Selected Wntmgs 1965-1990, (Translated by Paul Wtlson}, 1992 New 
York, Vmtage, p.30. 
82 W.Shawcross, op ctt, p.165. 
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Stalinist policies, the mtellectua1s found no openings, other than those provided 
officially to voice independent thoughts. Rather than risk alienation from the benefits 
the Communist regime undeniably afforded them, their remaining option was to 
retreat into the private sphere. 
As the economy began to falter in the early 1960s, however, demands for 
reform of the prevailing system did emerge, notably, from wzthin the Commurust 
Party itself, not from society. Admittedly, by 1968, the population was almost 
unanimously supportive of the CCP-led reform movement. Therefore, it would be 
understandable to presume that, in spite of the defeat of the reform effort, society 
would continue to support democratic-oriented reforms post-1968. The fact that it did 
not can be explained only with reference to the policies of normalisation introduced 
by Gustav Husak and their continued hold over society throughout the 1970s. 
(5.2) The Development of Second Societv 
(5.2.1) Normalisation 
In Czechoslovakia, political developments from 1969-1989 were dominated 
by two principal factors. Firstly, the state of the economy and secondly, the legacies 
of 1968. The principal concern here is the policies introduced by the Husak leadership 
after 1968 in an attempt to introduce a degree of normalisation in society. This had a 
distinct bearing on the evolution of dissent in the 1970s and 1980s. "Normalisation" 
can be defined as: 
"An attempt to promote an ideologically motivated and consumer-created 
legitimation of an unpopular regime under the close supervision of the USSR 
which retains the prerogative of supreme arbitration but prefers to work 
through domestic agents." 83 
The effort to turn back the clock to the pre-1968 reform period and return 
Czechoslovakia, once again, to the position as the Soviet Union's so-called "most 
loyal ally," intensified after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 
20-21" 1968,84 and the ouster of Dubcek in April 1969.85 In the political realm, 
normalisation included efforts to reassert the leading role of the CCP, and the 
83y Kusm, 'Challenge to Normalcy· Political Opposition in Czechoslovakia, 1968-77,' m· R L Tokes 
(ed ), Oooos1tion in Eastern Europe, 1979 London, The MacrmllanPress Ltd, p 26 
84 For the text of the Brezhnev Doctnne that was quoted to JUstify the mvas10n, see Robm 
A Remmgton, Wmter m Prague, 1969 Cambndge Mass, MIT Press, Document 65. 
85 For detalis surroundmg the "removal" ofDubcek, see W Shawcross, Q1U!!, pp.222-237. 
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reinstitution of strict control over the media. The leadership took steps to restore Party 
discipline, presided over a crackdown on mdependent groups and a "cleansing" of 
the CCP's membership. Dubcek himself was appointed as Ambassador to Turkey in 
January 1970, thereby removing a crucial rallying point from the post-1968 
opposition. 86 His supporters were removed from positions of influence within the 
Party and elsewhere, to be replaced With those who had opposed reform or who had 
refused any involvement in the reform process. The impact of these changes on the 
composition of the CCP was heightened by the voluntary resignation of others, 
thereby, effectively removing all reformist elements from the Party. During the first 
quarter of 1969, 4,035 new members entered the Party, whilst total membership 
decreased by 21,050.87 There was a correspondmg decrease in the number of basic 
Party organisations. What is most notable, here, is that overall the Party lost almost 
28 per cent of its total membership in an extremely short space of time. When 
combmed with the number of Czechoslovak emigrants (140,000), in theory, such 
numbers could have presaged the evolution of a society-wide mass movement of 
opposition to the Communist Party.88 Paradoxically, however, the purges were, in 
large part, responsible for the almost complete stagnation and even regression of 
social life in the 1970s and early 1980s. Similar changes were made in the leaderships 
of the mass organisations and in the top positions within the country's universities 
and research institutes, whose activities were redirected along orthodox lines. 89 
Centres of intellectual hfe, as potential foundation stones for the development of 
opposition thought, were particularly hard hit, the changes affecting half a miiiion 
people between 1969-70 alone.90 In the long-term, personnel purges had significant 
repercussions in Czechoslovakia, for they depleted the talent the post-reform 
leadership could draw on to help formulate public policy in all areas of life that would 
be responsive to genuine public demands. In turn, this increased the general alienation 
of the CCP from the mainstream of society and contributed to its apparent exhaustion 
in the late 1980s.91 In the short-term, however, the purges undoubtedly ensured that 
86 Ibid. p 231. 
87 Richard F S!arr ( ed.), 1970 Yearbook m International Commumst Affaus, 1970 Stanford, Hoover 
Insl!tutton Press, p 23. 
88 V.Kusm, 'Challenge to Normalcy Pohl!cal Oppos11!0n m Czechoslovalaa, 1968-1977,' op c1t, p 36. 
89 V Kusm, 'Czechoslovak,. and Econmmc Stagnal!on .. .' op c1t. 1982, p 29. 
90 P Payne, 'Four Years ofNormahsal!on: the Acadermc Purge m Czechoslovak10,' Index on 
Censorshm Vol2, 1972, pp 33-52 
91V.Kusm, The Intellectual Ongms of the Prague Spnng- The Development ofReform1st Ideas m 
Czechoslovak10. 1956-1967, 1971 Carnbndge, Carnbndge Umvemty Press, Conclustons 
-----------------
-217-
popular sympathy for opposition causes did not manifest itself in active support for 
second society activities. 
Until the mid-1980s, the CCP leadership relied on similar methods to 
neutralise any overt intellectual opposition also. Most directly affected by the 
personnel and academic purges between 1969-71, and the reinstitution of effective 
Party control over society, many Czech and Slovak intellectuals joined other citizens 
in "retreating to the pnvate sphere."92 Those who did not, found themselves the 
direct targets of a policy of co-optation imtiated by the CCP in order to quell any 
possibility of future dissent. Once a part of "the team," the belief was that an 
individual would have too much to Jose to risk confrontation with the regime. An 
intensified campaign to discredit the reformist leadership and to force its members to 
assume personal responsibility for 1968 led to the publication of various personal 
accounts and previously unpublished documents in an attempt to demonstrate that the 
1968 leadership had been informed of the extent of the danger posed by "anti-
socialist forces" and through failing to oppose it, had been guilty of provoking 
invasion. Amongst the intellectuals, in particular, such manipulative policies aroused 
feelings of disappointment, disillusionment and feelings of having been deceived. 
1968's enthusiasm, optimism and social participation, thus, gave way to passivity, 
apathy and a pervading sense of hopelessness. 
Significantly, changes were more widespread in the Czech Lands, where large 
numbers of intellectuals had been crucially involved in the process of democratisation 
throughout the 1960s. In Slovakia, where many of Dubcek's supporters had been 
pnmarily concerned with national and other issues of autonomy with democratic aims 
less strongly and widely voiced, the population emerged from the 1968 invasion 
relatively unscathed. These divergences ensured that the historical differences 
between the Czechs and the Slovaks persisted, and that attempts to form a 
countrywide movement of opposition would prove difficult. 
More significantly for the evolution of a second society, normalisation 
involved a significant change in the source of political legitimacy. The Husak 
leadership repudiated earlier attempts to foster legitimacy and create genuine popular 
support for the Communist regime via the ideological tenets of Marxism-Leninism 
and, instead, reverted to the strategy of gaining citizen compliance through a 
92Peter me, 'The NormalisatiOn of Post-InvasiOn Czechoslovakta,' Survey Vo124 No.3, 1979, 
pp 201-14. 
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combination of material rewards and coercion.93 This strategy proved to be successful 
in preventing all but a very few open manifestations of dissent in Czechoslovakia for 
almost a decade. The harsh repression of every manifestation of opposition was 
visible in numerous arrests and political trials.94 What is notable, however, is that the 
public's response to the arrests was both minimal and subdued. In part, this was 
attributable to the lack of official media attention, however, it was also the fact that 
open opposition was widely recognised as a source of unemployment and the loss of 
opportunities throughout society. 95 At the mass level, improvements in the standard 
of hving as well as increases in social welfare benefits and their extension to 
previously excluded sectors of the population, appeared to buy the acquiescence, if 
not the support, of the majority of the population, and were probably the greatest 
inducement to maintaining the status quo. In Slovakia, the impact of these policies 
was further supplemented by the benefits, symbolic and otherwise, the Slovaks 
received from the federalisation of the country, which came into effect on January 1st 
1969 (a point to which I shall return), as well as by the perceived increase of Slovak 
influence in Prague after Gustav Husak's (Slovakian) elevation to the top position 
within the Communist Party. 
One further factor requires attention here. As a consequence of the CCP's 
normalisation policies, an accepted code of behaviour for a large proportion of the 
population became "it is safer to be wrong with the Party than agamst It."96 Thus, 
whilst between 1969-71, the Party had been faced with a decrease in membership, 
after that date, new members were admitted m large numbers. Between 1971-76, 
334,000 new members joined the Communist ranks.97 Although their commitment to 
either the Party or its ideals may have been questionable, it did ensure that greater 
numbers supported the status quo and the incumbent leadership's policies, lest their 
recently acquired positions and pnvileges be threatened.98 
93 T Garton Ash, 'Czechoslovaloa Under Ice,' m T.Garton Ash, The Uses of AdvefSI!y Essays on the 
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( 
I (52 2) Immediate Post-Invasion Opposition ! ( In the immediate aftermath of the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of 
' Czechoslovakia, popular opposition manifested Itself above all in defiance in the 
media and some organisations of the infrastructure, such as cultural and academic 
societies, trade unions, and the "mass" organisations, as well as in various statements 
and acts demonstrating disapproval of the course of events. For example, the trade 
unions adopted charters advocating the right to strike; and Jan Palach, a student, 
burned himself to death in January, carrying a note that condemned the Soviet 
invasion and called for an end to censorship. On the day after his death, students 
staged national strikes, and it is estimated that 800,000 people attended his funeral. 99 
It is significant that such manifestations of discontent were acts of defiance not of 
opposition or demands for reform. It appeared that demands for reform, both from 
above and from the population had been sacrificed almost overnight for the sake of 
accommodation with the Husak regime. Furthermore, the opposition that did manifest 
itself came predominantly from the intellectual classes (writers, social science 
academics and students, a few Party activists and other officials). Although workers 
did express their support to such sctions as the three-day student strike in November 
1968, there is no record of any organised workers' opposition to the initial policies of 
the post-invasion period. lOO This is indicative of the lack of cross-class unity as a 
whole. 
During this period, then, the opposition could best be described as a negative 
one. Dissent took the form of resistance within the established order to the draconian 
programme of normalisation relentlessly pursued by Communist hard-liners. A 
certain amount of hope, however, did survive that, despite the necessity for obvious 
political retreats, some positions of influence and authority could be maintained by 
the reformist constituency and thereby safeguard the lasting ideals of the Prague 
Spring reform movement. In August 1969, the emergence of an unofficial document, 
originating among radical reformists, known as the "Ten Point Manifesto," provided 
evidence that some form of opposition to the Husak regime still existed,IOI The 
Manifesto amounted to a programme of survival under adverse circumstances, and the 
authors touched on several points which were to develop into permanent features of 
the opposition's activity over the coming years. Among them, the most significant 
were the presaging of the importance of human rights as the main contentious issue 
99 W.Shawcross, op ctt, pp 198-200 
lOO J Pebkan, op et!, p 29 
IOlpor the full text of the document, see· tbtd, pp.118-125 
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between government and opposition, and the suggestion that any struggle would be 
conducted on legal anti-political grounds.1o2 However, the authors of the Manifesto 
stated that they had no intention of founding a new party or movement, but would 
work within the existing institutional framework, and with regard to the future 
development of the opposition as an alternative force in Czechoslovakia, the 
statement concluded: 
"We have no reason to adopt an anti-Soviet stance insofar as the affairs of the 
Soviet Union are concerned; we are merely against the gross interference in 
the sovereignty of other states. We wish success to the Soviet people." 103 
With this concluding declaration, the evolving opposition demonstrated that it was 
not about to challenge the autonomy of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia or 
the prevailing system of rule. Moreover, it did not intend to formulate a real 
alternative to that rule, pnmarily condemning only Soviet interference in domestic 
Czechoslovak affairs. At a time when the population at large would have been the 
most receptive to an alternative that advocated democratic and nationalist-oriented 
reforms, the opposition opted to take one step backwards and effectively protest 
within the limits of the existing system. This undoubtedly had a long-term effect on 
the development of opposition to Communist rule. Furthermore, the harsh prison 
sentences imposed on the authors of the document effectively discouraged public 
sympathy or support. Almost simultaneously, a further collective attempt was made to 
draft a programme for opposition by the " Revolutionary Socialist Party" headed by 
Peter Uhl, however, it met with the same fate enjoyed by the proponents of the Ten 
Point Manifesto. Amongst a population still reeling from the effects of the Warsaw 
Pact invasion, Husak had successfully installed fear as the main obstacle to political 
opposition. 
(5.2.3) September 1969- Summer 1972 
The second phase of political dissent lasted from September 1969 to the wide 
scale political trials of Sununer 1972.104 In October 1970, the largest community in 
the opposition ranks, the ex:reformers, produced a leaflet which became known as the 
"28th October Manifesto" (SAP) _I OS To an extent, the publication of the Manifesto 
102for example, the Mamfesto stated "Even when unfree pohttcally, a mature nallon can defend Itself 
by asserllng tts hfestyle, tts plnlosophy ofhfe and tts character by means of practical deeds of an 
unpohllcal nature." See, tbtd p 123. 
103futd, p 124. 
104For a survey of dtssent documents m the early 1970s, see: J.F.Tnska, 'Messages from 
Czechoslovalaa,' Problems ofCommumsm. Vol24 No 6, November-December 1975, pp 26-42. 
IOSfor full text, see: J Pehkan, op ctt, pp 125-134 
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marked the beginning of a dynamic phase in the activities of the Socialist opposition. 
The ex-reformers had already accepted the fact of their expulsion from the CCP, but 
appeared still to believe that an alternative organisation could be established to 
operate along reform-Communist lines. Like the 1969 "Ten Pomt Manifesto," 
however, the document amounted to little more than a restatement of the Prague 
Spring beliefs rather than a definite progranune of opposition activity,I06 More 
significant, here, was the fact that the Manifesto was signed on behalf of a purported 
resistance movement, the 'Socialist Movement of Czechoslovak Citizens,' 
(SMCC).I07 In reality, however, the mainstream of Czechoslovak dissent failed to call 
to life a popular mass movement in support of its more democratically-oriented 
reform proposals, due, in large part, to the public's deep-seated sense of disillusion 
and hopelessness. 
The SMCC' s progranune is also significant with respect to this study for two 
further reasons. Firstly, it recognised that the formulation of a coherent progranune 
for action was essential to the success of the opposition. In addition, secondly, 1t 
acknowledged that the principle of co-operation among all opposition forces - that is, 
cross-societal action - was crucial, as was the central role of the working classes.tos 
Although such sentiments would, at first, appear to be encouraging to the evolution of 
opposition within the system, and, ultimately, of second society, it must also be noted 
that the SAP, as well as the October Manifesto, restated the SMCC's continued 
rejection of antt-Sovietism and stressed its socialist orientations. In that way, the 
SMCC failed to capitalise on the true siruation in the country, throughout which anti-
Soviet sentiments were widespread and the need for a real alternative to "socialism 
with a human face" following the Soviet-led defeat of 1968, was paramount to the 
success of any movement of oppositlon.109 The SMCC, therefore, remained 
revisionist in the sense that it did not move beyond a critique of the socialist political 
system and, thus, its appeal to non-Communist dissidents was limited. This lack of 
popular appeal was highlighted in early 1972 when the arrest and subsequent trial of 
the SMCC's leaders, on the one hand, dealt the decisive blow to their more-or-less 
I06see: 'The Short Act10n Programme,' 1ssued at the begmnmg of 1971 m: ibid. pp 136-156 
107For an m-depth history and analys1s of the Soc1ahst Movement, see: ibid. pp 45-60 
IOS•The Short Ac!ion Programme,' m. 1bid. pp.141-145. 
109 'A Change ofCaptam for Czechoslovakia,' Notes of the Month, World Today. May 1969, p 188 
-------------------------
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conventionally conducted appositional activity, but, on the other, failed to arouse any 
significant level of support or disapproval amongst the population.1to 
The primary reason for failure was, having been taught a hard lesson in 1968 
about the futility of reform and having paid a harsh price for belief in it, the public 
was unwilling to join forces with those who had managed (and apparently 
mismanaged) the entire Prague Spring reform efforts. Furthermore, the SMCC had 
faded to devise a programme that appealed to the population at large, and had failed 
to formulate an effective, realistic formula for opposition activity. In addition, the 
new Husak regime had established itself as the primary purveyor of matenal benefits 
in return for ideological and political acquiescence, which was to be one of the main 
obstacles to the evolution of an opposition movement throughout the 1970s. This last 
factor was decisive in the lack of public support. By 1972, the economic fruits of 
normalisation had begun to take effect. The drastic curtailment of inveshnent 
programmes and a concentration on the production of food and consumer goods led to 
an improved situation in the market from mid-1971.111 At the same time, the various 
shows of strength, such as the 1972 political trials, made the public aware that a 
confrontation would be futile and had scared people away from involvement in public 
affairs of any nature. 
(5.2.4) Summer 1972- August 1976 
From the summer of 1972 to the autumn of 1976, the Husak regime continued 
to consolidate its hold on the country mainly through the provision of matenal 
benefits; legal codification of its enhanced power; and a return to orthodoxy 
combined with occasional purges. Despite the fact that a movement of opposition 
potentially existed, the population generally responded by continuing to retreat into 
private preoccupations, whilst demonstrating acquiescence in the light of the results 
of Husak' s policy of consumerism. Throughout this period, the dissident movement 
remained unorganised, and appeared to undergo a "crisis of conscience." No 
organisation was even attempted, and no further programmes were devised. 
The levels of repression used against the Czechoslovak citizenry by the Husak 
regime cannot be overlooked. As in Romania, the policy of recrimination was 
particularly nasty and damaging to the prospects for the emergence of second society. 
110 See vanous articles m The Times, January 14" and February 14" 1972, Also, The Guardian, 
January 13", 14" and 15" 1972. 
111 T.Garton Ash, 'Czechoslovalaa Under Ice,' lm..£!!, p.56. 
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Those who suffered expulsion from jobs numbered several hundred thousand. In 
addition, their children were barred from higher education; and their relatives, plus 
the relatives of the 150,000 new emigres, experienced demotions, job transfers, and 
frozen career progress.l 12 Certain sectors of the arts, culture, journalism and the social 
sciences were virtually brought to a standstill, deprived of talent and accumulated 
experience. m To this general atlnosphere must be added the economic dimension, as 
discussed briefly above, in order for public and dissident attitudes in the early 1970s 
to be fully understood. The Czechoslovak economy proved itself robust enough to 
weather the return to a pre-1968, orthodox command-style of operation, bolstered by 
reduced commitlnents to Comecon and the Warsaw Pact budgets, and incorporatmg a 
marked, albeit temporary, shift in mvestrnent emphasis from heavy industry to the 
consumer sectors.114 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the precariousness and the in-
bmlt flaws of the Czechoslovak command economy were to become all too evident, 
yet in the crucial years of the early 1970s, the economy experienced a mim boom 
which helped pacify intellectual and political dtssent.115 Cowed into spiritual 
submission and deprived of alternative leaders and perspectives, the public largely 
chose Withdrawal into private activities, and self-enrichment over resistance and 
dissent. Material well being and economic survival became an accepted mode of 
existence for the Czechoslovak pubhc to the extent that, at the 14th Party Congress in 
1971, Husak announced that the process of normalisation had been successfully 
completed.ll6 
Critical attitudes dtd remain alive in Czechoslovakia, however, even dunng 
the years of non-organisation and aversion to political involvement. As on past 
occasions, it was principally the creative intelligentsia who made use of the modest 
samizdat channels and the foreign news media to formulate protest and critlcism,l 17 
112 P Payne, 'Four Years ofNonnahsanon. The Acadelllic Purge m Czechoslovakta,' Index on 
Censorship. Vol2 1972, p 32. 
113p Payne, 'Czechoslovakta Black Ltst ofWnters,' Index on Censorshtp, Vo1.2 1972, pp 33-52. 
114 B Korda, 'A Decade ofEconoffilc Growth m Czechoslovakta,' Sovtet Studtes, Vol28 No 4, 
October 1976, pp 499-523 
115Between 1970-78, consurnp!ton rose by 36.5 per cent, wtth pnvate ownership of such as cars and 
weekend/hohday homes mcreased substan!tally. See, G.Whtghnnan and A H Brown, 'Changes m the 
Levels of Membershtp and Soctal Composttion of the Commurust Party of Czechoslovakia 1973-5,' 
Sovtet Studtes. Vol27 No 3, July 1975, pp 413-7. 
116R W Dean, 'Czechoslovakta Consohdat10n and Beyond,' Survey, Vol18 No 4, Summer 1971. 
117 Anon, 'The Czech Underground Press,' Index on Censorshm, Vo1.4, 1974, p 24. 
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Most of the petitions, open letters, and essays documented miscarriages of justice in 
the many political trials, suppression of human and civil rights, and cases of 
discrimination against those involved with the reform attempts of the late 1960s.I1B 
The quantity of samizdat publications and the number of foreign contacts began to 
increase. However, these attempts at independence by the opposition should be 
viewed as no more than one of its last attempts to resolve Czechoslovakia's 
"predicament" Within the confines of a Soviet-style Socialism, rather than through 
the formulation of a popular alternative.119 In general, the primary target of protest 
prior to 1976-7 was the complete dependence of the ruling Communist Party 
leadership and apparat on the Soviet Union, not on the Communist system itself. This, 
in turn, undeniably ruded Husak and the regime's policy of legitimation via 
consumerism as a means to put the lid back on the dissident pot. Through the creation 
of a relatively prosperous society, Husak was able to effectively fend off any direct 
criticism of the regime per se, and keep the opposition's focus on the Soviet Union as 
the enemy instead. 
In 1976, the Czechoslovak government ratified the two international 
covenants signed on behalf of the country in 1968, a point which should be viewed as 
a turning point in the history of Czechoslovak dissent.120 Less than two months later, 
the opposition responded With the formulation and promulgation of Charter 77 in 
Jmuary 1977.121 It should be noted that the initial stimulus for the formation of 
Charter 77 was the persecution of the rock group, "The Plastic People of the 
Universe." 122 Part of a growing musical underground - which although strongly 
critical of society md its established mshtutions did not claim to be a political 
movement despite the fact that It challenged the CCP's cultural monopoly123 - the 
llBBetween 1968-77, Czechoslovak dissidents Issued approximately 120 separate letters of protest 
agamst government policies. T.E.Heneghan, 'Human Rights Protests m Eastern Europe,' World 
Today, March 1977, pp 90-100. 
l19 George Moldau, 'Letter from Prague,' m· Survey, Vol29 No 2, Sprmg 1973, pp.245-9. 
12~ese were the "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" and the "International 
Covenant on Econonuc, Social and Cultural Rights " 
121H Gordon Slallmg, Charter 77 and Human Rights m Czechoslovakia 1981 London, Alien and 
Unwm 
122 Z Ehas, RFE Research Background Report, Czechoslovakia/7, January 12" 1979, p 6, and 
Czechoslovalaa/15, January 24" 1979, p 12 
123 T R Ryback, Rock Around the Bloc. A History of Rock Music m Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Umon, 1990 New York, Oxford Umvemty Press, pp 141-48. 
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group was accused of using obscenities in its songs and, consequently, disturbing the 
peace.124 The charges, unfair tnals and severe sentences imposed provoked angry 
protests from intellectual elites, succeeded in forging a degree of solidarity not seen 
since 1968 and convinced at least a part of the public tliat they must cease to expect 
change to come from above.I25 Instead, they should enact It tliemselves.I26 In short, a 
minimal common denominator had been found m tlie defence of elementary human 
nghts, bridging obvious divisions within society.127 Significantly for this study, 
however, tlie gap bridged was one between intellectual and musical elites only, and 
not between these groups and tlie workers. This was in contrast to tlie persecution of 
Polish workers in 1976 and the formation ofKOR tliat did unite tlie opposition across 
traditional class divisions. 
(5.2.4.1) Summary 
After 1968, as result of tlie normalisation policies employed by the CCP, tlie 
Communists found themselves isolated from tlie people, with, at most, only 10 per 
cent of tlie population supportive of tlieir policies.128 However, between 1968-1975, 
pervasive fear and apathy along with tlie rising influence of materialistic policies 
introduced by tlie CCP prevented the emergence of a society-wide opposition 
movement and kept the population acquiescent. Widespread letliargy, social and 
political apatliy, and a state devoid of any alternative was all pervasive. The CCP 
chose to interpret this national mood of passivity as a political and ideological 
victory, maintaining that tlie population steadfastly supported the new Soctalist order. 
Opposition tliat did manifest Itself (the SMCC, for example) generally remained 
unorganised, fragmented, hampered by police surveillance and powerless to attract 
widespread support. Undoubtedly, tlien, tlie CCP was obsolete and stultified, but as a 
result oftlie general sense of apatliy and passivity of the population, no alternative to 
tlie Husak regime emerged, and it, therefore, continued to rule unchallenged. 
124 Interview w1th Vladmur Merta by P Wnght, 'In Search Of An Enemy Symposium,' Cheltenham 
Fesnval ofL1terature, October 7"' 1995 
125 V Have!, D1sturbmg the Peace A Conversa!ion w1th Karel Hv1zdala, (Traoslated by Paul W!lson), 
1990 New York, Alfred A Knopf, p.128. 
126H Gordon Slallmg, Charter 77 and Human R1ghts m Czechoslovakia, op Cl!, p.7, 9-11. 
127 V.Havel, 'The Tnal,' Letter of October 11"' 1976, m· Vaclav Have!, Ooen Letters, op c1t, pp 102-
108. 
128Jao F.Triska, Qll..£!!, p.30. 
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Notably, Czechoslovak opposition after 1974 was characterised by two further 
factors. Firstly, a move away from the formulation of specific action programmes. 
Unofficial opposition documents continued to contain advice and basic statements of 
principles, especially the declarations of the SMCC, but comprehensive platforms 
were no longer deemed as either necessary or worthwhile given their relative failures 
in the past to rouse any degree of lasting support amongst the population. And, 
secondly, Czechoslovak dissent was characterised by a growing internationalisation: 
Western media were increasingly used as channels of communication, and a growing 
number of "open letters" were despatched to the West, which prevented leading 
opposition activists from addressing the pressing issues domestically. 
(5.2.5) The Impact of Charter 77 
There have been many texts written on the Charter itself.I29 I do not intend to 
provide a further chronological study here. Rather, the focus of this section is on those 
factors related to Charter 77 that had an impact on the development of opposition and 
of second society in Czechoslovakia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Charter 77 was conceived as a "civic initiative," a movement that expressed 
certain desiderata in the sphere of human rights, but one that (notably for second 
society) refrained from calling to life a formal organisation or from formulating a 
concrete alternative programme.130 Charter 77 claimed that it was not a political 
organisation and deliberately refrained from offering alternative political and societal 
arrangements to the prevailing ones.131 It claimed no ideology and no leadership 
structure, and demanded no formal acts of membership from the signatories to the 
Charter. Charter leaders claimed simply to be seeking a dialogue with the Communist 
leadership to discuss, for example, how the government would institute practical 
changes that would enable it to comply with the Helsinki Final Act. m 
Two characteristics of Charter signatories deserve mention here. Firstly, the 
overwhelming majority of supporters were located in Prague. By June 1980, this 
figure totalled 600 out of 1,065 signatories. Criticisms of the Charter were thus made 
I29 See: H Gordon Slallmg, Charter 77 and Human R1ghts in Czechoslovak,., op c1t. For further 
d!scuss1on of the ongms of the Charter, see an mterv1ew w1th Charter spokesmen pubhshed m Labour 
Focus on Eastern Europe, Vol2 No 6, January-February 1979, pp 5-7. 
l30Jne Foundmg Charter, H.Gordon Slallmg, 1bid p 211. 
I3IJb!d, p 221. 
l32Jbid, pp 219-221. 
-227-
concerning the lack of real opportunity for such groups as the peasantry to sign. It is 
also noteworthy that the proportion of workers among signatories increased from 8 
per cent in the original list to 52 per cent by June 1977, reflectmg the burst ofsocietal 
support and approval for the Charter initiative in 1977.133 The Charter did 
increasingly attract ordinary, young, working men and women, some of whom had 
been debarred from higher education because of political discrimination. The Charter, 
as a movement, however, consistently failed to address their specific class grievances 
and, therefore, precluded the development of a mass following in society. By 
December 1977, however, it must be noted that the number of worker-members had 
fallen to 35 per cent, demonstrating Charter 77's failure to capitalise on the situation 
it had helped to create in society; and Its complete lack of direct appeal to the majority 
class withm the population.J34 Notably also, few university students signed the 
Charter (only 17 signatories amounting to 1.7 per cent in January 1977) most 
harbouring a strong aversion to the regime and its ideology, but also to politics more 
generally.I35 
Thus, the attempt of this group of intellectuals to break out of their apparent 
isolation and to begin a social dialogue generally succeeded only m bringing a 
number of scattered individuals into a loosely defined group.136 For a time, this 
appeared to be sufficient, and it gave Charter 77 enough energy and force to function. 
By the spring of 1977, however, It had become obvious to its leaders that the initiative 
had failed to accomplish any significant relaxation of regime repression, and that 
interest in it, both at home and abroad, had waned. Although there was a continuing 
consensus on the Charter's rums, from the summer of 1977, there began a period of 
almost uninterrupted discussion over how its goals could best be reached, and 
whether its legal and moral approach should be supplemented or replaced by a 
political one. m Each successive compromise was followed by renewed debate which, 
for the purposes of this study, is significant for the effect it had on the inability of the 
133Ibtd. p 41. 
134Mtruster of the Interior, J Obzma, estnnated that perhaps 2 tntllton could be classtfied as potential 
stgnatories Enghsh summary m Bulletin, Palach Press No 7, July 1977, pp 1-3. 
135H Gordon Slallmg, Charter 77 and Human Rtghts m Czechoslovakia, op et!, p42 
136 T.Garton Ash, 'Czechoslovakia Under Ice,' Qll..£!!, p 57. 
I37L HeJdanek, 'Letter to a Fnend,' No 20, August 18th 1977, m: H Gordon Slallmg, Charter 77 and 
Human Rtghts m Czechoslovakia, op ctt, p 229-233 
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movement to focus on more "constructive" objectives and mobilising activities for 
the population at large. 
By 1978, the Charter had scored notable successes in stimulating actions by a 
small number of citizens, but had not been able to win the support of the population 
as a whole or sway the authonties towards a more lenient course,l38 Some signatories 
began to feel alienated and out of touch as Charter 77 acted increasingly through its 
spokesmen and a limited number of the more militant activists only. There was also 
some fear that the movement was in danger of becoming a "ghetto," completely 
isolated from the mass of the population, which was increasingly unaware of Charter 
activity, in a society in which members of the opposition had very few potential 
chaunels of communication, or knowledge of the repressive measures meted out 
against its proponents.139 Charter materials, themselves, were available only to a 
limited circle and did not reach many areas outside of Prague.I40 Many who did have 
access to documents, believed them to be too abstract with a concentration on theory 
instead of concrete actions.I41 
The question of establishing "parallel institutions," already considered during 
1977, was fully discussed in 1978. Benda, for example, argued on the basis of 
observations of the "second culture" and the "parallel economy," that the way 
forward was in the creation of "parallel structures capable at least in a limited 
measure of substituting for generally beneficial and necessary institutions which were 
lacking." This would, in turn, effectively mobilise "people power'' as the only way to 
undermine the totalitarian system 142 Significantly, also, Jan Tesar argued that, given 
the state oflawlessness in Communist society, appeals to the authorities for laws to be 
observed were pointless, and that, most significantly, the only way to effectively 
138J HaJek, 'The Human Rtghts Movement and Soctal Progress,' m· V Have! (ed ), The Power of the 
Powerless· Ctttzens Agamst the State m Central-Eastern Europe, 1985 London, Hutchmson and Co 
Ltd,p 137. 
139See, P.Uhl, 'The alternallve commumty as revolullonary avant-garde,' m V Have! ( ed ), The Power 
of the Powerless Ctllzens agamst the state in Central-Eastern Europe, 1985 London, Hutchmson and 
Co. Ltd, pp 193-4 
140 H Gordon Slallmg, 'Independent Currents m Czechoslovakia,' Problems ofCommumsm, Vol34 
No I, January-February 1985, pp 32-49. 
I41H.Gordon Slallmg, Charter 77 and Human Rtghts m Czechoslovakia, op ctt, p 53. 
142Pubhshed m· Vaclav Benda, 'Parallel Pohs, or an Independent Society in Central and Eastern 
Europe An Inqurry,' m Social Research, Vol.55 Nos.l-2, Sprmg/Summer 1988, pp 214-222." See 
also: Bullelln, No. I!, August 1979, pp 24-5,31-4 
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undermine the totalitarian state was via the creation of a civzl soczety, that would 
positively broaden its activities w1thm the legal sphere, and actively exert pressure for 
legislative amendments.I43 This concept of parallel structures was widely 
recommended in the June 1978 draft statement issued by eighteen prominent 
Chartists, and members of all the groupings within Charter 77.144 The document 
suggested the formation of free trade unions, and the announcement of working 
groups on d1scrimmation in employment and education, on the model of the recently 
formed Committee for the Defence of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS). Ladislav 
Hejdanek, Charter spokesman, however, although agreeing with the need for "a 
whole series of civic initiatives with limited but very concrete and practical aims," 
maintained his belief that the text of the Charter did not permit political opposition. 
Undoubtedly, a more politically oriented opposition would be a necessity at some 
point in the future, but Czechoslovakia was not yet ready for that advance in aims or 
taches. In the Charter document No.21, issued on October 19th 1978, wluch set forth 
the compromise reached over the summer, the only specific recommendation to be 
endorsed was that regarding the need for a rethinking of the basic aims of Charter 
documents. The idea of forming a political opposition with its own programme was 
rejected and the term "parallel structJires" was not used.l45 
Two aspects of the Charter require further examination here: firstly, its 
rejection of political involvement; and, secondly, the articulation of a moral 
foundation. Both had a direct impact on the particular evolution of opposition within 
Czechoslovak society. 
(52 5 I) Charter 77's Anti-political Stance 
A dominant theme in Charter 77's original declaration and repeated in later 
statements, was its denial that it intended to offer a basis for political opposition or 
that it would formulate alternative social arrangements.146 In place of "narrow, 
traditional political opposition" Charter 77 suggested a constructive dialogue with the 
143J Tesar, 'Totahtanan D!ctatorslups as a Phenomenon of the 20th Century and the Poss!bihty of 
Overcommg Them,' m. H.Slallmg and V.Precan (eds ), 'Parallel Pohncs,' Jnterna!ional Journal of 
Poh!ics, Vol.ll No I, Sprmg 1981, pp 85-100 
144H.Gordon Slallmg, Charter 77 and Human Rights m Czechoslovakia, op Cl!, p.76. 
145for full text see 1b1d. Part 2 pp 261-264. 
146See, for example, J Patocka, 'What Charter 77 1s and What It Is Not,' m· H Gordon Skillmg, 
Charter 77 and Human R1ghts m Czechoslovakia, op c11, Part II, pp 217-219. 
-230-
state, and offered to cooperate in the preparation of relevant documentation and 
soluttons.I47 To quote Vaclav Have!: 
"Most signatories of Charter 77 ... do not espouse any specific ideology, 
political programme or confessional group ... even if this were not so and every 
last signatory were highly political, it would change nothing in the purely 
civic, non-ideological and non-political base on wluch the Charter stands and 
on which its signatories stand united." 148 
This is significant if only because it clearly demonstrated the Charter's desire to work 
with the authorities wzthm the exzsting legal and political framework, and with regard 
to second society, is significant because it adds to an explanation of why the Charter 
as a movement failed to attract any degree of significant popular support amongst a 
population which had abandoned any hope of a "Socialism with a human face." By 
1977, the public had already demonstrated its unwillingness to support a movement of 
intra-systemic reform through its failure to rally behind the doomed SMCC, even 
though the SAP had advocated a relaxation of the totalitarian rules binding society, 
and such as freer, more independent trade unions. The SMCC's failure to attract 
support despite a seemingly attractive programme should have been a clear indication 
to the Charter that it's plans for society and for the political system ultimately needed 
to be more radical and far-reaching. 
Admittedly, the Charter did go beyond the SAP formulated by the Socialist 
opposition in 1971, as it explicitly refused to draw a distinction between Communists 
(ex- or otherwise) and non-Communists, stating that human and civil rights were the 
responsibility of all citizens. It presented a programme only in the restricted sense of 
the word, however, namely in proclaiming the signatories' intention to stand up for 
lawful and moral relations between the state and the population.I49 It said nothing 
about desirable structl!ral change and, by not advocating systemic reform, the Charter 
simply recognised that conditions were not favourable for such transformations, and 
that a minimum programme, based on the observance of existing laws and accepted 
moral standards, was the first step in the right direction. I so By doing so, however, the 
Charter essentially sealed its own fate, because, by not standing firm against the 
I47Foundmg Declara!ion, m Ib1d, p 212 
148 V Have!, 'Two Notes on Charter 77,' m· V Have!, Onen Letters, op Cl!, p 324 
l49J Patocka, 'What Can We Expect of Charter 77 ?' 1b1d, pp 220-223 
ISO V.Havel, 'Two Notes on Charter 77,' m V Have!, Open Letters, op c1t, p 326. 
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regime and by not advocating fundamental systemic reform, it failed to attract a mass 
base of support. 
(5.2.5.2) Charter 77's Moral Foundatzons 
The Charter movement had a strong moral charge, with its emphasis on "the 
human face" of socialism. The Imtial declaration laid considerable stress on "the 
responsibility for the maintenance of civil rights" which rested with every citizen, and 
described this shared responsibility as a" civic commitment." 151 In short, the Charter 
represented an open commitment to social and moral values as a means of rescuing 
the nation from moral crisis.152 Rather than rely on the enlightenment of the 
authorities, or wait for various changes in its apparatus, Vaclav Have! recommended 
that each individual should "follow and support [the] changes in society's 
consciousness, in the spiritual and moral structure of society, which [aimed] to 
achieve a freer and more dignified self-realisation." 153 
A further point of significance for the development of a society-wide 
opposition movement or second society needs to be made here. That is, whilst 
discussions continued throughout the summer of 1977 over the political versus moral 
stance, the Charter, as a movement, failed to capitalise on the public support and 
sympathy It had received in January. In addition, as long as the discussion concerning 
the Charter's future remained private and confidential and, therefore, isolated from 
the critical and more realistic viewpoint of the ordmary citizen, it could not hope to 
attract a wider base of support throughout society. Consequently, by the summer of 
1977, the moment of "potential mobilisation" had passed, and Charter 77 had 
allowed Husak' s regime to gain the upper hand. In contrast, in Poland by 1981, it had 
become clear that the parallel polity was neither elitist nor isolated from the wider 
society. In the absence of an official political structure that could make it possible for 
them to participate effectively, the Charter members were forced to turn "inwards" in 
marked contrast to Poland where, as a result of the growing crisis of the system, the 
parallel polity became ahnost as much of a political reality as the official one. I 54 
151foundmg Declaration, H Gordon Slallmg, Charter 77 and Human Rtghts m Czechoslovalaa, op c1t, 
p.211. 
I 52 See: J Patocka, 'What the Charter Is and What It Is Not,' !lll£!t p 218. 
153y Have!, 'Breaktng the Ice Bamer,' Index on Censorshm, Vol!O No 6, November-December 
1981, p 9 
154 Antonm J.Ltelun, 'The New Socta! Contract and the Parallel Pohty,' m: J.L Curry ( ed ), Dtssent m 
Eastern Europe, 1983 New York, Praegar Pubhshers, pp 173-5 
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(5 2.6) Independent Civic Action 
Apart from its own defined responsibilities, the greatest achievement of the 
Charter was to serve as a catalyst in the development of what Vaclav Benda termed 
"parallel structures," functioning independently in many areas of life and 
constitutmg, at least potentially, a veritable "parallel community [polis] within the 
totalitarian framework." 155 
(5.2.6.1) A Second Culture 
Samizdat essays revealed the depth and direction of dissident intellectual 
thinking.156 Texts began to speak of a "parallel polity,'' of a "second" or 
"alternative" culture.157 The purpose of this parallel activity was to influence moral 
and ethical values; to restore popular awar~ess of rights and Jaws, and ofthe need for 
them; to strengthen individual and social consciousness; and to create some 
elementary structures that could be ready for use in case the "new post-1968 social 
contract" should be dissolved, either as a result of action from above or below.158 
Significantly, it is also clear from the vmous texts that, rather than attemptmg to 
force the hand of history by illegal, underground, conspiratorial or terrorist activities, 
the representatives of Charter 77 were chiefly preoccupied with the problem of 
preserving and expanding their parallel polity until history would turn to them.159 It 
was not concerned with creating the "situation" itself. Therefore, although one of the 
most sigmficant effects of the Charter with respect to second society had been to 
stimulate individuals and groups to act independently, independent action was 
peaceful and non-violent in character, and primarily cultural in orientation.160 
Although antedating Charter 77, independent culture was, therefore, given a 
substantial boost by the issuing of the Charter. Czechoslovak unofficial culture 
155V Benda et al, 'Parallel Pohtics or an Independent Soc1ety m Central and Eastern Europe: An 
Enquuy,' Soc1al Research, Vol55 Nos 1-2, Sprmg/Summer 1988, pp 211-246 See, also, J Vlad1slav, 
'A Parallel World,' Index on Censorshm, Vol.IO No 6, November-December 1981, pp.14-16 
156RFE Background Report, Czechoslovalaa/115, June 7th 1978, p 16. 
157H Gordon Slallmg, 'A Czech Awakenmg. Unofficial Pubhsbmg and Other Independent ActlVII!es,' 
Index on Censorshm, Vol10 No.S, October 1981, pp 24-25 
158H Gordon Slallmg, Charter 77 and Human R1ghts m Czechoslovakia, op c1t, pp 76-7 .. 
159y Have!, 'SIX As1des About Culture,' m: V.Havel, Ooen Letters, op c1t, pp.283-284 
160 G Moldau, 'Patocka University,' Index on Censorshm, Vol.8 No 3, May-June 1979, pp.54-6. 
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attempted to "spread," especiaJly to the youth, and experienced a "branching-out," 
beginning with literary works (Padlock Publications) and the arts (exhibitions in 
private homes, for example), music, and theatre.161 The underground circulation of 
typewritten materials, for example, was not new, having been widespread throughout 
the 1960s prior to the Prague Spring, and again in the 1970s during the period of 
normalisation.J62 What was distinctive about the material published after 1977 was 
not only its quantity, but also its content and high inteJlectual level, which ultimately 
contributed to the formation of "a paraJlel information system."163 After 1977, the 
idea of an "independent education programme" for those excluded from higher 
education because of their independent actions emerged, for example.164 Although 
achievements were relatively modest, when compared to the comprehensiveness of 
the 'Flying University' in Poland, the Czechoslovak counterpart was called the "anti-
umversity" because of what it represented in an effectively totalitanan system.16S 
Subsequently, during 1978, independent culture expanded into many additional fields, 
including drama, music and the arts.166 In effect, Charter 77 encouraged individuals to 
think for themselves, to "create culture" according to their own convictions, rather 
than to expect change or improvements to be introduced "from above." Charter 77 
and the activities it specifically promoted, however, were only the tip of the Iceberg of 
the paraJlel culture which gradually came into existence below the surface of ordinary 
life, as countless individuals and groups sought to live their lives in freedom.167 
161M Kundera, 'Comedy ts Everywhere,' Index on Censorship. Vol6 No 6, November-December 
1977. Also, V Have!, 'Refleclton on the Theatre,' Index on Censorshm, Vol12 No 2, Apnl1983, 
pp.31-33. 
162z Tomm, 'The Typewnters Hold the Fort,' Index on Censorshm, Vol.l2 No 2, Apnl1983, pp 28-
31. Also, J.Vlasislav, 'All You Need ts a Typewnter,' Index on Censorshtp. Vol12 No 2, pp 33-36. 
163y Precan, Book of the Charter, 1977 Cologne, pp 10-13. For an excellent overvtew of the range of 
sanuzdat matenal publtshed m Commumst Czechoslovakta, see: H.Gordon Sktllmg, Charter 77 
Human Rtghts m Czechoslovakia, op ctt, pp 99-114. Also, H Gordon Sktllmg, Samtzdat and an 
Independent Soctetv m Central and Eastern Europe, 1989 Basmgstoke, Macnullan Press, Part 11, 
pp 43-156,. 
164 K Wtlkes, 'Unofficial Educalton m Czechoslovakta,' Government and Onoostlton, Vol16 No 2, 
Spnng 1981, pp.l67-184 
16SL Hejdanek, 'Offenng a Vanety ofVtews,' Index on Censorshm. Vo115 No 3, March 1986, pp 25-
27 reports on the work of the" anlt-umverstty" See, also G Moldau, 'Patocka Umverstty,' Index on 
Censorshm, Vo18 No.3, May-June 1979, pp 54-6 
166 K Kyncl, 'A Censored Ltfe,' Index on Censorshm, Vol14 No 1, February 1985, pp 137-142. 
167 H Gordon Sktllmg, 'A Czech A wakemng. Unoffictal Publtshmg and Other Independent Cul!ttral 
Acltvtltes,' Index on Censorshm, Vol!O No 5, October 1981, pp.24-5. 
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In Czechoslovakia, then, the extent and depth of the second or parallel culture 
that came in to existence cannot be underestimated, as countless individuals sought to 
live their lives in freedom and truth. Independent cultural activity, furthermore, was 
not limited only to writers and other mtellectual elites, but thousands of "ordinary" 
people were also involved.t6s In particular, for the Czechoslovak youth, for example, 
the realm of culture was "the only authentic existential space in which to live," and 
independent poetry and rock music attracted huge followings.t69 The" Jazz Section," 
founded in 1971 as a branch of the official Union of Musicians, attracted four 
thousand members, to promote jazz, rock and later independent publishing.170 
(5.2.6.2) Commztteefor the Defence of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS) 
In an overtly political role, a parallel organisation that could have taken on 
enormous significance was VONS. Established in 1978 along the lines of Poland's 
KOR, Its main aim was to follow the cases of those subjected to criminal prosecution 
or impnsonment, and to keep records of all incidents of police brutality and 
harassment, I?! More significantly, VONS also represented an effort by the Charter to 
broaden its direct contact with the entire population. m In order to encourage people 
to turn directly to VONS, m May 1978, the committee began to issue its own 
communiques, each deahng with individual cases of official persecution, and the 
measures, charges and verdicts against victims. VONS was, therefore, important for 
the effect it had on the availability of mformation to the public as a whole. The 
communiques thus offered a line of defence previously unknown.t73 VONS was not 
responsible, however, for distributing financial aid and other forms of assistance to 
prisoners or their families and, in that sense, was not as "constructive" as, say, its 
Pohsh KOR counterpart. It was responsible for documenting cases of abuse and 
violation, and ensuring that no case of unjust persecution went unnoticed, but could 
offer no "way out" or forward for the victims. Consequently, Vons, unlike KOR m 
168 V Have!, 'SIX Astdes About Culture,' QP.£!!, 274-279. 
l69H Gordon Slallmg, Charter 77 and Human Rtghts m Czechoslovakia, op ctt, p 116. 
170 For a detailed analysts of the Jazz Section, see· J Skvorecky, 'Htpness at Dusk,' Cross Currents, 
No 6 1987, pp.53-62. 
171Foundmg charter ofVONS m Labour Focus on Eastern Europe. Vol2 No 4, September-October 
1978, p 8 
172 For the thmkmg that laybehmd the creation ofVONS, see. V Have!, 'Article 202' and 'Article 
203' m: V.Havel, Ooen Letters, op Clt, pp.l09-116 and 117-124. 
m see Labour Focus on Eastern Eurooe. Vol.2 No 5, November-December 1978, pp.3-5 
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Poland, was more of a halfway house, unable to offer the population an alternative or 
protection from the Communist regime. The initiative, like Charter 77, was therefore 
unable to encourage or to nurture the same degree of second society activity 
witnessed in Poland. 
(5 2. 7) Regime Reoression 
The limited appeal and impact of the Charter can be attributed, in part, to the 
tactics deliberately employed by the regime to curtail and minimise any response to it. 
There were no immediate comments from Party leaders once the Charter had been 
circulated, but throughout January 1977, harsh attacks in the official press set the 
campaign against the Charter, which proceeded on two levels. The first was a verbal 
campaign in the press, on radio and television and at mass meetings. The media 
campaign could have had a knock-on effect by awakening curiosity and public 
attention, however, in reality, it no doubt discouraged many people from expressing 
their sympathy for Charter 77, or openly supporting it. Workers in particular were 
dissuaded from openly supporting the Charter.I74 This onslaught in the media was co-
ordinated with a drive to mobilise opinion against it in the factories, cultural 
organisations and other official institutions. Hundreds of meetings were held to 
endorse resolutions condemning the Charter, during which members of the public 
were encouraged to sign an "anti-Charter," which was later published in the press. m 
This latter document was intended to demonstrate the overwhehning support enjoyed 
by the regime, particularly in the cultural world, and to bring Charter 77 into ridicule. 
The campaign against the Charter was also accompanied by a vendetta against 
individual Chartists, especiaily the official spokesmen, and against other personalities 
who had been prominent in 1968. 
In early April 1977, however, the media attacks halted and the Charter's 
supporters were officially ignored. The media did not report on later documents 
issued by the Charter, and resisted overt assaults on either the movement or its 
leaders. Consequently, Charter 77 dropped out of the public eye, and many people at 
home were hardly aware of its continued existence or activities. Unable, due 
principaily to the technical difficulties involved, to establish an effective, alternative 
communications network to ailow the widespread distribution of samizdat writings, 
174 T Garton Ash, 'Czechoslovakia Under Ice,' op ctt, p 58. 
175M Sunecka, 'Hostages; or How I Was Asked to Repudiate Charter 77,' Index on Censorshtp, 
Vol. 3, 1977, p.22. 
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Charter 77 was unable to effectively carry its message to the people.176 This had an 
undoubted effect upon the development of second society: without a means of 
communicatmg with the population, Charter 77 and other dissidents had no real hope 
of mducing a society-wide movement of dissent. 
This programme of repression was well orchestrated and, although it 
employed familiar methods, went far beyond them in both scope and intensity. As 
was the case in Romania, the police, in particular, made a sustained effort to isolate 
the initiators and supporters of the Charter from the general public; to deter others 
from joining them; and to destroy any links of solidarity amongst Chartists, via a 
combination of interrogations, house searches, and "preventive detention" for 48-
hours or longer. m In addition, other forms of penalising citizens were employed. 
Dismissal from work, for example, was the most severe; the termination of sickness 
benefits, invalid pensions, and the denial of educational opportunities and the 
employment of the relatives of Chartists were also tactics adopted.178 Other forms of 
persecution included eviction from places of residence, and forced accommodation in 
remote suburbs in order to isolate individual activists; the cutting off of telephones, 
the confiscation of driving licenses, passports and identity cards, all of wluch served 
to isolate dissidents and prevent their contact with the wider public. Intimidation was 
widely resorted to, as was the encouragement of emigration. 
The repressive policies, on the one hand, demonstrated the apparent fear with 
which the regime regarded any occurrence akin to that of 1968. On the other, they 
were designed to create an atJnosphere of fear as an effective obstacle to the spread of 
the Charter's ideas. During the autJunn of 1977, the campaign continued with a major 
trial of prominent personalities in October, beginning a period of successive trials of 
lesser-known Charter signatories that lasted two years. In October 1979, a further 
large-scale trial of leading Chartists took place.179 The trials, themselves, were also 
176 H.Gordon Skillmg, 'Independent Cnrrents m Czechoslovakia,' tbtd pp.32-36. Also, 
C.M.Sadowkst, 'Autonomous Groups as Agents of Democratic Change m Commurust and Post-
Commurust Europe,' m· L Dtamond ( ed.), Pohtical Culture and Democracy m Developmg Countries. 
1993 London, Lynne Rtenner Pubhshers !ne, p 169. 
177For example, durmg Leomd Brezhnev's vtstt to Prague m May 1978, the Charter's most active 
supporters were temporanly mtemed The New York Ttmes, May 30th 1978. 
!78 Richard F Starr (ed ), International Yearbook on Conunumst Atfaus 1979. 1979 Stanford, Hoover 
Uruverstty Press, p.18. 
179For a translation ofHavel's 22-3rd October 1979 'Defence Speech,' see: H.Gordon Skillmg, 
Charter 77 and Human Rtghts m Czechoslovakia, op ctt, pp 299-306. 
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significant because they effectively illustrated the lack of solidarity for the persecuted 
amongst the bulk of the population, as they failed to arouse any widespread degree of 
sympathy or supportive action. The relatively limited popular response to Charter 77, 
and the eventual decline of domestic and international interest, suggested that the 
termination of the media campaign and the use of selective police repression had been 
successful in reducing the Impact and danger ofthe Charter. 
In summary, in contrast to the draconian measures meted out m the 1950s or 
against dissidents in the early 1970s, the regime employed a milder form of 
repression that avoided outright force. However, because punishments in the late 
1970s were so arbitrary, they had the effect of discouraging widespread public 
support. Furthermore, the sudden crackdown on Charter 77 in the middle of 1979 
effectively solved the "action-inaction question" for many and represented the 
regime's decision to resolve the dilemma It then found itself in by drastic action, 
striking directly at the centre of the movement, and at some of its leading figures. In 
addition, the policies adopted throughout 1978-9 - which attempted to restrict cultural 
hfe and regularise relations with the Catholic Church- were expanded post-1980 and 
the events surrounding Solidarity in Poland. Against the Polish background, CCP 
leaders appeared to realise the risks involved for the regime in allowing working class 
discontent to be articulated through unofficial trade unions. In February 1981, a joint 
communique issued by the government and the Presidium of the Central Trade Union 
Council pledged to increase the opportunities for workers to participate in industrial 
decision-making; whilst the regime sought, with greater resolve than previously, to 
broaden the basis of public consensus and, thus, its legitimacy. In that respect, the 
June 1981 elections were fought on the basis of the correctness of current policies in 
the light of the relatively high standards of living enjoyed by Czechoslovak 
citizens.JSO Coupled with the policies that Illustrated a determination to eradicate 
dissidence altogether, the regime was successful m dealing a crippling blow to the 
second society's visible symbols. In the absence of an extensive samizdat network, 
the opposition was unable to effectively counteract official propaganda and strategies, 
or to protect the opposition structures that existed. 
(5.2.8) Slovakia 
Significantly, in Slovakia, Charter 77 had a limited response and impact. The 
original list of signatories did include some Slovak citizens resident in Prague, and a 
I80R F Starr (ed ), 1982 Yearbook on Intemallona1 Commumst Affatrs, 1982 Stanford, Hoover 
InstJ.tutton Press, pp 393-4. 
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few more did sign later.181 Overall however, support for the initiative was negligible. 
Slovakian political passiVIty shared many of the same roots as the phenomenon in the 
Czech lands.1s2 People were concerned primarily with the potential loss of material 
benefits, which produced a noticeable political acquiescence. There were, however, 
distinctive reasons for Slovak non-participation in the opposition movement, which 
reflected specific national traditions and experiences. In the first instance, a 
predominant concern for nationalism reflected in the federal state established in 1969, 
produced a feeling of political satisfactiOn among Slovaks.183 Although the 
significance of federation was later reduced by Constitutional changes which 
expanded central powers at the expense of local autonomy, the national organs of the 
Slovak Republic remained as symbols of national equality, and continued to enjoy 
some degree of administrative autonomy. This gave Slovaks an illusion of power and 
influence and, significantly, opened up many career opportunities in Prague and 
Bratislava for the Slovak youth. This answered some of their specific demands and 
gave them no pressing reason to oppose the Communist regime.184 Within Slovakia 
also, Husak enjoyed a degree of personal popularity as the first Slovak President in 
history, as well as being the overseer of federalisation. 
After 1968, normalisation was applied equally to Slovakia, but in a notably 
less severe manner. Intellectuals did not undergo anything like the drastic purges of 
the Czechs and, therefore, were not dnven together by persecution to defend their 
interests. For example, although some wnters were banned, many were permitted to 
publish so that the very existence of a Slovak culture did not appear to be threatened. 
The purge of the 1968 revisionists, moreover, was neither as ruthless nor all-
encompassing as in the Czech lands.18S Consequently, many Slovaks had more to lose 
than their Czech colleagues and were less ready to risk their careers or livelihoods by 
open opposition.186 Later manifestations of opposition were more harshly treated 
however. Constant surveillance, intimidation, persecution and harassment, all took 
181 Mrroslav Kusy, 'Nationalism, Totalitanamsm and Democracy An IntervieW w1th Mrroslav Kusy,' 
in: T.D.Wh1pple (ed ), After the Velvet Revolution. 1991 New York, Freedom House, p 247. 
182 H.Gordon Sklilmg, Charter 77 and Human R1ghts in Czechoslovakia, op c1t, pp 54-58. 
183Mrroslav Holub, Interv1ew, Cheltenham 1995, op c1t 
184 S L Wolcluk, 'Reg10nal Inequalities m Czechoslovakia,' m· D Nelson (ed ), Commun1sm and the 
Politics oflnequaliiles, 1983 Lexmgton, Lexmgton Books, pp 249-70. 
185 !hill. pp.250-258. 
186 V Kusm, From Dubcek to Charter 77. A Study of Normalisation m Czechoslovakia. 1968-1978, 
1978 New York, StMartm's Press, p 310. 
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their toil. Thus, when a smaii group was formed in Bratislava to discuss issues of 
common concern in early 1981, participants were arrested, interrogated and 
repeatedly harassed.! 87 
These policies were not accidental. By satisfying Slovak national aspirations 
by means of federalisation in 1968, the CCP succeeded in perpetuating Czech and 
Slovak historical divisions, and preventing the evolution of a cross-country 
opposition movement in support of a common grievance.l88 With a greater sense of 
unity in favour of nationalist goals, and with federalisation marking a step forward for 
Slovakia, there was also less of a feelmg of total despair at the defeat of the 
democratic reform movement. Those who did remain loyal to the ideals of 1968, and 
were later supportive of Charter 77, were isolated, both within their own community 
and, because of strict police measures, from their counterparts in the Czech lands. 
(5.2.9) Summarv 
In Autumn 1980, against the background of the dramatic events in 
neighbouring Poland and fearful that unrest could spread to Czechoslovakia, Party 
spokesmen admitted that protests against unsatisfactory working condrtions and 
occasional wildcat strikes had occurred in some industrial regions.I89 At the end of 
1980, Husak traveiled to Ostrava to hold talks with workers and union officials 
regarding grievances resulting from the harsh demands of the current economic 
plan.I90 Independent religious affiliation resulted in the CCP's stepping-up of its anti-
religious drive;I9! and Hungarian minorities in Slovakia continued to demand cultural 
and educational sovereignty. New factors, such as enviromnental and peace concerns 
did provoke a degree of mdependent action at the grassroots level. Furthermore, by 
the early 1980s, crisis in the economy was evident, with the country experiencing 
serious problems m many vital sectors of production and supply, which did not auger 
weii for the future stability of the regime. However, in January 1982, sharp price 
!87Jan Mlynank, 'Tatarka· Silenced m Slovakia,' Index on Censorshm Vol.2, 1984, p 28. 
188 !van Khma, 'Czechoslovakia· A Premature Obituary,' m I Kllffia, The Spmt of Prague and Other 
Essays, 1993 London, Granta Books, pp.123-5. 
189RJchard F Starr ( ed ), Yearbook on Intemalional Conlffiunist Affairs 1982, 1982 Stauford, Hoover 
hisl!tulion Press, p 392. 
190Ju'E Czechoslovak Situalion Report No.28, November 28th 1980, p 2. 
191R F Starr (ed ), 1982, .Q1!.£!!, pp 394-5. 
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mcreases were introduced for all major consumer items.192 What is significant is, that 
unlike in Poland where food and consumer goods price increases automatically 
provoked a backlash from society, in Czechoslovakia, no such reaction was evident. 
The reasons for this are important and lie, predominantly, in the failure of Charter 77 
to encourage widespread independent support. 
Undoubtedly, Charter 77 did accomplish some of its initial goals. Its 
community of over one thousand signatories did succeed in living a "life of truth" in 
defiance of the CCP.193 The Charter did promote the publication of various samizdat 
titles, via mdependent publishing houses;194 whilst the activities of such as the semi-
official Jazz Section highlighted the areas in which the opposition began to flourish. 
Independent religious affiliation became more overt also .I 95 VONS also played a 
significant role, tssumg communications and cataloguing cases of injustice and 
persecution in Czechoslovakia. Consequently in 1980, the Czechoslovak dissident 
scene offered a variety of loosely associated activities, with an accent on five issues: 
the momtonng of abuses of human rights; literary independence; economic and 
historical science; underground music; and independent religious belief. 
The limitations of the five are immediately noticeable, however. None of them 
individually, or even all together, threatened to promote or sustain a mass movement 
of active dissent. Only underground music and religious dissent attracted support 
from relatively large segments of the population. The former, however, could not lead 
to the creation of a programme for political change. Religion could have represented a 
strong moral element in the dissident community, particularly in Slovakia. 
Nevertheless, it is probably an exaggeration to claim that the Church was either ready 
or willing to be involved in political activity along the lines of the Polish example.196 
By 1980, for example, a degree of regularisation had been achieved with the Catholic 
Church, in particular, and there had been a noticeable Improvement in formal 
192R Wesson (ed ), 1983 Yearbook on Intemattona1 Commumst Affalfs, 1983 Stanford, Hoover 
Ins!itu!ion Press, p 263 
193 H Gordon Skillmg, Samtzdat and An Independent Soctetv m Central and Eastern Europe, op ctt, 
p.70. 
I94Anon, 'The Czech Underground Press,' Index on Censorship, Vol4, 1974,p 11 Between 1979-81, 
400 Czech wnters who had been offictally banned, resorted to sanuzdat or to smugg1mg therr 
manuscnpts to the West 
195Jrri Otava, 'Rehg10us Freedom m Czechoslovakia,' Index on Censorship Vo11, 1977, pp 13-17. 
196 P Ramet, Cross and Commtssar: The Pohttcs ofRehgion m Eastern Europe and the USSR, 1987 
B1oornmgton, Indtana Umverstty Press, p 80 
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relations between it and the state. Regime-initiated policies dunng this period 
effectively ensured that the Church would not act as a shelter for opposition activity 
as was the case in Poland. Even in Slovakia, where religious practice remained 
stronger than in the Czech Lands, the Church was unable to provide the sort of 
succour to an opposition that the Catholic Church in Poland provided to Solidarity. 
Consequently, in 1980, dissent in Czechoslovakia, appeared too strong to be wiped 
out, but not strong enough to mushroom into large-scale, active opposition. The 
methods that dissidents were able to adopt were extremely limited, both by the lack of 
public support, and by the adverse conditions under which they were forced to 
operate. 
One of the Charter's principal frulings, however, was its inability to overcome 
the fear the Husak regime generated runongst the vast majority of the population. In 
Czechoslovakia, the "new social contract," established between the Husak regime 
and society after 1968, proved a relatively viable frrunework for political stability.197 
Given the level of material advantage bestowed on an acquiescent population, active 
opposition was far too costly for most people to contemplate. Such frulings are 
adequately portrayed by the fact that, at the end of the 1970s, in proportion to the 
population, the CCP was the largest Communist Party in the world, with almost 10 
per cent of the Czechoslovak population being members.198 Most significantly, 62 per 
cent of newly-admitted Party card holders were workers, a fact which lends credence 
to the argument that the Charter was too elitist and cloaked in theory to appeal to 
broad sections of the population. Furthermore, 90 per cent of all new applicants were 
under 35 years of age, demonstrating the failure of the principal opposition groups in 
society to adequately reflect the genuine aspirations of the public.! 99 Estimates that 
placed the number of sympathisers and potential signatories at two million in 1983 
illustrates the inability of the Charter to mobilise a movement in potentia. zoo 
The difference between Poland and Czechoslovakia is immediately evident. -
The 1970s, as a decade of rurmoil and unrest led to the formation of a cross-class 
coalition of opposition in Poland. In Czechoslovakia, the 1970s were characterised by 
197 A.J Ltehm, 'The New Soc1al Contract and the Parallel Polity,' m J L Curry ( ed ), op c1t. pp 173-
181. 
198fuchard F Starr (ed ), Yearbook m Internalional Communist Affaus 1979, 1979 Stanford, Hoover 
Umvemty Press, p 19 
199R F.Starr (ed.), Yearbook on InternatiOnal Commumst Affa1rs 1982, op ctt, p.392. 
200RfE Czechoslovak Sttualion Report, January 22 1983,pp 11-12 
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political stabilisation, relative economic growth and the satisfaction of an 
unprecedented level of consumer demands. Subsequently, passivity and conformism 
were predominant characteristics amongst the population. Within the CCP, also, 
reformist tendencies had been purged m the early 1970s leaving no official openings 
which the independent opposition could take advantage of. In Poland, following the 
1976 formation ofKOR and the formulation of theories concerning the building of a 
second society, the number of people willing to cormnit themselves to opposition 
activity grew steadily. To the detriment of second society in Czechoslovakia, the 
Chartists, in contrast to their Polish counterparts, did not adequately reflect the mood 
of the population and, therefore, the active dissident cormnunity in Czechoslovakia 
remained far smaller. Furthermore, whilst the Polish opposition included the working 
classes, Czechoslovak dissent was confined primarily to intellectuals, with Charter 
signatones seeing greater importance in aiming their constructive actions at calls for a 
dialogue with the Cormnunist authorities and in extending a hand to moderate 
elements wJtlun the CCP, than to building a bridge between the Charter intellectuals 
and the workers or society as a whole20l Such factors, when combined with the 
draconian levels of repression employed by the regime in the aftermath of 1968, all 
contribute to an explanation of the under development of a distinct second society, or 
even of a mass-oriented social movement along the lines of the Polish Solidarity trade 
union, in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 80s. 
Consequently, although the Charter was significant as it represented a symbol 
of hope and a focus for dissident activity and thought, it failed to pose a real threat to 
political stability in Czechoslovakia until the late 1980s. As long as activities were 
confined primarily to the mtellectual and cultural realms, and exerted little influence 
over the masses, second society could not constitute a political force capable of e1tlier 
exerting pressure on fue aufuorities or even of safeguarding its own existence. Charter 
77's failure to formulate a clear alternative to fue Cormnunist regime ensured tliat 1t 
could play only a peripheral role wifuin society. The persistent risk of reprisals for 
participatiOn limited the number of people who were willing to support its activities 
openly. 
20lsome of the Charter 77 documents dunng Its first two years did, adnnttedly, demonstrate an 
awareness of the need to comment on, and cnticise, wtder social Issues than those affecting the 
commumty of Charter signatories. The documents faded, however, to develop concrete action 
programmes or alternative pohcies 
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(5.3) Second Society and the Breakdown of Communism in 1989 
The Impact ofMikhail Gorbachev's policies within the Soviet Union and of 
the sudden collapse of the hard-hue Honecker regime in East Germany undoubtedly 
played a cntical role in hastening the end of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia. 
However, as crucial as these developments outside the country were, the collapse of 
Communism within Czechoslovakia also reflected the serious and underlying 
problems the system created within the country and, more significantly with regard to 
this study, the impact of the various and growing acts of opposition that were 
especially evident throughout 1988 and 1989. The political system did remain very 
tightly controlled until the end of Communist rule. Throughout the mid to late 1980s, 
the leadership continued to resist Gorbachev and the increasingly dramatic reforms of 
Poland and Hungary. General Secretary MJios Jakes did make certain conciliatory 
gestures, including promises of liberalising reforms auned at easing foreign travel 
restrictions, and permitting cultural freedom, but continued to resist fundamental 
political and economic reform. However, the impact of Gorbachev's policies, and the 
presence of Party members who were less committed to mamtaining the policy of 
normalisation, led to the formation of new dissident groups and broader public 
participation in second society activities. 
In response to Moscow's reforms, Charter activists publicly supported 
Gorbachev's policies and called on CCP officials to emulate them. They also issued 
statements that evaluated conditions in the country as ripe for increased activity on 
the part of the Charter in 1987. Scattered incidents, such as the relatively lenient 
sentences imposed on the leaders of the unofficial Jazz Section for their independent 
activities, appeared to indicate a lessening of tension between the official and the 
dissident realms.2o2 However, as later reprisals against religious believers illustrated, 
the regime was unwilling, even at that late stage, to permit any real discussion of 
political reform. Clearly afraid of a repetition of the events of the late 1960s, when 
economic reforms spilled over into the political reahn, or of the crisis between regime 
and society in Poland, the Husak leadership continued to set strict limits on political 
debate. 
In the economic sphere, however, recognition of the necessity of reform at the 
January 1987 meeting of the CC, led to the recommendation of substantial changes in 
the organisation and management of the economy, similar in many respects to those 
202 V Have!, 'Farce, Reformab1hty and the Future of the World,' m· V Have!, Ooen Letters, op c1t, 
pp.359-361. 
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formulated by Prague Spring economists in the 1960s.20J Although the siiDilarity 
between the economic reforms proposed in 1967 and 1987 were acknowledged only 
indirectly, the fact that "reform" was once more a permitted term, and that proposals 
were akin to those of 1968, undoubtedly had a significant impact on the average 
citizen. 
Although there was no Czechoslovak parallel to the political developments 
that took place within Poland, the late 1980s did witness a number of important 
changes. The events of 1989 reflected the underlying cnses and widespread 
dissatisfaction of the Czechoslovaks with the Communist system. They were also 
conditioned by important changes at both the mass and elite level between 1987 and 
1989, which were significant in light of the political stagnation of much of the post-
1968 period. The first, and in many ways, most important of these changes was 
evident m a renewed willingness of the population to challenge the regime by 
organising independent groups and participating in unauthorised protests and 
demonstrations. In the first area, the late 1980s saw the emergence of nearly a dozen 
new mdependent groups that, although relatively small when compared to those in 
Poland, did represent a significant increase in unofficial associations in 
Czechoslovakia. Although several focused primarily on human rights issues, and built 
on the work of Charter 77 and VONS, others, notably, including the Movement for 
Civil Liberties (1988) and the Democratic Initiative (1987) were more directly 
political and formulated coherent progranrmes that called for political pluralism, 
intellecrual and religious freedom, and democracy.204 In addition, several independent 
groups emerged in 1988-9 among young people, members of such bodies as Czech 
Children (May 1988) playing a key role in orgamsing mass demonstrations to mark 
important anniversaries in 1988-9.205 Long-standing groups also adopted a more 
overtly challenging stance. The Jazz Section, for example, under the leadership of 
Karel Srp, became much more political and boldly began to engage large numbers of 
young people in quasi-opposition activities beyond the realm of music, which the 
regime found threatening precisely because it recognised the potential for widespread 
opposition. 
203 For an overv1ew of econonuc stagna!ion m the early 1980s, see V.V Kusm, 'Husak's 
Czechoslovakia and Econonuc Stagnalion,' Problems ofCommumsm, Vol.31 No 3, pp.24-37. 
204 H.Gordon Slallmg and P.Wuson (eds) CIV!c Freedom m Central Europe, op c1t, p 135. 
205Jm Pehe, 'Independent Movements m Eastern Europe,' RFE Research Background Report No 228, 
November 17th 1988, p.16. 
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In the 1980s, in contrast to earlier penods when the regime increased its 
pressure on the Church, a resurgence of religious faith was identifiable.206 For 
example, the Czech Cardinal Frantsiek Tomasek took his lead from Rome and began 
to speak out against the totalitarianism of the Communist regime, inviting John Paul 
11 to Czechoslovakia to celebrate the coming of Chnstianity to Slovakia,207 and 
individual priests joined the semi-official peace movement "Pacem in Terris."208 In 
the spring of 1987, no doubt encouraged by talk of economic reform in society, the 
Church announced a "Decade of Spiritual Renewal." That year, more than 100,000 
people participated in the annual pilgrimage to Velehrad. 209 Late in 1987, a group of 
Moravian Catholics began circulating a thirty-one-point petition calling for the formal 
separation of the Church and state, and for freedom of religion more generally, which 
was supported by a number of earlier Charter 77 documents condemning religious 
persecution.21o Such overt demonstrations of support for independence on the part of 
the Church marked a significant departure from earlier attitudes that were, arguably, 
crucial to the subsequent evolution of popular opposition to the CCP. In a country 
where 95 pert cent of the population identified themselves as religious, the evident 
sympathy of the Church for the activities of Charter 77 undoubtedly had a significant 
impact on the growth of public opposition in the late 1980s. When Cardinal Tomasek 
made a public appeal in support of the petition saying "cowardice and fear are 
unworthy of a true Christian," 600,000 people throughout Czechoslovakia Signed 
within six months. 211 Two further points are significant here. FirStly, that opposition 
was spread throughout both the Czech Lands and Slovakia. Within the latter, 
206See· P Ramet, 'Religwus Ferment in Eastern Europe,' Survey, Vol 28 No 4, Wmter 1984, pp.93-7; 
and A Tornsky, 'Modus Monend1 of the Catholic Church m Czechoslovakia,' Religion in Commumst 
Lands, Vol 10 No. I, Spnng 1982, pp 23-54 For mcreases m the numbers ofreligwus "believers," 
see: RFE Czechoslovakia Situanon Report/4, March 10 1986, p.IO. 
207 'Religion: RepressiOn Behmd the Rhetonc,' RFE Czechoslovakia Situanon Report/7, June 12 
1987,p.ll. 
208 Anon., 'The Church at the Crossroads,' Rehgwn m Commumst Lands, Vol 13 No 3, Wmter 1985, 
pp 250-260. 
209for reports ofvanous religious celebrations, see RFE Research, Situanon Report 
Czechoslovakla/7, May 2 1986, p.19; RFE Research, Situation Report Czechoslovakla/9, June 18 
1986, p.14, RFE Research, Situanon Report Czechoslovakla/15, October 14 1987, p.13; and RFE 
Research, Situanon Report Czechoslovakla/19, December 30 1987, p 15. For details of the Velehrad 
pilgnmage, see: 'Rehgwn· Persecunon and Resistance,' RFE Research, Situation Report 
Czechoslovakla/9, June 18 1986, p.l I 
210 A.Ward, 'New Wave ofRehgwus Persecution m Czechoslovakia,' Eastern European Reporter, 
Vol I No 4, Wmter 1986, pp 41-2. 
211RFE Research Situation Report, Czechoslovakia/!, January 21 1988, pp 45-8 
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throughout the early 1980s, a number of protests agrunst discriminatory policies were 
reported,212 and instances of religious dissent increased.213 This unintended 
consequence of Catholic activism represented one of the few instances of a broad 
second society developing runong the Czechs and the Slovaks. Secondly, It is 
significant that, largely as a consequence of the revival of religious activism, it 
becrune evident in the late 1980s that Czechoslovak dissent had begun to move out of 
its "intellectual ghetto." Admittedly, a large proportion of active dissidents were 
intellectuals and students, however, the growing numbers of workers willing to 
participate in mass demonstrations indicated that the traditional gap between them 
and the intellectual elite had narrowed. 
The increase in the number of dissident groups was paralleled by an increase 
in the number and size of independently organised mass demonstrations and protests. 
In this respect, a further vital factor in creating the conditions for revolution in 
Czechoslovakia was the media in its broadest sense. In addition to a "domino effect" 
of the demonstrations in Poland and Hungary, and the breaching of the Berlin Wall, 
the continued persistence of foreign radio stations like the BBC and Radio Free 
Europe in transmitting uncensored accounts eroded the credibility of the Communist 
government. In December 1988, when the CCP government ceased januning RFE 
much broader and more effective dissemination of the growing popular movements 
becrune possible. When these changes in the approach adopted by the media were 
coupled With a recognisable increase in srun1zdat and other publishing activities, the 
result was a greater boldness on the part of Charter 77 and other opposition groups. 
This development in Czechoslovakia m the late 1980s effectively engaged 
much larger numbers more actively against the regime. By 1989, pilgrimages in 
Slovakia and Moravia that began in the mid 1980s, crune to include and estimated 
700,000 participants.214 The 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion drew an 
estimated 100,000 people; as did the commemoration ceremony of the founding of 
the First Republic held in October 1988. Western governments and private human 
rights organisations played an important role in encouraging and supporting these 
signs of dissidence. In particular, American support of the stipulations of the Helsinki 
Final Act was critical. By 1988, several of the USA's NATO partners began to follow 
212 RFE Research, S!tuallon Report/11, No 32, August 8" 1986, Part 2 
213 H Gordon Sla11mg, SamiZdat and an Independent Soc1etv m Central and Eastern Europe, op c1t, 
p90. 
214s Wolclnk, Czechoslovakia In Trans11lon. Pohllcs, Economics and Soc1etv, op c1t, p 44 
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the American lead and encouraged visiting senior government officials to meet 
dissidents in Prague. The effect of Western support was to strengthen the sense of 
purpose and respectability among the Czechoslovak dissidents. 
Significantly, 1988 also saw the re-emergence of demonstrations focused on 
openly political issues. In October, a group calling itself the "Movement for Civil 
Liberties" announced its first manifesto, the opening sentence of which read, "The 
time has come to get involved in politics."2ts Praising the anti-political work of 
Charter 77, the signatories claimed that the time had come for concrete work to create 
"Democracy for Everyone." In 1988, also, Czech activists had been "putting their 
cards on the table," as Have! phrased it, moving from the advocacy of human rights 
into political activism, even though they were aware this would mean confrontation 
with the govemment.216 The concept of political activism was rarely expanded upon 
explicitly in opposition programmes (many newly established groups were still in the 
early formative stages when the Communist system collapsed in November 1989). 
However, manifestos and documents called for the kind of freedoms and civil 
liberties guaranteed by Western liberal democracies and, therefore, represented an 
alternative in potentia for a general public long disaffected with the Communist 
regtme. 
A final change in the natllre of 1989 dissent was the spread of non-conformity 
to the official world itself. By early to mid 1989, for example, when many loyal 
intellecruals were amongst the 30,000 individuals who signed the political manifesto 
'Several Sentences,' calling for political freedom and an end to censorship, it had 
become evident that many of the country's leading figures were willing to take a 
public stand in defence of opposition activities. Particularly after 1987, officials 
began to challenge accepted doctrines in many areas and to voice their criticisms of 
official policies more openly. m Leaders of the official Writers' Uruon, for example, 
announced, in 1988, a process aimed at rehabilitating many of the writers banned in 
1968, and attempts- to close the gap between official and samizdat publications. 
Simtlar trends were also evident in the fihn world and in music, and in Slovakia, 
215H Gordon Slollmg and P.WIIson, op c1t, p 135. 
216G Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbhng Down· The Collapse ofCommumsm in Eastern Europe, 1993 
Oxford, Oxford Umvers1ty Press, p.l53. 
217M Myant, The Czechoslovak EconomY. 1948-1988, op c1t, Ch 10. 
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where open disagreement with the regime's policies was more widespread than at any 
time since 1945.218 
(5.3.1) Events of 1989 
The collapse of the Czechoslovak Communist system was both rapid and 
peaceful. However, inspite of the public support for Have! following his arrest at the 
beginning of 1989 and of growing evidence of an increased willingness on the part of 
the public to speak out against the injustices of the Communist system,219 in early 
1989, the authorities remained under the impression that Charter 77 and Have! held 
no real moral or political significance, and that Communism would prevai1.22o 
Certrunly, as the year progressed, it did appear that such assumptions did hold some 
weight. The effort to commemorate the Warsaw Pact invasion on August 21st 
attracted less support than spontaneous demonstrations the previous year. Other 
attempts at public shows of independence were swiftly suppressed with the arrest of 
leadmg activists. Incidents received little publicity and demonstrators were kept in 
detention wherever possible. However, in a document issued on June 29th ("A Few 
Remarks") Have! and his colleagues presented Charter 77's most radical demands for 
change to-date, calling for democratic liberties including freedom of assembly, a free 
media, and open discussions. 221 Within two months, evidently encouraged by the 
increased ferment within Czechoslovakia and throughout the Communist bloc, 20,000 
people had signed it, the first time such a document had obtained widespread support 
outside the narrow circle of dissidents. 
The question of whether opposition activity in 1989 was an indication of the 
growing strength of second society or merely of a more relaxed atmosphere does have 
to be considered, however. Even in August 1989, for exrunple, the Charter's 
leadership was struggling with the dilemma of whether to mount demonstrations that 
might provoke further crackdowns and violence or to continue with acts of passive 
resistance. In short, in mid-1989, Charter 77, as the principal representative of the 
2I8 H Gordon Slallmg, Sam1zdat and an Independent Soc1ety in Central and Eastern Europe, op c1t, 
pp.89-92. 
2I9'fhe demonstration on the 20th anmversary of the Warsaw Pact mvas10n the prev10us year bad been 
snrularly spontaneous, attracting perhaps 10,000 people. It was leaderless because the actiVlsts bad 
been placed in preventive detention See· V Have!, 'A Statement to the Court,' New York Rev1ew of 
Books, Apnl27 1989, p 41. 
220 T Garton Ash, The Uses of Advers1ty Essays on the Fate of Central Europe, 2•• Ed1t1on, 1991 
London, Granta Books, pp 238-241. 
22I'fhe document can be found m Uncaptlve Mmds 2/4, August-September 1989, p.35. 
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opposition continued to offer no effective leadership or direction to society. Tlus 
suggests that evidence of opposition such as the mass signing of the "Few Remarks" 
document was the consequence of a relatively relaxed atmosphere throughout the 
country as a whole, rather than of the growing strength of the opposition movement 
and of second society. 
After months of demonstrations and demands, on Friday 17th November, the 
official Socialist Youth Union, in co-operation with a newly formed independent 
student organisation, organised a ceremony in Prague to commemorate the 50th 
anniversary of a murder of a Czech student by the Nazis. m The meeting provoked 
real and genuine interest amongst students because, for the first time, representatives 
of both the official student organisation and Its newly formed independent rival were 
to be permitted to speak. When the rally first formed, the speakers began to call for 
reforms that included demands for the removal of Jakes' regime, and for the 
implementation of democratic reforms. m Rather than adhere to original plans to light 
individual candles, several thousand of the estimated 30,000 students spontaneously 
set out for the traditional focal point of Prague demonstrations, Wenceslas Square. 
However, their progress was blocked by the Prague police and resulted in several 
beatings inflicted on the demonstrators. News of the clashes spread quickly through 
Prague, with the suspiciOn that one student had even died because of police brutality. 
In fact, later investigations showed that no one had been killed, but this rumour, soon 
broadcast throughout Czechoslovakia via Radio Free Europe, gave the evolving 
opposition an occasion for further protests. 224 
The two main political movements that were shortly to take power formed 
themselves within little more than 48-hours of the November 17th events, that is, 
after mass demonstrations. As was the case in Romania, they had not been 
responsible for the orchestration of the public uprising against the regime. On 
November 19th, a group of Slovak wnters, artists and intellectuals formed Public 
Against Violence (VPN); whilst the previous evening in Prague, Have! had convened 
a meeting of the opposition groups to create Civic Forum (OF) "as a spokesman on 
222For a detailed account of tlus event and those that followed, see· B. Wheaton and Z.Kavan, The 
Velvet Revolu!ion Czechoslovakia 1980-199 I. 1992 Boulder CO, Westview Press. 
223 The Observer, oo.ett, pp.101-2. 
224 P.Gnlh eh Cortona, 'From Comrnumsm to Democracy: Retlunking Regune Change m Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia,' Intema!ional Social Science Journa1128, May 1991, p 320. 
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behalf of that part of the Czechoslovak public which is increasingly critical of the 
existing Czechoslovak leadership."225 
If second society had been slow in forming in Czechoslovakia in comparison 
to Poland, It flourished in the ten days following November 17th. For example, on 
November 18th, actors voted to go on strike and empty theatres provided convenient 
meeting places, as well as vital communications equipment to local VPN and OF 
groups.226 Similarly, Prague students responded immediately and on November 20th, 
students throughout the country went on strike and created a computer network to aid 
communications. More significantly, small groups of students began to visit factory 
work places and rural villages in an attempt to forge a society-wide, cross-class 
response to their actions. The presence of well-known theatre personalities amongst 
the groups of students appeared to provide the necessary evidence to ordinary citizens 
that something unusual was happening. Effectively, for the first time since 1968, there 
were attempts to form a cross-class opposition coalition. By November 20th, and less 
than seventy-two hours after the initial demonstrations, the Czechoslovak regime had 
begun to fall. 
Whilst the government responded with attempts to replace the top Communist 
leadership and form a new government, thousands of protesters demanded the end of 
Communism on a daily basis. 227 At the same time, the newly formed Civic Foruni 
proceeded to formulate a distinctly political programme that was not only consistent 
with Charter 77's notion of ethical pluralism but also with the practical notions of 
electoral democracy and the free market.228 It is significant that the organisation now 
perceived the necessity of a coherent and overtly political programme as a viable 
alternative to Commurusm in order to maintain the support of the public. 
The enormous success of a general strike called for November 27th succeeded 
in convincing even the most doubtful that the Communist system could not survive. 
Two days later -the Federal Assembly overwhelmingly voted to revoke the 
constitutional articles guaranteeing the CCP's leading role, which had been one of the 
225T Garton Ash, Prague· Instde the Magtc Lantern, op ctt, p 82. 
226Smce trud-1987, m fact, Czechoslovak actors had been more vocal and overt m therr opposition to 
the Husak regrrne. See, for example 'Actor Urges the Regrrne to Resign,' RFE Research, Sttuatton 
Report Czechoslovalaa/7, June 12 I 987, pp.17 -21. 
227 The Observer, op ctt, pp 113-4 
228See· T.Garton Ash, Prague. Instde the Magtc Lantern, op ctt, pp 78-130 
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pnmary demands of the student strikers. When a week later the new prime minister, 
Ladislav Adamec, put forward a so-called coalition government containing almost no 
oppositionists, Civic Forum had gained such a position of strength and support, that it 
was able to force its rejection. On December 9th, Husak finally resigned from his by 
now symbolic post of President, and the followmg day - only three weeks after the 
initial student march - a coalition government dominated by non-Communists took 
power. After brief negotiations, Alexander Dubcek was eo-opted as Chairman of the 
National Assembly, which thereupon unanimously elected Vaclav Have! the new 
President of Czechoslovakia, providing an end-point to Eastern Europe's "velvet 
revolution." 
(5.3.2) Mode of Breakdown: Distinguishing Factors 
The breakdown of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia demonstrates 
charactenstics associated with both the collapse and negotzation models of 
breakdown. In the first instance, the events of autumn 1989 that Communist rule in 
Czechoslovakia were unplanned and unexpected by all the parties involved. The 
students demonstrating on November 17th were purely following a pattern 
established by the 1988 demonstrations that the larger the numbers on the streets of 
Prague, the louder the anti-Communist vote. Similarly, the various opposition groups 
brought together under the leadership of Vaclav Have! did not orchestrate the 
November 17th demonstrations. The founding of Civic Forum and Public Against 
Violence was an improvised response - that is, reaction rather than proaction - to an 
opportunity that was presented to dissidents. At no time prior to these events had 
opposition groups openly called for the overthrow of the government. Thus, the 
breakdown of Czechoslovak Communism can be seen as an example of regime 
collapse. It was a consequence of the failure of the CCP to reform itself, and its 
ultimate reluctance to use force to safeguard its rule. The Party did not respond more 
forcefully to the mounting demonstrations after November 20th because of Soviet 
opposition and the prospect of too much bloodshed. Unable to use military force in 
the face- of overwhelming mass demonstrations, the CCP effectively became 
powerless to safeguard Communism in Czechoslovakia. 
However, certain factors are more characteristic of a negotzated breakdown. 
For example, the model outlined in Chapter 11 argues that examples of regime 
collapse are characterised by minimal public involvement. Although second society 
organisations played little part in engineering the possibility of change in 
Czechoslovakia in 1989, it cannot be denied that regime breakdown was preceded by 
mass mobilisation and growing support for opposition activities. The existence of 
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certain organised groups (Civic Forum and Public Against Violence) ensured that, 
when the CCP recogrused the inevitability of its demise, an alternative was able to 
assume leadership of the growing popular demonstrations. As the only groups in 
society with some organisational ability and moral authority, they were in a position 
to negotiate with the CCP and subsequently fill the vacuum left by the disintegration 
of the Party. Furthermore, the existence of second society groups ensured that, 
although relatively swift, the breakdown of the regime was not accompanied by 
widespread violence as was the case in Romania. It is important to recognise that the 
mode of breakdown experienced by the CCP demonstrates characteristics typical of 
an elite-led negotzated regime breakdown. Although second society developed rapidly 
in late 1989, it has been noted that the Czechoslovak opposition reacted to events that 
it did not control. The mcumbent Communist elite played the key role in the 
transition process. In sununary, accompanied by mass mobilisation, non-violence and 
a degree of negotiatiOn, the breakdown of the Czechoslovak regime falls in between 
the collapse and elzte-led negotiatzon models. 
(5.3.3) Conclusion 
The emergence of second society and of Charter 77 and other opposition 
groups in Czechoslovakia and the particular forms of evolution they took, can only be 
understood against the background of historical factors and the experience of both 
Czechs and Slovaks during the late 1960s, particularly the Warsaw Pact invasion of 
1968, and the subsequent decade of "normalisation." The levels of genuine popular 
support for the CCP during the immediate post-war years, the historical cleavage 
between Czechs and Slovaks, the failure of the Communist regime to introduce any 
degree of de-Stalinisation post-1956, and the absence of an alternative authority 
within society, for example, cannot be overlooked in any account of the evolution of 
second society in Czechoslovakia. The legacy of 1968, however, is particularly 
significant for two principal reasons. On the one hand, it represented a year of high 
hopes and widespread enthusiasm and support for a fundamental transformation of 
the Communist system "from above." And, on the other hand, it represented a year of 
profound disillusionment and frustrations resultmg not only from the fact of outside 
intervention, but also from the capitulation of genuinely supported Communist 
leaders and the willing acceptance of the policies of normalisation. Not only did this 
succeed in casting doubt on the entire reform strategy pursued during the previous 
eight months in particular, but it also provoked feelings of disillusionment as to future 
prospects for reform more generally. 
--------------------- --- - - --~---------------------------------------------
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During the immediate post-Prague Spring years, there were sporadic and open 
outbursts of independent protest. Although certainly brave in light of the level of 
repression meted agamst independent thought and action, such protests failed to 
attract or inspire any level of widespread sympathy, appearing to the general public to 
be merely repetitions of outbursts from the "same old firm."229 The large-scale 
political trials of the early 1970s aroused neither general concern nor feelings of 
solidarity with the victims. What had become evident in Czechoslovakia was the 
widespread feeling of bitterness after 1968. This convmced many that the taches of 
the past were inadequate and pointless. It was clear that genuine anti-Russian 
sentiments were widespread, and, in the early 1970s, nationalism could have played a 
significant role as a motivating force and as a guiding principle amongst reformist 
elements. Such sentiments were, however, countered by a widely shared belief that no 
reform would be tolerated by the Soviet Union, therefore precluding the development 
of, or reactivation of Czechoslovakia's reform movement on a society-wide basis. 
Against this backdrop, Charter 77 represented a challenge to the Czechoslovak 
population, calling on it to defend its rights as citizens and confronting the pervasive 
apathy and silence deep-rooted m society since 1968. In this sense, the Charter has 
been descnbed as" a collective pubhc protest."230 Certainly, it carmot be denied that 
the Charter struck at the very foundations of real socialism. As an attempt "to live in 
the truth," the original declaration brought into being a "community" which won the 
open support of more than one thousand signatories, and probably the silent sympathy 
of many more. In spite of differences of opinion over both aims and directions, the 
Charter was able to maintain its unity for over a decade. In addition, it did succeed in 
providing the stimulus for many other civic initiatives and the emergence of parallel 
institutions, especially in the cultural and intellectual spheres. 
Most Chartists, whatever their ideological and political orientation, perceived 
the Charter's principal initial significance to lie in its moral approach, expressed in 
the willingness of the individual to stand up for his individual rights. For example, 
Vaclav Cemy saw the Charter's purpose as being "to shake not the laws, but the 
conscience" and believed It had scored a moral victory in this sense. 231 The 
achievements of the Charter in this respect carmot be questioned, yet, therein lies also 
229H.Gordon Slallmg, Charter 77 and Human Rtghts m Czechoslovakia. op ctt, p 177. 
230M Kusy, 'The Charter and Real Soctahsm," op ctt, p 18 
231y Cerny, 'On the Queslton ofCharltsm,' QP.£!!, pp.S-8. 
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its greatest weakness m practical terms. Even if the number of signatories and the 
number of reported sympathisers are taken into account, the Charter was able to 
appeal to only a very small section of the population. Too many others though 
sympathising with the aims of the Charter, were not willing to take the risks of acting 
on moral principles alone. This lack of widespread general commitment was a serious 
obstacle to the ability of Charter 77 to effect policy change. 
However, in one sense, Charter 77 did assume a political dimension. By 
encouraging the formation of independent groups, and discussion amongst them as to 
the future of the Communist system in the late 1980s, it contributed to what Have! 
referred to as a "sort of second political life ... outside the official structure."232 
Significantly in this study, however, this "parallel political life" did not concern itself 
with "an alternative political model," until late 1989.233 Certainly, one of the 
principal topics of discussion throughout the 1970s was whether the Charter should 
become a more genuinely political force, or even a formal opposition. Miroslav Kusy, 
for example, recognised that as a pnmarily moral "society of the just," calling for a 
rebirth of socialism in the true spirit of its claimed principles, Charter 77 could appeal 
only to the individual and not to the masses, and, therefore, would remain at best a 
movement of passive resistance. He strongly favoured a more pohbcal movement, 
which would formulate its own alternative ideological conception and its own 
Socialist progranune as an alternative to "real Sociahsm."234 Like others who pressed 
for a more political approach, however, Kusy failed to elaborate such an alternative 
progranune, or indicate in general terms what it may have embodied. m 
Significantly for this study, it must also be noted that the activities of the 
opposition generally and the Charter specifically, did not win the large-scale 
endorsement of the population. Focusing particularly on the Charter itself, it was 
claimed that the document had been written in such a manner that, if it had been 
widely published and distributed, perhaps 90 per cent of tlie population would neither 
232y Have!, The Power of the Powerless, op ctt, pp 20-22 
233y Have~ tbtd. pp 24-5, 48. 
234M Kusy, "The Charter and Real Soctahsm,' oo ctt pp 22-3, 25-8. 
235Jt was never, m fact, entirely clear who among the Chartists w1shed to make the Charter a pohttcal 
orgamsatton w1th its own programme, or what form such a programme would take. Sabata perhaps 
came closest to advocatmg this on the basis of the 1dea of" self-management" but d1d not elaborate 
thts m detail Ne1ther dtd Peter Uhl, who pressed for a more "rad1cal'' course. Battek, for the 
mdependent Soc1ahsts, gave a bnef outlme of therr pnnctples, but dtd not propose a platform for 
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have been able to understand the language and tenninology employed, nor grasp its 
true meaning or potential. 236 Certainly, the one thousand who signed the Charter 
demonstrated great courage, but were far outnumbered by the millions who were not 
willing to be associated with it. This widespread indifference of the population was 
undoubtedly an invaluable asset to the Communist regime. When combined with the 
almost complete lack of overt opposition in Slovakia, an explanation for the under-
development of a second society becomes partly evident. 
Furthennore, the negligible level of support for Charter 77 m Slovakia 
undennined potential for a united movement of oppositiOn. Certamly, there were 
reports of widespread approval, particularly amongst the Slovak youth; and the 
content of the declaration and knowledge of its subsequent activities were well known 
in leading centres such as Bratislava and throughout certain rural regions.237 In the 
absence of fonnal expressions of support, however, it became very difficult to judge 
the extent of sympathy for the opposition in Slovakia. 
Two further factors are central to explanations of the relative lack of public 
support for second society activities during the 1970s and 1980s. Firstly, the fact that 
Czechoslovakia's standard of living remained high and that the economy was not 
beset by the crises faced particularly m Poland. Consequently, in exchange for 
political acquiescence, in return for public accommodation, the regime guaranteed not 
only material existence, but also a pnvate life relatively free from interference.238 This 
"new social contract" helps explain the relative lack of political activity in post-1968 
Czechoslovakia.239 Secondly, a factor which helps explain the average citizen's 
adaptation to the nonnalisation of the Czechoslovak regime was "fear." In his open 
letter to Husak in April 1975, Have! suggested that people were "driven" to behave 
as they were doing so "by fear'' of unemployment, of no access to education, and of 
fmancial reversals.240 This system was further underpinned by the "ubiquitous 
omnipotent state police," whose acts of harassment against all dissidents, but 
236 See Bulletm, No 7, July 1977, London, Palach Press, pp 1-3. 
237This was due, m the mam, to easy access to VIennese radio and television broadcasts 
238B Korda, 'A decade of econmmc growth m Czechoslovalaa,' Soviet Studtes, Vol.28 No 4, October 
1976, pp 499-523. 
239V!adumr Kusm, 'Typology ofOpposillon,' Sovtet Studtes, Vol25 No 2, July 1973, pp 227-30, 
238-44. 
240for the full text of the letter, see Survev. Vol21 No 3, Summer 1975, pp.167-190. 
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especiaily those sympathising with Charter 77, served indirectly to make everyone 
aware of the consequences of non-conformity, or even simply of contact with a 
recognised political activist.24I 
In Czechoslovakia, then, during the post-1968 period of normalisation, a 
system ofloosely co-ordinated opposition irutiatives emerged that, at least in embryo, 
represented a second society, albeit at a lower level of development than that in 
Poland. In Czechoslovakia, independent groups, principaily Charter 77 and VONS, 
did succeed in establishing a limited sphere of freedom. Admittedly, the late 1980s 
did witness an increase in second society activities in response to reforms introduced 
by the CCP. Significantly, however, second society did not develop to the extent that 
it either united ail social classes against Communism or offered an alternative model 
for the fuh!re. In contrast to Romania, however, in late 1989, the formation of Civic 
Forum and Public Against Violence to lead the growing spontaneous public 
demonstrations, and the subsequent formulation of an alternative political 
prograrrune, presented the Communist regime with an organised and popular 
opposition prior to its ultimate capitulation. The establishment of the two groups 
ensured that, when the CCP relinquished power, the revolutionary momentum was 
not lost or hijacked by former Communist support struchires. In contrast to Romania, 
where the RCP security forces attempted to crush public demonstrations, the second 
society that existed in Czechoslovakia in December 1989 was sufficiently organised 
to present a force that the Communist regime could no longer repress. 
24Isee also. Anon, 'Gettmg Along m Czechoslovalaa,' New York Rev1ew, November 9 1978, pp 10-
14. And, M!lan Snnecka, 'The commumty of fear,' m H Gordon Sklllmg and V Precan ( eds.), Parallel 
Poh!!cs, op c1t, Apnll979, pp 27-30. 
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION 
THE IMPACT OF SECOND SOCIETY ON THE MODE OF BREAKDOWN? 
The review of existing regime breakdown and transitions literature revealed a 
number of areas which appeared to warrant further investigation, in addition to 
limitations in certain studies of the 1989 East European transitions. Furthermore, it 
identified a number of key questions regarding the concept of civil society and 
attempts to classifY the former Communist countries according to the form of regime 
breakdown experienced in 1989. Chapter One posed a number of questions: what is 
the constitutive role of civil society in the initial stages of transition; and does the 
level of development of this independent sphere affect the course of regime change, 
for example ? It was argued that the concept of civil society was one that would 
permit an investigation of these and related questions, and an additional line of 
analysis of the process of regime breakdown and transition to supplement existing 
theories. Furthermore, it was suggested that an important question which remained to 
be addressed related to why the European Communist regimes experienced widely 
differing modes of breakdown in 1989, and to the specific relationship between civil 
society and mdependent opposition groups to the form of change which occurred in 
individual countries. The question was posed as to whether civil society was a 
determining or peripheral factor in this respect, or one that could be used to explain 
the revolutionary divergences of 1989. 
The central purpose of this thesis, therefore, was to understand the effect of a 
domestic variable upon the mode of transition experienced in Eastern Europe at the 
end of the 1980s. Having explored the second society concept within the East 
European context, in comparing Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, analysis has 
focused on the extent to which a second society and opposition to Communism 
developed pre-1989, and the nature of that opposition to the status quo. By employing 
criteria outlined in Chapter Two, the case-study chapters identified the spheres in 
which a second society developed, and the orientation of its activities therewithin, and 
the context (the nature of the Communist regime) in which opposition emerged. 
My original hypothesis can be summarised as follows. The varying levels and 
maturity of the second societies in the case-study countries and their varying 
relationships with the state structure, had a direct impact on the mode of Communist 
regime breakdown.• The hypothesis is supported by the empirical evidence discussed 
1Matunty bemg compared on the basts of the extstence, or otherwtse, of cross-class unity in soctety, 
and the formulation of a pohtlcal alternative to Commurust rule. 
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in the case-study chapters, which clearly demonstrate that a connection between the 
two exists. For example, it has been suggested that the negotiated and protracted 
breakdown of Connnunism in Poland was, in part, directly related to the depth of 
second society development, and to the extent and nature of its opposition activities 
subsumed under the umbrella of the Solidarity trade union. More significantly, the 
fact that Solidarity was able to attract cross-class support, and to formulate a concrete 
and viable alternative policy programme to that of the PZPR, was central to the 
Party's decision to admit the banned union to roundtable negotiations in early 1989. 
In sharp contrast, a combination of factors in Romania (the nature of the 
Ceaucescu regime and the methods of repressiOn it willingly employed, combined 
with the traditional absence of mamfestations of opposition to oligarchic rule) created 
a situation m which no mark of a developed second society was evident in the late 
1980s. With no organised opposition able to spearhead a movement for reform, and 
with no coherent progranune to galvanise the opposition, manifestations of dissent 
were of an individual and ad-hoc nature, with no evidence of the existence of cross-
class national unity. The Romanian Communist regime had pursued policies that 
deeply antagonised every sector of the population, isolating itself from them, and 
therefore was dependent upon relatively high levels of repression to maintain its 
authonty over society. However, a number of mherent weaknesses of the Romanian 
system were identified throughout the case-study chapter. In 1989, the regime was, 
therefore, vulnerable to the cumulative snowballing of the anti-Connnunist movement 
throughout Eastern Europe. Breakdown was, subsequently, swift and violent, with the 
only coherent group in society possessing the necessary ability and credentials to take 
over the reins of the transition process, the former Connnunist Party Itself, re-formed 
under the banner of the National Salvation Front. It would be a mistake, however, to 
interpret the breakdown of the regime as being the consequence of second society 
activity. The demise of the Connnunist regime should be seen as following from the 
weakness of the state as opposed to the strength of second society forces. 
Czechoslovakia witnessed only a limited development of second society 
phenomena. At times, independent activity was intense, particularly within the sphere 
of independent culture, where opposition to Connnunist strictures was extensive and 
pervasive, giving rise to the Charter 77 declaration. Although its signatories 
persistently denied any political role or objectives, Charter 77 supporters were united 
into a kind of informal moral connnunity, representing a degree of independence 
---------- ---- ---------------------
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within the Czechoslovak Communist system. Generally, however, opposition to 
Communism remained isolated from a wider public, demoralised and apathetic 
following the Warsaw Pact defeat of the Prague Spring reform movement. It cannot 
be denied that the forms of autonomous activity the Charter and associated initiatives 
encouraged did effectively lay some foundations for the proliferation of mdependent 
second society organisations in late 1989, but, significantly, only after the Husak 
regime recognised the necessity for reform of the system. Regime breakdown was 
both sudden and unexpected, but unlike in Romania, was not accompanied by 
violence or serious confrontation. Furthermore, second society actors did assume a 
degree of prominence once transition was underway. The Czechoslovak revolution, 
therefore, represents an example located between the two extremes of the Polish and 
Romanian cases. 
The key research findings are presented in this concluding chapter. The 
following case-study comparisons are divided into sections. The first compares the 
historical factors that had a specific impact on the nature of the developed Communist 
regimes concerned and, in turn, on the evolution of a second society. The second 
section focuses specifically on certain aspects crucial to the full development, or 
otherwise, of a second society in the three case-study countries. For example, its 
breadth of development, the existence of a recognisable leadership, the formation of 
cross-class ties and the formulation of a coherent policy progranime will be 
considered. All these factors contributed to the mode of transition experienced in 
1989. The characteristics of the developed Communist systems, such as the degree of 
liberalisation from an orthodox Marx1st-Leninist line, the reaction of the regime to 
mounting opposition, and the impact or role of other actors such as the Roman 
Catholic Church, will be considered before an overview of the particular modes of 
breakdown experienced by the three countries in 1989. 
(6.1) Overview of Case-Study Chapters 
(6.1.1) Historical FaCtors 
The nature of the systems that evolved during the forty-five years of 
Communist rule in Eastern Europe, and of the domestic oppositions in the three case-
study countries, were conditioned by certain historical factors that cannot be ignored 
in any explanation of the impact of second society on the mode of regime breakdown 
at the end of the 1980s. In Poland, for example, a strong tradition of anti-Russianism 
dating back to the 16th century existed and was galvanised by the effective imposition 
of the Communist system in Poland between 1945-8. Combined with a religious 
homogeneity particularly evident after 1945 (something that established the Catholic 
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Church as a distinct and alternative authority within society), these two factors figure 
prominently in any analysis of the iiiegitimacy of the Communist regime in Poland, 
and also of the development of a second society there. The Church, in particular, 
cannot be omitted from any discussion of the achievements of the Polish opposition, 
especiaiiy foilowing the election of John Paul II as Pope in 1978. The fact that the 
Catholic Church supported the principal aims of the Solidarity movement and 
provided effective shelter for Its activities during the Martial Law years, is significant 
in understanding how the trade union was able to maintain itself as a viable 
alternative to the PZPR. 
In Romania, also, traditionaily strong nationalistic sentiments manifested 
themselves after 1945 in feelings of bitterness and hatred towards Soviet occupation. 
What could have served as a springboard for the growth of a popular opposition 
movement was, however, skiiifuily exploited by Communist leaders, principaily 
Ceaucescu. Consequently, there were no Soviet troops within Romania's borders, and 
the pursuit of an apparently independent foreign policy line portrayed a degree of 
sovereignty from Moscow. Such distinctly anti-Soviet nationalist policies had the 
effect of binding the state and the people in such a way that the RCP could use such 
sentiments to effectively stifle internal dissent. In the religious sphere, the presence of 
the Romanian Orthodox Church should have represented the existence of a strong, 
unified moral force at odds with Communism. In fact, throughout its history, the 
Church had never served as a focus for political action, and foiiowing the 
establishment of Communist rule in Romania, was easily subverted by the official 
regime and quickly brought under fuii control. Ultimately, the Orthodox Church 
adopted many of the same nationalist positions as the RCP and became thoroughly 
integrated into the Party-state organisation. At no time did it act as a saviour of 
independence or as a shelter for independent dissident activity, as did the Catholic 
Church in Poland. 
A tradition of deference to authority and of acceptance of foreign intervention 
and rule also played a role in queiiing discontent and preventing the development of a 
second society within Romania. A strong belief in fatalism and in the futility of 
independent thought or action contribute to an explanation of why the Romanian 
public appeared so acquiescent in the face of extreme adversity under Ceaucescu's 
rule, and why it took until December 1989 for the population to speak out against it. 
In comparison, Poland's strong tradition of conspiring against foreign rule was more 
conducive to the self-organisation of society against an imposed system of power than 
was the case in both Romania and Czechoslovakia. The country's history of 
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opposition to foreign occupation offered ready-made patterns for conspiratorial and 
anti-govermnent activity, and helped secure widespread social support for dissent. 
In Czechoslovakia, m contrast to both Poland and Romania, no traditions of 
anti-Russian or Soviet sentiment existed. The Communist system originally had a 
sizeable number of genuine supporters and was legitimately voted into government in 
1946 rather than imposed by the Soviet Red Army. Therefore, the CCP could draw on 
attitudes that were favourable towards the Soviet Union and that were supportive of 
socialism. This virtual absence of opposition to foreign occupation was not bolstered 
by any sigmficant degree of widespread nationalist sentiment or by the presence of a 
significantly independent Church Independent religious affiliation did represent a 
strong moral element in the dissident community, however, it would be an 
exaggeration to claim that it was either ready or willing to be involved in political 
activity along the lines of the Polish example. In addition, the long-standing divisions 
and inequalities between the Czech Lands and Slovakia effectively ensured that a 
national, united opposition would be virtually impossible to achieve. 
An historical factor that cannot be over-looked with regard to the particular 
evolution of a second society in Czechoslovakia is the relatively prosperous state of 
the economy compared to both Poland and Romania, particularly in the opposition's 
potentially most crucial years post-1968. The Czechoslovak economy emerged from 
World War Two the least damaged in Eastern Europe, and its ability to weather the 
impact of Stalinist economic policies, the reform era of the Prague Spring, and the 
policies of normalisation in the 1970s, ensured that economic fruits were exchanged 
for public accommodation in the political sphere. By contrast in Poland, successive 
economic crises provoked widespread working class outbursts throughout the course 
of Communist rule. The poor state of the economy was a constant against which the 
opposition could rally, and an effective foundation on which the intellectuals were 
able to base their theoretical work. Czechoslovak intellectuals, conversely, failed to 
recognise that formal organisation of the workers via independent trade unions 
represented the key to success. This is understandable, however, in a country where 
the state of the economy was not a focus for the opposition and, hence, it is hardly 
surprising that economic - and, therefore, workers' - demands were not at the 
forefront of opposition concerns. 
In Romania, like Poland, the dire state of the economy (a legacy of the 
backward state of the overwhehningly agrarian economy in 1945) especially during 
the 1970s-80s, did spawn a number of working class protests and an attempt to 
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establish an independent trade union. Both were empirical signs of discontent and a 
restive society. In contrast to Poland, however, where a growing wave of protest 
attracted the support of the intellectuals and led to the formation of Solidanty, as a 
consequence of the specific tactics employed by the Romanian Communist regime 
against any manifestation of opposition, and an inherent ability to get by in the face of 
adversity, the economic and political demands frequently made by Poland's workers 
were not uttered in Romania. A long-standing tradition of solving problems on an 
individual or familial basis, not collectively, made it more difficult to mobilise large 
numbers to achieve long-term social goals. Consequently, the average Romanian's 
success in getting by prevented them from turning such as a meat shortage into a 
social movement. 
One further factor does deserve mention here. Whilst the Polish population 
was united, firstly, in religious terms and, secondly, by nationalist anti-Russian 
sentiments; and the Romanian people also (although not with the same effect) by a 
strong sense of Romanian natiOnalism, in Czechoslovakia, the fact that the population 
was divided between Czechs and Slovaks undoubtedly had a restraining effect on the 
development of second society there. With divergent histories, and political and 
cultural traditions, the lack of umty between the two nations was evident prior to 
World War Two and increasingly noticeable after 1945. Significantly, crucial 
differences could be identified in the differing objectives of indigenous opposition. In 
the Czech Lands, for example, dissent was based on moral principles and dissidents 
campaigned for human and civil rights within a freer cultural atmosphere. In 
Slovakia, the principal aim was the attaiument of a greater degree of autonomy within 
the federal structure, an objective that predated the Communist period. This became 
particularly significant post-1968 when, having had their nationalist aspirations to an 
extent fulfilled by the reform of the federal structure effective on January 1st 1969, 
most Slovaks appeared to have made their peace with the Communist regime and 
were relatively content to enjoy the material rewards offered in return for political 
acquiescence. 
(6.1.2) The Second Soc1ety -Level of Development 
It has been evident in the preceding case-study chapters that the level of 
development of second society varied considerably from one country to another, and 
from one period in time to the next. A "fully developed" second society had the 
potential to include a predominantly illegal second economy; a public adherence to 
Marxism-Leninism countered by a tendency towards the development of a second 
social consciousness; an alternative political culture, and the re-emergence of 
--------------- -- --------------------------
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horizontal social networks and communities; and the existence of a dominant 
independent Church. Chapter II outlined specific criteria with which to measure the 
extent of development of second society within the case study countries, including 
factors such as the level of samizdat publishing, the emergence of independent 
education networks and the existence of independent groups and their particular 
orientations. 
Poland, although always constituting a special case within Eastern Europe 
due, pnncipally, to the status and strength of the Roman Catholic Church, fostered 
the almost complete development of a second society, to the extent that it operated 
alongside, as opposed to within, the official Communist regime. In the 1980s, 
independent activity could be witnessed in the economic, cultural, educational and 
political spheres. Polish ideas of the "social self-organisation" of society in 
opposition to the official regime mushroomed as a result of the formation ofKOR in 
1976. This effectively set in motion a process of organised collective opposition that 
although hampered by the imposition of Martial Law in December 1981, manifested 
itself most visibly in a wide variety of independent groups and organisations in 
society. 
In addition, independent publishing in samizdat journals was widespread. 
Leaflets, banners, flags and badges, libraries of forbidden books and independent 
publications were printed throughout the period of Solidarity's existence, all of which 
contributed to the creation of an all-encompassing alternative culture. In the belief 
that new independent groups would form around samizdat publications, the expansion 
of independent publishing was actively encouraged, and succeeded in breakmg the 
Communist monopoly of information. Independent education, synonymous with TKN 
also proved so popular that it acquired a degree of regulation and formalisation, and 
ultimately developed to the extent that an independent "National Education Council" 
was able to publish its own textbooks. In addition, the Polish opposition was a 
nursery for developing new social elites that, without doubt, influenced events in 
Poland. In particular, the fact that Lech Walesa was recognised as Solidarity's and 
second society's leader ensured that, during negotiations in early 1989, an opposition 
leadership experienced in negotiation tactics and processes, was not only readily 
identifiable, but was also one experienced in independent self-organisatiOn and 
political confrontation. 
In Czechoslovakia, also, second society was relatively well-articulated, but, 
significantly, only in the cultural sphere. The formation of Charter 77, and the 
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subsequent creation ofVONS, did act as a stimulus to independent thought and action 
outside official structures. The emergence of samizdat publications, for example, is 
notable for its scope; attempts to promulgate a form of independent scholarship d1d 
attract a notable number of adherents; and the activities of such groups as the semi-
official Jazz Section did succeed in creating a kind of independent social community. 
In stnkmg contrast to the Polish scene, however, in spite of efforts to broaden the 
number and the scope of such independent initiatives, no organised political 
groupmgs or parties were formed. Although Charter 77 served as a distinct rallying-
point, the perpetuation of its moral stance as opposed to one founded on political or 
systemic change, ultimately limited the development of second society. It would, 
therefore, be accurate to cite the existence of an extensive cultural underground, 
incorporating a system of parallel information, culture, scholarship and legal aid, 
however, the extent to which a second society existed must be called into question. 
This point is supported by Vaclav Have! who referred to the use of the term 
"independent society" with regard to the Czechoslovak opposition as inappropriate. It 
is significant also that other Czech theorists coined the term polis - commumty - to 
delineate the parameters of opposition development in Czechoslovakia 2 
It would also be true to state that in every sphere of opposition activity, the 
successes of the Czechoslovak dissidents were of a less concrete nature than those of 
their Polish counterparts. In Poland, in the sphere of samizdat publications, for 
example, the entire exercise of independent publishing had become so entrenched in 
the life of society by the early to mid-1980s, that samizdat was sold openly on the 
streets; printing methods were technically advanced and the survival of independent 
journals, even under the restrictions of Martial Law, began to have a direct impact on 
the quality and content of official newspapers. In Czechoslovakia, although the sphere 
of culture was the one in which second society was the most articulate, the 
combination of an inability to overcome technical printing and distribution 
difficulties, and an apparent ignorance of the issues with which the majority of the 
people were predominantly concerned, persistently hampered any attempts to 
effectively establish samizdat publications as a permanent aspect of Czechoslovak 
life. Whilst the Communist authorities in Poland necessarily had to accept this sphere 
of independence, in Czechoslovakia, the regime was able to effectively thwart the 
attempts of oppositionists to build a second society based upon the wide circulation of 
samizdat material. 
2V.Havel, 'The Power of the Powerless,' m· V.Havel et al, The Power of the Powerless, 1985 London, 
Palach Press, p. 79 
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The Romania case study highlighted the limited nature of second society 
phenomena. Admittedly, the literary world did produce some examples of 
independent writings and in the sphere of religion expressions of dissent did emanate 
from zndzvidual clergymen. Inspired by the formation of Charter 77 in 
Czechoslovakia, the prominent dissident writer Paul Goma attempted to form 
Romania's first human rights committee and, notably, a free trade union (SLOMR) 
was founded in 1979 with a distinctly political programme twelve months prior to 
Similar events in Poland. In the economic sphere, activities of an informal or 
unofficial nature could be identified on a relatively wide scale however, they failed to 
develop any degree of regularity or formalisation. 
Overall, the second society that existed in Romania in 1989 lacked any 
organisational basis, with long term collective action both minimal and scarce. Any 
open manifestations of dissent were spor~dic and occurred on an individual, 
pragmatic basis. No attempt was made to launch any form of independent 
scholarship; very little independent writmg was circulated in the form of samizdat; 
and, it is significant that, in the 1980s, emigration became the most common form of 
opposition. It is also significant that society-wide organisations and social movements 
were established only after Ceaucescu had been toppled from power, with the NSF, 
having secured the support of the armed forces, dominated by the only coherent and 
united group in society, the Communists. 
(6.1.3) Recognisable and Coherent Leadership 
A further factor that distinguishes both Poland and Czechoslovakia from 
Romania is that in the former two countries the opposition of a second society was 
spearheaded by a particular and identifiable movement. In Poland, the Solidarity trade 
union that, at its height, claimed a membership of over ten million symbolised 
society's attempts to oppose the Communist system and formed the basis for action 
throughout the 1980s. In early 1989, it was Solidarity (along with the Catholic 
Church) that was invited by the regime to enter roundtable negotiations. In 
Czechoslovakia, Charter 77 spokesmen and signatories became the figurehead for the 
Czechoslovak population's efforts "to live in truth," and were fundamental to the 
formation of Civic Forum in late November 1989, responsible for the formulation of a 
new democratic programme for Czechoslovakia in the wake of mass public 
demonstrations and the CCP's effective withdrawal from political power. 
- -- -------------------------
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In both countries, also, an individual or group leadership was clearly 
identifiable. In Poland, Lech Walesa was synonymous with twenty years of working 
class opposition to the Communist regime, and photographs of him signing the 
Gdansk Agreement in August 1980 gave hope to underground dissidents during the 
years of his house arrest and Martial Law. In Czechoslovakia, although never 
formally appointed or elected as leader of Charter 77, Vaclav Have! was considered 
by the Charter's sympathisers to be the country's spintual leader and, certainly, his 
many arrests, detentions and trials became symbolic rallying-points for the 
Czechoslovak opposition in the early 1980s. However, in Romania, by contrast, the 
harsh rule of the Ceaucescu regime meant that independent activity was limited to 
small groups of perhaps five to ten like-minded indJ.viduals, and to private 
declarations of opposition. The second society that existed in Romania lacked any 
form of organisation and no single person or group could be identified as leading 
Romanian opposition. Even if Ceaucescu's regime had seen negotiation as the only 
means of survival in December 1989, there would have been no formal opposition 
with which to negotiate. 
The nature of the particular movement in each country also deserves mention 
here. For example, in 1980-81, Solidarity had a relatively well organised and 
delineated organisational structure, an identifiable leader and a coherent programme. 
Even during the underground years of the Martial Law period, many of Solidarity's 
established structures continued to function, albeit haphazardly. By contrast, Charter 
77 generally operated, not as an organisation per se, but rather with up to a thousand 
sympathetic signatories to a common set of ideals. Whereas the Charter had no 
organisational structure, no statutes, membership regulations or fees, members of the 
Solidarity Union applied for membership and paid annual dues. One could conclude, 
therefore, that the latter's commitinent to the opposition cause was more formal, 
committed and regulated, than was membership of Charter 77. The latter demanded 
only a signature accepting the Charter's pronounced moral principles and a decision 
"to live within the truth." This is not to underplay the level of commitment or the 
risks taken by the Charter's signatories, which were undoubtedly immense. Rather, it 
is to say that support for the more emotional entity represented by Charter 77 lessened 
the credibility of the opposition as both a viable alternative to Communist rule and a 
potential negotiating partuer, and its ability to mobilise support for dissident activity 
in an effective and coherent manner. In addition, as a predommantly working class 
movement, Solidarity's "damage potential," in a workers' state was far higher than 
the strivings for a few hundred middle class intellectuals "to live a life in truth" in 
Czechoslovakia. 
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(6 1 4) Cross-Class Appeal and Directional Programme 
In Chapter 11, I posed the question of whether the key to appositional success 
within the political sphere was the formulation of a coherent political progranune that 
presented a viable alternative to Communist rnle, once intellectual dissidents had 
recognised the necessity of cross-class coalitions in order to unite their efforts with 
those of the wider society. The first point, here, is the recognition of the necessity of 
any opposition movement to appeal to all sectors of society. Opposition from an 
isolated class was easily dealt with by the Communist regimes. Workers had 
persistently expressed their opposition and discontent throughout Eastern Europe (in 
Poland m 1956, 1970 and 1976, for example) yet, on the whole, their efforts were 
inarticulate, unorganised and lacked a coherent set of goals. They were, therefore, 
swiftly suppressed by the incumbent regimes. More significantly, workers' actions 
had generally presented no appeal or opening to the intellectuals. Similarly, in 1968, 
waves of student and intellectual unrest across Eastern Europe demanded freer 
political and cultural environments, but had nothing in common with the 
predominantly economic concerns of the workers. 
In Poland in 1976, however, the formation ofKOR raised the possibility of a 
significant change in the accepted pattern of repression-opposition-reform-repression 
to-date. The creation of this bridge between the workers and intellectuals reflected the 
theoretical reassessment of the paths to, and the potential for, political change in 
Poland by leading opposition theorists, such as Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron. 
Despite the fact that KOR remained an organisation of intellectuals who had united to 
defend the interests of workers, the intellectuals had recognised the significance of 
joint action, and society as a whole could, then, effectively work towards the 
presentation of a united front of opposition to the Communist regime. The appeal of 
Solidarity to all sections of society is demonstrated by the subsequent formation of 
Rural Solidarity, the establishment of a Student Solidarity Committee, the continuing 
work of the TKN, and the proliferation of women's and enviromnental groups 
spawned by the success of the trade union. 
This Polish situation was unique in Eastern Europe at the time, both with 
regard to the level of dissenting opmion within society, and to the degree to which it 
provided evidence of cross-class unity. In Czechoslovakia, by contrast, Charter 77 
failed to develop its appeal beyond the intellectual and cultural realms, and exerted 
little or no influence over the mass of the population. The reason for this was that the 
Charter lacked (and failed to develop) an issue broad enough to galvanise other 
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groups. On the one hand, this was a reflection of the Charter's primarily moral 
principles. The call for individuals to create a just society via a "life in truth," could 
only appeal to an individual's sense of injustice and not to the people en masse. On 
the other, it reflected the fact that, although like KOR and Solidanty in Poland, 
Charter 77 did succeed in stimulating independent initiatives which went far beyond 
the achievements of Romania, the mainstream of Czechoslovak dissent was not 
reinforced by a strong independent movement of protest among either the workers, 
the peasants or the students. Furthermore, support for Charter 77 and related 
initiatives was not supplemented by powerful religious or nationalist-inspired 
movements, with its principal weakness with regard to any attempt to forge a national 
umty being the almost complete absence of support in Slovakia. From early 1978 
onward, the Chartists themselves were aware of their relative isolation from the 
public. Where the intellectual-led human rights movement in Poland was able to 
contribute to a favourable atmosphere for the demands of workers to be heard and 
acted upon, the relative weakness of Charter 77 was strikingly revealed by the general 
acquiescence of the population, and the complete absence of cross-class solidarity in 
society. 
In Romania, there were manifestations of both intellectual and worker 
opposition but, significantly, in characteristically differing and isolated forms. In 
Romania, virtually no historical precedent existed for co-operation between the 'two 
classes. When combined With the particular methods employed by Ceaucescu and the 
Communist regime to intimidate and isolate protest, the chances that repressive 
policies would generate a mass reaction, or that intellectual dissidents would organise 
effectively to press for an anmesty for persecuted workers were slim. In 
Czechoslovakia, intellectuals had theoretically recognised the centrality of societal 
umty for the success of the opposition but had failed to act upon It; in Poland, action 
had followed rhetonc. Only in Romania, was there a total absence of a cross-class 
coalition in both theory and reality. Nationalistic sentiments which could have formed 
the basis of an opposition-movement across societY were directed primarily against -
the Hungarian minorities within Romania and manipulated to serve the ends of the 
regime Itself. The complete subservience of the Romanian Orthodox Church further 
reduced the possibility of success for any opposition. 
A further important function fulfilled by the Polish opposition was its 
formulation of a viable alternative programme, something that represented an 
effective challenge to the political power monopoly of the PZPR. In this study, I have 
argned that the second society in the case-study countries assumed greater 
-------- - --
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significance once dissident intellectuals were able to put forward a critical theory that, 
in turn, offered a programme and direction to working class movements. In August 
1980, striking Polish workers, with the aid of the intellectual-based Committee of 
Experts, broadened their demands from economic issues, to place a more significant 
emphasis on the need to alter political relations within the Communist system. With 
the signing of the Gdansk Agreement, the Polish working class combined with the 
politically-activated intellectuals were responsible for the articulation of distinct 
political and economic alternatives. Confronted by a formidable and consolidated 
social movement, in particular, and a re-emerging second society more generally, the 
PZPR was compelled to respond and to recognise the existence of a body that would 
operate in the pubhc sphere outside the direct control of the Party and state. 
In 1980, the independence of the opposition had been acknowledged, but, 
significantly, withzn the existing system of power relations. At that time, this was 
accepted as a sufficient victory by the Solidarity-led opposition. Subsequent to its first 
National Congress in 1981, however, and in reaction to the imposition of Martial Law 
in Poland, the opposition graduated to demands and policy programmes premised on 
the replacement of the prevailing system with a democratically-oriented one. By the 
end of 1982, Solidarity had formulated a coherent and comprehensive policy 
programme that challenged the Communist regime with a viable alternative and a 
specific strategy aimed at combating the constraints of Martial Law. In so doing, the 
opposition not only gained a degree of credibility and therefore support from the 
general public, but it was also able, even after seven years of underground activity, to 
present itself to the Communist authorities as a "force to be reckoned with" as the 
economy took a further down-turn, and General Jaruzelski recognised the need for a 
degree of compromise in early 1988. 
From the outset, by contrast, the opposition in Czechoslovakia lacked a 
coherent programme. A dominant theme in Charter 77's founding declaration was its 
denial that it intended to offer a basis for political opposition. The Charter's 
subsequent pursuit of a constructive dialogue with the state is significant for its clear 
demonstration of the Chartists apparent willmgness to operate within the existing 
legal and political framework rather than a reformed alternative. This contributes to 
an explanation of why the Charter as a potential mass movement failed to encourage 
the extent or breadth of development of a second society that was achieved by 
Solidarity in Poland. Although later discussions focused on the need to broaden 
actiVIty and appeal principally within the political sphere, action remained at the level 
of theory only, and the Charter failed to propose a viable programme that would have 
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attracted a mass following. Admittedly, Charter 77 did promote and encourage the 
establishment of parallel structures challenging the claims of the system to control 
every sphere of existence. What such civic initiatives did not represent, however, was 
a definite attempt to formulate and establish an alternative to the Communist system 
of rule and, therefore, an attempt to change the system from below, driven by the 
forces of a second society. 
Briefly, then, in Poland we can talk of a second society representing a mature 
system of well-developed parallel structures and organisations that implicitly 
constituted a kind of alternative political system challenging the official power 
structure and which, by the early 1980s, was as much of a political reality as the 
official system. In Poland, by 1981, it had become clear that the second society was 
not isolated from the wider society, and it was increasingly apparent that it was this 
sector that expressed the real needs of society, addressing the genume issues and 
seeking to formulate practical solutions. In Czechoslovakia, however, there existed a 
second society perhaps better described as a second community, in which dissidents 
adamantly refused and denied political involvement or objectives, and which fell far 
short of offering an alternative model for the future. Independent activities 
promulgated by Charter 77 were generally isolated from the population. 
Romania, again, provides us with the complete exception. The second society 
that existed in Romania lacked any form of organisational basis, social movements 
forming distinct political opposition groups only after the events of December 1989. 
Manifestations of dissident opposition were, at all times, isolated from the mass of the 
population, and vice versa. One of the most important distinguishing factors of the 
1989 Romanian events, therefore, is that, through its inability to formulate and 
develop a society-wide alternative, the Romanian opposition was unable to portray 
itself as either a force that the Communist regime could not ignore (as in 
Czechoslovakia) or "do without" (P{)land). Furthermore, due to the absence of well-
established and extensive second society institutions and practices, the Romanian 
opposition failed to develop a viable alternative progranune and was unable to portray 
itself as a "government-in-waiting" to the CCP. 
(6.1.5) Nature of the Developed Commumst Regime- Reaction to Opposztion 
The impact of second society on the mode of regime breakdown experienced 
in 1989 cannot be fully understood without due consideration of the ways in which 
the Communist leaderships responded to any manifestation of opposition to the 
------------ - - -- ----------------------------, 
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system of rule in the three case-study countries. The nature of" developed socialism" 
in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania also needs to be taken into account. 
In Romania, for example, Communist politics were dominated from 1965 to 
1989 by Ceaucescu and his personal entourage, a state of affairs that was unique in 
Eastern Europe. The system was arguably the most orthodox of the East European 
Communist regimes. An early pretence at liberalisation had been replaced by an era 
of extreme Stalinist-inspired reforms in the political, cultural and economic spheres, 
underpinned by an active Securitate that swore allegiance to Ceaucescu personally, 
not the state. 
In Czechoslovakia, also, the system experienced little in the way of de-
Stalinisation in the late 1950s, which had a significant impact on the development of 
opposition to Communism. Starting from a higher level of economic development in 
1945, for example, the impact of Stalinist economic policies had not been so severe as 
in Poland by the mid-1950s. In turn, this meant that economic discontent (one of the 
pnmary motivating factors behind the Polish workers' riots in 1956) was not as 
pervasive in Czechoslovakia. Thus, whilst benefiting from a relatively satisfied 
working class and a still loyal intelligentsia, the CCP saw no justification for the need 
to reform. Admittedly, during the Prague Spring era and in response to a marked 
slowdown of the economy, the Communist leadership did attempt to introduce a 
package of popularly-supported reforms that would have fundamentally altered the 
nature of the state-society relationship in all realms. During the normalisation era of 
Czechoslovak politics that followed, however, all liberalisation reforms were either 
halted or reversed (the only one to survive being that relating to federalism) to be 
replaced by a Communist system somewhat reminiscent of that under Stalin. 
Wrdespread political purges of the Party and society ensured that all traces of 1960s 
reformism were removed. 
In contrast to both- Romania and Czechoslovakia, although operating within 
the restrictions of Martial Law in the early 1980s, in Poland, the population lived in a 
relatively liberal Communist system. Although the reforms conceded following each 
manifestation of discontent were gradually rescinded over time, an economy in a state 
of near constant crisis combined with a citizenry increasingly willing (and able during 
the years of Solidarity's exrstence) to protest, forced the PZPR to admit that a degree 
of economic reform and cultural relaxation were essential for the survival of the 
Communist regime, particularly in the mid to late 1980s. 
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It is also significant that the manner in which the Polish authorities responded 
to, and dealt with dissent differed considerably from Czechoslovakia and Romania. In 
the latter two countries, a combination of tactics ensured that opposition failed to gain 
widespread sympathy or support. In Czechoslovakia, the levels of repression 
employed by the regime after 1968 served to convince a large part of the population 
that the potential cost of opposition was too high a price to pay, especially when 
normalisation also provided higher standards of hving than had previously been 
experienced. Those that did speak out found themselves the victim of police 
harassment, arrest and imprisonment. In Romania, also, the manner in which 
Ceaucescu dealt with any dissent severely hampered the prospects for the 
development of a society-wide opposition movement. For example, a strategy of 
"removing" a dissenter from society (generally via encouraged emigration as in the 
case of dissident writer, Paul Goma or forcible psychiatric detentions) before his 
concerns could be made pubhc, was employed frequently throughout the 1970s and 
1980s. It is significant that, in Romania, during the Communist period there were no 
trials of opposition activists, which would only have served to broadcast the existence 
of opposition to Ceaucescu. Similarly, no reports of such events as the 1977 Jiu 
Valley strikes ever appeared in the country's media, so that very few Romanians were 
ever aware of the existence of opposition activity. It is perhaps indicative that, in both 
countries, the most common and widespread form of dissent during the 1970s-80s 
was mass emigration. Those who felt they could no longer tolerate the constraints of 
the prevailing systems felt more inclmed to leave the country than to attempt to 
oppose the Communist Party. 
In Poland, by contrast, the PZPR faced successive outbursts of discontent in a 
society inclined towards self-organisation even in the early stages of Communist rule. 
Concessions, particularly in the economic sphere, were granted without the resort to 
harsh repressive measures and wide scale arrests characteristic of Romania and 
Czechoslovakia. At first glance, it may appear that the imposition of Martial Law in 
December 1981 was the ultimate in repression, and a certain end to the independence 
of second society. Martial Law, however, imposed a state of war on soczety. By 
effectively declaring war on an entire population, the policy ensured that any response 
to it would be made by soczety. It therefore served to reinforce the unity of the Polish 
people and increased their determination to ensure that the recently legalised 
Solidarity would survive all attempts to crush it. The house arrest of Lech Walesa 
transformed lnm from the leader of a ten million strong union into a national martyr. 
Admittedly, the PZPR did resort to pohcies of intimidation and harassment ofleading 
Solidarity activists. However, because of the numerical strength of the Union and the 
----------------------- ------------------------------------------------------
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increasing sophistication of its orgarusational structure and methods of opposition, 
even a declared state of war could not thwart public efforts to entrench independence 
more deeply in the life of society. 
(6.1.6) Mode of Breakdown 
In Chapter I, the question was posed as to whether there was a scale that could 
be employed to categorise second society activities, ranging from unorganised 
opposition to the creation of a developed alternative society that determined the mode 
of regime breakdown experienced. The case-study countries were selected as 
representing three differing modes of change along a single continuum. Utilising the 
axes outlined m Chapter 11, the initial country selection and the subsequent 
conclusions of this thesis are portrayed in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1 Second Society and Modes of Regime Breakdown in 1989 
The Romanian case study chapter classified the mode of regime breakdown in 
1989 as fallmg between the categories of revolution and coup. In December 1989, the 
Romanian people acted spontaneously to the authorities' attempts to deport a 
Hungman pastor, buoyed up by the recent events in neighbouring Communist 
countries, yet without intellectual or independent leadership. In contrast to Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, the Romanian revolution was not led by an opposition movement 
with a coherent political platform. As a direct consequence of the under-development 
of second society and the absence of any viable alternative, the only coherent group 
capable of assuming leadership of the unplauned popular uprisings in late December, 
was the NSF. Composed of former Communists, it was the only group in society that 
knew how the political system operated and that was sufficiently organised to portray 
a sense of unity and purpose. In addition, the lack of restraint that would have been 
imposed by the moderatmg forces of a second society resulted in high levels of 
accompanying violence. With the assumption of power by the NSF it appeared that 
there had been a clear break with "Ceausescuism," but not necessarily from 
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Communism. The Romanian revolution, therefore, demonstrates characteristics of 
both the revolution and coup modes of breakdown. Significantly, second society 
actors were virtually absent until much later in the process of transition. 
At the other extreme, the mode of breakdown experienced by the Communist 
regime in Poland displayed characteristics associated with the opposztion-led 
negotiation and extrication models. The end of Communist rule in Poland represented 
a peaceful break with the past, with the PZPR effectively negotiatmg itself out of 
power. With Jaruzelski's recognition that the prevailing economic crisis required an 
accommodation with the banned Solidarity trade union and the latter's subsequent 
admission to a ~eries of roundtable talks, the PZPR not only sealed its own fate, but, 
more significantly, formally recognised Solidarity as a prospective political partner. 
Thus, despite the relative fragmentation of second society forces dunng the 1980s, 
and the existence of a Communist govermnent attempting to reform the economy and 
modifY the political system, the opposition had maintained itself as a real actor in 
public life. 
For the Communist system to have remained intact, the PZPR would have had 
to regain control of the public sphere and suppress all independent social ties. 
However, by 1989, the Party recognised that independence was too deeply entrenched 
within the Polish scene to be eradicated. Thus, the 1988-89 roundtable negotiations 
marked the end of a political cycle that began in August 1980. By 1989, second 
society, spearheaded by Solidarity, represented a popularly supported and, therefore, 
legitimate alternative to the Communist system of rule, with the necessary 
organisational infrastructure and political experience on which to build. The 
breakdown, itself, was therefore both gradual and peaceful, with second society actors 
eo-opted at an early stage of structural change. 
The Czechoslovak case study demonstrated that the mode of breakdown 
experienced by the CCP fell between the collapse and elite-led negotiation models. In 
Czechoslovakia, it is significant that, in November 1989, Charter 77, the Civic Forum 
and Public Against Violence reacted to mass demonstrations, and thereby took 
advantage of a situation for which they were not specifically responsible. It cannot be 
denied that, in late 1988, Charter policies had broadened into the political sphere to 
include demands for overtly democratic freedoms. Yet, in mid-1989, Charter 77 
continued to demonstrate its Jack of effective leadership of society, as spokesmen 
again disagreed over relevant tactics. The mass, student-led demonstrations that 
occurred in mid-November should be seen more as a reaction to the increasingly 
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obvious exhaustion of the Communist regime and a generally more relaxed 
atmosphere throughout the country and the Communist bloc as a whole, rather than 
an indication of the development and growing strength of second society. However, in 
contrast to Romania, where thousands of people on the streets failed to promote the 
establishment of an independent movement to lead the calls for reform, in 
Czechoslovakia, once it had become evident that the Communist Party had no 
effective means with which to combat this particular wave of public demonstrations, 
the formation of Civic Forum and its Slovak counterpart heralded a new stage in the 
evolution of the Czechoslovak opposition. This factor had a direct impact on the 
particular mode of breakdown experienced by the Communist regime. 
For the first time, the expansion of second society in late 1989 to encompass 
all significant groups within society effectively forged a sense of cross-class unity 
against the system. Consequently, the end of Czechoslovak Communism was both 
peaceful and, to a degree, negotiated between the incumbent CCP and a strengthening 
second society. The distinguishing factor between the Polish and Czechoslovak 
revolutions, however, is that, m the former, where the existence of a well-developed 
second society could not be derued, Solidarity was admitted to the negotiations which 
controlled the pace and extent of change and was acknowledged by the PZPR as a 
political partner at the outset. In tins respect, the Polish transition is characteristic of 
one variant of negotiated breakdowns, that is, opposztion-led negotiations. By 
contrast, in Czechoslovakia, Civic Forum and Public Against Violence effectively 
reacted to mass demonstrations and the inability of the CCP to retain its power 
monopoly and achieved a degree of prominence in the period of transition only, once 
they had been eo-opted by the incumbent elite and once actual breakdown was secure. 
Therefore, the breakdown of the Czechoslovak Communist regime resembles the 
second variant, that is, elite-led negotzatzons. 
(6 2) Concludmg Remarks 
This thesis has- aiialysed the relationship between the nature and extent of 
development of a second society in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania and the 
form of regime breakdown expenenced in the three countries in 1989. It has 
examined variations in the levels of development, and in the orientations of second 
society actors, in addition to the differing reactions of the Communist regimes to 
societal independence. The three case-study chapters clearly illustrate that where the 
second society was effectively fully developed, as in Poland, breakdown was gradual 
and negotiated with second society actors playing a central role in the process. Where 
second society was virtually non-existent (Romania) the process, by contrast, was 
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swift and violent as independent groups played little or no role until after the 
breakdown of the Communist regime. Czechoslovakia represents an example that can 
be located between these two extremes. The case-study comparisons, therefore, pomt 
to the primacy of second society in determining the mode of regime breakdown m 
Communist Europe m 1989. 
Although the analysis may be criticised for its concentration on one aspect of 
transition, the principal objective of this thesis was to evaluate the relationship 
between second society and the form of system change. It did not set out to provide 
an exhaustive account of regime transition or the process of democratisation. 
Moreover, the role of second society in determming the mode of regtme breakdown 
clearly emerges from the analysis in this thesis and, therefore, justifies a focus on the 
concept. The findings of this study could also have wider significance for any analysis 
of the process of transition post-1989 within the former Communist bloc. The relative 
extent and degree of maturity of second society in 1989 is one of the central 
explanatory factors for an understanding of how the process of democratisation has 
proceeded, and for the prospects of consolidation and persistence of the new political 
systems in the late 1990s and beyond. Arguably, Poland's experiences of social self-
organisation and of democratic procedures within independent groups have meant that 
the transition to democracy has been relatively smooth, and the transformation of the 
system virtually complete. In Romania, by contrast, where democratic processes and 
practices were not familiar to the population, due in part to the lack of independent 
activity throughout the period of Communist rule, the process of institution and civil 
society building simultaneous to the construction of a new political system, has 
undoubtedly hampered the transition to democracy. Although outside the limits of 
this thesis, the research conducted on second society and the form of Communist 
regime breakdown in 1989 does permit reflection on these and related questions. 
More significantly, however, by focusing on, and comparing the link between, 
- -
the extent of development of second society and the mode of Communism's 
breakdown in individual countries, the thesis contributes to the debate on transitions 
and provides an additional line of enquiry to supplement existing theory on regime 
breakdown. The thesis has addressed some of the limitations identified in the current 
academic literature. Having argued, for example, that" snapshot analysis"' is limited 
3 For examples of what I term" snapshot analysis," see: A Arato, 'Civil Society Agamst the State: 
Poland 1980-81,' Telos, Part 47, Spnng 1981, pp 23-47; and P.Gnlh di Cortona, 'From Commumsm 
to Democracy· Rethmkmg Regune Change m Hungary and Czechoslovakia,' InternatiOnal Social 
Science Journal. No.128, May 1991, pp 315-330 
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in Its contribution to an understanding of the long-term Impact of independent 
activity, via a systematic analysis of the continuity of second society as a concept, the 
thesis has demonstrated its explanatory relevance with regard to Eastern Europe. In so 
doing, it has focused on a factor that has been under-played to-date, and provides an 
analysis to supplement explanations based on economic, political leadership and 
military factors! Comparative approaches have featured prominently in the general 
study of democratic transitions/ particularly as these have tended to involve more or 
less simultaneous transitions within certain regions. The aim in this thesis has been to 
bring a comparative perspective to bear in order to provide new insight into the 
dynamics of the disintegration of the Communist order, and to supplement existmg 
comparative transitions literature via the formulation of an alternative theory of 
breakdown. 
4 For representattve examples of these studies, see. S M L!pset et a!, 'A Comparative Analysis of the 
Social Requisites of Democracy,' Internattonal Social Science Journal. No.\36, 1993; J Lmz, 
'Transi!ions to Democracy,' Washmgton Quarterly, Sununer 1990, pp 143-164; and P Schnntter, 'The 
Internattonal Context of Contemporary Democrattsatton,' Stanford Journal of International Affairs, 
Vol2, 1993, pp.l-34. 
5 T Lynn Karl and P Schnntter, 'Modes ofTransitton m Lattn Amenca, Southern and Eastern Europe,' 
Internattonal Social Science Journal. No.\28, 1991, p 269, and D Share, 'Transittons to Democracy 
and Transitton Through Transactton,' Comparattve Pohttcal Studies, Voll9 No 4, January 1987, 
p525. 
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